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This dissertation examines, by means of a critical case-study, how the notion of 
equality is currently interpreted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and how 
it might be interpreted in the future. 
 
It is well-known that the ECJ takes an Aristotelian, comparator-based approach 
to equality, seeking to ensure that “likes” are treated in like fashion, and “unlikes” 
in unlike fashion.  That this approach has produced inconsistent and 
unpredictable decisions has been discussed at length in the existing academic 
literature.  However, there have been few proposals for an alternative approach.  
The dissertation will attempt to bridge this gap, by suggesting that Michael 
Walzer’s theory of “complex equality” might be employed by the Court to 
achieve better, clearer, or more predictable outcomes. 
 
The first part of the dissertation consists of a short introduction and then a brief 
review of the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of equality in abstracto.  
These are followed by a more detailed description of Walzer’s theory.  It is 
explained how the theory divides social goods into a series of distributive 
spheres, and how, by ensuring the autonomy of each of these spheres, Walzer 
attempts to make certain that no member of a society can unduly monopolize 
that society’s commodities.   
 
The second part of the dissertation is the critical case-study, which consists of 
four chapters.  The first three of these consider the major “suspect” grounds, 
discrimination upon which is prohibited by EU law; these are gender, nationality 
and the so-called “Article 13 grounds” (race, religion, age, disability and sexual 
orientation).  The fourth chapter looks at semi-suspect and non-suspect 
grounds.  In each section, a sample of the ECJ’s case-law is analysed in the 
light of, firstly, Aristotelian equality, and secondly, complex equality. 
 
The third part of the dissertation provides an opportunity to reflect upon some of 
the common themes emerging from the case-law, and to weigh up the 
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1.1. Thesis  
 
Michael Walzer’s theory of complex equality could be used by the European 
Court of Justice when dealing with cases concerning equality, as a complement 
to the Aristotelian “test” that likes should be treated in like fashion and unlikes in 
unlike fashion. 
 
1.2. The trouble with Aristotle: A précis 
 
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle declared: 
 
“[T]he origin of quarrels and complaints [is] when either equals have and 
are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares.”1 
 
Many courts of law around the world have adopted this principle, or at any rate 
its underlying logic, in dealing with present-day “quarrels and complaints”.  The 
principle is usually restated in a slightly elongated form, such as: 
 
“[C]omparable situations must not be treated differently and different 
situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is 
objectively justified”.2 
 
The European Court of Justice, from a judgment of which this version is taken, 
usually refers to this as Community law’s “general principle of equality” which is 
used by the Court (inter alia) to review national rules which fall within the scope 
of the EC Treaty.3  However, in the fifty years since the general principle was 
                                                 
1 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (OUP, Oxford 1980), trans. WD Ross, 112 (Book V, Chapter 
3).  He made the same point (although sometimes with different wording) on other occasions.   
2 This exact wording taken from Case C-56/94 SCAC Srl v Associazione dei Produttori 
Ortofrutticoli [1995] ECR I-1769, para. 27. 
3 Equality’s original role in EU law was as a driver for market integration.  More recently, 
equality has been set free from the purely economic concerns of the single market to develop 
into a free-standing, autonomous fundamental right.  This process has been described fully in 
other works.  See N Bernard, “What are the purposes of EC discrimination law?” in J Dine and B 
Watt (eds), Discrimination Law: Concepts, Limitations and Justifications (Longman, London and 
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first invoked4, the ECJ’s handling, or indeed mishandling, of it has provoked 
confusion among practitioners, dismay among litigants, and quite often anger 
among critics. 
 
It must be stressed at the outset that it is not the intention of this dissertation to 
repeat work already done by others.  The critique of Aristotle, the test named 
after him, and the myriad problems which its use has caused and continues to 
cause in equality litigation at the ECJ (and other courts), has been prolonged 
and thorough; there is little or nothing to add.5  The failure or at least partial 
failure of Aristotle’s like-for-like test is almost universally acknowledged, and its 
flaws and inconsistencies need only the briefest summary here. 
 
In the field of gender discrimination, for example, two situations have been 
regarded as both comparable and different from one case to the next.6  
                                                                                                                                    
New York 1996); G de Búrca, “The Role of Equality in European Community Law” In Alan 
Dashwood and S O’Leary (eds), The Principle of Equal Treatment in E.C. Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1997); A Evans, “Union Citizenship and the Constitutionalization of Equality in EU Law” 
in M La Torre (ed), European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge (Kluwer, The Hague 1998).  
Also useful on this point is S Fredman, “The Age of Equality” in S Fredman and S Spencer (eds), 
Age as an equality issue: legal and policy perspectives (Hart, Oxford 2003) 43. 
4 The first use of the principle is thought to have been in Case 1/54 French Republic v High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1954-1955] ECR 1, at 8.  However, the 
caveat concerning objective justification did not become an explicit component of the “test” 
until 1977: Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. and Hansa-Lagerhaus Ströh 
& Co. v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen ; Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1977] ECR 1753. 
5 In terms of books, and in the specific context of the ECJ, the reader is referred first and 
foremost to the two leading works, by Ellis and Bell: E Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (Oxford 
EC Law Library, OUP Oxford, 2005); M Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union 
(Oxford Studies in European Law, OUP, Oxford 2002).  However, see also (for example) Dagmar 
Schiek, Lisa Waddington and Mark Bell (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on National, 
Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law (Ius Commune Casebooks for the 
Common Law of Europe, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007), as well as the many learned articles 
referenced in this dissertation; a good starting point would be the works cited immediately 
below, notes 13 to 21 inclusive. 
6 For example, the situation of a man suffering an illness and the situation of a woman suffering 
a pregnancy-related illness.  These two situations were held to be comparable in Case C-179/88 
Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark [Acting for Birthe Vibeke Hertz] v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening [Acting for Aldi Marked K/S] [1990] ECR I-3979 and in Case C-400/95 
Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark, acting on behalf of Helle Elisabeth 
Larsson v Dansk Handel & Service, acting on behalf of Føtex Supermarked A/S [1997] ECR I-2757.  
However, they were held to be different in Case C-394/96 Mary Brown v Rentokil Ltd. [1998] 
ECR I-4185 and in Case C-66/96 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark, acting 
on behalf of Berit Høj Pedersen v Fællesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger and Dansk 
Tandlægeforening and Kristelig Funktionær-Organisation v Dansk Handel & Service [1998] ECR I-
7327.  The matter is discussed further at section 3.4. below.  Another example would be the 
situation of a part-time worker and the situation of a full-time worker.  These two situations 
were held to be different in Case 170/84 Bilka - Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] 
ECR 1607, but comparable in Joined Cases C-399/92, C-409/92, C-425/92, C-34/93, C-50/93 and 
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Furthermore, the Court has been able to classify the alleged discriminator’s 
behaviour as both different treatment and identical treatment, depending solely 
on how it chose to phrase this behaviour7, or whether it chose to take into 
account or ignore certain details8.  Even within one and the same case, the 
Aristotelian “test” for equality is often able to produce more than one result.  That 
a case of “likes being treated in like fashion” is not a case of “unlikes being 
treated in unlike fashion”, is frequently little more than a question of how closely 
the people or entities are inspected9, and a case of likes being treated in unlike 
fashion, but for an objectively justifiable reason, could on many occasions be 
                                                                                                                                    
C-78/93 Stadt Lengerich v Angelika Helmig and Waltraud Schmidt v Deutsche Angestellten-
Krankenkasse and Elke Herzog v Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Landverband Hamburg eV and 
Dagmar Lange v Bundesknappschaft Bochum and Angelika Kussfeld v Firma Detlef Bogdol GmbH 
and Ursula Ludewig v Kreis Segeberg [1994] ECR I-5727.  The matter is discussed further at 
section 3.6. below.   
7 For example, the case-law on pensions in the UK, where a number of different companies 
granted pensions or pension-related payments in a way that could not help but reflect the 
unequal retirement ages, as between men and women, in the UK at that time.  In the Burton 
case, the Court used a relative formulation in describing British Rail’s behaviour; it was then able 
to conclude that, as between male and female workers, this had been an instance of identical 
treatment: Case 19/81 Arthur Burton v British Railways Board [1982] ECR 554.  But in the Birds 
Eye Walls case, the Court used a non-relative formulation in describing Birds Eye Walls’ 
behaviour; it was then able to conclude that, as between male and female workers, this had 
been an instance of different treatment: Case C-132/92 Birds Eye Walls Ltd. v Friedel M. Roberts 
[1993] ECR I-5579.  The matter is discussed further at section 3.5. below. 
8 For example, the case-law on positive action, and a number of cases concerning the rules 
governing job applications.  In the Kalanke case, a rule whereby, in a tie-break situation, all 
female candidates would be given automatic precedence was held to be, as between men and 
women, different treatment: Case C-450/93 Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] 
ECR I-3051.  However, in the Marschall case, an almost identical provision, but with a “saving 
clause” allowing a male candidate the possibility of pleading “specific” reasons why he should 
be accorded precedence, was held to be, as between men and women, identical treatment: 
Case C-409/95 Hellmut Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR I-6363.  Clearly, in the 
Marschall situation, the male candidate is still at a disadvantage; he would need a “specific” 
reason to have a chance of surviving the tie-break, while a female candidate would not.  But the 
Court seized on the “saving clause”, arguably giving it much more importance than it deserved, 
in order to equalize the situations of the two candidates.  This was clearly for political reasons; 
the Kalanke decision had been very unpopular, and the Court did not want to have to outlaw a 
second “positive action” measure.  The matter is discussed further at section 3.7. below. 
9 For example, in the field of nationality discrimination, the case of Vigier: Case 70/80 Tamara 
Vigier v Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte [1981] ECR 229. This could be a case of the 
same law applying to two victims of persecution (“likes being treated in like fashion”), or, if one 
takes into consideration the facts, firstly, that one of these has paid a contribution to a certain 
German institution while the other has not, and, secondly, that the one can gain retroactive 
admission to an old-age insurance scheme while the other cannot, it could be a case of the 
same law applying in two different ways to two different types of persecution-victim (“unlikes 
being treated in unlike fashion”).  The matter is discussed further at section 5.4.2. below.  As 
Isiah Berlin puts it, “unequal treatment of various members of class A can always be 
represented as equal treatment of them viewed as members of some other class B”: I Berlin, 
“Equality as an Ideal” in FA Olafson, Justice and Social Policy: A collection of essays (Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs 1961) 130. 
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read as a case of unlikes being treated in unlike fashion, if the objective 
justification is, as it were, front-loaded.10 
 
But aside from these dry and somewhat technical problems with the Aristotelian 
test, there is another, bigger problem, for the explanation of which a distinction is 
usually drawn between “formal” and “substantive” equality.11  It is felt that 
Aristotle’s test, with its love of bisection and its inability to see special cases or 
to admit of exceptions, suffers from an excess of formality, so that the results it 
produces do not correspond with actual, real-world equality (or so-called 
substantive equality).12  Put another way, the test cannot differentiate between 
situations.  A woman, for example, may wish to be treated unlike her male 
colleagues when it comes to a benefit such as paid maternity leave, but like 
them in all other respects of workplace life.  A disabled person might wish to be 
treated like his fellows in, say, a job interview, but unlike them (should the 
situation arise) in terms of prison conditions13.  The “equality” produced when 
the Aristotelian test fails to differentiate between these situations may be 
equality in form, but it is not equality in substance.14 The phenomenon whereby 
the same person would wish for their differences to be disregarded in one 
context, but taken into account in another, in order to achieve equal treatment in 
both, has been described as the “dilemma of difference”15.  It is a dilemma on 
the horns of which the Aristotelian test is severely impaled. 
                                                 
10 For example, Joined cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd (C-27/00) and Omega Air Ltd , 
Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority (C-122/00) 
[2002] ECR I-2569, and Case T-48/89 Fernando Beltrante and others v Council of the European 
Communities [1990] ECR II-493.  The former case is discussed further at section 6.3.1., and the 
latter case at section 6.3.3., below.   
11 This “bigger problem” concerns only equality cases involving human comparators. 
12 Some critics condemn only the first limb of the Aristotelian test (likes to be treated like) as 
formalist, preferring to see in the second limb (unlikes to be treated unlike) the beginnings of a 
substantive approach; see, for example, C Tobler, Indirect discrimination : a case study into the 
development of the legal concept of indirect discrimination under EC law (Intersentia, Antwerp 
2005) 25 et seq.  Many others, however, regard the entire test as excessively formal, and 
substantive equality as something entirely different.  This is the position adopted in this 
dissertation. 
13 See G Moon and R Allen, “Dignity discourse in discrimination law: a better route to equality?” 
2006 EHRLR 6, 610, for further discussion of this example.  As Bell and Waddington succinctly 
put it, the “[c]overed ground is sometimes relevant”: M Bell and L Waddington, “Reflecting on 
inequalities in European equality law” (2003) 28 ELRev 349, 360. 
14 For one among the very many who have looked at the formal/ substantive equality problem, 
see PA Cain, “Feminism and the limits of equality” 24 Ga L Rev 1989-1990, 803. 
15 D Schiek, “A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law?” European Law 
Journal, v. 8, n. 2, June, 290, 310.  Schiek attributes the phrase to Martha Minow.  The 
phenomenon is also referred to simply as the sameness/ difference debate. 
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In respect of its equality case-law, Carey has said that the European Court of 
Justice is incoherent, and criticized its “illogical application of tests”16.  Holtmaat 
and Tobler describe the Court’s approach as “misguided”17.  Prechal talks of 
“methodologically puzzling” approaches and “mixed messages”18, and Somek of 
“interpretative liberties”19.  The Court has also been repeatedly decried as 
inconsistent20.  The ECJ’s currency as an arbiter in equality matters becomes 
devalued as a result of these criticisms. 
 
Under these circumstances, the Aristotelian test becomes little more than a 
figleaf for the Court’s own view of what is or is not equal.  As More has put it,  
 
“a court can achieve any result it chooses by simply changing the 
measure it uses”21. 
 
Aristotle’s cruel callipers are widened or narrowed at the whim of the person 
holding them; measurements are taken and lines drawn.  If the litigant is lucky, 
these lines will be drawn so accurately that they will delineate perfectly the 
relative positions of him22 and his fellows.  If the litigant is unlucky, one of the 
                                                 
16 N Carey, “From obloquy to equality: in the shadow of abnormal situations” Yearbook of 
European Law 2001, n. 20, 79, 99. 
17 R Holtmaat and C Tobler, “CEDAW and the EU’s Policy in the Field of Combating Gender 
Discrimination”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2005, v. 12, n. 4, 399, 
416.  This was in the particular context of Case C-220/02 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, 
Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten v Wirtschaftskammer Österreich [2004] ECR I-5907. 
18 Sacha Prechal, “Equal Treatment, Non-Discrimination and Social Policy: Achievement in Three 
Themes” (2004) 41 CMLR 533, 537, 543 and 538. 
19 A Somek, “Solidarity Decomposed: Being and Time in European Citizenship” 2007 ELRev 32(6), 
787, 801.  
20 Christopher Brown, “The race directive: towards equality for “all” the peoples of Europe?” 
Yearbook of European Law 2001-2002, n. 21, p. 195-227, 205 (“Indirect discrimination is, 
however, a rather sensitive issue, and one which has not received consistent interpretation by 
the European Court of Justice”); TK Hervey and J Shaw, “Women, work and care: women’s dual 
role and double burden in EC sex equality law”, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1, 
February 1998, 43, 47 (“there remains a sufficient degree of inconsistency in the interpretations 
which the Court of Justice has given over the years”); H Meenan “Introduction” in Meenan (ed), 
Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 3, 11 (“[The] development 
[of equality and non-discrimination] has been… lacking in uniformity”); J Calderón and A Baez, 
“The Columbus Container Services ECJ Case and Its Consequences: A Lost Opportunity to Shed 
Light on the Scope of the Non-discrimination Principle”, Intertax, Vol 37, Issue 4, 212, 216 (“the 
real problem is not about lack of rulings but about lack of consistency in the case law”); J 
Schwarze, European Administrative Law (Revised 1st Edition Sweet & Maxwell, London and 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2006) 564 (“Not all 
the Court of Justice’s decisions have applied these criteria consistently and logically, however”). 
21 More, “”Equal Treatment” of the Sexes in European Community Law: What Does “Equal” 
Mean?” (1993) 1 Feminist Legal Studies 45-74, at 51. 
22 Gender-neutral. 
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lines will be drawn on the wrong side of him (principally because the measurer 
cannot see him), forcing him and his fellows into a patently false opposition on 
one side and/or a patently false kinship on the other.  It is hard not to be 
reminded of the movement of counters in a board game, Snakes and Ladders, 
for example.  Those making use of the Aristotelian test employ a strange left-or-
right, up-or-down mentality, which seems to see people in two dimensions rather 
than three. 
 
But an overly pliable test can quickly become vulnerable to abuse by judges, 
spurred on by extraneous political, or even non-political, concerns.  Worse still, 
equality, now owing its existence merely to judicial whim, can be portrayed by its 
enemies as nothing more than a deceptive slogan23, fit for discontinuation, if not 
abolition.   
 
A unified, easy-to-use theory of equality for EU law, while desirable, is not 
plausible.  There are too many justiciable fields of endeavour inhabited by 
today’s Union, each with its own particular nuance, inevitably affecting what 
goes on, including how equality is viewed, within the field.24  Besides, the 
requirement to treat likes in like fashion, and unlikes in unlike fashion, is itself an 
across-the-board rule, its very universality stretching it until all meaning is lost, 
with the results described above.  What is needed is a system which is capable 
of taking into account each field’s unique qualities.  It is submitted that Michael 
Walzer’s “complex equality”, or at least a variation thereon, would fit the bill. 
 
1.3. The project in outline 
 
The aim of the project is to investigate, via a critical case-study, whether 
Walzer’s theory could act as a credible complement to Aristotle for the Court of 
Justice, when dealing with cases on equality.  It is a library-based dissertation, 
very much doctrinal in nature (“black-letter law”).  It is a contribution to the 
existing literature on equality in the ECJ’s case-law, with the difference that it 
                                                 
23 This is how Lenin saw it: Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, The deception of the people by the slogans of 
equality and freedom (Lawrence and Wishart, London 1940).  
24 As Bernard puts it, “Even when the non-discrimination principle apparently focuses on the 
same “evil”, as in cases on discrimination on the grounds of nationality, it may in fact cover very 
different purposes, each with their own internal logic”: N Bernard, “What are the purposes of EC 
discrimination law?” in J Dine and B Watt (eds), Discrimination Law: Concepts, Limitations and 
Justifications (Longman, London and New York 1996) 98. 
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makes a tentative suggestion as to how improvements might be made in the 
future.   
 
After a brief consideration of the theoretical underpinnings of equality, Walzer’s 
theory is set out in detail in Chapter 2.  The next four chapters constitute a case-
study, with the Court’s jurisprudence in different cases examined first from the 
Aristotelian, and then from the Walzerian point-of-view.  Chapter 7 provides an 
opportunity to reflect on some of the common themes emerging from the case-
law.  In Chapter 8, some problems to do with the use of a Walzerian-style 
“Forum” are considered, and an alternative theory – Mediated Complexity – is 
put forward.  In Chapter 9, a final evaluation is undertaken as to whether 
complex equality, or mediated complexity, might serve as a possible 
complement to Aristotle. 
 
The purpose of the case-study is to consider the Court’s decisions both as they 
are, and as they might be under a Walzerian regime.  In the cases of gender 
and the “Article 19” grounds25, a number of cases on a given topic are 
summarized before Walzer’s theory is applied to them in a separate section.  It 
is felt that, in these areas where the Aristotelian analysis itself raises a large 
number of issues and polemics, often spanning an entire sequence of decisions, 
it is better to separate the two analyses.  However, in the cases of nationality 
and the semi-suspect and non-suspect grounds, an attempt has been made to 
integrate the two types of analysis to some degree, as it is felt that this can be 
done without undue confusion, allowing the argument to flow more smoothly.  
Even in those chapters, though, the basic order – Aristotle first, Walzer second – 
is for the most part still observed.  Only in Chapter 9 is a case analysis 
undertaken wherein the two theories are considered, as it were, simultaneously. 
 
A few words are perhaps required about the parameters of the project.  
Needless to say, of the thousands of decisions handed down over five decades 
by the European court, only a representative sample can be used, in any one 
section, to illustrate the points being made; where there is a choice, however, an 
attempt is made to make use of the Court’s more recent judgments, in order to 
keep the arguments up-to-date and also to avoid unnecessary repetition of the 
choices made by earlier writers.  Due to pressure of space, certain interesting 
                                                 
25 So named after Article 19 TFEU – prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 
December 2009, this was Article 13 EC. 
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aspects of EU law in which the principle of equality also plays a role have 
regrettably had to be omitted.  Consequently, the dissertation contains no 
discussion of Article 110 TFEU (formerly Article 90 EC, on internal taxation 
imposed on foreign and domestic products), or of price discrimination within the 
context of Article 102 TFEU (formerly Article 82 EC).  However, other forms of 
discriminatory taxation are looked at in Chapter 5 (on nationality discrimination), 
and competition law, albeit a different aspect, is represented in Chapter 6 (on 
semi-suspect and non-suspect grounds).   
 
It must be emphasised that, in this dissertation, Walzer’s theory is being mooted 
solely as a possible new arrow for the judicial quiver.  An entirely new, 
Walzerian society is not being called for.  Walzer’s own project may have been 
to “describe a society”26, but that does not prevent his theory being applied in 
more specific, discreet contexts27.   
 
Another important point that must be made is that, as Walzer’s theory turns on 
the shared meanings of goods arrived at by the relevant distributive 
communities, none of the meanings which are suggested in the course of the 
dissertation are intended to be final, and by extension none of the outcomes 
which are postulated should be read as being the outcomes which would 
definitely be arrived at if a Walzerian system were put in place.  The suggested 
meanings, and postulated outcomes, are discursive only; other meanings and 
outcomes are entirely possible.  The final decision would be that of the 
distributive community.28  Throughout the analysis, and almost at the risk of 
monotony, a similar caveat to this one is given before a meaning is proposed; 
sometimes the expression “Standard Contingent Reply” is used as shorthand for 
the fact that the meaning cannot be known until the distributive community 
makes it known.29  Where assumptions are made about what the meaning would 
be – and they are made fully consciously – this is simply to drive the argument 
forward.  Alternative meanings and outcomes – where considered interesting – 
are given, but it must be appreciated that there could never be room to give 
them all.  Some goods have an almost infinite number of possible meanings; to 
                                                 
26 M Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, New York 
1983) xiv (hereinafter referred to as Spheres of Justice). 
27 See the long list of such applications at the beginning of Chapter 2. 
28 At least under the orthodox theory; an alternative theory, “Mediated Complexity”, wherein 
the final decision is left to the Judge, is proposed in Chapter 8. 
29 See below, Chapter 3, section 3.2. 
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consider every one, and the outcomes that each would lead to, would be an 
impossible task, and would make for extremely tedious reading.  However, it 
must be stressed that at no point is the intention to “speak for” other persons, 
groups or communities. 
 
Finally, a small mention should be made of the problem of indirect 
discrimination.  Whether indirect discrimination is covered by the Aristotelian test 
at all is an unresolved issue, but, for the purposes of this dissertation, it is.  To 
put it another way, the second limb of the test (unlikes treated like) is taken to be 
a formulation, albeit a very rough one, of the idea of indirect discrimination, 
whereby identical treatment is applied to two or more parties who are, in fact, 
differently situated, with the result that the identical treatment in fact affects them 
differently.  However, whether Aristotle’s test is regarded as a failure with 
respect to indirect discrimination for the “traditional” reasons (difficulties in 
identifying the comparators, problems of establishing sameness, and so on), or 
whether it is regarded as a failure with respect to indirect discrimination for not 
covering the concept at all, is really only a detail.  The main issue, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, is whether Walzer’s method can overcome the 
failure, producing better and more consistent results for those to whom the 
discrimination relates.  
 
Of the great physicist George Gamow it was said, 
 
“Even when he’s wrong, he’s interesting.”30 
 
The reader of this dissertation is urged to adopt a similar attitude towards 
Walzer.  What is offered here is food for thought.  If the theory is flawed, or even 
out-and-out “wrong”, either in and of itself or as applied to the ECJ’s equality 
case-law, then it is at least interesting.  If it is felt to be unhelpful in one area – 
gender discrimination, for example – then it may still be of interest in another.  If 
it is thought to be inoperable in practice, either in its pure form or in the less 
cumbersome alternative version – Mediated Complexity – discussed in Chapter 
8, then it may at least inspire, or embolden.  Furthermore, it is hoped that its 
presentation here might kickstart a much-needed discussion, which in turn might 
                                                 
30 Gamow’s important role in particle physics is described in Atom, a BBC series produced by 
Paul Sen and presented by Jim Al-Khalili, 2007, from which this assessment of Gamow – by his 
contemporaries – is drawn. 
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pave the way towards a future theory which does “work”.  Above all, what is 
presented here is not intended to be a replacement for the Aristotelian test, but 
at most a complement, or perhaps less even than that: a mere tool, of the many, 
in the ECJ judges’ tool-box.  Ideally, it should not simply be confirmed as “right” 
or condemned as “wrong”; this belittles the exercise.  A complement for a 2,300-
year-old test is unlikely to be found overnight. 
 
1.4. The search to find a complement 
 
1.4.1. The difficulty 
 
In searching for a potential complement to Aristotle for the European Court of 
Justice, one is confronted by a dizzying array of equality theories; rather like 
Pablo Neruda’s critics, theorists have effectively stabbed equality with nibs and 
drowned it in ink.31 
 
One theorist may be ruled out of the search at a fairly early stage, though, and 
that is Karl Marx.  Article 120 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (formerly Article 98 of the Treaty of Rome) declares that “[t]he Member 
States and the Union shall act in accordance with the principle of an open 
market economy” (emphasis added).  The phrase is also used at Articles 119(1) 
TFEU and 119(2) TFEU32.  The open market economy is naturally at odds with 
the marketless economy envisaged by Marx.33  Thus, prima facie, for the Court’s 
judges to adopt a Marxist approach to equality would not be in keeping with the 
European project overall.  Such an approach might not even be possible, as 
cases usually only involve one or two individuals, and it would be hard to apply 
Marxist principles on such a small scale.  Nevertheless, if it were possible, 
commentators would no doubt argue that this was “the thin end of the wedge”, 
and would wonder why the ECJ, like a turkey voting for Christmas, had decided 
to advocate an adjudicatory method which would in the long run lead to the 
unravelling of the entire Union. 
 
                                                 
31 See Pablo Neruda, “Oda a la crítica”. 
32 Formerly Articles 4(1) EC and 4(2) EC. 
33 This has led one commentator to talk of “the hard-wiring of neo-liberal policies into the EU”: 
AT Callinicos, Equality (Polity Press, Cambridge 2000) 107. 
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Meanwhile, at the other end of the political spectrum, the outlook is no less 
severe.  The famous “libertarian” vision of Robert Nozick holds freedom to be 
considerably more important than equality.  It is hard to believe that there would 
even be nation states (in the traditional sense) in Nozick’s world, still less a 
multi-State entity like the EU.  He envisions a “framework” of entirely voluntary 
“communities”, which will “wax and wane”34: “[S]ince any… community may be 
established within the framework, it is compatible with all particular utopian 
visions, while guaranteeing none”35.  Community members are free to enter and 
leave communities as they wish, or indeed start their own.  Such central 
authority as there is would be a protective association, and nothing more.  No 
“paternalistic restrictions”36 may be imposed, and enforced redistribution 
between communities is also forbidden: “none have the right to impose their 
vision of unity upon the rest”37.  Under these circumstances, it again appears 
that the ECJ judges would be to say the least shooting the European project in 
the foot if they endorsed a Nozickian modus operandi. 
 
What does that leave?  The situation is reminiscent of that in economics, where 
some favour one hundred percent regulation, à la Marx, while others favour 
hardly any regulation at all, à la Friedman.  Reality forces most States into some 
sort of compromise-position between the two.  Competition law, of which the EU 
has perhaps fittingly become something of a standard-bearer, is an example of 
how this works on a day-to-day basis: there is little or nothing to stop innovators 
setting up companies and prospering, but as they grow bigger and bigger, 
increased regulation is brought to bear on them in order to give the other 
runners in the race a “fair chance”38.   
 
Is there a similar mid-way point for equality?  One could argue that a very small 
example might be inheritance tax: there is nothing to stop individuals prospering 
and thus creating disparities of wealth within their communities but, on their 
deaths, the State acts to redress the balance slightly by taking a share of the 
estate for itself.  Given the wide disparities of wealth in evidence in today’s 
society, it could be argued that this measure hardly makes any difference at all.  
                                                 
34 R Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, New York 1974) 312. 
35 Ibid., 320 (emphasis added). 
36 Ibid., 324. 
37 Ibid., 325. 
38 A chance which Friedman and the Chicago School hold is undeserved, if not positively unfair 
on the market-leader! 
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More extreme is the biblical Sabbatical, mentioned favourably by Walzer, which 
required land to be returned to its original owner after fifty years.39  This was 
undoubtedly a more drastic plan, effectively sending everyone back to square 
one after a half-century, but it has also been described as a “utopian plan that 
never was put into practice”40.   
 
However, to find a half-way house should involve more than just locating the 
middle of the continuum-of-regulation.  What Marx and Nozick highlight is the 
ongoing battle between equality and freedom, with Marx’s socialists being one 
hundred percent equal but not particularly free, and Nozick’s libertarians being 
(almost) one hundred percent free, but not in the least bit equal.   
 
1.4.2. Equality versus freedom 
 
In Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, the point was made that excessive 
standardization actually leaves some people unhappy.  Robbed of their ability to 
live an individualistic way of life (however that may have expressed itself), these 
people are in a very real sense less free.  Thus, opponents of egalitarianism are 
sometimes called libertarians, or hyperindividualists.  The elimination of 
individualism poses a very difficult, and dangerous, problem for equality 
theorists.  As Vlastos puts it, 
 
“If A is valued for some meritorious quality, m, his individuality does not 
enter into the valuation.  As an individual he is then dispensable; his 
place could be taken without loss of value by any other individual with as 
good an m-rating.”41 
 
This reasoning (which, it must be pointed out, is by no means Vlastos’ 
conclusion, or even close to it) could have come straight out of Huxley’s “World”.  
Indeed, the Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning at one point declares: 
 
“Murder kills only the individual – and, after all, what is an individual? [...] 
We can make a new one with the greatest ease – as many as we like.”42 
 
                                                 
39 Leviticus, Chapter 25, Verses 8-10. 
40 Lieber, Etz Hayim: A Torah Commentary (Jewish Publication Society of America, 2001) 738. 
41 G Vlastos, “Justice and Equality” in Richard Brandt (ed), Social Justice (Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1962) 31, 44 (Vlastos’ emphasis). 
42 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (Vintage, 2004) 128. 
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Other theorists recognize the conflict between equality and freedom, but appear 
to see freedom as the source of the trouble, not equality: 
 
“Equality lays down how we are to treat people: but Liberty entitles us to 
act as we choose, not as some rule lays down.  If I have any Liberty then 
there are some decisions I am allowed to make on my own; I am free in 
some cases to act arbitrarily.  And if that is so, I may in such cases 
arbitrarily choose one person rather than another, without there being 
any ground to justify discrimination. [...] This is what it is to be free.  
Freedom is inherently unfair.”43 
 
The tussle between the two concepts is probably as old as philosophy itself.44  
Theorists such as Matson note how the traditional settlement between the two 
ideas usually takes the form of an “agreement”45 (some variant on the 
Rousseauian social contract), which in most societies replaces the anarchic 
system, so famously summed up by Hobbes, which is very much based on the 
notion that “might is right” (maximum freedom, minimum equality).  The 
contract46 demands a surrender of freedom (or “sovereignty”47), in return, 
principally, for a guarantee of security.  However, a side-effect of the newly-
secure society will of course be that its citzens can now cohabit peacefully, the 
mighty alongside the weak, the clever alongside the foolish, and so on.  The 
contract thus balances the loss of freedom with a gain in equality, at least in the 
short term.  But “might is right” creeps back into play in new, disguised ways, 
and this balance is quickly imperilled once again.  Contractualism on its own 
cannot therefore be the answer. 
 
Theorists like Dworkin48, Arneson49 and Williams50 have investigated solutions 
involving complicated redistributions (even of abstracts like intelligence) and 
                                                 
43 JR Lucas, “Against Equality” [1965] XL Philosophy 296, 307. 
44 Tocqueville believed that equality and freedom were “two different things”: GE Bevan (tr), 
Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America (Penguin Classics, 2003) 584.  But cf. Laski, who, 
while acknowledging the latter’s view that the two concepts were “antithetic things”, held that 
this was a “drastic conclusion”: Harold J Laski, A Grammar of Politics (George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., London 1925) 152. 
45 Wallace Matson, “Justice: A Funeral Oration” [1983] I Social Philosophy and Policy 94, 99. 
46 Or its more recent variants, such as Rawls’ “principles”. 
47 Locke refers to resigning one’s natural power “into the hands of the community”: John Locke, 
The Second Treatise of Civil Government (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1946) 43. 
48 See, for example, R Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2001), which is a compendium of all his writings on 
equality. 
49 See, for example, Richard J. Arneson, “Equality and Equal Opportunity For Welfare” [1989] 56 
Philosophical Studies 77. 
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rectifications51, Williams at least spotting the “inhuman”52 aspect of mixing and 
matching human characteristics and body parts like a game of dress-up dolls; as 
in Brave New World, extreme equality threatens the annihilation of individuality.  
Real-life examples also confirm this.  The socialism of the Soviet Union, while 
(supposedly) providing equality of resources, led almost immediately to 
exceptional inequality of power, with a concomitant loss of freedom for those left 
powerless.  As Frankfurt has put it, although without expressing a view on the 
“merit of this argument”, “an egalitarian distribution of money can be achieved 
and maintained only at the cost of repression”.53 
 
1.4.3. Reasons for choosing Walzer 
 
In these circumstances, would a half-way house even make any sense?  Is 
there any use in two entities being half-equal?  Is someone who is half-free free 
at all? 
 
It seems to deny reality, though, to lurch from one extreme to the other, 
demanding either that everyone be entirely free in every circumstance, or that 
everyone be entirely equal in every circumstance.  A more variable approach 
which judges each situation afresh, and which equalizes only where it is 
appropriate to do so54, but lets freedom prevail otherwise55, would make more 
sense.  Walzer’s conception of a world of spheres, rigourously separated one 
from another, achieves this equilibrium.  As he himself has written: 
 
“The art of separation doesn’t make only for liberty but also for equality…  
Religious liberty annuls the coercive power of the political and 
ecclesiastical officials.  Hence it creates, in principle, the priesthood of all 
believers…  Academic freedom provides theoretical, if not always 
practical, protection for autonomous universities, within which it is difficult 
to sustain the privileged position of rich or aristocratic children.  The free 
market is open to all comers, without regard to race or creed […]; and 
                                                                                                                                    
50 See, for example, BAO Williams, “The Idea of Equality” in Peter Laslett and WG Runciman 
(eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society, Series II (Basil Blackwell, 1972). 
51 Some of these tales of supposed rectification seem a bit far-fetched and even offensive, 
particularly where disability is concerned.  But for a possible real-life example, see J Clayton, 
“Running without legs?  That’s not fair on all the other athletes” The Times (London 15 January 
2008) 30. 
52 Supra n 50, 130. 
53 Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal” [1987] 98 Ethics 21, 22. 
54 Inter-sphere situation. 
55 Intra-sphere situation. 
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though it yields unequal results, these results never simply reproduce the 
hierarchy of blood or caste or, for that matter, of “merit”…  Under the 
aegis of the art of separation, liberty and equality go together.”56 
 
The very fact of the spheres ensures the freedom, but it is their separation which 
ensures the equality.  However, as Walzer hints in the quotation above when 
talking about the market, this is not simple equality; within a single sphere, 
disparities may be perfectly permissible.  Whether equality gives way to 
freedom, or whether freedom gives way to equality, must be determined from 
the specific context: 
 
“[E]ach freedom entails a specific form of equality or, better, the absence 
of a specific inequality – of conquerors and subjects, believers and 
infidels, trustees and teachers, owners and workers – and the sum of the 
absences makes an egalitarian society.”57 
 
But, crucially, Walzer’s theory provides the means for making this important 
determination, as will be explained further in the next chapter.   
 
Walzer’s spheres, then, rather like those of Shakespeare’s time58, allow for 
collective harmony while still acknowledging individual variation.  Complex 
equality is thus the true half-way house between the two extremes, offering the 
prospect of a genuine complement for the ECJ without requiring the dismantling 
of its parent organization, and for these reasons has been chosen over the other 
available theories as the appropriate one to apply to the problem under 
consideration.   
 
 
                                                 
56 M Walzer, “Liberalism and the Art of Separation” Political Theory Vol. 12 No. 3 (Aug 1984) 
315, 320-1. 
57 Ibid., 326. 
58 See, for example, Twelfth Night, IIIi: “I had rather hear you to solicit that/ Than music from 
the spheres”.  It was held that, in their rotations, the crystalline spheres containing the planets 
and the fixed stars created “a ravishing harmony inaudible to mortal ears”: Shakespeare, 




2. Michael Walzer and Complex Equality 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
Michael Walzer launched his theory of complex equality in 1983 in a book 
entitled Spheres of Justice.1  The theory, as will be seen, is innovative in that it 
focuses on distribution, where distribution is defined very broadly to include not 
just tangible goods, but also abstract goods such as rights2, and even 
characteristics3.  Walzer’s writing style in Spheres of Justice is also innovative; 
instead of arguing from first principles, he chooses to take a more artistic 
approach.  He produces what some have called a “portrait”4 (or even an entire 
“portrait gallery”5), others an “impressionist painting”6.  In this dissertation, 
Walzer’s lead will be followed.  The emphasis will be on working through 
“accounts of distributions” (of which the court reports provide an almost limitless 
supply), letting these “accounts” (or even “stories”, as Walzer puts it) “suggest” 
any necessary principles for themselves – “stand[ing]… in the city”, as it were, 
rather than “climb[ing] the mountain”, interpreting rather than describing7. 
 
Over the years, Walzer’s theory has been applied to a dazzling variety of 
situations around the world.  These include higher education in Malaysia8, 
                                                 
1 M Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, New York 
1983) (hereinafter referred to as Spheres of Justice). 
2 McCrudden, in his recent reanalysis of equality, divides the concept into four categories.  In 
the second category, he too envisages rights as distribuends, calling them “prized public goods”: 
C McCrudden, “The new concept of equality” (Paper prepared for the Academy of European 
Law conference, “Fight Against Discrimination: The Race and Framework Employment 
Directives” 2/6/03-3/6/03) 
<http://www.era.int/web/en/resources/5_2341_679_file_en.796.pdf> accessed 14 April 2009. 
3 See section 3.3. below. 
4 NL Rosenblum, “Moral Membership in a Postliberal State” World Politics, Vol 36, No 4 (Jul., 
1984) 581. 
5 Ibid. 
6 J Carens, “Complex Justice, Cultural Difference, and Political Community” in D Miller and M 
Walzer (eds), Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995), 47. 
7 All quotations from Spheres of Justice, supra n 1, xiv. 
8 H Stokke, “Reasonable Discrimination? Affirming Access to Higher Education in Malaysia” 
1999/ 2000 Hum Rts Dev YB 189. 
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affordable housing in the US9, and children’s rights in El Salvador10.  Complex 
equality has been used in everything from the practice of paying research 
subjects for participating in clinical trials11, to the communication strategies of 
police officers12, and from the protection of personal data13, to the creation of 
hierarchies of creditors following insolvency14.  Could the equality strategy of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) be added to this already impressive list?  In 
this chapter, it is intended to sketch the basics of the theory (with due attention 
paid to the many who have written about it since 1983) and then, towards the 
end, to begin to consider whether it could be applied to the case-law of the ECJ. 
 
2.2. Complex equality: A thumb-nail sketch 
 
Michael Walzer holds that there is no one single distributive sphere; rather, there 
are different distributive spheres for different goods.  The first major tenet of the 
theory of complex equality is that these spheres must be kept separate. 
 
Within any one of these spheres, the good in question is distributed according to 
its shared social meaning, that is, according to an understanding of what the 
good means to the society in which the distribution is taking place, such 
understanding being shared by the members of this society (distributees and 
distributors alike).  A second tenet of the theory of complex equality is that these 
shared social meanings, or shared understandings, must be respected. 
 
Violation of these shared social meanings would occur if a person acquired a 
good, not in conformity with its shared social meaning, but instead by virtue of 
the prior possession of another good, belonging to a different sphere.  This latter 
good is referred to in Walzer’s lexicon as a dominant good.  If, having previously 
                                                 
9 KD Adams, “Can Promise Enforcement Save Affordable Housing in the United States?” 41 San 
Diego L Rev 2004 643. 
10 K Read, “When Is a Kid a Kid?  Negotiating Children’s Rights in El Salvador’s Civil War” History 
of Religions, Vol 41, No 4, Essays on the Occasion of Frank Reynolds’s Retirement (May, 2002), 
391. 
11 JA Anderson and C Weijer, “The Research Subject as Wage Earner” Theoretical Medicine 23: 
2002, 359. 
12 Phillip Chong Ho Shon, ““Now You Got a Dead Baby on Your Hands”: Discursive Tyranny in 
“Cop Talk”” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law Vol XI no 33 [1998] 275. 
13 J Van Den Hoven and PE Vermaas, “Nano-Technology and Privacy: On Continuous Surveillance 
Outside the Panopticon” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 32:2007, 283. 
14 C Villiers, “Employees as creditors: a challenge for justice in insolvency law” Comp Law 1999, 
20(7), 222. 
 24 
acquired the dominant good in its proper sphere, a person were to use this good 
to tyrannize (again, Walzer’s word) a neighbouring sphere, that is, to gain 
privileged or even exclusive access to the good or goods in this neighbouring 
sphere, then complex equality would be vitiated.  Put simply, such a person may 
not use a dominant good to “jump the queue” in a subsequent distribution of an 
entirely different good.  In Walzerian terms, this distribution would be flawed.  
Only where the goods in each sphere are distributed according to their shared 
social meanings, and only according to their shared social meanings, is tyranny 
(or dominance) averted, allowing complex equality to prevail.  The prohibition on 
tyranny, or dominance, is the third tenet of the theory of complex equality. 
 
The boundaries of the spheres must therefore be patrolled to avoid what Walzer 
calls boundary crossings, or blocked exchanges, wherein a successful recipient 
of a good in Sphere 1 is able to convert his success into automatic (and 
unwarranted) success in Sphere 2, thus by-passing the distributive process 
intrinsic to Sphere 2.  All such convertibility must be eliminated.  A given sphere 
must be autonomous, that is, governed, internally, by the distributive rule 
germane thereto, and no other.  The maintenance of the autonomy of spheres is 
vital to complex equality.  It could be said that this is a fourth tenet of the theory 
of complex equality, but it is, to all intents and purposes, a restatement of the 
first tenet, described above, namely that spheres must be kept separate. 
 
As long as the boundaries of a sphere are secured against any contamination 
from neighbouring spheres, any distribution taking place within the sphere, 
grounded solely on the shared social meaning of the good in question, should 
be just15.  Of course there will be winners and losers.  Not everyone will receive 
the same amount of the good, a result which Walzer calls simple equality, and 
which he does not believe to be feasible.  The situation in the sphere after the 
distribution will be at best what Walzer calls rough equality.  However, it will not 
be the kind of gross inequality which is so characteristic of modern society.  So 
long as the tenets set out above are adhered to, any inequalities which remain 
within the sphere will at least be just, that is, they will have come about for the 
right reasons, and not for the wrong ones; Walzer calls them “small inequalities”.  
Moreover, with dominance having been eradicated, a winner in one sphere will 
be prevented from going on to claim immediate and unconditional victory in the 
                                                 
15 In this paragraph, the word “just” is used in the basic sense that Walzer uses this word, that is, 
“not corrupt”. 
 25 
other spheres.  There is no dominant good which can “buy” all of the others.  
This opens the door for a society of multiple winners, wherein each member can 
stake a claim for at least some of the successes on offer, in other words, those 
successes which they have properly deserved, or to which they are properly 
entitled.  Each person will thus have some share of the benefits and burdens, 
privileges and chagrins, of the society in which they live.  That is complex 
equality. 
 
A straightforward real-world example would be the sphere of education.  
Education should be distributed by teachers, to students, in school.  This is a 
fairly uncontroversial “shared understanding” of the meaning of education, 
although of course other understandings are possible.  However, the sphere of 
education must be protected from spillover from neighbouring spheres, for 
example, the sphere of money (students gaining advantage by virtue of wealth), 
the sphere of family (students gaining advantage via the influence of relatives), 
the sphere of politics (curricula being dictated by certain political factions) or the 
market economy (multinational corporations sponsoring schoolbooks as a 
means of “subliminal advertising”).  As long as its borders are patrolled and it is 
kept autonomous, the situation obtaining in the sphere of education should be 
one of (rough) equality as between, say, student A and student B (although not, 
of course, as between the students and their teacher).  It should also, 
momentarily anyway, be one of simple equality, but, almost as soon as the first 
lesson is completed, A may well have begun to overtake B academically16.  
Indeed, A may leave school with top grades in all subjects, while B attains a 
bare pass.  However, as long as A is prevented from monopolizing his success 
by converting it into success in all the other spheres17, then B has at least the 
chance of succeeding elsewhere.  The complex egalitarian rejects a single big 
triumph by one person, in favour of many small triumphs by different people.  
With shared understandings respected, spheres constrained, and dominance 
precluded, complex equality will prevail. 
 
                                                 
16 Walzer vehemently disagrees with Dworkin (and, to a lesser extent, Rawls) that individuals do 
not deserve their natural talents, and that all talents should therefore be artificially distributed 
among the entire population. 
17 Unless, of course, success in education forms part of the “shared understanding” appropriate 
to the sphere in question. 
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2.3. Negative Dominance 
 
Negative dominance is first introduced by Walzer in his chapter on “Hard Work” 
in Spheres of Justice.  It builds on the traditional notion of dominance, that is, 
the power of a good to afford its possessor automatic access to other goods in 
other spheres.  However, while possession of a positively dominant good might 
entitle its possessor to all, or at least some, of the good things in life, possession 
of a negatively dominant good brings about quite the opposite result.  According 
to Walzer, such a good: 
 
“commonly carries other negative goods in its train: poverty, insecurity, ill 




“poverty [is carried] into the sphere of money, degradation into the 
sphere of honor, weakness and resignation into the sphere of power.”19 
 
A possessor of a negatively dominant good, then, risks becoming “subordinate 
in all [spheres,] […] defeat in one area so often lead[ing] to defeat in another”20.  
Rather than trying to be the King of every kingdom, to borrow Walzer’s early 
metaphor, the possessor of the negatively dominant good is forced to be the 
pauper of every kingdom; the negatively dominant good is not a good luck 
charm, but a bad luck charm.  As Andre more philosophically puts it, 
 
“People are complex emotional, social, cognitive wholes, who can find 
themselves in downward spirals: one failure breeds others.  We get 
discouraged, we lose our footing, we turn away from our friends.”21  
 
Later, Walzer himself was to take up the theme of failure: 
 
“Failure pursues [excluded men and women] from sphere to sphere in 
the form of stereotyping, discrimination, and disregard, so that their 
condition is not in fact the product of a succession of autonomous 
decisions but of a single systemic decision or of an interconnected set.  
And for their children, exclusion is an inheritance; the qualities that 
supposedly produce it are now its products.”22 
                                                 
18 Spheres of Justice, supra n 1, 165. 
19 Ibid., 183. 
20 J Andre, “Blocked Exchanges: A Taxonomy” in Miller and Walzer, supra n 25, 195.   
21 Ibid. 
22 M Walzer, “Response” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, 
Oxford 1995) 291.  Compare Walzer’s use of the word “stereotyping” here, with Mark Bell’s 
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Hervey also writes about exclusion, and, although she is not referring to 
negative dominance, or to complex equality at all, the “pattern of disadvantage” 
which she describes is a similar concept: 
 
“Members of racial, ethnic or religious (and indeed other) minorities are 
likely to be over-represented in socially disadvantaged groups.  This 
phenomenon is known as “social exclusion”: a process by which access 
to income and other social benefits or services, such as health 
protection, housing and education, is restricted, and a pattern of 
disadvantage, manifesting itself in several interrelated ways, is 
perpetuated.”23 
 
Possession of a negatively dominant good can cause a boundary breach in 
exactly the same way as possession of a positively dominant good.  The only 
difference, then, is in the likely reaction of the possessors.  The declaration that 
a distribution is defective and must be rerun, this time with their good left “at the 
door”, is likely to make the possessor of a negatively dominant good much 
happier than it might make the possessor of a positively dominant good. 
 
2.4. The concept of “shared understandings” investigated further 
 
The concept of “shared understandings” is central to the theory of complex 
equality.  All distributions need a fundamentum distributionis, or distributive 
principle, which makes it clear what each recipient should get, and, perhaps 
more importantly, why.  For the complex egalitarian, this must be the shared 
social understanding of the meaning of the distributed good.  Any distribution 
grounded on anything other than the shared social understanding of the 
meaning of the distributed good will be invalid.  Thus it is absolutely essential to 
the theory that this understanding is determined correctly. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
reference to breaking down stereotypes quoted in the section on age (within the subsection 
entitled, “A Walzerian Analysis”) in Chapter 4, below.  An assumption made about somebody, or 
a class of people, can be one kind of negative dominant, following that person, or that class of 
people, from sphere to sphere, and jeopardizing their chances of success in each. 
23 Hervey, “Putting Europe’s House in Order: Racism, Race Discrimination and Xenophobia after 
the Treaty of Amsterdam” in O’Keeffe and Twomey (eds), Legal issues of the Amsterdam Treaty 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999) 333. 
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Some critics have focused merely on the logistics of this determination.  If there 
is to be a debate, who should participate?  Where should it take place, and 
when?  This type of criticism will be considered presently. 
 
Meanwhile, other critics have questioned Walzer’s entire premise that every 
social good indicates its own distributive principle, and that the shared 
understanding can be discerned from the good almost as easily as, say, a 
robber can be identified by his finger-prints.  To put it in Walzer’s own words, 
 
“If we understand what it is, [and] what it means to those for whom it is a 
good, we understand how, by whom, and for what reasons it ought to be 
distributed.”24 
 
This implies that that there is one understanding to every one good.  Naturally, 
many commentators have protested about this, claiming that there can be two, 
or even several, understandings to one good.25  Others go further and argue that 
this is not just another perspectivist point, in other words, that the good means 
different things to different people, but that even one and the same person might 
understand one good in two (or more) ways.26  Further, these understandings 
need not be mutually exclusive, but may well co-exist.  Still others restate the 
argument in terms not of understandings but of spheres, that is, that one good 
may find itself in two distributive spheres, depending on the identity of the 
potential recipients.27 
 
It is perplexing that these critics indict such a differentiated theory on a charge of 
being too uniformitarian (“one understanding to one good”).  It is submitted that 
Walzer’s theory can quite easily accommodate multiple meanings, for multiple 
recipients.  Walzer himself arguably entertained the idea of one good having two 
                                                 
24 Spheres of Justice, supra n 1, 9. 
25 A Gutmann, “Justice across the Spheres” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), Pluralism, Justice, 
and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) (“the social meanings of some goods are multiple” on p 99); 
Margo Trappenburg, “In Defence of Pure Pluralism: Two Readings of Walzer’s Spheres of 
Justice” The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol 8, No 3, 2000, 343 (“sometimes different 
principles are used to distribute one particular social good” on p 345; “social goods have 
multiple or ambivalent meanings” on p 346). 
26 M Rustin, “Equality in Post-Modern Times” in Miller and Walzer, supra n 25, giving health-care 
and wealth as examples of goods with a double-meaning; Macdonald gives love as his example: 
RA Macdonald, “Access to Justice and Law Reform” 10 Windsor YB Access Just 287, 333. 
27 RB Thigpen and LA Downing, “Liberal and Communitarian Approaches to Justification” Review 
of Politics, 51:4 (1989: Fall) 533 (again giving medical care as an example).  Mayer gives 
education and membership (inter alia) as his examples: R Mayer, “Michael Walzer, Industrial 
Democracy, and Complex Equality” Political Theory, Vol. 29 No. 2, April 2001, 237, 245-246. 
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understandings in Spheres of Justice, where he described territory as being “a 
social good in a double sense”28, representing two different things to two 
different sets of people.  And he certainly entertained the idea twelve years later, 
when he gave the example of soup, which would mean one thing, and therefore 
be distributed in one way, to one group of people, in the grocery store, and 
would mean another thing, and therefore be distributed in another way, to 
another group of people, in a soup kitchen.29  He confirmed that the theory had 
no trouble, as a consequence, splitting soup into two different distributive 
spheres. 
 
Returning to the question of logistics, just how should the shared social 
understandings (of the meanings of distributed goods) be determined?  What 
would such a determination look like?  It is sometimes hard to picture exactly 
what Walzer has in mind here – some kind of meeting of villagers in a village 
hall, perhaps, or a gathering of citizens in the Roman Forum.  Should a mass 
show of hands be used for the taking of decisions, as on the Pnyx hill in ancient 
Athens?  Walzer himself makes no pretence of the fact that he is more 
concerned with the theory than the practice: 
 
“I won’t try to describe how we might go about creating such a society.  
The description is hard enough”30. 
 
In what follows, the word “debate” will be used to describe the determination 
process.  However, there is nothing significant about the choice of this particular 
word, and no special meanings should be read into it.  The location of the 
debate will be given as “forum”, but subject to the same caveat.  Perhaps the 
most important thing to remember is that, since the shared understandings 
change from society to society31, it makes sense that the precise style of the 
debate, as well as the nature of the forum, will also change from society to 
                                                 
28 Supra n 1, 44. 
29 M Walzer, “Response” in Miller and Walzer, supra n 25, 282.  See also Walzer’s comment, 
made during an exchange of views which he conducted with Dworkin shortly after the 
publication of Spheres of Justice, that “[i]t is entirely possible, on my view, that for some goods 
we will have complex rather than unitary distributive principles”: M Walzer and R Dworkin, 
“Spheres of Justice: An Exchange” New York Review of Books 30/12 (July 1983), 43, 44. 
30 Supra n 1, xiv.  And see B Barry, “Spherical Justice and Global Injustice” in Miller and Walzer, 
supra n 25, at 77: “Walzer resolutely refuses to investigate the micro-processes that go into the 
formation and sustenance of beliefs”. 
31 In the sense in which that word is used in the second paragraph of section 2.2., that is, the 
society in which the distribution is taking place.  One could also call this the distributive 
community. 
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society.  But as well as questions of how and where, it is also necessary to 
consider questions of who.  Who should be present at the debate?  What 
characteristics do they need?  How are they to be treated, both during and after 
the debate?  Questions of when, or at least how often, will also crop up. 
 
If the intention is to design a procedure for ascertaining the shared social 
meaning of a good, and it is accepted, as discussed above, that goods have 
multiple meanings, then it follows that said shared social meaning will32 only be 
able to be ascertained via some form of deliberation, wherein the various 
proposed meanings are put forward, and then weighed up as to their relative 
merits.  The deliberation would end with the meaning considered best being 
selected.  Since it is the social meaning that is required, that is, the 
“understanding of what the good means to the society in which the distribution is 
taking place”33, it follows prima facie that all members of the society should be 
invited to the deliberation, and given a chance to propose meanings, and also 
prima facie that all members of the society should participate in the final 
selection.  An examination of the many and varied types of democracy, not to 
mention the many and varied electoral systems, is of course beyond the scope 
of this dissertation.  But the society in question would obviously have to settle on 
a particular type, and on a particular system, in order to proceed.  The 
deliberation has been given different names by different commentators.  One of 
the most common is conflict.  Also popular are dispute and argument.  These 
words suggest that, in many people’s view, the process would not be altogether 
amicable. 
 
Settling, as discussed above, on the default word “debate”, the next question is: 
who should be present at the debate?  While all members of the society should, 
                                                 
32 The future and conditional tenses are used throughout this paragraph.  For the purposes of 
this dissertation, the creation of Walzer’s forum, that is, a forum capable of producing the 
shared social meanings necessary for complex equality, is, with one or two exceptions, 
something which has not happened yet.  However, in reviewing Spheres of Justice, a number of 
critics seem to have read Walzer as meaning that the way in which a society distributes this or 
that good today is already, and without more, the correct distributive mechanism for that 
particular society for that particular good.  By designing a theory dependent on local distributive 
mechanisms, they conclude, Walzer has made himself a hostage to the status quo.  See in 
particular B Barry, “Intimations of Justice” [1984] Columbia Law Review Vol. 84, 806 and J 
Cohen, Review of Spheres of Justice [August 1986] The Journal of Philosophy 83, 457.  Dworkin 
also seems to be of this view, with his oft-quoted remark that if a society pursues Walzer’s 
approach based on shared traditions, “political theory will be only a mirror, uselessly reflecting a 
community’s consensus and division back upon itself”: Walzer and Dworkin, supra n 29, 46. 
33 See supra section 2.2., second paragraph. 
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by rights, be invited (see previous paragraph), this may only bring about an 
impression of inclusion and fairness, not the real things.  Okin (who discusses 
Walzer at some length) argues that women, for example, are “deprived of a 
voice”34, male domination being so ingrained within modern society.  Warren is 
undoubtedly right when he declares that, 
 
“inequalities are suspect when the voices of those affected are absent”35. 
 
This is even reminiscent of the test for standing in Article 263 TFEU (formerly 
Article 230 EC).  But, returning to Okin, how could there ever be ““shared 
understandings” on abortion”36 where one of the major constituencies, namely 
the fetuses themselves, quite literally have no voice and, though very much 
affected, cannot possibly participate in the debate?  Armstrong sums up the 
problem very nicely when he talks of “the definition of the “us””37: 
 
“Certainly one of the bones of contention that will remain for feminist 
theorists in particular is the question of who has the right to define this 
“we”, and whether it might not be a great deal more fragmented, and 
even unresolvable, than our rhetorical “we”s would indicate.  In this 
sense defining the “we” in advance of telling the story is wholly 
illegitimate, since defining the “we” has to be a part of the story itself, 
open to negotiation and contention.”38 
 
If the presence of “those affected” is compulsory at the debate, then two obvious 
groups in that category, the distributees and the distributors, would need to be 
present.  And Armstrong is right that the identification of at least the first of these 
two groups is “every bit as controversial and political”39 as anything that might go 
on once the debate proper has commenced.  The distributive community’s 
shared understandings cannot be ascertained until the community itself has 
been demarcated.40  Merkel also seems to be of the opinion that Walzer pays 
insufficient attention to this first step: 
                                                 
34 SM Okin, Justice, gender, and the family (Basic Books, New York 1989) 72. 
35 ME Warren, “What Can Democratic Participation Mean Today?” Political Theory, Vol 30, No 5 
(Oct 2002) 677, 698.  
36 Supra n 34, 66.  Or rather on the right to life and the right to control one’s own body, which 
are the two rights which Okin mentions, since it is likely to be these which are being distributed, 
not abortions themselves. 
37 C Armstrong, “Philosophical Interpretation in the Work of Michael Walzer” Politics (2000) 
20(2) 87, 91. 
38 Ibid., 90. 
39 Ibid., 91. 
40 On this analysis, there would need to be a debate before the debate.  But this is surely right, 
because the right to decide on distributions (or decision-making power) is a distribuend like any 
other, and thus its shared understanding would technically also need to be elucidated in a prior 
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“It furthermore seems problematic that Walzer assumes a possible 
consensus on questions of distribution.  That might be conceivable in his 
own idyllic upper-class community of Princeton, but it would hardly work 
in the Bronx or in Harlem, which are barely an hour away.”41  
 
But if two of the major groups of “those affected” are the potential distributees 
and the potential distributors, it is equally apparent that these two groups are 
likely to fundamentally disagree on the correct distributive principle to be 
employed.  This problem is nicely dissected by Trappenburg, who in fact 
identifies four orders of “actors”: first-order actors (for example, parliaments), 
second-order actors (for example, local offices, boards, and so on – that is, 
distributors), third-order actors (potential recipients – that is, distributees), and 
public opinion.  Each order has a different motivation or driving force (except 
public opinion, which shares the same driving force as second-order actors).  
According to Trappenburg42, first-order actors are motivated by overall 
efficiency, second-order actors are motivated by (sphere-specific) equity, and 
third-order actors are driven by plain self-interest.  Thus, the question to be 
asked is not just who is present at the debate, but in what role do they find 
themselves on the day of distribution?43 
 
And, again, the matter of the power-balance within the forum arises.  
Distributees can certainly be held to ransom by distributors, but occasionally it is 
distributors who find themselves powerless.  An employee of a law firm, forced 
to take “false independent” status44 by his employers for tax purposes (theirs not 
his), will find himself to be a distributor of services who is entirely subservient to 
his supposed distributees.  In EC competition law, too, sellers can conceivably 
be held to ransom by (dominant) buyers45.  Will the two parties put their relative 
differences in power aside (or even, in Rawlsian terms, erect a “veil of 
                                                                                                                                    
debate.  But then the same problem would simply arise again in that debate, and so on, ad 
infinitum. 
41 W Merkel, “Social justice and the three worlds of welfare capitalism” European Journal of 
Sociology (2002) 43: 59, 65. 
42 Supra n 25, 358-9, in turn drawing on the work of Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions 
Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens (Russell Sage Foundation, New York 1992). 
43 This links back to the point made above that one and the same person can easily understand 
one good in two or more ways. 
44 In other words, to become an independent service provider who then “invoices” his former 
employer at the end of each month instead of receiving a salary. 
45 See Case 298/83 CICCE v Commission [1985] ECR 1105, [1986] 1 CMLR 486.  Walzer’s remark 
that “the consumer is not, and can never be, sovereign” (Spheres of Justice, supra n 1, 113) is 
respectfully disagreed with. 
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ignorance”) during the debate, in order to ascertain, in a neutral fashion, the 
appropriate distributive principle?  Or will, as Okin suggests, the “more powerful” 
be able to silence, or render incoherent, those whom they dominate, so that the 
resultant “shared understanding” is only shared in appearance?46   
 
It is even possible that some of the “more powerful” may do this unwittingly, 
entering the forum with a distorted view of their community, so entrenched that 
they “do not even consider it alterable”47, such that the “shared understanding” 
at which they think they have arrived is in fact “buil[t] on the prevailing 
ideologies”48.  The danger of an all-pervasive ideology contaminating all debates 
is not lost on Walzer, who comments that, although entry for participants is free, 
 
“we may want to plead with some of them that they leave their 
conceptual baggage at the door.”49 
 
And even if entry is free, implying that wealth makes no difference in the forum, 
those with money may still wish to use it to influence the thinking of others, via 
education, communication, or some other means.  This point has been made 
forcefully by Barry50.  According to him, any apparent consensus is actually the 
result of “power over communications” (and so on), exerted by “the beneficiaries 
from the status quo”51.  This would give rise once again to the scenario wherein 
participants enter the forum unwittingly brain-washed, and then endorse an 
understanding of the good in question which is not theirs at all, but one planted 
by the powerful to perpetuate their own success (and perpetually to thwart the 
ambitions of the weak). 
 
Deliberate or inadvertent ill-treatment of certain (weaker) factions during the 
debate is not the end of the story, however.  How are participants, particularly 
those whose views did not survive into the final “consensus”, to be treated after 
the debate?  Ball flags up this issue in the context of gay rights: 
                                                 
46 Supra n 34, 112.  Although one counter-argument might be that, in a Walzerian world, no 
party should hold significantly more power than any other. 
47 Ibid., 113. 
48 Ibid., 72.  As Rustin points out, if an injustice has “not already become the subject of 
contention within a society”, complex equality offers no grounds for intervening: supra n 26, 31. 
49 Supra n 22, 295.  He makes a similar point in Spheres of Justice: “All non-political goods have 
to be deposited outside: weapons and wallets, titles and degrees”.  Supra n 1, 304. 
50 Supra n 30, 77-8. 
51 Both quotations from ibid., 78 (Barry’s italics).  But, again, in a Walzerian world, would not the 
tyrannical use in the sphere of decision-making (ie in the forum) of success gained in the sphere 
of communications be prohibited as a “blocked exchange”? 
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“[Gay men and lesbians] should be wary of a theory of political morality 
that does not contain the necessary protections against shifting 
majoritarian norms.”52 
 
Walzer himself sympathizes with those whose favoured “meaning” was rejected 
in the forum, and who now find themselves to be a minority. 
 
“I don’t mean to dismiss the many problems that autonomy poses, 
especially with regard to non-believers, who are forced to take on religion 
as a kind of ethnic affiliation.  (I suspect that most religious communities 
have included significant numbers of non-believers.)  Their condition is 
not, however, entirely different from that of religious fundamentalists in a 
secular state.  Another problem is more serious: it is very difficult to stop 
the religious majority from using state power across both communal 
boundaries and distributive spheres.”53  
 
With that last sentence, Walzer seems to be implying that, at least in a society in 
which complex equality is correctly practiced, the minority will be able to take 
comfort from the fact that the majority will be prevented from using their status 
as a dominant good; “membership of the majority” will not be allowed to be a 
pass-key to access all spheres.  These issues are discussed in greater detail 
below, in Chapter 4, section 4.4.2.3., on the Tyranny of “Normalcy”. 
 
The last question to be asked is when, or at least how often, should the debate 
take place?  Walzer himself is clear that 
 
“[s]ocial meanings are historical in character; and so distributions, and 




“Boundaries […] are vulnerable to shifts in social meaning, and we have 
no choice but to live with the continual probes and incursions through 
which these shifts are worked out.”55 
                                                 
52 Carlos A Ball, “Communitarianism and Gay Rights” 85 Cornell L Rev 1999-2000 443, 451. 
53 Supra n 22, 289. Scanlon also considers the problem of “those with divergent views”, post-
debate.  He concludes that, in a private association, it would be acceptable to “deny [the 
relevant] goods to those who clearly lack [the required] beliefs”.  However, at the level of 
political society, goods such as civil and human rights must be extended even to people who 
“reject [society’s] most basic tenets”: TM Scanlon, The difficulty of tolerance: Essays in political 
philosophy (CUP, Cambridge 2003) 194-5. 
54 Spheres of Justice, supra n 1, 9. 
55 Ibid., 319.  See also M Walzer, “Liberalism and the Art of Separation” Political Theory Vol. 12 
No. 3 (Aug 1984) 315, 328, where he talks of the need for “continued revision”: “the arguing 
and the fighting have no visible end”. And four years later, he declares, “the interpretative 
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It follows, then, that the debate itself must be continual.  All the commentators 
seem to concur that this is the only solution.  Danchin, for example, writes that 
“an unforced consensus must constantly be sought”56: 
 
“For value pluralism not to lapse into the subjectivism of utopian 
universalism (religious or secular fundamentalism) on the one hand, or 
apologetic relativism (illiberal nationalism) on the other, it must strive for 
objectivity by continually seeking an overlapping consensus on the 
conflicting ends that divide cultures, groups, and individuals.”57 
 
Warren notes that “where individuals are empowered to serve as boundary 
patrols between spheres”, justifications of inequalities (and therefore the 
distributive criteria which gave rise to them) would have to be “continually 
challenged and reworked”58. 
Clark is heavily critical of Walzer, but certainly agrees that the distribution of 
goods “is a matter of continuing argument rather than consensus”59.  Thigpen 
and Downing also talk about “continuing disagreements and unanswered 
questions”60, observing, with regard to the presuppositions held by the 
participants of the debate, that “it is not possible to scrutinize every aspect of an 
intellectual inquiry at one time”61.  They conclude: 
 
“[P]resuppositions may have been questioned yesterday, and they may 
be questioned again tomorrow.  Those engaged in inquiry may 
reexamine their assumptions when those who question the continued 
usefulness of a concept or an approach gain the serious attention of their 
colleagues.”62 
 
2.5. An objection: Walzer’s “relativism”, and the need for an 
override 
 
                                                                                                                                    
enterprise goes on and on, never moving toward definitive closure”.  See M Walzer, 
“Interpretation and Social Criticism” in SM McMurrin (ed), The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, viii (CUP, Cambridge 1988) at 24. 
56 Peter G Danchin, “Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in 
International Law” 33:1 Yale J Int’l L 2008 1, 53.   
57 Ibid., 50 (Danchin’s emphasis). 
58 Both quotations from supra n 35, 698. 
59 Samuel Clark, “Society against Societies: The possibility of transcultural criticism” Res Publica 
(2007) 13:107, 110. 




A common objection to complex equality also takes as its point of departure the 
notion of “shared social meanings”, that is, shared, to a greater or lesser 
extent63, by the community in which the distribution is to take place.  Allowing 
every society to be judged by its own yardstick, rather than insisting that all 
societies be judged by a single, universal yardstick, has led to Walzer’s being 
labeled as a relativist.64  If the community is left to fix its own distributive criteria 
for every good, answerable only to “(internal) standards of justice”65, what is to 
stop it settling on disagreeable, or even cruel, criteria?  Rustin warns that 
Walzer’s theory may entail “practical indifference to barbarity”66.  Scanlon sums 
up the objection thus: 
 
“Opponents of relativism thus commonly appeal to the possibility that the 
accepted norms of a society might license conduct which involves 
treating people in horrible ways.”67 
 
So what types of things might be classed as “horrible”?  Nationalism is a popular 
example.  Danchin confirms that cultural relativism, because of its penchant for 
“particularistic ideology” and “anticosmopolitanism”, may well bring in its train 
“variants of nationalism”68.  So if the Nuremburg Laws of 1935, which distributed 
(inter alia) the right to marry and even the right to engage in extra-marital 
relations, had been found to be a manifestation of the “shared understanding” of 
the German people at that time of those rights (and who should have them), 
does it follow, under complex equality, that those laws were just? 
 
Another example is slavery, where many commentators allege that Walzer 
himself is in violation of the rules.  In a section discussing whether the Athenian 
treatment of metics was unjust (given the conception of citizenship that prevailed 
in Athens), Walzer leaves the question of slaves aside, because “the injustice of 
slavery is not disputed these days, at least not openly”69.  This judgment 
appears to be extrinsic to the community in question, and would seem to rely on 
                                                 
63 See the previous section. 
64 One of the earliest allegations of relativism came from Dworkin, leading to the exchange of 
views in the New York Review of Books mentioned above (supra n 29).  Dworkin, in a review of 
Spheres of Justice in an earlier issue of the Review, later reprinted in his own A Matter of 
Principle, had commented, “We cannot leave justice to convention and anecdote”: R Dworkin, A 
Matter of Principle (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986) 220. 
65 Spheres of Justice, supra n 1, 315. 
66 Supra n 26, 31. 
67 TM Scanlon, What we owe to each other (Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Massachusetts 1998) 337. 
68 Supra n 56, 51. 
69 Spheres of Justice, supra n 1, 53. 
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extrinsic values.  Carens describes the remark as “puzzling”70.  Is Walzer on the 
way to acknowledging the presence of an outer sphere (to borrow Carens’ 
model of concentric circles) containing  
 
“minimal standards of justice applicable to all contemporary states, 
regardless of their own particular histories, cultures, or political 
arrangements”71? 
 
Opponents of abortion might also wish to apply such standards to states which 
allow the practice (presumably in accordance with shared social meanings72).  
Those who take issue with female genital mutilation, living outside the countries 
in which this ritual is observed, might likewise need to call on them.  One might 
describe these standards as transcultural, or universal.  They are standards 
which override (or which those invoking them hope will override) the local norms 
at issue. 
 
However, given the nature of complex equality, the concept of and (arguable) 
need for an “override” is not limited to inter-state disagreements, although these 
may provide the easiest or most sensational examples.  All spheres, including 
and perhaps even especially those within the same state, are required to be, 
and to be kept, impregnable to outside influences.  Within each distributive 
sphere, there is a specific social meaning which must be respected: 
 
“Dominance is ruled out only if social goods are distributed for distinct 
and “internal” reasons.”73 
 
The structure provided by the social meanings is vital to the theory: 
 
“There are no external or universal principles that can replace it.”74 
 
And yet, as several commentators have shown, principles that are certainly 
external to the distributive sphere concerned, and quite possibly universal as 
well, can be discerned at various points in Walzer’s argument.  These principles, 
which (arguably) override the ban on boundary crossings, could be labeled as 
“interspherical”75, or even “trans-sphere”76.  The most common example is equal 
                                                 
70 Carens, supra n 6, 58.  
71 Ibid. 
72 But see supra text accompanying n 36. 
73 Spheres of Justice, supra n 1, xv. 
74 Ibid., 314. 
75 This term used by Gutmann, supra n 25, 107. 
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membership of the community, that is, equal citizenship.  Walzer himself implies 
that this is a blanket principle, applicable across all spheres, in the third of his 
three “very general” principles:  
 
“that [a] distribution must recognize and uphold the underlying equality of 
membership”77. 
 
Seizing on this, critics have rushed to proclaim equal citizenship as a “referee 
criterion” or “master principle”78, a “criterion that seems to apply across [all] 
societal spheres”79, and a “fundamental principle […] across other relational 
spheres”80.  According to Gutmann, equal citizenship “inform[s] distributive 
justice in many other spheres”81.  According to Miller, it “plays a regulative role” 
but is not a fundamental principle82.  Den Hartogh sums up the issue in this way: 
 
“It follows that the sphere of membership cannot be fenced off from the 
other spheres in the way required by the nondominance principle: the 
possession of membership determines or codetermines one’s share in 
the other spheres.”83 
 
Walzer later admitted that citizenship has a certain “centrality” within the theory, 
and that it takes on “heightened instrumental and also symbolic value”: 
 
“Indeed, this value may itself be critical, as both Miller and Swift suggest, 
in adjudicating the internal disputes.”84 
 
Other concepts that critics have asserted are, or may be, overrides include 
responsibility85, justice86, morality87, and recognition88.  A controversial addition 
to the list would be democracy itself.  Armstrong puts the argument well: 
                                                                                                                                    
76 This term used by Walzer, supra n 22, 294. 
77 Spheres of Justice, supra n 1, 84. 
78 Both terms from Trappenburg, supra n 25, 347. 
79 Ibid., 346. 
80 James W Fox, Jr, “Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship” 54 Case W Res L 
Rev 2003-2004 1, 37. 
81 Supra n 25, 116. 
82 D Miller, “Introduction” in Miller and Walzer, supra n 25, 3.  
83 G den Hartogh, “The Architectonic of Michael Walzer’s Theory of Justice” Political Theory, Vol 
27, No 4, Aug 1999, 491, 494. 
84 Supra n 22, 87. 
85 Trappenburg, supra n 25, 346. 
86 Gutmann, supra n 25, 107 (and see also RJ van der Veen, “The Adjudicating Citizen: On Equal 
Membership in Walzer's Theory of Justice”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol 29, No 2 
(Apr., 1999), 225, 228). 
87 Ibid., 112. 
88 “[S]omething that may be achieved in many spheres”: R Keat, “Colonisation by the Market: 
Walzer on Recognition” 1997 Journal of Political Philosophy Vol 5, No 1, 93, 103. 
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“[T]he only way of ascertaining (choosing) our goals is the democratic 
way.  This is the one a priori, transcendental and universal principle that 
Walzer will not drop: that we must not stop telling stories, and that only 
we can be the judges of which are the best.”89 
 
From this argument it is not a giant leap to conclude that the entire theory, since 
it necessarily has to apply across the board, is a universal principle and is thus 
in violation of itself.  Ball articulates this nicely: 
 
“Similarly, one can view the rule that spillover effects from one sphere to 
another always lead to injustice, as a form of metaprinciple from which 
no departure is possible without violating Walzer’s theory of justice.”90 
 
It would not be fair to finish this section, however, without briefly considering 
what Walzer himself has said on these topics over the years.  It is submitted, for 
the purposes of this dissertation, that Walzer all along entertained the idea of 
certain overarching norms.  In 1983, in Spheres of Justice, he referred to “our 
common humanity”, which he said gave rise to two rights: the right to life and the 
right to liberty91.  But anything else, he went on, would have to “follow from 
shared conceptions”, and would be “local and particular in character”92. 
 
In 1988, in Interpretation and Social Criticism93, he modified this position slightly, 
accepting that there was what he called “a kind of minimal and universal moral 
code”94, consisting of prohibitions on murder, deception, betrayal, and gross 
                                                 
89 Supra n 37, 90. 
90 Supra n 52, 491. 
91 Spheres of Justice, supra n 1, xv. 
92 Ibid.  However, prior to Spheres of Justice, it appears that he took a tougher line.  In an article 
in 1981, for example, he wrote: “What is crucial, however, is that the redistributive pattern [the 
people] choose is not subject to authoritative correction”.  See M Walzer, “Philosophy and 
Democracy”, Political Theory, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug., 1981), 379, 385.  
93 M Walzer, “Interpretation and Social Criticism” in SM McMurrin (ed), The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values, viii (CUP, Cambridge 1988) (hereinafter referred to as Interpretation and Social 
Criticism). 
94 Ibid., 22. 
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cruelty95.  In the same year’s Company of Critics96, he insisted that it was not his 
wish to be an apologist “for this (or any other) society”97. 
 
In 1994, in Thick and Thin98, he continued his discussion of the “moral minimum” 
or “Minimal Morality”99.  Again, he considered that it “most likely”100 would 
consist of rules against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, and tyranny.  But the 
point that he was keen to stress was that this “thin morality” does not “leap from 
the philosopher’s mind like Athena from the head of Zeus”: it must be (or rather 
have been) “worked on”101.  Thus, even supposedly universal norms have been 
“work[ed]… out”102 by men and women who themselves are “creatures of 
history”103, that is, particular people, from a particular time and place, with 
particular fears, beliefs, goals, and so on: 
 
“Minimalism… is less the product of persuasion than of mutual 
recognition among the protagonists of different fully developed moral 
cultures.”104 
 
In 1995’s Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, he again conceded that “[m]urder, 
torture, and enslavement are wrongful features of any distributive process”105: 
 
“We need a theory of human rights (or its functional equivalent in other 
cultures) to set the basic parameters within which distributions take 
place.”106 
 
2.6. The ECJ and its override: An answer to the objection 
 
                                                 
95 Thus, according to Walzer, the Biblical prophets were able to employ the minimal code – “a 
kind of international law” – in order to criticize foreign nations with alien values (Jonah in 
Nineveh, for example): “don’t violate treaties, don’t kill innocent women and children, don’t 
transport whole nations into involuntary exile”.  See ibid., 76 and 78-9. 
96 M Walzer, The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Political Commitment in the Twentieth 
Century (Basic Books, New York 1988, 2nd edn 2002) (hereinafter referred to as Company of 
Critics). 
97 Ibid., xix. 
98 M Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (University of Notre Dame 
Press, Indiana 1994) (hereinafter referred to as Thick and Thin). 
99 Ibid., 9.  
100 Ibid., 10. 
101 All quotations from ibid., 12. 
102 Ibid., 14. 
103 Ibid., 12. 
104 Ibid., 17, emphasis added. 
105 Supra n 22, 293, emphasis added. 
106 Ibid. 
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In the context of European law in general, and the practice of the European 
Court of Justice in particular, it is submitted that several overarching “codes” are 
already in place that could, without the slightest difficulty, be pressed into 
service as “overrides” to be used to “screen” local, tradition-sensitive distributive 
criteria, should the Court decide to adopt a Walzerian approach to its equality 
cases.107  Pre-eminent amongst these, however, is the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), which in two important ways already has what might be 
called override status.  Firstly, its entire raison d’être was to act as “a bulwark 
against any recrudescence of [Nazi or Fascist] dictatorship”108; by its very 
nature, therefore, it would override any law, however widely proclaimed or 
obeyed, that constituted a threat to the rights which it contained.  Secondly, the 
European Court of Justice itself has declared that European law enshrines the 
notion of human rights common to the EU’s Member States, and that:  
 
“[I]nternational treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can 
supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of 
Community law”109. 
 
It has thus repeatedly used the ECHR as a yardstick by which to measure 
national, and EU, legislation.110  Furthermore, all EU Member States are 
                                                 
107 As well as the European Convention on Human Rights, which is dealt with in the text, there is 
the European Union’s own Charter of Fundamental Rights [2000] OJ C364/1, the United Nations 
Charter 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Convention No 111 of the 
International Labour Organisation 1958, the European Social Charter 1961, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 1966, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1966 (“CERD”), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 1979 (“CEDAW”).  To these could even be added the Member 
States’ constitutions. 
108 AH Robertson and JG Merrills, Human Rights in the World: An introduction to the study of the 
international protection of human rights (4th edn MUP, Manchester 1996) 120. 
109 Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, para. 15.  At the end of 
the same paragraph the ECHR is referred to explicitly, as it is for much of the rest of the 
judgment.  The declaration in Hauer was preceded by a number of declarations of a similar 
nature, albeit not referring directly to the ECHR.  See Case 29/69 Erich Stauder v City of Ulm 
[1969] ECR 419; Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle 
für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125; Case 4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und 
Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities [1974] ECR 491.  Eventually, 
the legislature caught up with the judiciary, and the obligation on the EU to respect the rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR was set out explicitly in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (the 
“Maastricht” Treaty, signed in 1997), hereinafter “TEU”. 
110 Space forbids a full rehearsal of the cases in which the ECHR has played a prominent, or even 
decisive, role in proceedings.  However, amongst the most well-known of these cases (and with 
the right invoked in parentheses) are the following: Case 44/79 Hauer, supra n 109 (the right to 
property and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession), Case 63/83 Regina v Kent Kirk [1984] 
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signatories to the ECHR in their own right, which means that the rights 
enshrined therein may be invoked throughout the Union.111  To all intents and 
purposes, this means that all activity in the bloc – including distributive activity – 
is already carried out under the gaze of the European Convention.  The 
Convention sets universally-applicable maximum and minimum parameters for 
behaviour, and behaviour which falls outside these parameters – even if the 
result of consensus – stands to be impugned.   
 
Although there are other candidates, then, it is proposed that the Court should 
use the ECHR, representing as it does both nation-wide and continent-wide 
consensus, to help it to scrutinize the “sphere-specific” distributive principles 
with which it is faced and to act, if necessary, as a kind of safety valve or circuit-
breaker.  As will be argued at greater length elsewhere, the European 
Community is well-suited to the theory of complex equality, and the “override 
question” provides another illustration.  The ECJ has both faced and solved the 
problems of if, when and how to override local, narrow rules where they clash 
with wider objectives; it is very much a past master when it comes to these 
particular conundra.  Indeed, the entire European project could be seen as an 
ongoing exercise in finding and maintaining the right balance between diversity 
(many inner spheres; many sets of principles) and union (one outer sphere; one 
set of principles).112  As later examples from the case-law will show, any 
                                                                                                                                    
ECR 2689 (no punishment without law), Case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651 (the right to a fair trial), Joined cases 46/87 and 
227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 2859 (the right to 
the inviolability of the home), Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia 
Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and 
Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991] ECR I-2925 (the freedom of expression), Case C-368/95 
Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR 
3689 (the freedom of expression).  For a recent, high-profile rights case, see Joined Cases C-
402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council 
of the European Union, Commission of the European Communities, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland (ECJ 3 September 2008) (the right to a fair trial and the right to 
property). 
111 While they may be invoked by any individual on European territory, regardless of nationality, 
they may only be invoked against the Signatory States themselves.  However, via a form of 
drittwirkung (though not in the orthodox sense), the State may be held responsible where the 
breach is carried out by a second individual, for failing to have implemented the Convention 
sufficiently rigorously, and thus the Convention could be said to have horizontal as well as 
vertical effect (although again not in the orthodox sense). 
112 The use of the adjectives “inner” and “outer” here draws (again) on Carens, who talks of an 
“innermost... circle” and an “outermost circle”: Carens, supra n 6, 60 and 63.  “United in 
diversity” was at one time mooted as a possible motto for the EU.  See the (later scrapped) 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] OJ C310/1, at Article I-8. 
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instances of “barbarity”, or “horrible” treatment113 which may emerge from a 
given distributive community’s shared understandings will be not latent (as they 
could have been, and could have remained, under the Aristotelian approach), 
but patent: quickly identifiable by both practitioners and judges, who of course 
are already extremely familiar with the ECHR.  If a distributive criterion offended 
against the “Minimal Morality”114, it could then be swiftly “rule[d] out”115 and any 
distribution based upon it declared flawed, leaving only the question of remedy 
outstanding. 
                                                 
113 The words in quotation marks taken from Rustin and Scanlon respectively, as cited at the 
beginning of section 2.5. 
114 Walzer, Thick and Thin, supra n 98, 9. 
115 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, supra n 1, 162. 
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3. The principle of equal treatment of persons irrespective of 
gender 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
In Chapter 1 some illustrations were given of how easily a comparison could be 
engineered to attain a certain result, for example, with regard to the choice of 
comparators.1  It was also seen how adjusting which properties were to be taken 
into account could transform or even reverse the result of a comparison.2  Thus 
it appears that what McColgan calls the “comparator-driven approach” to 
equality3, and what Holtmaat and Tobler call the “symmetric approach” to 
equality4, is endlessly malleable.  Nowhere is this more apparent (in the ECJ’s 
case-law, at least) than in the field of gender discrimination. 
 
The Aristotelian “like cases alike” (or “like for like”) test5 admits of two possible 
outcomes (“discrimination” and “not discrimination”), but each can be arrived at 
via two different routes, resulting in four conceivable permutations; see the table 
at Appendix I.  As the result to be inserted in the second column is generally 
known in advance of performing the test, that is, it is generally already known 
whether Comparator 1 and Comparator 2 have been treated in like fashion or in 
unlike fashion, the column which usually (although not always) offers the best 
scope for “rigging” (judicial or otherwise) is Column 1.  It will be seen that a great 
deal hangs on the result of the enquiry as to whether the two comparators are 
like, or unlike.  This in turn depends in large part upon which properties are to be 
taken into account for the purposes of the comparison, and (perhaps the same 
thing) upon which degree of “difference awareness” is to be employed while 
doing the comparing. 
                                                 
1 See supra, section 1.2. 
2 The agents of such engineering or adjusting may, in the first instance, be the Distributors 
themselves, but ultimately, and for the purposes of this dissertation, most importantly, they 
may be the judges before whom the discrimination case is eventually brought. 
3 Aileen McColgan, “Cracking the comparator problem: Discrimination, “Equal” Treatment and 
the Role of Comparisons”, EHRLR 2006, 6, 650, 650. 
4 R Holtmaat and C Tobler, “CEDAW and the EU’s Policy in the Field of Combating Gender 
Discrimination”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2005, v. 12, n. 4, 399, 
417. 
5 These two phrases are also borrowed from McColgan: Supra n 3, 651 and 660. 
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As Hervey and Shaw point out, “the archetypal question is that of whether a 
woman is “like” or “unlike” a man when she is pregnant”6.  This is a question the 
ECJ has now attempted to answer many times, and which is quite often coupled 
with that (to some palates at least) unsavoury question, “Is a pregnant woman 
“like” or “unlike” a sick man?”.  These questions will be examined at section 3.4. 
below.  However, before embarking on the case-study proper, it is necessary to 
deal with two preliminary issues – how the Walzerian analysis is to proceed 
(section 3.2.) and, crucially, whether the theory can accommodate 
characteristics and voluntary choices (section 3.3.). 
 
3.2. Outline of analysis and taxonomy of results 
 
In analyzing an ECJ equality case from the Walzerian perspective, it is first 
necessary to identify the good being distributed, so as to be able to delineate the 
sphere at issue.  The person or entity invoking the principle of equal treatment 
will either already be in this sphere, or else will be trying to gain access to it.  
Likewise, their (real or hypothetical) “comparator”7 will either already have 
entered the distributive sphere, or will be attempting to enter it.  It will then be 
necessary to identify any boundary breaches, whether at the level of distributee, 
or at the level of distributor, or indeed anywhere else. 
 
All results except those arrived at by the distributive community itself or, in the 
event of a dispute, by the person universally accepted as arbiter8, will be 
provisional only.  Thus, for everyone else, a common answer to the question, 
“Has there been a breach of the principle of equality?” is: 
 
“This cannot be known until the distributive community concerned has 
pronounced upon whether y is or is not part of its shared meaning of x.”9 
                                                 
6 TK Hervey and J Shaw, “Women, work and care: women’s dual role and double burden in EC 
sex equality law”, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1, February 1998, 43, 48. 
7 Under the Aristotelian test.  Complex equality does not actually entail comparison, and so can 
technically proceed without a comparator at all – for a concrete example, see below text 
accompanying n 81. 
8 See section 7.2.2. below. 
9 Where x is the good being distributed.  In what follows, this will be referred to as the Standard 
Contingent Reply.  The same system of variables is used here as is used in Walzer’s own 
statement of the theory of complex equality in Spheres of Justice: “No social good x should be 
distributed to men and women who possess some other good y merely because they possess y 
and without regard to the meaning of x.”  See M Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defense of 
 46 
 
That said, there are times when a boundary breach is so blatant that it may 
simply be presumed.  And even on other occasions, a good prediction can 
usually be made of what the result will be. 
 
Results, then, fall into two basic categories: “breach” or “no breach”.  An 
important point to remember is that there can still be a fair degree of inequality 
(of the sort that Walzer would call simple inequality) within the distributive 
sphere, even after the test has been applied and a finding of “no breach” has 
been made.  Such an inequality would be one of the “small inequalities” to which 
Walzer referred in Spheres of Justice10, a “just” inequality in the sense that the 
reason for any distinction being made falls within the meaning of the good being 
distributed, and not outside it.  Walzer never promised to “even[…] up the 
balance”, merely to 
 
“get[…] the unevenness right.”11 
 
The outcome of most social transactions involves a certain amount of inequality; 
one party rarely walks away from such a transaction in exactly the same position 
as the other party.  And, where court cases are concerned, it is almost 
inconceivable that both parties would fare identically, unless they had come to 
some kind of (highly unusual) fifty-fifty settlement.  It has been clear since King 
Solomon’s day that there must be a winner and a loser; equality of outcome is 
neither possible nor even desirable.12  These are in most cases the benign 
inequalities of which life is necessarily made up.  They do not offend against 
complex equality, because the ground upon which any distinction is founded is 
intrinsic to, rather than extrinsic to, the sphere at issue.  In US terms, it is the 
non-suspect nature of the ground which leads to the prima facie assumption that 
the distinction will turn out to be inoffensive.  As Balkin puts it, such inequality is, 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, New York 1983) 20 (hereinafter referred to as Spheres of 
Justice) – Walzer’s italics. 
10 Ibid., 17.  See also more detailed examination in Chapter 2 above – section 2.2. 
11 Ibid., 260. 
12 Referring to 1 Kings 3: 16-28.  Of course the outcome, while unequal on its face, may, looking 
at the bigger picture, lead to equality overall, for example, where a damages payment to one 
party simply restores the balance which existed before the contested event occurred. 
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“the inevitable if occasionally unfortunate outcome of markets, individual 
private preferences, and judicial respect for legislation passed by 
democratically elected representatives of the people.”13 
 
Tridimas explains it thus: 
 
“[I]n the sphere of economic law, the principle of equality prohibits only 
measures imposing risks on traders beyond those which they can 
reasonably be expected to bear in the light of the underlying economic 
circumstances.”14 
 
What one might call “normal” risks must just be run as usual; any negative 
outcome will not be actionable as a breach of the principle of equal treatment.  
In other words, the loser may not sue the winner. 
 
In what follows, then, many cases which do not disclose any boundary breach 
(“no breach” cases) may alternatively or in addition be referred to as “small 
inequalities”. 
 
3.3. Characteristics and voluntary choices: Is the theory fit for 
purpose? 
 
A first issue that needs considering, especially in the context of suspect 
grounds, is the extent to which complex equality and boundary-defence can 
work at all in the combating of discrimination.  A typical boundary breach 
presupposes two distributions in two, neighbouring spheres.15  In the first 
distribution, X has distributed to him or her a good which will turn out to be 
dominant (or, perhaps more importantly for present purposes, negatively 
dominant); X then moves to the second sphere taking this good with them.  In 
the second distribution, X has distributed to him or her, on the strength of his or 
her possession of said good, a second good (assuming that possession or 
otherwise of the first good actually has nothing to do with the second good, and 
                                                 
13 JM Balkin, “Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A play in three acts” 26 Cardozo L Rev 2004-2005, 
1689, 1717. 
14 T Tridimas, “The Application of the Principle of Equality to Community Measures” in Alan 
Dashwood and S O’Leary (eds), The Principle of Equal Treatment in E.C. Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1997) 228 – emphasis added. 
15 The one described in this section is by no means the only sort.  For example, the one 
described in this section is a boundary breach by a distributee.  However, one could also have a 
boundary breach by a distributor.  Nevertheless, the fact remains that all boundary breaches 
entail two distributions. 
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does not form part of the second good’s shared meaning).  A complex 
egalitarian would now consider that the boundary between the two spheres had 
been breached: X had used the first good tyrannically to gain the second, and so 
the second distribution was flawed.  X should have left the first good “at the 
door” (of the second sphere).  This begs the somewhat difficult question: can a 
characteristic be regarded as the product of a distribution?  Put another way, is 
a characteristic a distribuend, such that it can go on to be regarded as a 
dominant, or negatively dominant, good? 
 
It is worth starting with an easier version of this question, albeit one equally as 
important for the case-law analysis which must be undertaken: can a voluntary 
choice be regarded as the product of a distribution?  For example, when, in an 
age discrimination case called Bartsch, the claimant enters the “second sphere” 
(where the distribuend is a survivor’s pension), she brings with her the fact that 
she chose to marry a man twenty one years her senior.16  She exercised a free 
preference.  Except perhaps for classicists, there is no sphere run by Cupid, 
where he “distributes” those with whom the “distributee” must fall in love.  
However, that is to take too simplistic or literal a view of Walzer’s theory, which 
admittedly many critics do, especially when it comes to visualizing the network 
of spheres itself, and working out what constitutes a sphere in the first place.  
There is absolutely no reason why choice should not be a completely acceptable 
distributive criterion, as long as the relevant community is in agreement.  
Examples given by Walzer include the choosing of elected representatives (in 
the sphere of politics), and, indeed, the choosing of partners (in the sphere of 
romantic love).  However, in both of the latter examples, it is the distributor who 
chooses.  But a perfectly obvious example of a sphere where it is the distributee 
who chooses is the market itself.1718  So, by analogy, it is not hard to envisage a 
“first sphere” wherein Mrs Bartsch chose the late Mr Bartsch as a marriage 
                                                 
16 Case C-427/06 Birgit Bartsch v Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge GmbH 
[2008] ECR I-7245. 
17 Although no doubt Foucault would object that consumers are not making a free choice at all, 
but merely acting upon cues planted in them by “experts” via the media.  The individual’s 
acting, unquestioningly, on this expertise is one of what Foucault calls the “techniques of the 
self”, a kind of self-regulation which in turn forms part of his theory of biopolitics: M Foucault, 
“The Political Technology of Individuals” in LH Martin, H Gutman, PH Hutton (eds), Technologies 
of the self: a seminar with Michel Foucault (University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst 1988).   
18 In Mayer’s critique of Walzer’s industrial democracy, he argues that an employee chooses to 
put himself under the authority of his manager; if that is correct, then the sphere of office 
would also become a sphere in which it is the distributee who chooses: R Mayer, “Michael 
Walzer, Industrial Democracy, and Complex Equality” Political Theory, Vol. 29 No. 2, April 2001, 
237. 
 49 
partner.  (Again, to worry unduly about the identity of the distributor in this 
sphere is to subject a postmodern theory to seventeenth century-style analysis: 
Walzer makes quite clear, in any event, that in matters of the heart potential 
lovers distribute themselves via what he calls “the gift of self”.)19  The 
conclusion, then, is that voluntary choices can indeed be regarded as the 
product of a distribution. 
 
Returning to the question of characteristics, then, it goes without saying that 
these are conceptually close, sometimes very close, to voluntary choices.20  
Ball, for example, regards membership of the gay community as a voluntary 
choice21, while others hold that homosexuality is more a matter of nature than 
nurture; for such people homosexuality would presumably more properly be 
described as a characteristic.22  Walzer seems happy on several occasions to at 
least entertain the idea of a boundary breach wherein the party in breach brings 
with them to the “second sphere” a characteristic, the possession of which 
causes (or at least might cause) the second distribution to be flawed.  The very 
first examples he gives draw on Pascal, and envisage the tyrannical importation 
into a foreign sphere of such matters as strength and handsomeness.23  Later, 
he speculates as to how charm might be used in the acquisition of love, how 
                                                 
19 Spheres of Justice, supra n 9, 238.  “The sphere of private affairs is exactly like the market in 
commodities, except that these commodities own themselves”: ibid. 
20 Schiek’s three-limbed schema for classifying the grounds of discrimination is instructive here 
(see also below, section 4.2.1).  The second and third classifications are actual and unalterable 
biological differences (for the purposes of this section, “characteristics”), and differences which 
are the product of choice (for the purposes of this section, “voluntary choices”).  The schema is 
explained in full in D Schiek, “A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law?” 
European Law Journal, v. 8, n. 2, June, 290, particularly at 309-310. 
21 The gay community is a “communit[y] of choice”, not a “[c]ommunit[y] into which people are 
born”: Carlos A Ball, “Communitarianism and Gay Rights” 85 Cornell L Rev 1999-2000 443, 449-
450. 
22 Schiek, however, agrees with Ball that sexual orientation is a product of choice: supra n 20, 
310.  Howard refers to it as a characteristic: E Howard, “The case for a considered hierarchy of 
discrimination grounds in EU law” 13 MJ 4 (2006), 445, 454.  This dissertation takes no position 
on the matter.  Wintemute also considers the proximity of characteristics and choices, this time 
in the context of gender discrimination: R Wintemute, “When is Pregnancy Discrimination 
Indirect Sex Discrimination?” Industrial Law Journal, Vol 27, No 1, March 1998, 23.  He wonders 
whether the fact that pregnancy is (usually) a result of the exercise of free will makes any 
difference to the way in which it should be viewed by discrimination law. As examples of choices 
of which only men are physically capable, he gives growing a beard, or donating sperm: ibid., 27-
28. 
23 Spheres of Justice, supra n 9, 18-19.  Another early example is eccentricity, which Walzer 
describes as “a social good like any other”: ibid., 8. 
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being stimulating might be used in the acquisition of influence, or even how skill 
at bargaining might be used in the acquisition of pictures.24   
 
In an important section on abstraction, he notes how many of a person’s 
“capacities”25, and even the capacities “to make an effort or to endure pain”26 
needed to make use of the former capacities, are, at least in some philosophers’ 
eyes, merely “the arbitrary gift of nature”27.  Walzer objects to such abstraction, 
believing that a capacity such as (to take a random example) skill at playing the 
piano should enable one to acquire (say) public honour.  Again, the “good” 
which this person brings with them to the sphere of honour, and which, 
potentially, could be dominant (in this case obviously not), is a characteristic.  
This implies that there was an earlier “distribution”, to all humans, of what 
Walzer calls the “goods in their minds”.28  One could hypothesize as to who the 
distributor in this original sphere might be – Mother Nature, perhaps (echoing 
Walzer’s “gift of nature”), or some kind of Deity29, or even, from the scientific 
point of view, one’s parents or other forebears.30  But again it is futile to become 
preoccupied with such matters in a postmodern theory.  It is simply irrelevant; 
the use of the word “distribution” in a case like this is really only a kind of 
shorthand.  The real point is that all matters (including characteristics like piano-
playing ability) must stay within the sphere to which they are germane, unless 
their presence in a second matter’s sphere is sanctioned by the shared 
understanding of that second matter. 
 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 23-24.  Walzer also seems to regard what he calls “birthright” (in other words, nobility) 
as a potentially dominant good; he even nominates the sphere in which it is distributed as “the 
sphere of birth and blood”: ibid., 16.  
25 Ibid., 260. 
26 Ibid., 261. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid.  If Walzer’s tone is understood correctly, he actually regards this distribution as more 
important than a distribution of physical goods such as “hats and coats”: ibid. 
29 Walzer happily acknowledges God as a distributor when he talks about “divine grace” in 
Chapter 10 of Spheres of Justice.  Of course, God’s distributive criteria, both for Grace and (if 
applicable) characteristics, are unknown and unknowable.  As Walzer laconically puts it, “we 
don’t know how [desert] figures”: supra n 9, 260.    
30 In the era of genetic engineering, it is not at all far-fetched to talk about the distribution of 
genes, ordinarily by one’s parents, but occasionally by third parties via some manner of 
donation.  Although it would vary from community to community, it seems likely that the 
correct distributive criterion for any such donation would be need.  If it ever came about that 
wealth or status could “buy” a person’s children superior genes, this would almost certainly be 
regarded as a boundary breach, or blocked transaction. 
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Critics have also happily embraced the idea of characteristics as goods capable 
of giving rise to boundary breaches.  Trappenburg gives as one of her many 
examples the situation where, of two political candidates, one has clearly 
garnered more votes in an election, which is the only valid way of distributing 
parliamentary seats in most communities.  However, she then asks whether the 
other candidate’s being trustworthy and decent, or being black, or being 
unattractive, might be a reason to cede the seat to him.  Of course, if the seat 
were ceded to the second candidate on the grounds of one of these 
characteristics, there would be a very compelling argument for deeming this a 
boundary breach.31 
 
The conclusion, then, must be that characteristics can indeed be regarded as 
the product of a distribution, even if it is a hypothetical one.  Complex equality 
and boundary-defence may thus be relied upon in the fight against 
discrimination, which is necessarily based on characteristics, or voluntary 






The comparing of pregnant women with sick men has been described as 
“insulting”33, “inappropriate”34, “distasteful and unfortunate”35 and “inaccurate 
and politically damaging”36.  At best it could be called a somewhat troubling 
                                                 
31 See Margo Trappenburg, “In Defence of Pure Pluralism: Two Readings of Walzer’s Spheres of 
Justice” The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol 8, No 3, 2000, 343, 350-352. 
32 Or ascribed differences.  This is the first of Schiek’s three categories – see supra n 20. 
33 J Dine and B Watt, “Introduction” in Janet Dine and Bob Watt (eds), Discrimination Law: 
Concepts, Limitations and Justifications (Longman, London and New York 1996) 4, referring to 
the UK cases of Turley v Allders Department Stores [1980] IRLR 4 (woman dismissed on grounds 
of pregnancy not victim of sex discrimination – sick man comparison used only by Ms P Smith in 
her dissent) and Hayes v Malleable Working Men’s Club and Institute [1985] IRLR 367 
(overturning Turley – sick man comparison unanimously endorsed).  
34 Nicola Lacey, “From Individual to Group?” in B Hepple and EM Szyszcak (eds), Discrimination: 
The Limits of Law (Mansell 1992) 104. 
35 H Fenwick and TK Hervey, “Sex equality in the single market: New directions for the European 
Court of Justice”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, April 1995, 443, 450. 
36 Clare McGlynn, “Social Policy: Equality, Maternity and Questions of Pay”, European Law 
Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, August 1996, 327, 332. 
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tribute laid at the feet of formal equality.  But another, more “substantive” course 
of action beckoned, one which the ECJ pursued across a series of landmark 
cases.  This course of action was to do away with the test altogether, where 
discrimination on grounds of pregnancy was alleged, thus overcoming the 
absence of a male comparator.  The Court introduced this new approach in a 
case called Dekker, where a woman who had applied for the post of instructor at 
a training centre for young adults was not appointed on the grounds that she 
was three months’ pregnant37.  The ECJ stated: 
 
“[O]nly women can be refused employment on grounds of pregnancy and 
such a refusal therefore constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of 
sex.”38 
 
In Webb, concerning a dismissal from employment rather than a refusal to 
employ, the Court stated the position in even more forceful terms:   
 
“[T]here can be no question of comparing the situation of a woman who 
finds herself incapable, by reason of pregnancy discovered very shortly 
after the conclusion of the employment contract, of performing the task 
for which she was recruited with that of a man similarly incapable for 
medical or other reasons...  As Mrs Webb rightly argues, pregnancy is 
not in any way comparable with a pathological condition”39. 
 
And, in the same case, Advocate General Tesauro confirmed that this approach 
was indeed one of “substantive equality”40, which, in his view, was the outcome 
sought by those who had drafted the Equal Treatment Directive41.  Habermann-
Beltermann42, about the attempted termination of an employment contract, again 
on discovery by the employer that the employee was pregnant, completes this 
important trio of cases in which the ECJ totally rejects the need for comparison 
(as a prerequisite for a finding of discrimination).43 
                                                 
37 Case C-177/88 Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus [1990] ECR I-3941. 
38 Ibid., para. 12. 
39 Case C-32/93 Carole Louise Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd. [1994] ECR I-3567, para. 24-25. 
40 Ibid., at 3573 (Para. 8 of the Opinion). 
41 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L 39/40. 
42 Case C-421/92 Gabriele Habermann-Beltermann v Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Bezirksverband 
Ndb./Opf. e.V.. [1994] ECR I-1657. 
43 The Habermann-Beltermann judgment has nevertheless attracted the ire of certain critics for 
its endorsement of Germany’s law prohibiting pregnant women from undertaking night work, 
especially when this may be the only type of work which they can undertake, due to family 
responsibilities.  See Fenwick and Hervey, supra n 35, at 456. 
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However, other entries in the ECJ’s canon of pregnancy cases are less clear-
cut, particularly where the topic at hand is pregnancy-related illness.  In the early 
case of Hertz v Aldi44, the Court seemed to decide that a pregnancy-related 
illness, manifesting itself after the end of maternity leave, could not be regarded 
as different from any other illness45.  Since male and female workers were 
equally exposed to illness, a woman suffering from such a complaint, at such a 
time, could not allege sexual discrimination if her absences resulted in dismissal 
(just as they would for a male colleague).  But, as carefully explained by 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his Opinion in Brown v Rentokil46, in 
the operative part of the Hertz judgment, the Court missed out the vital temporal 
caveat, so that it simply declared that the Equal Treatment Directive 
 
“does not preclude dismissals which are the result of absences due to an 
illness attributable to pregnancy or confinement”.47 
 
Inevitably, this led the Court to refuse to make a finding of discrimination where 
a woman was fired as a result of absences caused by a pregnancy-related 
illness manifesting itself before her maternity leave: Larsson48.  The situation 
was (at least partially) clarified in the abovementioned Brown case, which 
explicitly overruled Larsson.  Here, the Court faced the fact that, since a 
pregnancy-related illness is quite obviously part and parcel of pregnancy itself, 
to dismiss on the grounds of the former is to all intents and purposes to dismiss 
on the grounds of the latter, which would be contrary to Dekker, Habermann-
Beltermann and Webb.  Therefore, the Court held that dismissing a woman as a 
result of a pregnancy-related illness arising before maternity leave, would be 
direct discrimination.  However, the Court maintained the distinction based on 
the moment of first appearance of the illness, such that a pregnancy-related 
illness arising after the end of maternity leave would be treated no differently 
from any other illness. 
 
                                                 
44 Case C-179/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark [Acting for Birthe 
Vibeke Hertz] v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening [Acting for Aldi Marked K/S] [1990] ECR I-3979. 
45 Ibid., para. 16. 
46 Case C-394/96 Mary Brown v Rentokil Ltd. [1998] ECR I-4185. 
47 Case C-179/88 Hertz, supra n 44, Operative part of Judgment. 
48 Case C-400/95 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark, acting on behalf of 
Helle Elisabeth Larsson v Dansk Handel & Service, acting on behalf of Føtex Supermarked A/S 
[1997] ECR I-2757. 
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The saga of the pregnancy-related illnesses continued some five months after 
Brown with Pedersen49.  Here, a Danish law resulted in the situation whereby, 
over a period of six months, a woman absent from work due to a pregnancy-
related illness might receive, for the first three months, no pay, and, for the 
second three months, half pay (assuming, for the purposes of the example, the 
six months in question were the six months immediately preceding her 
confinement).  Meanwhile, any other ill employee would receive full pay for the 
entire six-month period.  The ECJ followed Brown in acknowledging that the 
disorders and complications arising during pregnancy are to be regarded as a 
“specific feature of that condition”50.  Thus, the considerable drop in pay suffered 
by the woman with the pregnancy-related illness represented discrimination51.  
That said, a woman suffering from so-called “routine... minor complaints”52, 
similarly denied pay, was not to be regarded as having been discriminated 
against, that is, if she would not have qualified as ill under the normal test for 
paid leave. 
 
A final example is the 2005 case of McKenna53.  Here, a pregnant employee of 
the North Western Health Board, who was absent for almost her whole term 
owing to a pregnancy-related illness, was downgraded from full pay to half pay 
after 183 days pursuant to the Board’s sick-leave scheme.  At the moment that 
her pay was halved, she was still some two months away from taking maternity 
leave.  Furthermore, the absence caused by the pregnancy-related illness was 
“set against” her total sick-leave entitlement (365 days per four years).  The 
Court considered that both matters fell within the scope of Article 141 EC54 and 
the Equal Pay Directive.  However, neither the Article nor the Directive was 
breached.  As regards the halving of the pay, the Court held that it was not 
necessary to pay women on maternity leave full pay, just as long as such pay as 
they did receive did not fall to such a level as to “undermine the purpose of 
                                                 
49 Case C-66/96 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark, acting on behalf of 
Berit Høj Pedersen v Fællesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger and Dansk 
Tandlægeforening and Kristelig Funktionær-Organisation v Dansk Handel & Service [1998] ECR I-
7327. 
50 Ibid., para. 33, citing Case C-394/96 Brown, supra n 46, para. 22. 
51 Please note that, as (with the exception of the final question) the issue raised in this case was 
pay rather than treatment, the Court dealt with it under Article 119 EEC (subsequently Article 
141 EC, and now Article 157 TFEU), and Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle 
of equal pay for men and women [1975] OJ L 45/19 (“the Equal Pay Directive”). 
52 See, for example, Case C-66/96 Pedersen, supra n 49, para. 42. 
53 Case C-191/03 North Western Health Board v Margaret McKenna [2005] ECR I-7631. 
54 As it then was – now Article 157 TFEU. 
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maternity leave”55.  From this the Court reasoned that it could not be illegal for a 
woman who is absent during her pregnancy by reason of a pregnancy-related 
illness to suffer a reduction in pay either, subject to a similar proviso.  As regards 
the offsetting of the absences against the total sick-leave entitlement, the Court 
held that if it was possible for an employer to reduce pay during pregnancy, it 
must be possible for an employer to allow such offsetting too. 
 
3.4.2. Preliminary Analysis 
 
The foregoing case-law illustrates not only that the running of a “like for like” test 
can entail problems, but that, in the case of pregnancy, these problems are so 
insuperable as to necessitate the relinquishing of the test altogether.  The 
abandoning of comparison in the Dekker case is certainly an achievement in the 
quest for substantive equality56, and many would regard it as only the first step 
in a much longer journey.  But the ECJ seems reluctant to develop its doctrine of 
“noncomparative discrimination” much beyond what might be called “pure 
pregnancy” cases.57  Even in the adjacent field of pregnancy-related illness, the 
ECJ has rushed to recover its fallen safety blanket.58  As Ellis has put it, 
referring to Hertz v Aldi: 
                                                 
55 McKenna, supra n 53, para. 50.  In reaching this conclusion the Court was inspired by the 
earlier case of Gillespie (Case C-342/93 Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social 
Services Boards, Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services 
Board and Southern Health and Social Services Board [1996] ECR I-475), as well as the Directive 
on the Protection of Pregnant Workers (Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the 
introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of 
pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth 
individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) [1992] OJ L 
348/1). 
56 “By recognising that difference matters in itself and requires changes in the way it is dealt 
with, in order to eliminate the disadvantage historically resulting from difference, Community 
law is clearly paying a debt to the feminist legal theory that has disentangled the principle of 
equality from comparative evaluation”: M Barbera, “Not the same?  The Judicial Role in the New 
Community Anti-Discrimination Law Context” (2002) 31 Industrial Law Journal 82, 90-1, 
footnotes omitted, extracted in A McColgan, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd 
edn Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) 26. 
57 Although note its recent (slight) expansion of the doctrine to include cases of in vitro 
fertilisation, even prior to the transferring of the fertilised ova to the uterus: Case C-506/06 
Sabine Mayr v Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [2008] ECR I-1017. 
58 Also in the field of maternity pay.  In Boyle, the employer offered pregnant workers three 
months and one week maternity leave on full pay, which was more than required by law, but 
only on condition that the excess be repaid if the woman in question failed to return to work 
afterwards.  No such condition was imposed on those taking sick leave.  However, utilizing a 
comparative approach, the Court held the two situations to be different, and thus upheld the 
contested clause: Case C-411/96 Boyle v Equal Opportunities Commission [1998] ECR I-6401. 
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“At one level of abstraction, a “pregnancy-related illness” can be said to 
be something from which a person cannot suffer but for her female sex; 
at another level of abstraction, it can be said that “illness” can be 
suffered alike by either sex.”59 
 
The Court in Hertz v Aldi chose to employ the second of these two “levels of 
abstraction”, thus providing a nice example of what in cinematographical terms 
might be called “zooming out”, that is, the taking into account of fewer attributes 
rather than more.  Ms Hertz and her hypothetical male comparator are both “ill”, 
rather than Ms Hertz being “ill and (formerly) pregnant” and the comparator 
being “ill but not (formerly) pregnant”.  In this way, Ms Hertz and the comparator 
can be regarded as “like”, and can receive the same treatment without violating 
the equality principle. 
 
Of course, as has been seen, the matter was a long way from resolved, with the 
final position being (roughly) that, in the case of pregnancy-related illnesses 
arising prior to the taking of maternity leave, the noncomparative approach 
would be employed, and, in the case of pregnancy-related illnesses arising after 
maternity leave, the comparative approach would be employed.  Only a few 
months after the birth, then, a new mother is abstracted out of her specific 
context (new motherhood, including the risk that a pregnancy-related illness may 
materialize).  At first glance, the choice of the last day of maternity leave for this 
switch from “incomparable” to “like” seems a little arbitrary, the coldly legal 
rationale being, of course, that this day marks the end of the special “protection” 
afforded to pregnant women60.  Doubts also linger as to how strictly this line-in-
the-sand is being policed.  In McKenna, for example, it was held that absences 
resulting from a pregnancy-related illness could be set against the employee’s 
total sick-leave entitlement, without this amounting to discrimination61.  Although 
Hertz and Brown are cited as authority, Ms McKenna’s absences were quite 
                                                 
59 Evelyn Ellis, “The definition of discrimination in European Community sex equality law”, 
European Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 6, December 1994, 563, 567. 
60 This word borrowed from Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive, subsequently Article 
2(7) of Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 
2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions (the “New Equal Treatment Directive”) [2002] OJ L 269/15.  
Most recently the word can be found at Article 28(1) of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation (recast) (the “Recast Directive”) [2006] OJ L 204/23. 
61 Please note that this finding was contrary to the Opinion of Advocate General Léger. 
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obviously prior to her maternity leave.  For the employer to be allowed to include 
these in some future aggregate calculation, pursuant to the sick-leave scheme, 
is surely tantamount to declaring that absences on the grounds of pregnancy-
related illness, prior to maternity leave, are no different from (in other words, are 
“like”) absences on the grounds of any other illness.  This seems to be a return 
to the position in Larsson, which Brown had supposedly overruled. 
 
The Court’s approach to the distinction between pregnancy-related illness and 
illness unrelated to pregnancy has been erratic in other ways.  Brown appeared 
to state once and for all that a woman suffering from a pregnancy-related illness 
and a man suffering from some other illness were not alike, as regards 
vulnerability to dismissal (at least until the abovementioned line-in-the-sand was 
reached).  But, since Pedersen, it has emerged that a woman suffering from a 
pregnancy-related illness and a man suffering from some other illness are alike, 
as regards right to pay, and level of pay.  It is worth considering the two cases in 
the light of the table at Appendix I.  In Brown, Ms Brown (Comparator 1) faced 
dismissal after twenty six weeks of absence, pursuant to a contractual clause.  
Any male employee (Comparator 2) would face exactly the same rule.  This was 
like treatment, for the purposes of Column 2.  So if the Court wanted to arrive at 
a finding of discrimination, it had to declare Comparator 1 and Comparator 2 to 
be unlike.  The rule was then “applied in the same way to different situations”62, 
thus constituting direct discrimination63.  However, in Pedersen, the factual set-
up was different.  Here, Ms Pedersen (Comparator 1) faced three months on no 
pay and three months on half pay, in the six months leading up to her 
confinement, pursuant to Law No. 516 of 23 July 1987.  Meanwhile, a male 
employee who fell ill (Comparator 2) would enjoy six months on full pay, 
pursuant to the same law.  This was unlike treatment.  So, now, if the Court 
wished to arrive at a finding of discrimination, it was going to have to declare the 
two Comparators to be like.  In fact the Court used noncomparative 
discrimination to get around this problem64.  However, the important point is that 
the ECJ could not repeat its remark from Brown about those suffering from 
pregnancy-related illnesses and those suffering from other illnesses being in 
“different situations”, because, given the factual situation of the Pedersen case, 
                                                 
62 Case C-394/96 Brown, supra n 46, para. 31. 
63 Ibid., para. 32. 
64 Case C-66/96 Pedersen, supra n 49, para. 35. 
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this would amount to unlike being treated in unlike fashion, which could not, ipso 
facto, be discrimination.65 
 
The distinction between a pregnant (female) worker and a non-pregnant (male) 
worker has also been problematic.  In Gillespie66, for example, where seventeen 
plaintiffs who took maternity leave during 1988 complained that they did not 
enjoy the benefit of a (back-dated) pay rise announced at the end of that year, 
the Court held that no provision of EC law “required that women should continue 
to receive full pay during maternity leave”67.  However, a woman on maternity 
leave should receive a pay rise awarded during that period, because “[t]o deny 
such an increase... would discriminate against her purely in her capacity as a 
worker since, had she not been pregnant, she would have received the pay 
rise”68.  Why only apply this reasoning to the second limb of the judgment (the 
pay rise), and not also to the first limb (the “normal” pay)?  In other words, in the 
same case, two comparisons are run.  The same person (let her be A) is both 
“pregnant worker”, and thus incomparable with B (a man), and “worker”, and 
thus like B (such that, when treated in unlike fashion, as when B benefits from a 
pay rise but A does not, there is discrimination).  Thus, the sort of adjustment 
referred to at the beginning of section 3.1 can be seen clearly here, carried out 
in the space of a single case. 
 
Turning finally to the doctrine of noncomparative discrimination itself, this has 
been discussed at length in other works69.  From a linguistic point of view, the 
doctrine seems at the very least paradoxical.  “Discrimination” comes from the 
Latin word discrimen, meaning “distinction”70.  A thing cannot be distinguished 
                                                 
65 Indeed, by the time of the McKenna case, the Court had to acknowledge that there was one 
rule for dismissals, and another rule for pay: see Case C-191/03 McKenna, supra n 53, para. 58.  
The (implicit) equation of those suffering from pregnancy-related illnesses and those suffering 
from other illnesses in Pedersen (as regards pay, at least) led, in that case, to a levelling up of 
the situation in favour of those suffering from pregnancy-related illnesses.  But note how, by the 
time of McKenna, this same equation could be used to level down, that is, to subject women 
with pregnancy-related illnesses to worse treatment than they might otherwise have expected. 
66 Case C-342/93 Gillespie, supra n 55. 
67 Ibid., para. 20.  The Court was clearly inspired here by the Directive on the Protection of 
Pregnant Workers (also cited at supra n 55), which only calls for the payment of an “adequate 
allowance” (Article 11).  However, this Directive did not apply ratione temporis to the Gillespie 
case. 
68 Ibid., para. 22. 
69 For example, T Macklem, Beyond Comparison: Sex and Discrimination (CUP, Cambridge 2003) 
16-19; Elisa Holmes, “Anti-Discrimination Rights Without Equality” (2005) 68(2) MLR 175, 186-7. 
70 CT Onions (ed), The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd rev edn Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1973) 564. 
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by itself, but only (it is submitted) in relation to something else.71  Put another 
way, anti-discrimination law proceeds along the lines of what has been called 
“pair-wise comparison”.  “Singleton-wise comparison” would simply not work; a 
thing cannot be compared on its own72.  However, many words have evolved 
away from their original meanings, so perhaps one should not set too much 
store by linguistics. 
 
However, other problems remain.  If a pregnant woman is incomparable, making 
any adverse treatment an instance of sex discrimination, what happens when an 
employer favours a non-pregnant woman over a pregnant one?  The latter has 
suffered sex discrimination even though both the advantaged party and the 
disadvantaged party are female.  There may thus be a need to differentiate sex 
discrimination from pregnancy discrimination. 
 
Perhaps the last word should be given to Ellis, whose opposition to the 
abandonment of comparison is well-known: 
 
“It is submitted that an element of comparability is important to the 
component of adverse impact; if direct discrimination is defined simply as 
“nasty treatment” on the ground of sex, enormous discretion is placed in 
the hands of courts and tribunals, who remain overwhelmingly male in 
composition, to decide what is to the detriment or advantage of 
complainants, the majority of whom are female.  For reasons of 
objectivity, it is preferable if the adversity of the treatment received by the 
complainant is measured by means of a comparison with the treatment 
received or receivable by a member of the opposite sex, placed in 
broadly the same circumstances as the complainant.”73 
 
3.4.3. A Walzerian analysis 
 
A Walzerian perusal of the same case-law reveals that complex equality can 
help to render the judgments more consistent and less confused, and can also 
offer a solution to the “noncomparative discrimination” problem.    
                                                 
71 See, for a strong defence of this position, R Wintemute, “When is Pregnancy Discrimination 
Indirect Sex Discrimination?” Industrial Law Journal, Vol 27, No 1, March 1998, 23: “Claims of 
discrimination without comparison are impossible” (at 25). 
72 Unless the comparison is, for example, between the thing as it is and the thing as it might be: 
Macklem, supra n 69, 141. 
73 Supra n 59, 571-2.  For criticism of this statement, see, for example, GF Mancini and S O’Leary, 
“The New Frontiers of Sex Equality Law in the European Union” European Law Review, Vol. 24, 
No. 4, August 1999, 331, 338. 
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The starting point for a Walzerian scrutiny of the Dekker case would be the 
ascertaining, by the relevant distributive community, of the shared meaning of 
the post of instructor.  This would likely include some element of aptitude or 
competence (for example, in the training of young adults), but would almost 
certainly not include any consideration of whether or not the post-holder was 
pregnant.  The inclusion of such a consideration in the fundamentum 
distributionis, then, breaches Walzer’s rule that the distributive principle of any 
good must follow from its shared meaning.  Complex equality having been 
contravened, the Walzerian analyst, like the Court, would find for Ms Dekker.  
The same result, mutatis mutandis, would be achieved in Webb and 
Habermann-Beltermann.   
 
The holy trinity of the ECJ’s pregnancy case-law remaining untouched, then, 
how would the Walzerian analyst deal with the other cases mentioned above?  
Here the results are not so clear-cut, as they turn on shared meanings which are 
hard to forecast.  In Brown, for example, the distribuend is continued 
employment with Rentokil74.  The company seems to be asking two questions of 
potential distributees, the first question being: do you have the ability to do the 
job?  The second question, however, is: are you free from pregnancy-related 
illnesses?75  The distributive community would probably see the meaning of the 
good at hand in terms of the first question only, and this would then determine 
the correct fundamentum distributionis: continued employment should go to 
those who are able to do the job.  As in Dekker, inclusion of an alien element 
within the fundamentum distributionis would flaw the distribution and render it 
                                                 
74 Or, looked at the other way round, dismissal. 
75 A possible third question is, are you available to do the job?  The distributive community 
might think it was fair that availability to do the job formed part of the shared meaning thereof, 
such that, in a case like Mahlburg, statutorily-enforced non-availability on grounds of pregnancy 
might be legitimately taken into account: Case C-207/98 Silke-Karin Mahlburg v Land 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern [2000] ECR I-549.  However, it also seems fair that a short-term 
absence should not be allowed to defeat a long-term contract (this was the reasoning in 
Habermann-Beltermann, followed in Mahlburg).  This is a classic clash-of-meanings, then, as 
between the distributor and the distributee.  It is true that, under orthodox complex equality, 
the final word would rest with the distributive community, possibly leaving pregnant women 
hostage to factions within a community which were hostile to working mothers.  However, 
under the alternative proposal of mediated complexity, this balancing act would be the sole job 
of the Bench, which might even be able to operate a kind of “hardship rule” to decide between 
conflicting meanings.  Clearly, an entire lost career would outweigh a few months of lost 
revenue.  See below section 8.3., and in particular footnote 34.   
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complexly inegalitarian; pregnancy would effectively become a negative 
dominant.76 
 
The same two questions are asked of the employee by Aldi in Hertz v Aldi, the 
only difference being that in Brown the illness arose before maternity leave, 
while in Hertz it arose after maternity leave.  Although the Court saw a 
difference, it is not clear that the Walzerian analyst would, meaning that the 
result for the latter would be identical to that reached in Brown, mutatis 
mutandis. 
 
Returning to Brown, it is just conceivable that some members of the community 
might argue that those with pregnancy-related illnesses were too ill to do the job, 
ergo were not able to do the job; in other words, even without the second 
question, they would argue, the potential distributee’s state of health is part of 
the meaning of the good and, consequently, a part of the way it should be 
distributed.  However, this definition of employment (continued or ab initio) is 
problematic, and overlaps with other debates which the same forum would have 
had, or would have to have in the future, about the very meaning of a job, 
debates which would have to take in at least a hundred years of developments 
in social protection, employment law, and workers’ rights generally.  In a 
nutshell, a job is not just an acquisition of labour-power by the employer to 
achieve his or her (economic) ends, but is also a means of livelihood (usually 
the sole means of livelihood) for the employee and his or her family.  It is unjust 
to simply cast him or her aside if he or she falls ill, not to mention dangerous, as 
ill employees struggle to conceal their medical problems and work on, for fear of 
losing their livelihoods.  Paid sick leave is now mandatory for employers, and so 
dismissal on the grounds that someone has fallen ill is illegal.77  Going back to 
the Brown case, then, those who included the potential employee’s state of 
health in the meaning of continued employment would have to do so across the 
board: no job would be open to the ill, and all employees becoming ill during 
their employment could be sacked on the spot.  This is very unlikely to be a 
viewpoint widely held within the distributive community as a whole. 
 
                                                 
76 Or a positive dominant if the distribuend was taken to be dismissal. 
77 That is, immediate dismissal; as time goes on, dismissal may become a legitimate option for 
the employer.  See the paragraph-after-next. 
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The most likely scenario, then, is that the distributive criterion adopted by 
Rentokil would be found to be at odds with the shared meaning of the 
distribuend, meaning that the Walzerian analyst, like the Court, would find for Ms 
Brown.  Pregnancy-related illnesses have nothing whatsoever to do with the 
performance of pest control services. 
 
This logic would seem to be applicable whether the pregnancy-related illness 
manifested itself before or after confinement/ maternity leave, but it is crucial to 
know if pregnancy-related illnesses are to be treated the same as other types of 
illnesses, or if they are to be accorded special protection.  Could an employee’s 
contract be terminated on the strength of periods of absence caused by a 
pregnancy-related illness, and, if so, would the requisite qualifying period begin 
to run from the beginning of the first leave of absence taken after the illness had 
manifested itself?  Assuming that that was the case, the employee’s dismissal 
after, say, 26 weeks would be entirely legal, even though it would be, to all 
intents and purposes, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy.  It would be for 
the distributive community to work out these arrangements, but, as at the end of 
the paragraph-before-last, it seems highly unlikely that the entire community, 
made up as it will be of men and women a large number of whom will want to 
start their own families, would agree to meanings of employment or continued 
employment which stipulate that employees must have a clean bill of health, 
where the term “clean bill of health” includes freedom from pregnancy-related 
illnesses.  While illnesses may eventually gain a legitimate status within the 
sphere of employment (much like intelligence within the sphere of education), 
such that any eventual inequalities based on ill-health would themselves be 
legitimate (“small inequalities”), any mention within the discussions of pregnancy 
should sound an urgent alarm.  “This is a major boundary – a boundary with the 
sphere of family and with the sphere of rights, to name but two”, such an alarm 
should say, “not just now but always.”  Pregnancy’s status within the sphere of 
employment should be illegitimate always.78  This would mean that pregnancy-
related illness could never feature in a fundamentum distributionis without 
causing a boundary breach and flawing the distribution.  To answer the question 
posed at the beginning of this paragraph, this would hopefully give special 
protection to those suffering from pregnancy-related illnesses not just before 
confinement/ maternity leave, but afterwards too.  While it might be acceptable 
                                                 
78 Except in the very rare situation that the job at hand required the post-holder to be pregnant, 
in other words, that pregnancy was brought into the shared meaning of the distribuend. 
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to fire an employee suffering from a “regular” illness after, say, 26 weeks, it 
would not be acceptable to fire an employee suffering from a pregnancy-related 
illness after that period, or (subject to the distributive community’s agreement) at 
all.  This would separate those suffering from “regular” illnesses and those 
suffering from pregnancy-related illnesses, and sick leave taken by the latter 
could not be used as grounds for termination of the employment contract. 
 
Considering Pedersen, here the very comparison being made was between a 
woman suffering from a pregnancy-related illness, and any other (hypothetical) 
ill employee.  Complex equality would require that the woman suffering from the 
pregnancy-related illness receive the same salary as the woman (or man) 
suffering from a “regular” illness, namely full pay.  This conclusion mirrors that 
reached by the Court. 
 
Turning to McKenna, it again seems probable that the distributive community as 
a whole would omit the reference to pregnancy, in ascertaining its shared 
meaning of pay and benefits, which North West Health Board includes in its 
distributive criterion.  This difference of opinion would lead, as before, to an 
infringement of complex equality.  It is worth noting how this verdict clashes with 
that of the Court, which held that inferior pay for those on maternity leave, and 
by extension for those absent by reason of a pregnancy-related illness, was not 
discriminatory.  
 
Another very interesting point about McKenna is that it shows nicely how 
Walzer’s theory can be used non-comparatively, that is, a complainant does not 
need a comparator in order for their situation to be assessed – breaches of 
complex equality (or otherwise) can be deduced form observing the situation 
and circumstances of one person alone.  Ms McKenna cannot point to any 
particular comparator.  There are options, naturally, such as a woman on 
maternity leave, a non-pregnant woman absent by reason of “traditional” illness, 
a man absent by reason of “traditional” illness, and so on.  However, it is not 
obvious which of these the comparator should be.  Walzer’s theory, meanwhile, 
allows her predicament to be exposed to the light of day without comparison 
being necessary, and the boundary breach, between the spheres of family and 
employment79, is immediately evident.80  Her “nasty treatment”, to use Ellis’ 
                                                 
79 Or rights and employment. 
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phrase81, can be seen, and without undue discretion having to be afforded to the 
(possibly male) judges. 
 
Finally, in Gillespie, the distributive community’s shared understanding of a 
back-dated pay rise, and its shared understanding of pay itself, would determine 
how these things are to be distributed.  These understandings may or may not 
make exceptions for those on maternity leave.  If they do, then pregnancy’s 
presence within the distributive sphere becomes legitimate.  But if they do not, 
then, as explained above, it would be illegitimate, representing a breach of 
boundaries and causing the distributions at issue to be flawed.  What seems 
likely, though, is that one shared meaning would make special allowance for 
pregnant women, while the other would not.  Thus use of a Walzerian approach 
to equality would avoid the sort of fractured result which the Court arrived at, 
finding discrimination in the case of the back-dated pay rise but not 






For many years, Member States finding themselves before the Court tried to rely 
on derogations vis-à-vis national pensionable ages, for example, at Article 
7(1)(a) of the Social Security Directive82, and at Article 9(1)(a) of the (at that 
time) new Occupational Social Security Directive83.  The ECJ on the other hand 
largely ignored this and often seemed indirectly to be impugning discrimination 
in a State’s determination of pensionable age for the purposes of granting old-
age pensions.  However, a crucial complication in the ECJ’s case-law on 
                                                                                                                                    
80 Hopefully, then, Walzer’s theory answers Patricia Cain’s call “to move beyond equality, which 
inevitably compares women to men, and to focus on women themselves”: PA Cain, “Feminism 
and the limits of equality” 24 Ga L Rev 1989-1990, 803, 806. 
81 See supra, text accompanying n 73. 
82 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security [1979] OJ L 6/24. 
83 Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes [1986] OJ L 225/40.  This 
was later updated by Council Directive 96/97/EC of 20 December 1996 amending Directive 
86/378/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in 
occupational social security schemes [1997] OJ L 46/20.  Both of these have now been 
overtaken by the Recast Directive. 
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pensions emerges where the difference brought before the Court is not a 
difference in normal pensionable ages for men and women, but a second 
difference which subsumes the first. 
 
This complication can be seen in the early case of Burton v British Railways 
Board84, in which the Board undertook an “internal reorganization”, as a result of 
which it offered voluntary redundancy to male workers aged 60 and female 
workers aged 55.  Mr Burton, aged 58, applied for voluntary redundancy but was 
rejected.  Performing the “like for like” test in order to ascertain whether or not 
there had been discrimination, the Court faced two ways of looking at the 
Board’s offer.  The first way of looking at the Board’s offer was as follows.  For a 
male worker to be eligible for the payment of the voluntary redundancy benefit, 
he must have reached the age of 60, while for a female worker to be eligible for 
the payment of a voluntary redundancy benefit, she must have reached the age 
of 55 (the “first formulation”).  On the first formulation, one could simply declare 
the offer to be a case of like workers, treated in unlike fashion.  However, one 
could also conclude that both kinds of worker were eligible for the payment of 
the voluntary retirement benefit if they applied within 5 years preceding their 
normal minimum age of retirement.  On this, second formulation, which the 
Court in Burton preferred, both kinds of worker were treated the same, that is, 
likes were treated alike.  There was thus no discrimination. 
 
The second formulation could be called a “relative formulation”.  While the first 
formulation is based on two, fixed numbers (60 and 55), the second formulation 
is based on one number (5), but this number is relative to two other, fixed 
numbers (65 and 60).  The comparison, which appears to disclose no 
discrimination, is thus in reality relative to an existing distribution, which is 
discriminatory85. 
 
It is easy to think of other examples.  Suppose two men, A and B, both go to see 
a doctor for a vaccination prior to a foreign trip.  The doctor wishes to see the 
patients one year after the first injection for a booster.  It would not make sense 
to make the second appointments of A and B on the same date, if the first 
                                                 
84 Case 19/81 Arthur Burton v British Railways Board [1982] ECR 554. 
85 A relative formulation does not in fact have to contain any numbers as long as the distribution 
is based, for all comparators, on a single concept, the which concept on closer inspection varies 
significantly from one class of comparator to the next.  For this reason, the use of relative 
formulations is a popular method of practicing indirect discrimination. 
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appointments of A and B were on different dates.  The original disparity here is 
functional.  Even a one-hundred-metre race does not require all runners to finish 
at precisely the same spot, just one hundred metres from their respective 
starting points.  Calling it a “one-hundred-metre race” disguises the underlying 
disparities among the starting points; but, again, these disparities are functional. 
 
So the problem in Burton is not the taking into account of less or more attributes.  
There are two attributes per worker whichever of the two “ways of looking” is 
employed: their gender, and then, either, their actual age of qualification for the 
voluntary redundancy benefit, or, the relative formulation of “five years from 
normal retirement age”.  But, if the latter, this “attribute” smuggles into the 
comparison a (disguised) difference.  It is submitted that this difference is 
illegitimate86, making the use of the disguise effectively a trick.  In the doctor and 
race examples above, the hidden differences are functional and the use of the 
relative formulation is justified by a desire for clarity and ease.  The (hidden) 
different numbers are actually irrelevant.  It is the (given) same number which is 
relevant.  The same cannot be said for Burton87. 
 
Four years after Burton came Roberts v Tate & Lyle88.  Here, Ms Roberts found 
herself made redundant at the age of 53 under a mass redundancy; she was a 
member of Tate & Lyle’s “contracted out” occupational pension scheme (that is, 
contracted out of the State retirement pension scheme).  Under the final 
severance terms, all employees made redundant were to be offered either a 
cash payment or an early pension, in other words, pensions were immediately 
                                                 
86 One of the supposed purposes of the pensionable age difference in the UK was apparently “to 
enable a married couple to retire at the same time (it being assumed that husbands were 
normally slightly older than their wives)”: Evelyn Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (Oxford EC 
Law Library, OUP Oxford, 2005) 380.  Such an assumption does not function in a 21st century 
world where age differences between brides and grooms vary considerably.  It also takes no 
account of same-sex partnerships, or those workers who for whatever reason are single when 
they retire.  That said, other, more credible purposes have been suggested for the difference.  In 
the Pension Reform case of 1987, for example, the German Constitutional Court held that 
women should be allowed to retire earlier than men because of the “double burden” which 
they endured from pregnancy and child care: 74 BVerfGE 163 (1987).  See further DP Kommers, 
The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2nd edn Duke University 
Press, Durham and London 1997) 295. 
87 For further criticism of the Burton decision, see, for example, T Millett, “Sex equality: the 
influence of Community law in Great Britain” Yearbook of European Law 1986, 06, 219, and 
“European Community law: sex equality and retirement age” International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 1987, 36/03, 616.      
88 Case 151/84 Joan Roberts v Tate & Lyle Industries Limited [1986] ECR 703. 
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payable to both men and women over the age of 55.  Ms Roberts pleaded 
discrimination. 
 
Roberts v Tate & Lyle acts as a kind of obverse to Burton.  Clearly, what Ms 
Roberts wanted was for the ECJ to view the severance terms on what in Burton 
had been the second formulation, that is, employing the technique of the 
“relative formulation”.  It would then see that the relative formulation (seemingly) 
employed by Tate & Lyle had been: “Pensions should be immediately payable to 
male workers who are ten years away from the normal State pensionable age, 
and to female workers who are five years away from the normal State 
pensionable age”.  Ms Roberts hoped that the Court would find this to be 
discriminatory, and call for its replacement with a non-discriminatory relative 
formulation such as: “Pensions should be immediately payable to all workers 
who are ten years away from the national pensionable age”.  This would 
produce the result that early pensions would be accorded to men aged 55, but 
also to women aged 50, thus bringing her within the scope for an immediate 
pension.  But the ECJ, having been only too glad to endorse the relative 
formulation in Burton, now seemed to turn against the idea of relative 
formulations.  Covert differences should be exposed to the light of day.  On this 
reading, of course, Tate & Lyle’s severance terms seemed egalitarian (65 minus 
ten was 55; 60 minus five was 55).  This could not be discrimination because it 
was “the grant of a pension to persons of the same age who are made 
redundant” and amounted merely to “a collective measure adopted irrespective 
of the sex of those persons in order to guarantee them all the same rights”89. 
 
It was Tate & Lyle, then, which had refused to ossify an original disparity here 
(namely the disparity in the State pensionable ages)90.  But was the Court, by 
endorsing this, subtly showing its disapproval for the original disparity?  And is it 
not merely a cosmetic remedy to equalize a secondary difference, while leaving 
the original difference intact?  Does it even make sense?91 
 
                                                 
89 Both quotations from ibid., para. 36 (emphasis added). 
90 In fact, Tate & Lyle had ossified the original disparity in the first version of the severance 
terms.  However, its male workers, who would not then have received their early pensions until 
the age of 60, had complained.  See ibid., para. 5. 
91 Such a course of action is akin to the abovementioned doctor making the second 
appointments of both of his patients on the same date. 
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Another four years passed, and the Court was confronted with the case of 
Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange92.  Mr Barber had worked for Guardian 
Royal Exchange (“Guardian”), and its predecessor company, since 1948.  A 
member of Guardian’s Pension Fund (another contracted-out occupational 
pension scheme), he found himself dismissed by reason of redundancy at the 
age of 52.  However, according to Guardian’s Guide to Severance Terms, those 
made redundant up to ten years preceding their normal pensionable age would 
receive an immediate pension.  Those who had not yet attained this age 
(namely, 55 for men and 50 for women) would have to make do with a so-called 
“deferred pension”.  The English Court of Appeal asked the ECJ whether it was 
discriminatory that where a man and a woman of the same age were made 
compulsorily redundant in the same circumstances, the woman received an 
immediate pension while the man received only a deferred pension. 
 
The Court held that the age condition in Guardian’s Severance Terms infringed 
Article 119 EC93 “even if the difference between the pensionable age for men 
and that for women is based on the one provided for by the national statutory 
scheme”94.  Relative formulations were thus driven out once and for all, or so it 
seemed. 
 
Three years after Barber came Birds Eye Walls v Roberts95.  Here, Mrs Roberts, 
a packer for Birds Eye Walls, was affiliated to Unilever’s (contracted out) 
occupational pension scheme.  Pursuant to this, those who were compelled on 
the grounds of ill health to take early retirement before reaching the statutory 
State pensionable age would receive from the employer an ex gratia payment 
called a bridging pension.  This included an amount corresponding to a 
proportion of the State pension.  However, from the age of 60 onwards, a female 
worker received a smaller bridging pension, on the grounds that she was now in 
receipt of the State pension itself.  Mrs Roberts alleged that this was a breach of 
Article 119 EC96. 
 
                                                 
92 Case C-262/88 Douglas Harvey Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] 
ECR I-1889. 
93 As it then was – subsequently Article 141 EC, and now Article 157 TFEU. 
94 CaseC-262/88 Barber, supra n 92, para. 32 (emphasis added). 
95 Case C-132/92 Birds Eye Walls Ltd. v Friedel M. Roberts [1993] ECR I-5579. 
96 As it then was – subsequently Article 141 EC, and now Article 157 TFEU. 
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Neither the Advocate General (Van Gerven AG) nor the Court agreed with Mrs 
Roberts.  Advocate General Van Gerven was swayed by an argument of the 
Commission’s that Birds Eye Walls 
 
“is attempting to achieve substantive equality between the sexes by 
compensating for an inequality (difference in pensionable ages)”97. 
 
In other words, although Birds Eye Walls’ behaviour in granting the relevant 
female workers less once they reached the age of 60 is an instance of 
inequality, it is designed to remove or prevent98, or compensate for99, another 
inequality, namely the fact that, without this reduction, men would receive less 
than their female counterparts between the ages of 60 and 65100.  The second 
inequality is, as the quotation from the Report for the hearing above shows, 
merely the difference in State pensionable age (in the UK), by another name.  
After quickly distinguishing Barber, the Advocate General concludes that Birds 
Eye Walls’ aim is actually to ensure equal pensions for men and women101.  The 
discrimination is thus justified, and Article 157 TFEU is not breached102. 
 
The Court goes slightly further in that it refuses to make a finding of 
discrimination at all.  Recalling the “like for like” test, the ECJ declares that, 
 
“the general principle of equal treatment laid down by Article 119 of the 
Treaty... presupposes that the men and women to whom it applies are in 
identical situations”103. 
 
But the financial position of a woman compelled on the grounds of ill health to 
take early retirement is not comparable to that of a man in the same situation, 
between the ages of 60 and 65104: 
 
“That difference as regards the objective premise, which necessarily 
entails that the amount of the bridging pension is not the same for men 
and women, cannot be considered discriminatory.”105 
                                                 
97 Ibid., at 5586 (Section II-3 of the Report for the hearing). 
98 Van Gerven AG’s choice of verbs: ibid., at 5595 (Para. 16 of the Opinion). 
99 The Commission’s choice of verb: ibid., at 5586 (Section II-3 of the Report for the hearing). 
100 When the female counterparts would receive bridging pension plus State pension, while they 
(the men) would receive bridging pension only. 
101 Case C-132/92 Birds Eye Walls, supra n 95, at 5596 (Para. 17 of the Opinion). 
102 Ibid., at 5596 (Para. 18 of the Opinion). 
103 Ibid., para. 17.  Article 119 EC subsequently became Article 141 EC, and now Article 157 
TFEU. 
104 Ibid., para. 20. 
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Thus, Birds Eye Walls’ behaviour in reducing the amount of the bridging pension 
granted to the relevant female workers, after they reach the age of 60, does not 
breach Article 157 TFEU.106 
 
The Court has thus lurched back to its earlier position of favouring relative 
formulations107.  But, going back to the analysis of Burton above, is the use of 
this relative formulation a “trick” to perpetuate a (non-functional) disguised 
difference?  Both the Advocate General and the Court would appear to reply to 
this question in the negative.  Birds Eye Walls, they would argue, far from 
playing a trick to perpetuate the UK’s difference in pensionable ages, is actually 
trying to fashion the uneven landscape in which it finds itself, to generate 
evenness: fighting fire with fire, as it were.  And, of course, applying a second 
inequality to an existing situation of inequality in order to bring about equality is 
not new: it is, as the Commission rightly stated108, substantive equality. 
 
Nevertheless, this is a troubling result, because, as Mrs Roberts correctly 
pointed out, Birds Eye Walls is “rely[ing] on differences in pensionable age for 
national schemes [which] is tantamount, in effect, to relying on discrimination 
based on sex”109.  And the Court had stated in Barber that Article 119 EC110 
prohibited any discrimination with regard to pay as between men and women, 
whatever the system employed, even if said system is “based on... the national 
statutory scheme”111.   
 
                                                                                                                                    
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., Para. 21. 
107 Although, as the Advocate General nicely describes, the facts of this case lend themselves to 
both a non-relative and a relative reading, the former leading to a conclusion of direct 
discrimination, and the latter leading to a conclusion of indirect discrimination: “[I]t is possible 
to focus on the fact that the appellant pays to all female ex-employees aged between 60 and 65 
a lower bridging pension than to their male counterparts [non-relative formulation]... By the 
same token, however, emphasis can be laid on the fact that it calculates the bridging pension 
for all its ex-employees in the same way, namely by deducting from their [gross retirement 
pension] such pension payments as they can claim from the State or from Unilever [relative 
formulation]”.  Ibid., at 5593 (Para. 13 of the Opinion). 
108 Ibid., at 5586 (Section II-3 of the Report for the hearing); see also ibid., para. 15. 
109 Ibid., at 5585 (Section II-2 of the Report for the hearing). 
110 As it then was – subsequently Article 141 EC, and now Article 157 TFEU. 
111 Case C-262/88 Barber, supra n 92, para. 32.  The Court again appears to go back on Barber, 
thus upholding Birds Eye Walls, in the more recent case of Hlozek, where a difference as 
between the ages at which men and women were to be awarded bridging allowances, prima 
facie based on the respective Austrian pensionable ages, was endorsed: Case C-19/02 Viktor 
Hlozek v Roche Austria Gesellschaft mbH [2004] ECR I-11491. 
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A second note of caution must also be sounded.  The Court relies on the 
assumption that a female worker like Ms Roberts receives a State pension in the 
first place.  But this is not necessarily the case.  In the UK, married women who 
worked were given two options, the first being to pay their national insurance 
contributions at the full rate and then to receive a full State pension in their own 
right, and the second being to pay national insurance contributions at a reduced 
rate, but to receive a reduced State pension (or no State pension at all) when 
pensionable age was reached.  In the precise circumstances of the case, Ms 
Roberts had taken the second option and therefore was not in receipt of a State 
pension, although, fortuitously, she was in receipt of a widow’s pension, which 
was equal in amount.  The Court had been asked about the possibility of a 
claimant having no State pension to countervail, as it were, the reduction in the 
bridging pension, but took a most dismissive line on this, holding that the two 
options were “a matter in which married women… have freedom of choice”112.  
The Court’s reasoning then becomes confused, with the judges first saying that 
they would not look to actual amounts when ruling on this kind of 
discrimination113, but later – apparently – taking account of Mrs Roberts’ receipt 
of a widow’s pension in this case114.  The worry is that another female claimant, 
identical to Mrs Roberts but for the fact that her husband was still alive, would 
have found herself at 60, with no State pension or widow’s pension, but facing a 
massive drop in the bridging pension which was her only means of support.  The 
Court’s ruling is only logical as long as the one thing replaces the other.  As 
soon as there is no replacement, discrimination as between a female claimant 
and a male comparator, still in receipt of the full bridging pension, is obvious. 
3.5.2. A Walzerian analysis 
 
A Walzerian reading of the same pensions cases reveals two agreements with 
the Court, and two disagreements; it also suggests a greater degree of 
consistency when Walzer’s test is applied than would be the case under 
Aristotle. 
                                                 
112 Case C-132/92 Birds Eye Walls, supra n 95, para. 27. 
113 Ibid., para. 28. 
114 Ibid., para. 31. 
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In Burton, the result would depend on the relevant distributive community’s 
shared understanding of a voluntary redundancy benefit.  This community would 
have to decide if the most important thing was that all workers should receive it 
at the same biological age (say, 55 – the “biological age understanding”), or if 
the most important thing was that all workers should receive it in the 5-year 
period immediately preceding their national pensionable age.  If the meaning is 
to provide a safety net for those workers who are selected for voluntary 
redundancy, then the availability of the benefit in the run-up to the attainment of 
the national pensionable age, in other words, in the period during which 
redundancy is most likely to take effect, is critical (the “run-up rationale”).  This 
would suggest that the second of the above two options is the better, or at least 
the more logical, one, but of course it would be up to the community.  However, 
one cannot help thinking that this might merely be a case of setting the rules 
within a well-defined and autonomous distributive sphere, meaning that any 
inequality that emerged in the final agreement would be a small inequality only, 
not a boundary breach.115  It appears, then, that the Walzerian analysis of the 
case would not produce a different outcome from the Aristotelian one.  If it is 
presumed (subject to confirmation by the distributive community) that there is no 
boundary breach here, and therefore no violation of complex equality, it can be 
seen that this is an identical conclusion to the one reached by the Court, 
namely, that there was no discrimination in evidence in British Railways’ 
arrangements for voluntary redundancy. 
 
Roberts, on the other hand, is an example of a case where the Walzerian 
analyst would (or at least might) reach a different verdict to the one reached by 
his or her Aristotelian counterpart.  The case, as has already been seen, is a 
model of the confusion produced by the “like for like” test, since both of the 
interpretations of Tate & Lyle’s pension scheme (that of Tate & Lyle, and that of 
Ms Roberts) appear to satisfy it.  Tate & Lyle sees an instance of likes treated 
alike (both a woman aged 53 and a man aged 53 would fail to acquire the early 
pension).  Ms Roberts, meanwhile, sees an instance of likes treated unlike (a 
man seven years below his national pensionable age would acquire the pension, 
                                                 
115 But this would come down to whether the reason for the inequality was intrinsic to the 
sphere of voluntary redundancy benefits (as the run-up rationale would be) or extrinsic thereto.  
A reason which turned on gender alone would imply an illegitimate crossing from the sphere of 
attributes to the sphere of voluntary redundancy benefits.  See the discussion on Roberts, 
immediately below. 
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while a woman seven years below her national pensionable age would not).  A 
Walzerian take on the case, on the other hand, would start with the distributive 
community, and its shared understanding of an early pension.  What does 
“early” mean?  Does it mean 55, irrespective of gender (again, the “biological-
age understanding”)?  Or does it mean five years prior to the employee’s 
national pensionable age?  If the latter, could the “extra” five years of eligibility 
enjoyed by men at the time of Ms Roberts’ action (namely, the period from age 
55 to age 60) represent a sly advantage, making masculinity a positive 
dominant?116  It is at least possible, then, taking as read the Standard 
Contingent Reply, that Tate & Lyle’s pension scheme sanctions a distribution 
flawed by dint of a boundary breach.  If this is the final conclusion, then it would 
obviously conflict with the Court’s actual decision, which was the Tate & Lyle 
had not violated the principal of equal treatment.117 
 
Barber is almost a mirror image of Roberts, in that instead of the current system 
being based on the biological-age understanding, and the complainant calling 
for the run-up rationale, here the current system was based on the run-up 
rationale, but with Mr Barber calling for the biological-age understanding to be 
used in its place.  It would be up to the distributive community to decide what it 
understood by an immediate pension, and indeed what “immediate” should 
mean in this context.  If the meaning is to provide protection for those workers 
who are made redundant, then the availability of the benefit in the run-up to the 
attainment of the national pensionable age, in other words, in the period during 
which redundancy is most likely to take effect, would seem, as in Burton, to be 
critical.118  Alternatively, the community might call for the immediate pension to 
be available to everyone at 55, regardless of gender, and come to the 
conclusion that the “extra” five years of eligibility which the existing approach 
                                                 
116 For a discussion of how an attribute can be a positive, or negative, dominant, see supra, 
section 3.3. 
117 It is important to note, though, that, on this analysis, even after the flaw in the distribution 
was resolved (ie early pensions were granted to men at sixty, and women at fifty five), this 
would still not help Ms Roberts.  An alternative approach would be to level down rather than 
up, so that ten years prior to the employee’s national pensionable age was set as the threshold 
for an early pension.  That way, women would enjoy the “extra” five years too, and Ms Roberts 
would qualify for a pension at 53.  As usual, this would be up to the distributive community. 
118 Furthermore, it is not as though a male worker made redundant before the beginning of his 
run-up period (like Mr Barber) would be left completely without help.  They would still have 
access to the “deferred” pension in the meantime. 
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bestows on women (namely, the period from age 50 to age 55119) was a secret 
benefit, turning the possession of female gender into a positive dominant.  The 
Standard Contingent Reply prevails as usual, but the stronger of the two 
positions would seem to be the first one.  If the distributive community assents, 
then the status quo would be vindicated and complex equality upheld.  This 
would once again be at odds with the Court’s finding of discrimination on the 
part of Guardian Royal Exchange.  It is worth noting how the Walzerian test 
produces consistency as between Barber and Burton (no breach of complex 
equality in either), where using the Aristotelian test in those cases led the Court 
to give two conflicting judgments (discrimination in Barber, no discrimination in 
Burton), even though the pension schemes utilized by the two employers were 
similar (although the one in Barber was contracted-out while the one in Burton 
was not), and the complaints made by the two (male) plaintiffs were almost 
identical.  The “problematic” nature of the Burton judgment “in view of the more 
recent case law on pensions” is thus overcome.120 
 
Finally, there is Birds Eye.  In this case, the starting point of a Walzerian 
examination would be for the distributive community to decide upon its shared 
understanding of a bridging pension.  It would probably conclude that this was a 
means of providing relief to those workers who had taken early retirement on 
grounds of ill health, until the maturing of their State pension (at age 60 for a 
woman, and at age 65 for a man).  It would therefore probably further conclude 
that the fact that the date on which the bridging pension began to be reduced 
corresponded to the date on which the State pension became payable was at 
the very least logical.  A female worker’s receiving a smaller bridging pension 
than a male worker between the ages of 60 and 65 would thus seem to be in 
keeping with the (likely) shared meaning of the distribuend in question.  Taking 
as read the Standard Contingent Reply, it appears plausible that a Walzerian 
examination of this case would disclose no breach of complex equality; this 
would be the same result as that reached by the Court, which found no 
discrimination in the behaviour of Birds Eye Walls.121 
                                                 
119 These five years are not really “extra” as the ones in Roberts were (see previous paragraph).  
They may occur earlier in the female worker’s life, but the aggregate number of qualifying years 
remains ten for both sexes. 
120 Quotations from I Heide, “Sex equality and social security: selected rulings of the European 
Court of Justice” 2004 International Labour Review v.143, n. 4, 299, 327. 
121 Likewise a Walzerian analysis of Case C-19/02 Hlozek, supra n 111, would most likely result in 
the distributive community’s declaring that the meaning of a bridging allowance was to provide 
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However, it must also be remembered that the Court was happy to declare that 
women and men, that is, all women and all men, were not in “identical 
situations”122, in other words, were not alike, “between the ages of 60 and 65”123.  
As discussed above, this reasoning ignores the possibility that a female 
claimant, like in fact Mrs Roberts, might not be in receipt of a State pension 
between those ages.  The Aristotelian sledgehammer effect is thus seen once 
again.  Aristotelian logic, as clearly invoked by the Court at paragraph 17 of its 
judgment, is unable to discern the subtle differences that may arise from one 
case to another; it is incapable of reaching a conclusion of “like in some cases, 
unlike in others”.  A Walzerian approach, it is submitted, would have picked up 
on the difficulty here.  As ventured in the previous paragraph, the distributive 
community might well decide that, to it, a bridging pension means “a means of 
providing relief to those workers who have taken early retirement on grounds of 
ill health, until the maturing of their State pension”.  But it follows that, if there is 
no State pension to mature, then the bridging pension must continue providing 
relief indefinitely.  And if that is what a bridging pension means, then distributing 
it in any other way violates complex equality.  The fact of not being in 
possession of a matured State pension is the attribute which the complex 
egalitarian (assuming the meaning above is the correct one) would see as 
legitimate, that is, as legitimately able to swing the distribution.  That is the 
attribute that forms part of the meaning, not the fact of being female or the fact 
of being male.  If a future female claimant, then, without a matured State 
pension at 60, were to lay claim to her bridging pension after her sixtieth 
birthday, she would not be denied it, as she would still be able to show the 
requisite badge of entitlement. 
 
3.6. The question of part-time and full-time work 
 
                                                                                                                                    
a financial bridge between the termination of the worker’s employment and the receipt of the 
State pension (again, the run-up rationale).  Thus the difference, as between the sexes, of the 
age at which the worker was entitled to the bridging allowance made perfect sense, as long as 
the State pensionable ages themselves were different.  Of course, for the latter to be altered, 
being as they are a separate distribution, would be a job for a separate, and presumably much 
larger, forum. 
122 Case C-132/92 Birds Eye Walls, supra n 95, para. 17. 




A good starting point for this section is the case of Bilka124, which neatly 
straddles the dividing line between cases concerning pensions, on the one 
hand, and cases concerning part-time work and full-time work, on the other. 
 
Mrs Weber von Hertz had worked for Bilka, the German department store, for 
fifteen years, that is, from 1961 until 1976.  Although for the first eleven years 
she had worked full-time, from October 1972 onwards she worked part-time.  
Bilka declared that, in order to obtain a pension under its occupational pension 
scheme, an employee must have worked full-time for at least fifteen years (over 
a total period of twenty years).  Mrs Weber von Hertz alleged a breach of EC law 
on the grounds that women workers “were more likely than their male 
colleagues to take part-time work so as to be able to care for their family and 
children”125. 
 
The ECJ considers the main issue, which is of course discrimination.  Although 
the Court does not use the term, it is indirect discrimination which is at stake 
here; Bilka is making receipt of the pension conditional upon a requirement 
(fifteen years’ full-time work) applied equally to all, but with which a considerably 
smaller proportion of women than men (it is argued) can comply.  It will be seen 
that the exact wording of the second limb of the test for indirect discrimination 
varies in the ECJ’s case-law126.  In Bilka itself, the Court settles on the phrase 
“much lower proportion”: 
 
                                                 
124 Case 170/84 Bilka - Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607. 
125 Ibid., para. 6. 
126 Since 1997, there has been a legislative definition, at Article 2 of the Directive on Indirect 
Discrimination and Burden of Proof (Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the 
burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex [1998] OJ L 14/6).  This reads: “[I]ndirect 
discrimination shall exist where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice 
disadvantages a substantially higher proportion of the members of one sex unless that 
provision, criterion or practice is appropriate and necessary and can be justified by objective 
factors unrelated to sex”.  This definition was replaced in the New Equal Treatment Directive by 
a second one: “[I]ndirect discrimination [shall exist] where an apparently neutral provision, 
criterion or practice would put persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with 
persons of the other sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a 
legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”.  The New 
Equal Treatment Directive has since been overtaken by the Recast Directive, where the 
definition of indirect discrimination can be found at Article 2(1)(b); it is identical to the 
definition in the New Equal Treatment Directive.  
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“If, therefore, it should be found that a much lower proportion of women 
than of men work full time, the exclusion of part-time workers from the 
occupational pension scheme would be contrary to Article 119 of the 
Treaty where [...] that measure could not be explained by factors which 
exclude any discrimination on grounds of sex.”127 
 
As to this “explanation”, known as an “objective justification”, Bilka argues that 
the exclusion of the part-time workers from the scheme “is intended solely to 
discourage part-time work, since in general part-time workers refuse to work in 
the late afternoon and on Saturdays”128; the company was thus trying to make 
full-time work “more attractive”129.  The ECJ gives little guidance on objective 
justifications, however, and their assessment remains a job for the national 
court: 
 
“If the national court finds that the measures chosen by Bilka correspond 
to a real need on the part of the undertaking, are appropriate with a view 
to achieving the objectives pursued and are necessary to that end, the 
fact that the measures affect a far greater number of women than men is 
not sufficient to show that they constitute an infringement of Article 
119.”130 
 
Finally, in an intrepid move, Mrs Weber von Hertz called for “periods during 
which workers have had to meet family responsibilities” to be regarded as 
“periods of full-time work”131.  However, the Court dismissed this with the now-
famous remark: 
 
“Article 119 does not have the effect of requiring an employer to organize 
its occupational pension scheme in such a manner as to take into 
account the particular difficulties faced by persons with family 
responsibilities...”132 
 
Bilka built on the slightly earlier case of Jenkins133, where part-time employees 
(all but one of whom were female) were paid at a lower hourly rate than full-time 
employees, although both types of employee were doing the same work.  The 
Court saw no problem with an employer’s full-time rate being higher than its 
part-time rate, as long as there was no distinction between men and women 
                                                 
127 Case 170/84 Bilka, supra n 124, para. 29.  Article 119 EC subsequently became Article 141 EC, 
and now Article 157 TFEU. 
128 Ibid., para. 33. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., para. 36. 
131 Ibid., para. 39. 
132 Ibid., para. 43. 
133 Case 96/80 JP Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd [1981] ECR 911. 
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(that is, as long as male and female part-timers were treated equally, and male 
and female full-timers were treated equally).  However, if it were established that 
a “considerably smaller percentage”134 of women than men performed “the 
minimum number of weekly working hours required in order to be able to claim 
the full-time hourly rate”135, then there would be a breach of (what is now) Article 
157 TFEU, in the absence of an explanation not based on sex.  It was for the 
national court to decide, regard being had, inter alia, to “the employer’s 
intention”136, whether or not a difference based on weekly working hours was “in 
reality”137 discrimination based on the sex of the worker.138 
 
In Stadt Lengerich v Helmig139, six (part-time) female employees sued their 
employers on the ground that part-time employees were not receiving the same 
rate of pay for overtime as full-time employees.  In other words, a full-time 
employee, working in excess of the “ordinary working week of full-time 
workers”140 (in this case, 38.5 hours), would receive payment at between 15 and 
25% above the hourly rate.  Meanwhile, a part-time employee, working in 
excess of their contractual working hours (which varied), would receive payment 
at the normal rate.  (In the event that the part-time employee continued to work 
beyond the 38.5 hour threshold, then they would become entitled to the higher 
rate.)  The plaintiffs alleged that this state of affairs breached Article 119 EC141 
and the Equal Pay Directive. 
 
Advocate General Darmon dealt with the issue swiftly.  Part-time employees 
were not treated differently, per se, from full-time employees.  Both received 
                                                 
134 Ibid., para. 13. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid., para. 14. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Lester has called the Jenkins judgment “equivocal” and “sibylline”, particularly owing to this 
reference to the employer’s intention, which appeared to shield unintentional indirect 
discrimination from censure.  He explains that the Court’s judgment was not “able to be used” 
by the Employment Appeal Tribunal (when the case returned to the UK), so that “no-one was 
any the wiser”: A Lester, “The Uncertain Trumpet – References to the Court of Justice from the 
United Kingdom: Equal Pay and Equal Treatment without Sex Discrimination” in Schemers (ed), 
Article 177 EEC: Experiences and Problems (North Holland, 1987) 164, 177-183. 
139 Joined Cases C-399/92, C-409/92, C-425/92, C-34/93, C-50/93 and C-78/93 Stadt Lengerich v 
Angelika Helmig and Waltraud Schmidt v Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse and Elke Herzog v 
Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Landverband Hamburg eV and Dagmar Lange v Bundesknappschaft 
Bochum and Angelika Kussfeld v Firma Detlef Bogdol GmbH and Ursula Ludewig v Kreis Segeberg 
[1994] ECR I-5727. 
140 Phrase used by Darmon AG.  Ibid., at 5729 (Para. 3 of the Opinion). 
141 As it then was – subsequently Article 141 EC, and now Article 157 TFEU. 
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overtime supplements when the weekly working time fixed by collective 
agreement for full-time workers was exceeded.  Far from remedying an 
inequality, to grant part-time employees overtime supplements when their 
weekly working time was exceeded would actually “give rise to a real 
inequality”142, as, for the same number of hours worked, some would get the 
overtime supplements while others would not.  Ex Article 119 EC was, as things 
stood, not breached.  The ECJ agreed with this position: 
 
“In the circumstances considered in these proceedings, part-time 
employees do receive the same overall pay as full-time employees for 
the same number of hours worked.”143 
 
There was thus no discrimination in breach of ex Article 119 EC, and no 
violation of Article 1 of the Equal Pay Directive. 
 
In February 1996 came the case of Kuratorium für Dialyse und 
Nierentransplantation v Lewark144.  Ms Lewark was employed for 30.8 hours a 
week in the defendant’s “Care Unit”, where she was one of eleven part-time 
workers (ten women and one man).  She was also the only part-time worker on 
the Local Staff Council.  In November 1990, with the defendant’s consent, she 
attended a full-time training course in order to obtain the knowledge that was 
necessary for performing her functions on the Staff Council.  The training course 
on 13 November 1990 lasted 7.5 hours.  Ms Lewark would not normally have 
worked that day.  The defendant paid her her normal salary for the week (30.8 
hours), but failed to recompense her for the time spent on the training course.  
Since a full-time worker would have been so recompensed, Ms Lewark 
considered that there had been a breach of Article 119 EC145 and the Equal Pay 
Directive. 
 
As regards whether there was a difference in treatment between those working 
part-time and those working full-time146, the Court concluded that there was 
                                                 
142 Ibid., at 5733 (Para. 29 of the Opinion). 
143 Ibid., para. 27. 
144 Case C-457/93 Kuratorium für Dialyse und Nierentransplantation e.V. v Johanna Lewark 
[1996] ECR I-243. 
145 As it then was – subsequently Article 141 EC, and now Article 157 TFEU. 
146 Note that the Court’s earlier, more lenient approach to such difference in treatment (see, for 
example, Case 96/80 Jenkins, supra n 133, para. 11) seemed to have now slightly hardened (see, 
for example, Joined Cases C-399/92, C-409/92, C-425/92, C-34/93, C-50/93 and C-78/93 Helmig, 
supra n 139, para. 26). 
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indeed such a difference in treatment; this was in fact “indisputable”147.  The 
Court then stated that, if it were the case that “a much lower proportion”148 of 
women than men worked full-time, the exclusion of part-time workers from the 
benefit in question (that is, compensation for the time spent on the training 
course) would be contrary to ex Article 119 EC, in the absence of an explanation 
not founded on sex.  After examining the relevant statistics, the Court concluded 
that, in this particular case, there was (in principle) “indirect discrimination”149.  It 
of course remained open to Germany to show that the measure taken by the 
defendant reflected a legitimate aim of social policy, was appropriate to achieve 
that aim and was necessary in order to do so.  It will be seen that this is the 
same three-stage test as was proposed by the Court in Bilka150.  As usual, it was 
up to the national court to assess whether this test was satisfied. 
 
A month later, the Court reached an almost identical conclusion in the case of 
Freers151. 
 
In the 2004 case of Wippel v Peek & Cloppenburg152, Ms Wippel was employed 
by the Austrian company Peek & Cloppenburg pursuant to a system known as 
“work on demand”.  She had no fixed working hours, and the duration and 
“positioning” of her working time was determined by agreement between the 
parties in each individual case.  Specifically, the sales manager would ask her to 
work certain hours in a given week, and Ms Wippel could either accept or 
decline, without any need to give reasons.  Importantly, she was not guaranteed 
any fixed income.  Ms Wippel complained that the absence in her contract of an 
agreement as to working hours and the organizing of working time amounted to 
discrimination on the grounds of sex.   
 
The Austrian law on Working Time153 provided that the “positioning” of normal 
working time was to be by agreement, as were any changes thereto.  However, 
notwithstanding this, the “positioning” of normal working time could be changed 
unilaterally by the employer, but only if, inter alia, there was a justification and 
                                                 
147 Case C-457/93 Lewark, supra n 144, para. 26. 
148 Ibid., para. 28. 
149 Ibid., para. 30. 
150 Case 170/84 Bilka, supra n 124, para. 36, quoted above (see text accompanying n 130). 
151 Case C-278/93 Edith Freers and Hannelore Speckmann v Deutsche Bundespost [1996] ECR I-
1165. 
152 Case C-313/02 Nicole Wippel v Peek & Cloppenburg GmbH & Co. KG. [2004] ECR I-9483. 
153 Arbeitszeitgesetz. 
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two weeks’ notice was given to the worker.  A later article of the same law 
applied these principles to part-time work too. 
 
Advocate General Kokott started by considering the new Part Time Workers 
Directive154.  The latter, following the increasingly tough language in the case-
law, had introduced a prohibition on discrimination against part-time workers.  
However, the Advocate General concluded that there was no such 
discrimination in the legislation in this case (the Austrian law on Working Time 
treated full-time workers and part-time workers in the same way).  Nor, 
according to the Advocate General, was there discrimination on the grounds of 
sex in the legislation in this case.  Although the law made provision, in respect of 
full-time workers, for normal working time of 40 hours a week and 8 hours a day, 
no specific provision on maximum working time existed for part-time workers.  
The absence of such a provision had a greater impact on women than men.  
However, in stark contrast to the referring court, which saw this as an instance 
of “like treated unlike”, the Advocate General decided that full-timers and part-
timers were not comparable “in this specific context”155. 
 
Turning to the contract of employment, Kokott AG again found no discrimination 
against those working part-time.  If anything, a “work on demand” contract which 
made no provision for (previously agreed) fixed working time would be 
“beneficial” to “employees who are only able... to work irregular hours and in 
varying amounts”156.  With regards to sex discrimination, if all of those with fixed 
working hours (part-time or full-time) were compared with those employed on 
demand, the difference in percentage of female workers was so small as to be 
insignificant.  There could be no discrimination if the numbers of women were 
the same on both sides of the comparison (those allotted a fixed working time, 
and those not).157 
 
The Court agreed with the Advocate General in all of her conclusions.  Of 
particular interest is that, as regards possible sex discrimination in the 
                                                 
154 Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on 
part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC - Annex : Framework agreement on 
part-time work [1998] OJ L 14/9. 
155 Case C-313/02 Wippel, supra n 152, at 9512 (Para. 93 of the Opinion). 
156 Ibid., at 9515 (Para. 106 of the Opinion). 
157 Of course, if all those working full-time were compared with all those working part-time, the 
difference in percentage of female workers was significant.  However, neither the Advocate 
General nor the Court were minded to run this comparison. 
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employment contract, the Court declared that since no full-time worker at Peek 
& Cloppenburg had a contract like Ms Wippel’s, she effectively had no 
comparator.  Without a comparison, there could not be a finding of less 
favourable treatment158.  The Court is here conspicuously moving away from the 
doctrine of noncomparative discrimination which it had championed in the 
pregnancy cases159.  Similarly, turning to the Equal Treatment Directive, the 
Court contemplated the same comparison as the Advocate General, namely, to 
compare all of those with fixed working hours (part-time or full-time) with those 
employed on demand.  However, it went further than the Advocate General by 
abandoning the comparison altogether.  Because the second group could 
accept or refuse work at will, while the first group could not, the two groups were 
simply “not analogous”160.  If they were unlike, they could of course be treated 
unlike. 
 
3.6.2. Preliminary Analysis 
 
In Helmig, Advocate General Darmon mentions (and the Court does not 
disagree) that one rationale for the granting of overtime payments is the need for 
employers to be dissuaded from working their employees long hours.  This in 
turn is because, according to the Advocate General, workers need leisure-time 
and recuperation from fatigue.  Therefore, as well as penalizing the employer, 
the overtime payment in some ways attempts to (partially) compensate the 
employee for their lost leisure and rest.  By declaring that full-time employees 
(mostly male) and part-time employees (mostly female) were treated alike as 
regards overtime, the Court implied that a woman who (for the sake of example) 
works part-time while raising a family loses neither leisure nor rest if she is 
required to work more than her usual shift (but less than a “full-time” shift).  But 
this is erroneous if, as Mrs Weber von Hertz argued in Bilka, familial 
responsibility is regarded as work too. 
 
The point made in the previous paragraph raises a myriad of issues, many if not 
all beyond the scope of this dissertation.  They cannot be done justice in a short 
                                                 
158 Case C-313/02 Wippel, supra n 152, at para. 62. 
159 To this it could conceivably be counter argued that the Court was merely constrained by the 
wording at Clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement on part-time work, annexed to the Part 
Time Workers Directive. 
160 Case C-313/02 Wippel, supra n 152, at para. 64. 
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space.  Only a cursory examination of these issues will therefore be attempted 
here; the writers cited should be consulted for a full analysis of the arguments. 
 
At the heart of the matter is what the Court itself called the “double aim” of 
Article 119 EC (later Article 141 EC, and now Article 157 TFEU)161, namely, its 
economic aim and its social aim.  As Barnard excellently explains, the formal, 
like-for-like test lends itself perfectly to the economic role (“creating a level 
playing field of competition”), but much less well to the social role162.  The 
economic sphere is centred on the market, and the market is historically 
predicated on a “male breadwinner” model.  Comparisons were thus traditionally 
to a “male norm”163, and no allowance was made for women’s onerous caring 
duties (for example, arguably, by Stadt Lengerich and the other employers, 
endorsed by the Court, in Helmig).164 
 
That said, the Court’s record on the social dimension of Article 119 EC (later 
Article 141 EC, and now Article 157 TFEU) has not been entirely negative.  
Many of the successes can indeed be found in the case-law on full-time and 
part-time work, and particularly the use of the doctrine of indirect discrimination.  
This doctrine, some argue, allows for consideration of groups, as opposed to 
individuals; a measure is impugned if it impacts negatively on a whole class of 
                                                 
161 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena (no. 
2) [1976] ECR 455, para. 8 and 12. 
162 Catherine Barnard, “The Economic Objectives of Article 119” in TK Hervey and D O’Keeffe 
(eds), Sex equality law in the European Union (Wiley, Chichester 1996) 329. 
163 The most celebrated writer on this particular aspect of the debate is Catherine MacKinnon: 
“As male is the implicit reference for human, maleness will be the measure of equality in sex 
discrimination law… If male power is systemic, it is the regime.”  See C MacKinnon, “Feminism, 
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence” (1983) 8 Signs 635, 644-5 
(MacKinnon’s emphasis).  See also C MacKinnon, “Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law” 
(1990-91) 100 Yale Law Journal 1281.   
164 On the subject of women’s caring role, Everson has written, “it is the inability of [the 
European right of sexual equality]... to take caring obligations into account, which has failed 
European women as a whole”.  See M Everson, “Women and Citizenship of the European 
Union” in TK Hervey and D O’Keeffe (eds), Sex equality law in the European Union (Wiley, 
Chichester 1996) 209. The Court’s approach in Helmig has been described as “problematic”: 
Hervey and Shaw, supra n 6, 54.  Ellis said that the judgment left the law in an “unsatisfactory 
state”: Evelyn Ellis, “Recent developments in European Community sex equality law” Common 
Market Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2, April 1998, 379, 383.   Wentholt commented that it 
“expresse[d] a male point of view”: K Wentholt, “Formal and Substantive Equal Treatment: the 
Limitations and the Potential of the Legal Concept of Equality” in T Loenen and PR Rodrigues 
(eds), Non-discrimination law: comparative perspectives (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 
1999) 63.  Costello and Davies called it “dubious”: C Costello and G Davies, “The case law of the 
Court of Justice in the field of sex equality since 2000” Common Market Law Review 2006, v. 43, 
n. 6, December, 1567, 1591. 
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comparators, not just one165.  Others, however, refuse to see indirect 
discrimination as a victory for substantive equality.  Hervey, for example, 
believes that the ECJ’s use of indirect discrimination is still essentially market-
driven, and warns that the doctrine has “significant limitations”166. 
 
Finally, on the question of part-time and full-time work, there is something 
worrying about the Wippel judgment, in that the whole case turns on the 
comparison between workers on demand and workers with fixed hours.  Can the 
very fact that workers on demand work on demand support, in and of itself, an a 
priori refusal to compare?  This is reminiscent of Westen’s oft-quoted complaint 
about the circularity of equality: “people who by a rule should be treated alike 
should by the rule be treated alike”167.  The comparison is over before it starts, 
because the fact that two things have already been treated differently (Column 2 
at Appendix I), specifically, in this case, one worker has been given fixed hours 
and another has not, predetermines whether or not they are to be regarded as 
“like” (Column 1 at Appendix I).  On Westen’s analysis, while one may pretend 
that the distributing of goods takes place after the allocating of attributes, in 
actual fact the distribution has already taken place, when the attributes were 
allocated.  The same “standard or rule”168 is applied to both events, and, having 
been applied the first time, it cannot help but be applied the second time; 
treatment thus folds into likeness.169  The consequence of this from a judicial 
point of view is that, as McColgan puts it, the differences between comparators 
are “reducible to the very ground on the basis of which the claimant sought to 
challenge the discrimination”.170 
                                                 
165 Mancini and O’Leary, supra n 73, 342-3; Lisa Waddington, “The development of a new 
generation of sex equality directives” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
2004, v. 11, n. 1, 3, 6.  
166 TK Hervey, “Thirty Years of EU Sex Equality Law: Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards” 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2005, v. 12, n. 4, 307, 311.  The same 
author, writing with Helen Fenwick, went as far as to say that, when faced with a conflict 
between equality for women and the interests of the market, the Court would “safeguard the 
market”: Fenwick and Hervey, supra n 35, at 469. 
167 P Westen, “The Empty Idea of Equality” (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537, 547. 
168 Ibid., 545.  
169 As Numhauser-Henning puts it, referring to Wippel, “[the] problem consists of the fact that 
what is forbidden by the non-discrimination provision – differential treatment as regards 
employment conditions – is at the same time part of what constitutes the groups that are to be 
compared.  Different employment conditions pertaining to the mode of employment are a sine 
qua non”: Numhauser-Henning, “EU sex equality law post-Amsterdam” in Meenan (ed), Equality 
Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 155-6. 
170 Supra n 3, 670, referring to the approach of Lord Hoffman in the English case of Carson: R. 
(on the application of Carson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 37; [2006] 
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3.6.3. A Walzerian analysis 
 
Refracting the same cases through the prism of complex equality shows, firstly, 
how complex equality facilitates a more robust scrutiny of (to use the Aristotelian 
nomenclature) “objective justifications”.  It also demonstrates how Walzer’s 
theory produces more predictable results (more often than not different from 
those reached by the Court), and allows for a more compassionate handling of 
cases like Helmig. 
 
In Bilka, for example, the fons et origo of the enquiry would be the meaning of a 
pension under an occupational pension scheme, as shared by the members of 
the relevant distributive community.  Is such a pension to reward a commitment 
to full-time work?  Or is it to aid an ex-employee in their old age?  If the latter, 
then making the distribution conditional on the completion of 15 years’ full-time 
work would seem inappropriate, or, put in Walzerian terms, the fundamentum 
distributionis would seem to be out of line with the meaning of the good being 
distributed.171  Those who had completed 15 years of full-time work (of whom 
there would necessarily be more men than women) would now hold a badge of 
honour, garnered via an unconnected achievement in a different sphere, which 
would give them exclusive access to the sphere in issue.  Bilka’s scheme thus 
provides good examples of both a flawed distribution and a boundary breach. 
 
The Court left open the possibility that Bilka’s behaviour in disenfranchising part-
time workers could be justified, the only justification put forward by Bilka being 
the desire to discourage part-timers and to make full-time work more appealing.  
The ECJ, then, while not expressly endorsing this justification (a job which it 
leaves to the national court), at least entertains it as a possibility.  It will often be 
seen in this case-study how the job of the judge (European or national) in 
assessing a proposed objective justification is similar to the job of the 
                                                                                                                                    
1 A.C. 173.  Costello and Davies comment that the Court’s handling of the comparability issue in 
Wippel was “regrettable”: supra n 164, 1594.  
171 It would be different if the 15-year stipulation was connected financially to the pension, that 
is, if 15 years of full-time employment was somehow the minimum amount of salary-generating 
work needed to pay for it (via contributions deducted at source).  However, it is clear that 
building up a sufficient quantity of contributions is not the issue here.  Bilka stated before the 
Court that the stipulation was “solely to discourage part-time work”: Case 170/84 Bilka, supra n 
124, para 33 (emphasis added). 
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“gatekeepers” of any given sphere in trying to decide whether a badge 
presented by a would-be distributee may be legitimately brought in, or must be 
left “at the door”.  The same sort of issues, whether justifying a discrimination or 
attempting to tie a badge to the business of a sphere, tend to crop up.  However, 
it is not just the same process described in a different way, and Bilka is a good 
illustration of that.  At the objective justification stage of the Aristotelian test, 
almost anything may be pleaded as a possible rationale for discrimination by a 
distributor172; the justification put forward needs only to be remotely of interest or 
importance to him or her.173  The “gatekeeper” stage of any proposed 
transaction under complex equality, meanwhile, is a much stricter affair; holders 
of badges without a proven connection to the “host” sphere will be refused entry, 
unless they are prepared to put the badge aside.  Thus, under a Walzerian 
analysis, Bilka’s sole suggested defence could be rejected straight away, 
without the need in this instance to wait for the national judge; it simply has 
nothing to do with the distribution of pensions.  That is not to say that it may not 
be a valid or worthy goal, just that the wrong means were chosen to accomplish 
it.  In Walzerian terms, Bilka pursued its objective in the wrong sphere.  This is 
reminiscent of a famous line of TS Eliot’s: 
 
“The last temptation is the greatest treason: to do the right deed for the 
wrong reason.”174 
 
In Bilka, of course, it was the “reason” which was – arguably175 – right, and the 
“deed” which was wrong. 
 
Looking at the worst case scenario, and assuming that Bilka’s defence is 
accepted by the referring court, the overall result would be to exonerate the 
store of discrimination altogether.  The Walzerian analysis, meanwhile, 
culminates in the finding of a clear boundary breach on the part of Bilka, that is, 
                                                 
172 As long as it does not involve a suspect ground.  Economic rationales, in certain types of 
internal market cases, are also excluded. 
173 The proportionality test – and particularly the appropriateness branch thereof – is supposed 
to disqualify any that are too remote. 
174 TS Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral (Faber and Faber, 1935) 47. 
175 The point being made here is not that the department store was correct in its policy of 
discouraging part-time workers – a policy which would obviously have had a disastrous impact 
on women employees – merely that if the discouragement of part-timers was the result that 
Bilka wanted to achieve, it should have opted for a more appropriate method by which to 
achieve it.  To return to the education example, a schoolteacher may give one student an A 
grade and one student a C grade on the grounds of the two students’ relative intelligence, but 
not on the grounds that the second was caught smoking while the first was not – even though 
preventing minors from smoking is, in and of itself, a perfectly laudable aim. 
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a violation of complex equality.  This same pattern (Walzerian analysis revealing 
infraction of complex equality, while no infraction of equality principle found by 
ECJ at all) is repeated several times. 
 
Jenkins does not require a lengthy analysis here, as, from the legal point of 
view, it is very similar to Bilka.  Kingsgate Ltd (the defendant company) may 
have had a legitimate wish to disincentivize part-time workers, but it should not 
have used the hourly rate as a means by which to achieve this.  To do so 
distorts the true meaning176 of the hourly rate.  The distributive community177 
would almost certainly hold that the hourly rate should represent recompense, or 
consideration, for one hour’s work.  It is not a tool by which to penalize those 
who have chosen to work part-time, thus turning their choice into a negative 
dominant178.  That fight had to be fought (if at all) in a different arena. 
 
In Helmig, Stadt Lengerich and the other employers denied their part-time 
workers overtime supplements when they worked beyond their ordinary working 
week, but granted the same supplements to full-time workers who had worked 
beyond their ordinary working week.  This implied that a part-time worker 
(almost certainly a woman) who worked beyond her ordinary working week had 
not lost any leisure-time or recuperation from fatigue (a loss normally requiring 
compensation), and that the time between the end of her ordinary working week 
and the end of a full-time worker’s ordinary working week was effectively “spare” 
and at the disposal of the employer at no extra cost.  There is little doubt that 
this represents a massive boundary breach.  By belittling, if not abnegating, a 
part-time female employee’s caring duties by effectively declaring that only after 
38.5 hours in the workplace can anyone be regarded as fatigued, Stadt 
Lengerich and the other employers contribute to the perpetuation of abhorrent 
notions about the role of carers (for which read women) in today’s society.  If 
they belong anywhere (and it is a big “if” in the 21st century), notions of 
                                                 
176 Taking the Standard Contingent Reply as read. 
177 There is no need to assume that this would only consist of the distributors (Kingsgate Ltd’s 
management) and the distributees (Kingsgate Ltd’s employees), and that it would therefore be 
intrinsically biased in favour of the full time (male) workers – who would represent the majority 
– and against the part time (female) workers.  All interested parties are entitled to be present at 
a Forum, which might include Kingsgate’s shareholders, its customers, and other members of 
the local community affected by its decisions.  Furthermore, if the theory of mediated 
complexity were preferred to that of complex equality stricto sensu, then the decision would fall 
to the Bench, which would considerably reduce the risk of bias.  See Chapter 8 below. 
178 For a discussion of how a choice can be a positive, or negative, dominant, see supra, section 
3.3. 
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respective “roles” of family members – including emotional “roles” – belong 
within the sphere of kinship only.  Their reiteration in the sphere of office (and 
others) is one of the worst boundary breaches that there is, and, as Armstrong 
points out, it cuts both ways – women are disadvantaged when those in other 
spheres assume female monopolization of caring work, and those assumptions 
(in a State’s economic policy, say, or its law and order policy) feed back into the 
domestic sphere, thus preserving the status quo:   
 
 “[T]he theory of complex equality provides us with a particularly clear 
framework for analysing the political nature of the personal”179 
 
Boundary revision is urgently needed in this area, but the process is likely to be 
both lengthy and difficult. 
 
In Kuratorium there is arguably an even bigger affront to part-time workers than 
there was in Helmig.  The case turned once again on the temporal no-man’s-
land between the end of a part-time worker’s ordinary working week and the end 
of a full-time worker’s ordinary working week.  This time, however, the 
distribuend was recompense for a training day.  The full-time worker who 
attended the training day over and above his ordinary working week180 would 
receive recompense.  The part-time worker, such as Ms Lewark, on the other 
hand, who attended the training day over and above her ordinary working week, 
that is, on a day on which she would otherwise not have been working, received 
none.  At least Ms Helmig received her normal hourly rate for the extra work 
undertaken; Ms Lewark did not even receive that. 
 
Once again, it will fall to the distributive community to decide what it understands 
by a recompensed training day.  It would be an odd community that did not 
answer this by simply saying that the recompense rewards the worker for having 
attended the training day, and compensates them for the lost time and energy; 
this meaning would seem to apply to any attendee, whoever they are, however 
long their ordinary working week is, and wherever the training day comes within 
it.  A fundamentum distributionis which made receipt of the recompense 
conditional on the length of working week/ position of training day would thus 
offend against this meaning, in breach of complex equality.  A (presumably 
                                                 
179 C Armstrong, “Complex equality: Beyond equality and difference” 2002 Feminist Theory 3, 
67, 80.   
180 Or, presumably, as part of it.  This detail is not made clear in the judgment. 
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male) full-time worker could use their full-time status as a monopolizable badge 
of honour, which would come to act as a positive dominant.  Since the Court this 
time found the employer’s behaviour to be discriminatory, Kuratorium is one 
case in this area where an Aristotelian analysis and a Walzerian analysis would 
appear to coincide. 
 
Finally, in Wippel v Peek & Cloppenburg, the task for the distributive community 
would be to arrive at a shared understanding of an agreement as to both 
working hours themselves, and the organization of working hours.  Without 
putting words in the community’s mouth, it might say that such an agreement 
provides certainty for a worker, enabling them to plan their time better and thus 
giving them greater stability.  As in the previous case, this shared meaning 
would seem to apply to any type of worker.  Thus, a distributive principle which 
differentiated between those who worked on demand and those who had fixed 
working hours would appear to be at odds with this meaning, flawing the 
distribution and violating complex equality.  A second distribuend in this case, 
namely, a provision on maximum working time, would probably be understood in 
a similar way, which would also be universally applicable, making another partial 
distributive criterion similarly abusive of complex equality.  The Walzerian 
outcome in Wippel diverges from the Court’s, since the Court found no 
discrimination in this case at all.  It may be seen that the Walzerian approach is 
preferable here.  From the moment Ms Wippel makes her complaint181, the 
outcome is infinitely more straightforward and predictable than it would be using 
the circular Aristotelian test as described above. 
                                                 
181 The need for an actual complaint here is important, because, in the abstract, this case can 
seem perplexing.  When the point is made in the text, for example, that the first of the shared 
meanings considered would seem to apply to any type of worker, a counter-argument might be 
that, while someone working on demand who wanted an agreement of this type would no 
doubt be grateful that they were included in the meaning of such an agreement, why should 
they want an agreement like this in the first place?  Did they not choose work-on-demand to 
give themselves flexibility in the organization of their time?  Why would they want their working 
week so structured in advance?  The answers to these questions are hard.  However, once a real 
complainant comes forward, it is no longer particularly relevant why they might want the 
agreement.  The fact is that they do want it, and they allege that their being denied it is 
discriminatory.  The focus of the lawyer’s enquiry now, therefore, shifts from the reasons why a 
worker-on-demand would want their working hours organized, to whether the organization of 
their working hours, while no doubt contrary to custom or even inconvenient, is actually 
impossible (the non-organization of their working hours being a vital component of the job 
itself), or merely possible, but considered unnecessary.  If the latter, the question to be 
answered next is whether the inequality which this consideration causes is reasonable (in the 
sense of well-reasoned).  In other words, the reasons of the discriminator for discriminating are 








Much of the following case-law turns on Article 2(4) of the (old) Equal Treatment 
Directive, and the question of whether or not this constitutes an exception to the 
general rule laid down in Article 2(1).  Article 2(4) reads: 
 
“This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal 
opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing 
inequalities which affect women's opportunities in the areas referred to in 
Article 1(1).” 
 
In the 1995 case of Kalanke182, Mr Kalanke and a woman called Mrs Glissmann 
both applied for the post of Section Manager of Bremen’s Parks Department.  
Since both candidates possessed the same qualifications, but since women 
were under-represented in the sector, the female candidate was given priority on 
the basis of Paragraph 4 of the Law on Equal Treatment of Men and Women in 
the Public Service of the Land of Bremen183.  In proceedings brought by Mr 
Kalanke, the Court of Justice was asked if Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment 
Directive covered Paragraph 4 of the German law, and, if not, whether Article 
2(1) of said Directive required it to be disapplied. 
 
Advocate General Tesauro considered that what was meant by “equal 
opportunities” in Article 2(4) was equality with respect to starting points, not 
points of arrival.  However, Paragraph 4 of the German law was not designed to 
guarantee equality as regards starting points; it aimed to achieve equality as to 
result.  Tesauro AG continued: 
 
“This does not seem to me to fall within either the scope or the rationale 
of Article 2(4) of the directive.”184 
 
The objective of Article 2(4) was substantive equality.  Differentiated treatment 
was permissible under this article, but only the sort of differentiated treatment 
                                                 
182 Case C-450/93 Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR I-3051. 
183 Landesgleichstellungsgesetz. 
184 Case C-450/93 Kalanke, supra n 182, at 3060 (Para. 13 of the Opinion). 
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needed to neutralize existing difference.  Such treatment was discriminatory, but 
only in appearance; the existing difference legitimized the deviation from formal 
equality.  The Advocate General went on: 
 
“The rationale for the preferential treatment given to women lies in the 
general situation of disadvantage caused by past discrimination and the 
existing difficulties connected with playing a dual role.”185 
 
Quota systems, in his opinion, were “irrelevant” to that end186.  What was 
needed was “measures relating to the organization of work”187 and “educational 
guidance and vocational training”188.  Any positive action had to not only derive 
from an existing obstacle, but also had to be temporary, that is, it would cease 
once the obstacle was removed.  In this case, the German law sought to cure 
under-representation.  But: 
 
“such a measure tends merely to rebalance the numbers of men and 
women, [...] it will not remove the obstacles which brought about that 
situation”189. 
 
For these reasons, the Advocate General concluded that the German law was 
contrary to Article 2(1) of the Directive, and could not be excepted under Article 
2(4). 
 
The ECJ agreed that the German law was contrary to Article 2(1) of the 
Directive.  As regards the derogation in Article 2(4), the Court declared: 
 
“National rules which guarantee women absolute and unconditional 
priority for appointment or promotion go beyond promoting equal 
opportunities and overstep the limits of the exception in Article 2(4) of the 
Directive.”190 
 
The German law was concerned, not with equality of opportunity, but with 
equality of result.  It could not therefore be saved by Article 2(4). 
 
                                                 
185 Ibid., at 3063 (Para. 18 of the Opinion). 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. (Para. 19 of the Opinion). 
189 Ibid., at 3066 (Para. 24 of the Opinion). 
190 Ibid., para. 22. 
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Two years later, the Court had a second opportunity to consider the scope of 
Article 2(4).  In Marschall191, Mr Marschall and a woman candidate both applied 
for a teaching position.  Since both the candidates were equally suitable, and 
since fewer women than men were employed in the relevant pay bracket, the 
female candidate was appointed to the position on the basis of the Law on 
Officials of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia (“the Law on Officials”)192. Mr 
Marschall brought an action, and the Administrative Court made a reference to 
the ECJ. 
 
Advocate General Jacobs noted that the Law on Officials contained a proviso; 
where there was under-representation of women, women were to be given 
priority in the event of equal suitability “unless reasons specific to another 
candidate predominate”.  However, unlike a large number of the interveners, he 
did not see that this proviso was sufficient to merit diverging from the rule as laid 
down in Kalanke.  The Law on Officials was discriminatory, and, notwithstanding 
the proviso, unlawful; it could not be saved by Article 2(4). 
 
The Court, meanwhile, held that Kalanke had only outlawed the granting of 
automatic priority to women.  The proviso (or “saving clause”) altered the 
situation.  Recalling Paragraph 22 of the Kalanke judgment193, the Court stated 
that a guarantee of “absolute and unconditional priority” went beyond the remit 
of Article 2(4).  But a national rule like the Law on Officials, containing as it did a 
saving clause, did not exceed the limits of the article.  That said, of course, if a 
“reason... specific to another [male] candidate” were allowed to override a 
female candidate’s priority, that reason could not itself be discriminatory as 
against women.  This important condition became the second limb of the 
Operative Part of the Judgment. 
 
In Badeck194, forty six members of the Parliament of the Land of Hesse 
complained about the Hesse Equal Rights Law195, which called for a large 
number of positive action initiatives to be put into practice in the public 
                                                 
191 Case C-409/95 Hellmut Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR I-6363. 
192 Beamtengesetz für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
193 Quoted above (see text accompanying n 190). 
194 Case C-158/97 Georg Badeck and Others, interveners: Hessische Ministerpräsident and 
Landesanwalt beim Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen [2000] ECR I-1875. 
195 Hessisches Gesetz über die Gleichberechtigung von Frauen und Männern und zum Abbau von 
Diskriminierungen von Frauen in der öffentlichen Verwaltung. 
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administration.  The State Constitutional Court of Hesse made a reference to the 
ECJ.  Advocate General Saggio found all of the initiatives to be non-
discriminatory, with the exception of a rule concerning appointment to collegiate 
bodies, wherein female candidates were to be granted appointments, 
irrespective of suitability, up to a quota of fifty percent.  The Advocate General 
thought that, since this rule “allow[ed] no exceptions”196, it exceeded the limits of 
Article 2(4) and could not therefore be saved.  The Court meanwhile found none 
of the initiatives to be discriminatory; the rule concerning collegiate bodies was 
(according to it) “non-mandatory”.197 
 
Positive action was also touched upon in the unusual case of Schnorbus198.  
Here, a woman who had successfully passed the First State Examination in Law 
complained when she was passed over twice for admission to the practical legal 
training course.  She was then forced to defer for some five months, pursuant to 
the Law on Legal Training199, which permits the authorities to defer a person’s 
appointment for up to twelve months.  She alleged that the combined effect of 
the Law on Legal Training and its implementing regulation200 was that those who 
had completed military service (who were necessarily all male) were able to take 
advantage of an exception to the deferral rule; they could plead “particular 
hardship” and gain automatic acceptance.  The Administrative Court sought a 
reference. 
 
Advocate General Jacobs’ conclusion was that this was indirect discrimination, 
but that it was objectively justified.  Those who had undertaken military service 
had had the commencement of their legal studies delayed by approximately one 
year; the German measures compensated for this delay.  Because the 
measures were justified, there was no need to consider them in the light of 
Article 2(4).  However, interestingly, the Advocate General did not rule out the 
possibility of measures like those at issue (giving preferential treatment to men) 
coming within the scope of Article 2(4): “the reference to existing inequalities 
                                                 
196 Case C-158/97 Badeck, supra n 194, at 1899 (Para. 42 of the Opinion). 
197 Ibid., para. 65. 
198 Case C-79/99 Julia Schnorbus v Land Hessen [2000] ECR I-10997. 
199 Juristenausbildungsgesetz. 
200 Juristische Ausbildungsordnung. 
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which affect women’s opportunities [in Article 2(4)] is merely an example”201.  
The Court agreed that this was indirect discrimination, and that it was justified by 
objective reasons. 
 
Finally, one might consider EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway202.  Although 
this dissertation is concerned with the European Court of Justice, rather than the 
EFTA Court, this case is instructive in that it contains discussion (and ultimately 
endorsement) of the way in which the ECJ construes Article 2(4) of the Equal 
Treatment Directive.  In it, the EFTA Surveillance Authority brought an action 
against Norway claiming that, by applying its legislation so as to reserve a 
certain number of academic positions exclusively for women, Norway had failed 
to fulfil its obligations under the EEA Agreement.  The law in question was 
Article 30(3) of the Norwegian Act No. 22 relating to Universities and Colleges, 
the last sentence of which read: 
 
“The Board can decide that a post shall be advertised as only open to 
members of the underrepresented sex.”203 
 
Before the EFTA Court, Norway requested that a different approach be taken to 
that of the ECJ, under whose interpretation of the Equal Treatment Directive, 
“affirmative action measures are legally defined as derogations from the 
prohibition on discrimination”204.  Rather, they should be viewed as “an intrinsic 
dimension” of the prohibition205.  Norway admitted that its law permitted 
“automatic and unconditional preference” for women206, but argued that this was 
what substantive equality demanded.  The EFTA Court, however, would not 
diverge from the ECJ’s approach.  Article 2(4) of the Directive was a derogation, 
and absolute and unconditional priority (that is, the substituting of equality of 
representation for equality of opportunity) was forbidden.  The last sentence of 
the Norwegian law at issue gave unconditional and automatic priority to women 
                                                 
201 Case C-79/99 Schnorbus, supra n 198, at 11013 (Para. 53 of the Opinion).  Note that Article 
141(4), a result of the revision of the EC Treaty carried out at Amsterdam, was sex neutral, as is 
its successor in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 157(4) TFEU. 
202 Case E-1/02 EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway [2003] EFTA Court Reports 
1. 
203 Ibid., para. 2. 
204 Ibid., para. 25. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid., para. 26.  And not just those women who were equally as qualified as, or better 
qualified than, men: see ibid., para. 45 (last sentence). 
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candidates, and such a measure could not fall within Article 2(4).  Norway had 
therefore failed to fulfil its obligations. 
 
3.7.2. Preliminary Analysis 
 
The debate on positive action is very much a continuation of the one considered 
above in the context of the question of part-time and full-time work.  The 
principal similarity between the two debates is the shift which positive action 
entails between individual rights and group rights.  This time, however, the Court 
is noticeably more cautious.  Positive action may involve the needs of a group 
(for example, female managers, female teachers or male lawyers who have 
undertaken military service) overriding the needs of given individuals (for 
example, Mr Kalanke, Mr Marschall or Ms Schnorbus).  If such overriding does 
indeed take place (as in the cases of Mr Marschall and Ms Schnorbus), the 
individuals in question must satisfy themselves with the thought that their 
misfortune served a greater good.  But this raises questions, in particular as 
regards the Kantian “Categorical Imperative”.  Are such people now being 
treated simply as a means?  The “individual versus group” debate has 
generated a large volume of literature.  In much of this, comparator-driven, 
“individualistic”, formal equality is condemned, and group-oriented, substantive 
equality is often called for in its stead207.  As far as this particular group of case-
law is concerned, Marschall is regarded as the high-water mark, described by 
Hervey as, 
 
“the closest the Court comes to recognising a substantive approach to 
equality”208.  
 
Meanwhile, Kalanke has been described as “confused”209, Schnorbus as 
“dismally confused”210, and EFTA as “simplistic”211. 
 
                                                 
207 Lacey, supra n 34; Catherine Barnard, “The Principle of Equality in the Community Context: P, 
Grant, Kalanke and Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows?” Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 57, No. 2, 
1998, 352.  For more on the weaknesses of “individualism”, see Fredman, “Changing The Norm: 
Positive Duties In Equal Treatment Legislation” 12 MJ 4 (2005) 369, at 370 et seq. 
208 Hervey, supra n 166, 316. 
209 Hervey and Shaw, supra n 6, 59. 
210 Costello and Davies, supra n 164, 1598. 
211 Holtmaat and Tobler, supra n 4, 421. 
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As with the debate on full-time and part-time work, full justice cannot be done to 
the debate on positive action in this dissertation.  There are compelling 
arguments on both sides, put forward in response to the complicated questions 
thrown up by the debate.  These questions include whether there can ever be 
such a thing as a “debtor sex”, owing “compensation” to a “creditor sex” for the 
historical wrongs done to the latter212.  If so, for how long must this 
compensation be paid?213  If indefinitely, is there not a risk that the once over-
represented group will itself become under-represented in due course?214  
Furthermore, does such an arrangement only give rise to benefits for the 
creditor sex, or are there potential detriments, which should also be 
considered?215 
 
Finally, returning to the question at the very beginning of this section, there is to 
this day phenomenal confusion over the issue of whether positive action is or is 
not an exception to the general rule against sex discrimination.216  Holtmaat and 
                                                 
212 The phrase “creditor or debtor... sexes” can be found in Mancini and O’Leary, supra n 73, 
345, referring to the concurring opinion of Scalia J in the US case of Adarand v Peña 515 U.S. 200 
(1995).  For more discussion of the “compensation arguments”, and the possible replacement of 
“backward-looking” strategies with “forward-looking” ones, see M Tomei, “Discrimination and 
equality at work: A review of the concepts” International Labour Review, 2003, v. 142, n. 4, 401.  
213 It will be remembered that Tesauro AG in Kalanke insisted that positive action measures 
must be temporary.  Also taking this position is Docksey: “The State would have to provide for 
monitoring the situation to ensure that single-sex recruitment is brought to an end when a 
better balance is achieved”.  See C Docksey, “The European Community and the promotion of 
equality” in C McCrudden (ed), Women, Employment and European Equality Law (Eclipse, 
London 1987) 17.  In Allen’s view, “time limiting affirmative action ensures that it is focused and 
more acceptable to those who cannot take the benefit of the action”: Allen, “Article 13 EC, 
evolution and current contexts” in Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union 
(CUP, Cambridge 2007) 50. 
214 See Debra Franzese, “The Gender Curve: An Analysis of Colleges’ Use of Affirmative Action 
Policies to Benefit Male Applicants” 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 719.  Franzese describes a significant 
under-representation of men on US college campuses.  It is not clear, though, whether this is 
the result of earlier positive action in favour of female students, or simply a natural increase in 
academic ambition on the part of women. 
215 One detriment could be that women who have been appointed to posts on the basis of a 
quota will be viewed as in some way inferior.  As Evelyn Ellis puts it, positive discrimination 
“would be patronizing to women and would undermine their achievements”: Ellis, supra n 164, 
400.  Docksey refers to the “possibility [for women] of being stigmatised as inferior candidates”: 
supra n 213, 19.  See also Tomei: “Preferential treatment... acts as a disincentive for members of 
the beneficiary groups to improve their skills [and] erodes their perceived competence in the 
eyes of society” (supra, n 212, 413). 
216 Wentholt accuses the Court of “undermin[ing] the effectiveness of affirmative action” by 
treating it as a derogation: Wentholt, supra n 164, 60.  Docksey also regards it as a derogation: 
supra n 213, 17.  Barnard calls for a “reconceptualis[ation]” of discrimination such that positive 
action would no longer be regarded as an exception: supra, n 207, 371-2.  Masselot notes a 
conflict within the wording of the (later abandoned) Constitutional Treaty; Article II-83 presents 
positive action as an exception to gender equality, while Article III-214(4) presents positive 
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Tobler comment that it should in fact be regarded as “[sex equality’s] other, 
positive side”217.  The latter two writers, as well as Andrews218 and of course the 
Norwegian delegation in EFTA, draw attention to the (arguably) preferable 
wording to be found in the UN Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  However, as the EFTA Court (and 
Advocate General Jacobs in Marschall) pointed out, this Convention has for the 
moment no binding effect. 
 
3.7.3. A Walzerian analysis 
 
It is clear that, when it comes to positive action, it is better to take a broad 
approach to Walzer than a narrow one.  Where such a complicated and 
pervasive social issue as gender inequality is at stake, it is necessary to 
contemplate the interplay of every sphere of justice with every other one, and 
the matter must be looked at in relation to the whole sphere and not just one 
particular element within it.219 
 
In the context of the unequal treatment of women, Walzer entertains positive 
action (or affirmative action as it is known in the US), and furthermore he sees it 
                                                                                                                                    
action as part of gender equality: Annick Masselot, “The State of Gender Equality Law in the 
European Union” European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2, March 2007, 152.  Under the Lisbon 
Treaty, Article 141 EC remains – with one technical exception - untouched, although 
renumbered as Article 157; the new Article 157(4) is identical to (what would have been) Article 
III-214(4).  Also, Article 6 TEU now gives binding legal effect to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, Article 23 of which is identical to (what would have been) Article 
II-83.  So in fact the conflict identified by Masselot has not gone away.  Numhauser-Henning, 
too, observes that the Charter’s wording is “more narrow” than that of the Treaty: supra n 169, 
153. 
217 Supra, n 4, 414. 
218 Jill Andrews, “National and International Sources of Women’s Right to Equal Employment 
Opportunities: Equality in Law Versus Equality in Fact” Northwestern Journal of International 
Law and Business, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1994, 413.  
219 If the narrow approach is insisted upon, then the results may be disappointing.  This is 
because, on a more microscopic examination of the individual cases, disparities between 
(potential) shared understandings and the distributive criteria actually used do emerge.  For 
example, there is no element of academic or managerial merit in Hesse’s distribution of college 
appointments in Badeck, while, without wishing to pre-empt the particular distributive 
community at issue, a common understanding of such an appointment would be that the holder 
possessed some degree of aptitude either for teaching or for management (depending on the 
exact role in question).  Thus recruitment strategies based entirely on positive action may, on 
the narrow reading, find themselves at odds with Walzer’s theory, and it is accepted that, in 
these circumstances, positive discrimination is an area to which complex equality has less to 
offer.  However, the reader is reminded of the important comment made at section 1.3. above, 
that the theory is proffered here only as a potential new tool to be added to the judicial tool-
box, not as an all-encompassing theory operating to the exclusion of all others.   
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as a component of, rather than an exception to, complex equality.  He uses here 
the argument mentioned above in the context of part time and full time work220, 
that sex discrimination may itself be a boundary breach, as notions of gender 
“roles” within the family (part of what he calls the “structures of kinship”) are 
reiterated in other distributive spheres, unjustly locking women into stereotypes 
that do not have the slightest connection to these other spheres.  As he puts it, 
 
“The real domination of women has less to do with their familial place 
than with their exclusion from all other places… [W]hat is most important 
right now is that the market, as it actually functions and as we 
understand its functioning, sets no internal bar to the participation of 
women.  It is focused on the quality of goods and on the skill and energy 
of persons, not on kinship standing or sex.”221 
 
And as he nicely sums it up in a later work, 
 
“patriarchy and male dominance are […] examples of distributive 
simplicity.”222 
 
Okin has probably gone the furthest of all commentators to develop this 
argument.  While critical of Walzer’s use of “shared understandings” as the basis 
for distribution, she praises his view that the various spheres of justice should be 
separated: 
 
“Walzer’s theoretical framework – separate spheres having to allow for 
different inequalities to exist side by side only insofar as a situation which 
he calls “dominance” is not created – has considerable force as a tool for 
social, and particularly for feminist, criticism.”223 
 
She continues that the implications of the separate spheres criterion for justice 
 
“suggest what many feminists have been arguing […]: the unequal 
distribution of rights, benefits, responsibilities, and powers within the 
family is closely related to inequalities in the many other spheres of 
social and political life.  There is a cyclical process at work, reinforcing 
the dominance of men over women, from home to work to what is 
conventionally referred to as the “political” arena, and thence back home 
again.”224 
 
                                                 
220 See supra, text accompanying n 179. 
221 Spheres of Justice, supra n 9, 240-1. 
222 M Walzer, “Response” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, 
Oxford 1995) 290. 
223 SM Okin, Justice, gender, and the family (Basic Books, New York 1989) 112. 
224 Ibid., 113. 
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Women are still “designated and defined by their position within the family”225, 
whereas: 
 
“[s]ocial goods must be distributed in accordance with their own relevant 
reasons, not determined by women’s familial roles.”226 
 
If it were considered that, say, the Parks Department of Bremen, or even 
Bremen’s entire local administration, was characterized by an 
overrepresentation of male workers, then it might be concluded that recruitment 
procedures over the years had been biased in favour of men and had sought to 
reiterate structures of kinship (male “provider”/ breadwinner, female carer) within 
the sphere of office.  As this would be a violation of complex equality, it would 
then be appropriate to bring the violation to an end by ensuring, henceforth, a 
fifty-fifty gender divide within that Department/ administration.  But if it were 
further considered that, given the engrained and institutional nature of the bias, 
preferential treatment should be accorded to women in the short term in order to 
bring about a fifty-fifty gender divide in the long term, then, logically, that too 
should be sanctioned by complex equality.  On that analysis, the Court reached 
the wrong decisions in Kalanke and EFTA, although the right ones in Marschall 
and Badeck.  The Walzerian result in Schnorbus would depend on how the 
Court read the preferential treatment accorded to male Bar candidates in that 
case.  If such preferential treatment, which was intended to make up for a year 
lost to military service, in fact perpetuated structures of kinship within the sphere 
of office, either by reiterating supposed gender “roles”227 in inappropriate fora, or 
simply by creating more male lawyers than female ones, then Ms Schnorbus 
was in the right in impugning it.  If, on the other hand, it itself was a method of 
redressing an otherwise inevitable overrepresentation of women in the legal 
profession, then it could be condoned as a means of maintaining, not disrupting, 
the autonomy of the sphere in question. 
 
                                                 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid., 114.  The theory which Okin goes on to develop, the “abolition of gender” (ibid., 116), is 
by her own admission one which “would certainly not be agreed upon by all as desirable” (ibid., 
180).  Nevertheless, this is, in her opinion, the logical conclusion to Walzer’s theory, inasmuch as 
it applies to the gender issue.  She thus goes further than the view expressed above that 
respective “roles” of family members (if any) should be restricted to the sphere of kinship, by 
asserting that they should be abolished even from there. 
227 The male as “fighter”, for example. 
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4. Racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, 
and sexual orientation: New statuses, new status rights? 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
The insertion of a new Article 13 into the EC Treaty, via the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997, and the subsequent adoption of two major Directives1, gave 
the ECJ significant new tools with which to investigate discrimination based on 
five additional grounds: racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, sexual 
orientation, and disability.  Since the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 
1 December 2009, Article 13 EC has been replaced by Article 19 TFEU, which – 
with a few technical exceptions – is identical.  It is of course wrong to suggest 
that these statuses were invented at Amsterdam; people were black and white, 
gay and straight, old and young, and so on, before 1997.  It is just that Article 19 
and its daughter Directives allowed differential treatment, grounded on such 
attributes, to be much more robustly objected to.  Nevertheless, such treatment 
(as long as it fell within the ambit of the Treaty) could still have been objected to 
prior to the amendment by dint of the all-encompassing “general principle” of 
equality, the residual role of which, as will be seen, is a matter of some 
confusion.2  
 
                                                 
1 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22 (“Directive 2000/43” 
or the “Race Equality Directive”) and Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ 
L303/16 (“Directive 2000/78” or the “Framework Employment Directive”). 
2 See Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981, and the comments on 
Mangold in Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion in Case C-427/06 Birgit Bartsch v Bosch und 
Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge GmbH [2008] ECR I-7245.  And even before the 
adoption of the Directives, the general principle was, it seemed, of limited use.  For example, it 
could not be used to admonish Member States which refused to treat same-sex relationships (or 
even registered partnerships) as equivalent to marriage (or opposite-sex relationships outside 
marriage): Case C-249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd. [1998] ECR I-621, 
Joined cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P D and Kingdom of Sweden v Council of the European 
Union [2001] ECR I-4319. 
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4.2. Racial/ ethnic origin and religion/ belief 
4.2.1. The ECJ’s case-law 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, “racial or ethnic origin” and “religion or 
belief” will be dealt with together, although it is not at all asserted that they are 
the same thing.  Religion, if anything, overlaps with race.  As Brown points out:   
 
“In most cases, discrimination on grounds of belonging to a minority 
religion will disproportionately affect people belonging to an ethnic 
minority; in other words, such religious discrimination will constitute 
indirect race discrimination.”3 
 
Drawing a boundary between the two ideas can be “problematic”4.  Lester has 
made an impassioned plea (albeit in the UK context) that race and religion must 
be treated separately, pointing to a number of significant differences between 
the two concepts (for example, a person’s race may be visible, while his religion 
may be invisible)5.  In the Jewish context, he goes on to explain, religious anti-
Semitism and racial anti-Semitism are entirely distinct; they were prevalent at 
different times, and those affected by the second would not necessarily have 
been affected by the first6. 
 
The separateness of the two notions has certainly not been lost on the 
Community institutions, which chose to leave religion to sit alongside the other 
grounds, while giving race its own Directive, entailing noticeably greater 
protection: the Race Equality Directive7.  The scope rationae materiae of the 
Race Equality Directive, which is set out in Chapter I thereof, embraces not only 
employment, but also social protection (including social security and healthcare), 
social advantages, education, and access to and supply of goods and services 
which are available to the public (including housing)8.  Discrimination on grounds 
of racial or ethnic origin occurring in any of these four additional arenas is thus 
outlawed, while discrimination affecting any of the other “new statuses” would 
                                                 
3 Christopher Brown, “The race directive: towards equality for “all” the peoples of Europe?” 
Yearbook of European Law 2001-2002, n. 21, p. 195-227, 204-5 (Brown’s italics). 
4 M Bell, “EU anti-racism policy: the leader of the pack?” in Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an 
Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 187. 
5 A Lester and P Uccellari, “Extending the equality duty to religion, conscience and belief: 
proceed with caution” EHRLR 2008, 5, 567, 570. 
6 Ibid., 572. 
7 Directive 2000/43.  Full citation at n 1, supra. 
8 Ibid., Article 3(1)(e)–(h). 
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not be9.  Victims of race discrimination even receive greater protection than 
victims of gender discrimination, who admittedly are safeguarded in one of the 
additional arenas (goods and services), and part of another (social security), but 
not the remaining two.10  This has led to talk of a “hierarchy” of grounds, with 
race at the top, followed by gender.  Third place would be held jointly by religion, 
sexual orientation, disability and age11, and last of all would be nationality12.  
However, writers seem to vacillate between lamenting the fact that the EU does 
not confer the same level of protection on all of the grounds13, and accepting 
                                                 
9 Cf. the Framework Employment Directive, Article 3(1). 
10 The Equal Treatment Directive (Directive 76/207, [1976] OJ L39/40) limited protection to 
employment (Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the original Directive, Article 3 only since amendment by 
Directive 2002/73, [2002] OJ L269/15).  The position is the same under the Recast Directive, 
Directive 2006/54, [2006] OJ L204/23.  Social security was dealt with in a separate instrument 
(Directive 79/7, [1979] OJ L6/24 – the Social Security Directive).  In 2004, protection against sex 
discrimination was extended to cover goods and services, although, crucially, not education: 
Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ 
L373/37 – see Article 3(1) and Article 3(3).  However, even within the arena of public goods and 
services, protection against race discrimination is more extensive than protection against sex 
discrimination, for example, sex may be taken into account in setting insurance premiums, but 
race may not.  See ibid., Article 5(2); no such exception is to be found in the Race Equality 
Directive.  See further Bell, supra n 4, 181-4. 
11 Although it has been pointed out that age actually receives lesser treatment in comparison 
with the other three grounds in this list, mainly due to the extensive exceptions to be found in 
the Framework Employment Directive, Article 6.  See further H Meenan, “Age equality after the 
employment directive” 10 MJ 1 (2003) 9, 10.  McGlynn has suggested that it is both age and 
disability which “occupy the lowest rung”: C McGlynn, “EC legislation prohibiting age 
discrimination: “Towards a Europe for All Ages”?” (2000) 3 C-YELS 279, 294.   
12 Nationality generally, that is.  The protection in relation to the free movement of EU nationals 
is extensive.  Thus, Martin puts nationality ahead of sex in his hierarchy-of-treatment, as does 
Warnier: Martin D, Égalité et non-discrimination dans la jurisprudence communautaire: étude 
critique à la lumière d’une approche comparatiste (Bruylant, Brussels 2006) 590; N Warnier, “Les 
discriminations directes and indirectes dans la domaine de l’égalité homme-femme et de 
l’égalité nationaux-non-nationaux” Revue de droit international et de droit comparé 2006, v 84, 
2e trimester, 225, 285.  (EU) nationality discrimination will be dealt with in Chapter 5 below.  For 
one description of the full hierarchy, see G Pitt, “Religion or belief: aiming at the right target?” 
in Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 202, 223-4.  
Another can be found in E Howard, “The case for a considered hierarchy of discrimination 
grounds in EU law” 13 MJ 4 (2006), 445.  Costello and Davies believe that the Court may make 
use of the general principle of equality to “flatten” the hierarchy: C Costello and G Davies, “The 
case law of the Court of Justice in the field of sex equality since 2000” Common Market Law 
Review 2006, v. 43, n. 6, December, 1567, 1574. 
13 “[N]o clear rationale has been given for the greater material and protective scope for sex and 
race... there is no obvious reason why sex and race should be favoured above the other grounds 
contained in Article 13”: H Meenan, “Conclusion” in Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged 
European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 342-3.  “[I]t will remain difficult to explain to citizens 
why one form of discrimination enjoys a higher level of protection in law than another”: L 
Waddington and M Bell, “More equal than others: distinguishing European Union equality 
directives” Common Market Law Review 2001, v. 38, n. 3, June, 587, 611.  “[I]f Article 13 is to be 
a cornerstone provision of an emerging Union constitution, then the rights of certain citizens 
should not be more “fundamental” than those of others.  By enacting [a specific Directive for 
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that the “specific characteristics”14 or “peculiarities”15 of the different grounds 
require different responses for each16.  With regards to race, the specific 
characteristics setting it apart from the other grounds include the fact that there 
is a political consensus on the need to combat racial discrimination (which there 
may not be in respect of the other grounds)17.  With regards to gender, there is 
the fact that the EC Treaty itself appears to privilege this ground over the 
others18. 
 
To date only one case based directly on Directive 2000/43 has come to 
judgment at the ECJ.  In Firma Feryn19, a Belgian company specializing in up-
and-over doors refused to hire Moroccans to fit its products; one of the 
company’s directors publicly stated this policy both on television and in the 
press.  On a reference from the Brussels Labour Court (an action having been 
brought by a Belgian public-interest body), the ECJ held that 
 
                                                                                                                                    
race but] a Framework Directive for the other forms of discrimination, one is giving the 
impression that the right of someone from an ethnic minority to non-discrimination in, for 
example, the supply of goods and services is more important than that of a homosexual.”: 
Brown, supra n 3,  223. 
14 M Bell and L Waddington, “Reflecting on inequalities in European equality law” (2003) 28 
ELRev 349, 368. 
15 H Meenan, “Age discrimination – Of Cinderella and The Golden Bough” in Meenan (ed), 
Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 299. 
16 “As such these differences in treatment amount to a recognition of difference rather than the 
creation of a hierarchy.”: Bell and Waddington, supra n 14, 368.  “[Taking a differentiated 
approach to the new grounds] is not to endorse a hierarchy of inequality but rather to 
acknowledge the differences between them.”: B Fitzpatrick, “The “mainstreaming” of sexual 
orientation into European equality law” in Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged European 
Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 313 (footnote omitted).  Schiek in particular has attempted to 
explain the differences between the grounds, via her well-known three-pronged categorization 
in D Schiek, “A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law?” European Law 
Journal, v. 8, n. 2, June, 290, particularly at 309-310.  “If there are different categories of 
characteristics, discrimination on grounds of which is forbidden, this may justify differences 
between different prohibitions to discriminate”: Ibid., 310.  But for some criticisms of her 
approach, see Pitt, supra n 12, 224 et seq.  
17 Suggested by Brown, supra n 3, 222.  If the consensus argument is accepted, then the 
apparent favouritism shown to race is not really favouritism at all, but merely “realism” (ibid., 
223) or “pragmatism” (Meenan, supra n 15, 299, referring to E Barry, “Different Hierarchies – 
Enforcing Equality Law” in Costello and Barry (eds), Equality in Diversity – The New Equality 
Directives (Ashfield, 2003) 414).  As McGlynn points out, the Commission itself has admitted 
that its approach was steered by pragmatism: McGlynn, supra n 11, 288, referring to 
COM(99)564 – see para. 11 of the latter document.  Further discussion of the pragmatism 
rationale can be found in Howard, supra n 12, 451 et seq. 
18 Suggested by Schiek, supra n 16, 300. 
19 Case C-54/07 Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn 
NV. (ECJ 10 July 2008). 
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“[t]he fact that an employer declares publicly that it will not recruit 
employees of a certain ethnic or racial origin, something which is clearly 
likely to strongly dissuade certain candidates from submitting their 
candidature and, accordingly, to hinder their access to the labour market, 
constitutes direct discrimination in respect of recruitment within the 
meaning of Directive 2000/43.”20 
 
Turning to “religion or belief”, there has as yet been no case under the 
Framework Employment Directive (which will be discussed in detail in the 
following sections) in relation to this ground.  Indeed, as Bell has pointed out in 
relation to sexual orientation, “absolutely low levels of litigation” may actually be 
an “early warning sign” that the Directive is not working21.  However, the 
European Court did consider the ground some years prior to the passing of the 
Directive, in 1976 to be precise.  In the Prais case, Ms Prais requested an 
alternative date for the written test of a Council concours, because the date as it 
stood clashed with the Jewish festival of Shavuot (Pentacost)22.  The request 
was refused, and a subsequent complaint was rejected.  Ms Prais then sought 
the annulment of both the refusal and the rejection before the ECJ.  She relied 
on Article 27(2) of the Staff Regulations, which stipulated that officials were to be 
selected without reference to race, creed or sex, as well as on the prohibition on 
religious discrimination (which formed part of the fundamental rights of the 
individual), and Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights (ECHR).  The Council counter-argued that these instruments 
were not to be understood as according to Ms Prais the rights which she was 
claiming; the Council would need an “elaborate administrative machinery” if it 
had to take account of “all religions” when fixing dates for its tests23.  The ECJ 
agreed.  The principle of equal treatment in fact worked against Ms Prais, by 
requiring that the tests should take place on the same conditions for all 
candidates; this meant that all candidates would have to sit the tests on the 
same date.  The interests of participants in avoiding certain unsuitable dates had 
to be balanced against this necessity.  While the Court admitted that it would be 
“desirable” that the Council informed itself “in a general way” about dates of 
religious significance, the instruments cited did not impose a duty on it to avoid 
                                                 
20 Ibid., para. 25. 
21 Bell, “Publication review - Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the European Union: National 
Laws and the Employment Equality Directive” EHRLR 2007, 4, 481-482, 482. 
22 Case 130/75 Vivien Prais v Council of the European Communities [1976] ECR 1589. 
23 Quotations from ibid., para. 11. 
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conflicts, especially when, firstly, it had not been told about Ms Prais’ difficulties 
in good time, and, secondly, other candidates had already been convoked24. 
 
4.2.2. A Walzerian analysis 
 
4.2.2.1. Implicit bias: Prais v Council 
 
Cases concerning religion and race provide a nice example of what Walzer was 
describing at the beginning of Thick and Thin, discussed above, namely that 
moral codes do not just fall out of the sky, but that they are in fact the product of 
the particular history of the people, or peoples, laying claim to them.  This 
means that, despite their claims to universality and neutrality, many such codes 
may have certain cultural ideas “embedded” within them.25 
 
Thus, in a case like Prais, the apparently neutral decision, first of the Council 
and then of the Court, to treat all candidates alike may have implicitly favoured 
candidates belonging to Europe’s dominant faith: Christianity.  In other words, a 
hidden “norm” (or “invisible baseline”26) is endorsed, and with each endorsement 
further petrified, so that whatever sacrifices are to be made in the name of “like 
treatment” are in fact exclusively made by the candidate of the non-dominant 
faith.  This is not a meeting in the middle.  Candidates of the non-dominant faith 
must be leveled, up or down, to “match” those of the dominant faith.  It is not as 
though, for example, a Christian candidate would ever be required to sit an 
examination on a Sunday (the Community institutions are closed on Saturdays 
and Sundays).  As Danchin has put it (in the context of the “affaire du foulard” in 
France), 
 
“any exception to the general rule […] will be determined by the majority 
[…] typically out of deference to the historical relationship between the 
nation and its dominant religion.  […] [T]his exercise of national 
                                                 
24 Quotations from ibid., para. 18. 
25 In the context of sexual orientation, Ball also talks about the role which “personal and 
intellectual attachments to particular western and liberal contemporary societies” may play in 
the determination of supposedly universal principles: Carlos A Ball, “Communitarianism and Gay 
Rights” 85 Cornell L Rev 1999-2000 443, 503.  
26 Peter G Danchin, “Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in 
International Law” 33:1 Yale J Int’l L 2008 1, 25. 
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sovereignty will be neutral neither towards religion in general, nor to 
minority religions […] in particular.”27 
 
This is reminiscent of Schmitt’s famous comment, “The sovereign is: He who 
decides on the state of exception”28.   
 
While it is not the intention of this dissertation to second-guess shared 
understandings – the whole point is that they must be arrived at by the 
distributive community itself – nevertheless it is fairly certain that the shared 
understanding of the thing distributed in the Prais case, namely a post at the 
Council, would not contain any reference to the religion of the potential post-
holder.  To perform work at the Council may require some experience of living in 
Europe, and no doubt a high level of verbal reasoning and other skills, but it is 
unlikely to require belief in any particular religion, or in any religion at all.  It is 
true that an examination may have to be held to confirm the candidate’s 
possessing of the (pertinent) experience and skills.  However, holding this 
examination on the feast-day of any non-dominant religion practiced within the 
Council’s jurisdiction allows those who can show a badge of membership of the 
dominant religion (according to whose calendar the date has been set) 
privileged access to the distributive sphere, while effectively turning away, or at 
least discouraging, those whose badges say something else.  Membership of 
the dominant religion is thus being used tyrannically, contrary to complex 
equality.29  The Court of Justice, if it found the shared understanding of posts at 
the Council to be as described, would therefore have had to find against the 
Council, and in favour of Ms Prais.  As Danchin points out in a different context, 
such a finding would require “more than noninterference with the individual’s 
imagined sphere of liberty”; it would require “public recognition of a plurality of 
different religious and cultural groups and ways of life”30. 
 
                                                 
27 Ibid. (footnote omitted). 
28 “Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet”: Carl Schmitt, Politische 
Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität [Political Theology: Four Chapters towards 
a Theory of Sovereignty] (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1990) 11. 
29 As an alternative to viewing “membership of the dominant religion” as the dominant good in 
this case, facilitating access of the majority to a good thing (the post at the Council, or at least 
the possibility thereof), one could also see Ms Prais as possessing a negative dominant (“being 
Jewish”, “not being able to attend the test”), which grants access of the minority to a bad thing, 
or “negative good” (exclusion from the test).  Walzer discusses negative goods and negative 
dominance in Chapter 6 of Spheres of Justice, on “hard work”: M Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A 
Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, New York 1983) 165-183.  See the discussion at 
section 2.3. above. 
30 Supra n 2656, 11. 
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Complex equality would even allow a policy of proportionality, such as Walzer 
describes in the context of schooling.31  The Council, as an institution which 
represents all Member States of the EU, might wish to have a work-force 
representative of the EU’s population (if such an idea formed part of the shared 
meaning of “a job at the Council”) and “not dominated by the… reigning 
ideologies”32.  If proportionality were to be a component in the distributive 
mechanism employed by the Council, then holding the qualifying test on the 
same day as a Jewish festival would violate this mechanism by preventing an 
entire constituency within the European population (Jewish people) from having 
an opportunity to compete.  Failure to respect a shared meaning would of 
course represent a further violation of complex equality.  The Court’s job would 
simply be to identify that there had been a flawed distribution, and then, if 
possible, to right the wrong done. 
 
4.2.2.2. Explicit bias: Firma Feryn 
 
The shared understanding was much less clear-cut or predictable in Firma 
Feryn.  Here, the post being distributed was that of a fitter of up-and-over doors.  
A worrying aspect of the case was that, if Mr Feryn was to be believed, the 
exclusive hiring of non-Moroccans was part of the shared understanding of this 
post within the relevant distributive community.  He repeatedly said in both the 
press and on television that his customers “[did] not want Moroccans”, and “[did 
not] want them coming into their homes”.  He continued: 
 
“We must meet the customers’ requirements.  […] I want the firm to do 
well and I want us to achieve our turnover at the end of the year, and 
how can I do that?  I must do it the way the customer wants it done!”33 
 
Presumably Mr Feryn would therefore argue that he was taking a Walzerian 
approach to the distribution of which he was (ultimately) in charge, and reflecting 
his community’s understanding of what it meant to be a fitter of up-and-over 
doors, by making sure that no such fitter was of Moroccan nationality.34  Of 
                                                 
31 Spheres of Justice, supra 29, 221-224. 
32 Ibid., 226. 
33 Firma Feryn, supra n 19, at Para. 4 of the Opinion. 
34 Fox describes a similar situation occurring in the US prior to the civil rights revolution: 
“employment was understood within its own sphere as properly discriminatory – a norm that 
applied to employers and employees alike (witness the strong support for racist employment 
policies among white unions)”: James W Fox, Jr, “Relational Contract Theory and Democratic 
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course, one man’s testimony cannot be determinative of a shared meaning.  
There may very well have been in Belgium at that time potential owners of up-
and-over doors who did not hold the same racist views as Mr Feryn’s customers 
apparently did.  But if, for the sake of argument, the shared meaning was indeed 
as Mr Feryn described it, how is a complex egalitarian to respond?  Walzer 
himself entertains the idea of certain types of homogeneity, including ethnic or 
religious homogeneity, within certain workplaces: 
 
“it may well happen that at a given time, in a given place, the most 
successful factory will be run largely by Italians, say, or by Mormons.  I 
don’t see anything wrong with that.”35 
 
However, he draws the line at hiring practices that use race as a criterion: 
 
“In a society with a long history of racism, it would make sense to rule out 
racial criteria, hence to impose a minimal set of fair employment 
practices.”36 
 
The Firma Feryn case provides an example of the problematic situation 
discussed in section 2.5. above, where leaving a community to fix its own 
distributive criteria can lead to nationalism, or worse.  As mentioned in that 
section, the solution is to build into the theory a kind of universal moral code 
against which the context-dependent principles can be tested, and which, if 
necessary, can act as an override.  It was submitted that Walzer had all along 
intended that the theory should incorporate such a “thin morality”37, although he 
was at pains to point out that even this had a particularist dimension that could 
not be ignored. 
 
Later in the same chapter (section 2.6.), it was discussed how the European 
Court of Justice already had at its disposal an instrument which represented a 
kind of “European version” of this thin morality.38  It was also discussed how 
                                                                                                                                    
Citizenship” 54 Case W Res L Rev 2003-2004 1, 41-42.  Racism was quite simply “the custom of 
the relationship”: ibid., 42. 
35 Spheres of Justice, supra n 29, 162. 
36 Ibid. 
37 M Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (University of Notre Dame 
Press, Indiana 1994) 12. 
38 It would, in fairness, be exceedingly thin, by Walzer’s standards.  A Council of Europe 
instrument such as the ECHR, for example, necessarily represents the combined “moralities” of 
(in 2009) forty seven signatory states, to say nothing of the local “moralities” of the smaller 
constituent communities within these states. But in many ways post-war Europe was facing a 
“moment[...] of crisis”, and was “unite[d] [by] the sense of a common enemy” (Nazism/ 
Fascism); this justified the construction of “an abstract version, a stick figure, a cartoon” (all 
109 
 
simple it would be to identify any distributive criterion which offended against 
said morality, and to rule it out.  In Firma Feryn, the apparently shared rule that 
no fitters of up-and-over doors may be of Moroccan nationality is just such a 
criterion.  It offends against Article 14 and Protocol 12 of the ECHR.  Relying on 
Europe’s Minimal Morality, then, as represented (at least in part) by this 
instrument, the judge at the ECJ would not have any difficulty in declaring that 
there had been a flawed distribution.39  He could then (subject to what is said at 
section 7.2.1. below) either rewrite the distributive criteria himself, or send the 
case back to the Labour Court in Brussels for it to rewrite them. 
 
4.3. Age 
4.3.1. The ECJ’s case-law 
 
Age has been described as “particularly difficult”40, and even “the hardest of the 
four grounds”41 covered by the Framework Employment Directive42.  As 
discussed above, though,43 it is less a case of hardness or simplicity, or better or 
worse, than it is different courses for different horses.  The “differences” of age, 
as a ground for discrimination, are manifold, including the obvious fact that 
noone’s age remains static44.  In a recent case, Advocate General Mazák 
                                                                                                                                    
quotations from Thick and Thin, supra n 3798, 18).  It could also be argued that in the half-
century or so since the War, the signatory states have grown closer and gone through more and 
more common experiences, lending a sort of communal thickness to the cartoon, and possibly 
starting to turn it back into a statue.   
39 Fox takes a slightly different route out of the problem (see supra n 34), by using equal 
citizenship as his override.  It will be recalled that equal citizenship was mooted as a possible 
universal or adjudicatory principle, already supplied by Walzer himself in Spheres of Justice: see 
supra, Chapter 2, section 2.5. 
40 Meenan, supra n 15, 284. 
41 T Osbourne, “Will the European Union Directive on equal treatment fulfil its purpose of 
combating age discrimination in employment?” (2004) The International Lawyer v. 38, n. 3, Fall, 
867, 880. 
42 Directive 2000/78.  Full citation at n 1, supra. 
43 Text accompanying n 13, et seq. 
44 Of course, one’s religion, or one’s sexual orientation, or one’s being disabled or not, can 
change over time.  But these statuses are very unlikely to change as often, or as inevitably, as 
age.  Advocate General Jacobs has commented that, while a ground like sex involves a “binary 
criterion”, age is “a point on a scale”: Case C-227/04 P Maria-Luise Lindorfer v Council of the 
European Union [2007] ECR I-6767, at 6789 (Para. 84 of the First Opinion). 
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acknowledged the “genuine difference between age and the other grounds”, 
including age’s “fluid” nature45. 
 
Those discriminating on grounds of age have less to fear from Directive 2000/78 
than those discriminating on one of the other grounds.  For a start, national 
provisions laying down retirement ages are outside the purview of the 
Directive46.  In addition, payments made under state social security schemes, or 
social protection schemes, are exempted47.  As well as these two compulsory 
exemptions, the Directive provides for a number of optional ones (optional on 
the part of the Member States, that is).  The prohibition on age discrimination, 
for example, need not be applied in respect of the armed forces48.  The fixing of 
ages in occupational pension schemes may also contravene the ban, if a 
Member State so decides49.  It is Article 6(1) of the Framework Employment 
Directive, though, which affords Member States the biggest scope to 
discriminate on grounds of age, or to permit such discrimination, without 
penalty50.  The first paragraph reads: 
 
“Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds of 
age shall not constitute discrimination, if […] they are objectively and 
reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, […] and if the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.” 
 
Thus, as long as a legitimate aim can be shown, which passes a standard 
objective justification test51 and a standard proportionality test, any instance of 
age discrimination – including direct age discrimination - can, theoretically, 
evade the Directive.  As Meenan has rightly pointed out, Article 6(1) is “infinitely 
elastic”52.  Waddington and Bell have called it “open-ended”53.  Others have 
                                                 
45 Case C-388/07 Incorporated Trustees of the National Council on Ageing (Age Concern England) 
v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2009] ECR I-1569, at Para. 
74 of the Opinion.  
46 Recital 14. 
47 Article 3(3). 
48 Article 3(4). 
49 Article 6(2).  Skidmore has commented that this derogation “runs the risk that it may result in 
other forms of discrimination”: P Skidmore, “EC Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in 
Employment: Towards a Comprehensive Community Anti-Discrimination Policy?” (2001) 30 ILJ 
126, 130. 
50 Schiek has described Article 6 as being “loaden with exceptions”: Schiek, supra n 16, 301. 
51 It was argued in the Age Concern reference (Case C-388/07 Age Concern, supra n 45), by Age 
Concern, that the additional words “and reasonably” added an extra hurdle to the objective 
justification test in Article 6(1).  However, this argument was rejected by both the Advocate 
General (see Para. 79 of the Opinion) and the Court (see Para. 65 of the Judgment). 
52 Meenan, supra n 15, 297. 
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gone even further, accusing Article 6(1) of “legalis[ing] age discrimination”54 and 
warning that the exception “could end up swallowing” the rule55. 
 
Age was in fact the subject of the very first preliminary reference made to the 
Court of Justice specifically on Directive 2000/78: Mangold v Helm56.  The case 
concerned the use of fixed-term employment contracts.  In Germany, the law 
placed two curbs on the use of fixed-term employment contracts (in order to 
prevent their misuse), requiring an objective reason justifying the fixed term, or, 
alternatively, imposing limits on the number of renewals (three) or on duration of 
use (two years).  However, German law permitted fixed-term contracts, even 
without the above restrictions, if the employee was aged 60 or over.  When 
Germany came to transpose Directive 2000/78, by means of the “Law on part-
time working and fixed term contracts”57 (the “FTC Law”), this threshold was 
lowered to 58.  In 2002, the threshold was again lowered, by the so-called “Hertz 
Law”, to 52. 
 
In 2003, at the age of 56, Mr Mangold was hired by Mr Helm (a lawyer) on a 
fixed-term employment contract; the contract contained no objective justification, 
or stipulation of a maximum number of renewals, or stipulation of a maximum 
duration.  In proceedings brought by Mr Mangold, the Court of Justice was 
asked whether there was an incompatibility between EC law (in particular, 
Directive 2000/78) and the German laws which deprived employees over 58 
(and later 52) of legal protection against abuse, by employers, of this kind of 
contract.   
 
Advocate General Tizzano recalls the wording of Article 6(1) of the Directive, 
and then comments that the difference in treatment on grounds of age (as 
between those who can enter into fixed-term contracts without restrictions, and 
those who cannot) “is… self-evident”58.  He goes on to opine that this difference 
in treatment is objectively justified, albeit implicitly, by the aim of “enhancing the 
                                                                                                                                    
53 Waddington and Bell, supra n 13, 599. 
54 Eurolink Age cited in Waddington, “Article 13 EC: Setting Priorities in the Proposal for a 
Horizontal Employment Directive” (2000) 29 ILJ 2, 176, 179, discussing the Directive when it was 
still at the proposal stage. 
55 Osbourne, supra n 41, 874. 
56 Case C-144/04 Mangold, supra n 2. 
57 Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsverträge und zur Änderung und Aufhebung 
arbeitsrechtlicher Bestimmungen. 
58 Case C-144/04 Mangold, supra n 2, at 10004 (Para. 88 of the Opinion). 
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employability of unemployed older workers who… have particular trouble finding 
new employment”59.  In other words, the lack of a requirement to provide 
protection to the potential employee boosts his or her prospects of employment, 
as the employer will find such a candidate more attractive than one for whom 
protection must be provided.  However, according to the Advocate General, this 
objective justification fails the proportionality test.  The denial of stability within 
the employee’s employment relationship, which on the Advocate General’s 
reading of the rules could start as early as the age of 50, and would last until 
retirement, is therefore permanent.  Such permanent “exclusion from… 
safeguards”60 is, in Tizzano’s view, disproportionate. 
 
The Opinion ends with consideration of a small point which has gone on to have 
a big significance.  The Advocate General suggests that, in declaring the 
German laws to be incompatible with EC law, the Court should use, not Article 6 
of Directive 2000/78, but the general principle of equality itself.  After all, the 
analysis (difference in treatment, objective justification, proportionality) would be 
identical.  The benefit would be that general principles have horizontal direct 
effect, while Directives do not (and, in any case, the deadline for transposition of 
the Directive had not, at the material time, passed). 
 
The Court largely follows its Advocate General.  The difference in treatment on 
grounds of age, brought about by the FTC Law and the Hertz Law, would be 
discrimination unless the conditions listed in Article 6(1) were met.  As regards 
objective justification, the Court, like Advocate General Tizzano, was satisfied 
that the German laws served the purpose of 
 
“promot[ing] the vocational integration of unemployed older workers, in 
so far as they encounter considerable difficulties in finding work.”61 
 
Turning to proportionality, the Court commented that Member States had a 
“broad discretion in their choice of measures [to achieve employment policy 
objectives]”62.  However, the FTC Law, combined with the Hertz Law, deprived 
all workers over the age of 52 of protection against abuse by employers, via 
indefinitely renewable fixed-term contracts, and therefore of “stable 
                                                 
59 Ibid. (Para. 90 of the Opinion). 
60 Ibid., at 10005 (Para. 96 of the Opinion). 
61 Ibid., para. 59. 
62 Ibid., para. 63. 
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employment”63.  It made no difference “whether or not they were unemployed 
before the contract was concluded”64, or what the duration of any period of 
unemployment had been.  This failure by the German authorities to take into 
consideration “the personal situation of the person concerned”65, or indeed the 
structure of the labour market as a whole, meant that the German law went 
“beyond what [was] appropriate and necessary”66.  The imposition of what might 
be called a “blanket” age-threshold meant that Germany had failed the 
proportionality test. 
 
Finally, the Court picked up Advocate General Tizzano’s point about the 
preferability of using the general principle of equality in deciding this case, rather 
than the Directive.  However, in a controversial move, the Court went further, by 
claiming that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age was itself a 
general principle of Community law67.   
 
The Court’s baptism of a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
age has provoked ire among some critics68, who are unconvinced as to the 
sources69 of the new principle (which are, according to the Court, various 
international instruments, including the ECHR and the ICCPR, and “the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States”70).  It is well known that 
at the time of the drafting of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Member States, while 
happy to countenance the new Article 19 (then Article 13), were adamant that it 
should not create rights of general application71.  Furthermore, many writers 
speculate as to whether a precedent has now been set, allowing all of the other 
grounds covered by Article 19 to be “upgraded” (to use Muir’s word) to general 
                                                 
63 Ibid., para. 64. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., para. 65. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., para. 75. 
68 Although Meenan describes it as “enormously helpful”: Meenan, supra n 15, 306. 
69 Or “alleged sources” as Arnull puts it: A Arnull, “Editorial: Out with the old...” (2006) 31 EL Rev 
Feb 1, 2. 
70 Case C-144/04 Mangold, supra n 2, at para. 75. 
71 This can be confirmed by contrasting the wording of Article 19 TFEU (then Article 13 EC) with 
Article 18 TFEU (then Article 12 EC) prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality, as 
discussed by E Muir, “Enhancing the effects of Community law on national employment policies: 
the Mangold case” EL Rev 2006, 31(6), 879, 889. 
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principles72.  If so, this in turn raises questions about how certain other cases 
were decided73.  
 
Almost two years after Mangold, the ECJ gave judgment in the case of Palacios 
de la Villa v Cortefiel74, which concerned compulsory retirement in Spain.  A 
Spanish law of 2005 legalized compulsory retirement clauses within collective 
agreements; workers over a given age could be compulsorily retired as long as 
this was “consistent with employment policy” (the “employment policy aim”), and 
as long as they had completed the minimum contribution period for a pension.  
The 2005 law was given retrospective effect by means of the so-called “Single 
Transitional Provision” (the “STP”), although the STP mentioned only the second 
of those two conditions, not the first.  In proceedings brought by Mr Palacios de 
la Villa against his employer Cortefiel, on being compulsorily retired at 65 
pursuant to the relevant collective agreement, the Court of Justice was asked 
whether the STP was precluded by the principle of equal treatment. 
 
Advocate General Mazák was of the opinion that the STP was not covered by 
the Framework Employment Directive, because retirement ages were exempted 
from the remit of the Directive by Recital 1475.  The Court of Justice disagreed.  
The matter at issue was the prevention of future participation in the labour force.  
This fell within Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive, which provided that the Directive 
would apply to “employment and working conditions, including dismissals and 
pay”.  Turning to Article 6(1), the Court acknowledged that no employment policy 
aim was mentioned explicitly in the STP, but nevertheless held that such an aim 
(in this case, regulating the national labour market for the purposes of checking 
unemployment) could be inferred from the context.  As regards the 
proportionality test, the Court felt that the taking of this particular measure in 
order to facilitate access to the labour market (in other words, removing older 
workers in order to free up posts for younger workers) was “not unreasonable”76.  
Also counting in favour of Spain’s conduct were the fact that a safeguard 
condition had been included to ensure that no older worker was retired before 
they had earned a full pension, and the fact that the “compulsory retirement 
                                                 
72 Ibid., 889-890; Meenan, supra n 15, 306; Arnull, supra n 69, 2. 
73 See below, text accompanying n 116. 
74 Case C-411/05 Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA [2007] ECR I-8531. 
75 In the event that the Court came to the opposite view, the Advocate General’s alternative 
submission was that the STP was justified and proportionate. 
76 Case C-411/05 Palacios, supra n 74, para. 72. 
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mechanism”77 could only be used in the context of a collective agreement, which 
ensured flexibility, and consideration of any industry-specific factors.  In the light 
of all of this, the Court’s conclusion was that Spain’s action in passing the STP 
had been “appropriate and necessary”.  No mention was made of the general 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age from Mangold. 
 
O’Cinneide has commented that, in Palacios, the objective justification test was 
applied “with considerable rigour”, with the justification itself being subjected to 
“close scrutiny”78.  Connolly meanwhile appears to take the opposite view, 
criticizing the Court for its “generous” approach (or “light touch” as he puts it) in 
accepting an implicit purpose for the STP, discerned from “evidence”, as 
opposed to an explicit one.  He regards Palacios as a “departure from the 
stricter approach” of cases like Mangold, with the Court apparently prepared to 
approve “vague” goals as justifications; according to him, Spain’s attempt to 
redistribute jobs from the old to the young is little more than a “ruse”, leaving 
“those most in need of protection” without it79. 
 
The issue of compulsory retirement has returned to the Court of Justice in the 
form of the Age Concern reference80.  Here, the English charity Age Concern 
(among others) has sought a judicial review of certain provisions of the 
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, which is one of the measures 
adopted by the UK for the purpose of transposing Directive 2000/78.  Age 
Concern argues that the transposition is flawed.  According to Age Concern, 
Article 6(1) does not permit Member States to introduce a general defence of 
justification for direct age discrimination, but that is just what the Regulations do 
(in stipulating that employers may dismiss employees at the age of 65 without 
having to show any objective justification whatsoever).  According to Age 
Concern, for the Directive to be correctly transposed, the discriminator (that is, 
the employer) would still need to show a legitimate aim, and proportionality.  The 
UK disputes this.  The High Court made a reference to Luxembourg. 
 
                                                 
77 Ibid., para. 74. 
78 Both phrases from C O’Cinneide, “Age Discrimination and Mandatory Retirement” [2008] 6/7 
European Anti-discrimination Law Review 13, 15. 
79 Quotations from M Connolly, “The ECJ signals a light touch towards age discrimination and 
compulsory retirement” Emp LB 2007, 81(NOV), 1, 3 (emphasis added).  
80 Case C-388/07 Age Concern, supra n 45. 
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In September 2008, Advocate General Mazák delivered his Opinion.  He found 
without difficulty, following Palacios, that the Regulations fell within the scope of 
the Directive.  Turning to the substance, Age Concern had argued that the 
Member States had to specify which differences in treatment were potentially 
capable of being justified, and had to specify what aims were capable of 
justifying such differences.  The national court in its questions had referred to 
the possibility of the Member State drawing up a “list” to define the justifiable 
differences.  The UK rejected Age Concern’s argument, and stated that a list 
would be unrealistic and inappropriate.  The Advocate General agreed; 
implementing legislation had to be specific and sufficiently clear (which, in his 
opinion, the Regulations were), but a list would be “impossible”81.  Thus, the 
Regulations were not incompatible with Article 6(1).  Member States (but not, 
importantly, individual employers) needed to proffer an identifiable (although not 
necessarily express) “legitimate aim”, and the means employed to achieve it 
needed to be “appropriate and necessary”.  However, the Advocate General left 
it to the national court to decide whether, in this particular case, these two 
obligations had been discharged. 
 
In March 2009, the Court handed down its judgment.  Having confirmed that the 
Regulations did fall within the scope of the Directive, the Court went on to 
explain that, when transposing a directive, Member States had to make sure that 
the implementing law was effective, but that they retained a broad discretion as 
to the methods to be used.  Thus, the UK could not be impugned for having 
chosen not to draw up a list of justifiable differences.  Neither did it matter if 
legitimate aims were not stated explicitly, as long as they could still be identified.  
However, both the ascertaining of the legitimate aim, and the proportionality test, 
were jobs for the national court.  The only guidance which the Court would give 
was that, when weighing up whether a specific measure was “appropriate and 
necessary”, the national court should reject “[m]ere generalizations”82; a 
generalization could not constitute evidence of the suitability of a measure for its 
purpose.83 
                                                 
81 Ibid., at Para. 54 of the Opinion. 
82 Case C-388/07 Age Concern, supra n 45, para. 51. 
83 It is worth noting that the UK’s Regulations did not contain a safeguard condition, like the one 
in Palacios, requiring that employees not be compulsorily retired if they had not yet acquired 
sufficient pension entitlements.  As the safeguard condition was such a key plank in the Court’s 
finding (in Palacios) that the STP was proportionate, surely the absence of such a condition can 




Finally, a quick mention might be made of the recent case of Petersen84.  Here, 
a German dentist was informed that her authorization to provide “panel” dental 
care (that is, dental care to those insured under the statutory health insurance 
scheme) was to expire when she reached the age of 68.  Ms Petersen having 
brought an action, a reference was made to the ECJ asking the Court whether 
setting a maximum age of 68 for practice as a panel dentist was an objective 
and reasonable measure to protect the health of patients insured under the 
statutory scheme.  The Court in fact looked at three possible justifications for the 
German rule, which it said had been “mentioned” by the referring court, although 
only the first had been “relied on”.85  With regard to this justification, the Court 
held that, given that there was an exception to the rule to the effect that dentists 
outside the panel system could work on after 68, the proffered objective of 
protection of public health could not be regarded as legitimate.  However, the 
Court said that the rule could potentially be justified on both of the other 
grounds, namely, the protection of the financial balance of the German health 
system and the need to distribute employment opportunities among the 
generations. 
 
4.3.2. A Walzerian analysis 
 
Complex equality is very well suited to the task of helping judges to decide 
discrimination cases owing to its novel focus on distribution, which facilitates the 
exposure of one of the mainsprings of discrimination: assumptions.  That 
assumptions are one of the major sources of discrimination, across all grounds, 
has been well explained by Bell (in the gender and sexual orientation 
discrimination contexts), McGlynn (in the age discrimination context) and Quinn 
(in the disability discrimination context).  Bell writes: 
 
“Discrimination against women is largely based on... gender-based 
assumptions relating to [women’s] social role.  The physical sex of the 
individual may be the marker through which discrimination is visualized, 
but it is not the physical characteristics of women per se which is at the 
                                                                                                                                    
78 at 19) and Connolly (supra n 79 at 4).  For an interesting analysis of the ECJ judgment, see M 
Connolly, “The Heyday case: much ado about very little” Emp LB 2009, 90 (Apr), 2. 
84 Case C-341/08 Domnica Petersen v Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk 
Westfalen-Lippe (ECJ 12 January 2010). 
85 Ibid., para. 38. 
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root of the discrimination against them.  In other words, a woman is not 
denied promotion to management level because the employer believes 
her physical body is inappropriate, but because of arbitrary and 
prejudicial assumptions about the capabilities of women as a social 
group, and their proper place in society.  The underlying objective of anti-
discrimination legislation in this perspective is to breakdown [sic] such 
gendered stereotypes.”86 
 
But sometimes the anti-discrimination legislation not only fails to break down the 
stereotypes, it reinforces them.  McGlynn’s concern, for example, is not so much 
the way assumptions inform the thinking of society’s discriminators (such as 
employers), but the way in which they pervade even the legislative arena, so 
that “objective” justifications for discrimination suggested by an instrument like 
the Framework Employment Directive are little more than these same 
assumptions, repackaged: 
 
“[T]he suggested legitimate justifications for differential treatment on 
grounds of age in [the Framework Employment Directive] may be based 
on assumptions regarding national retirement ages […].  Equally, 
justifications for age discrimination based on requirements of 
professional training, for example, may also be based on ageist 
assumptions regarding the nature of the labour market and the desirable 
age of employees.  […]  These assumptions appear to be out of step 
with the moves towards a more flexible labour market, “portfolio” careers 
and the removal of assumptions about the nature of jobs and the nature 
of the employees required to fill them.”87 
 
Tyranny, as has been explained before, involves having a “badge” from another 
sphere, which actually only has Meaning X, but which is allocated Meaning Y by 
the gate-keepers of the neighbouring sphere.  This in turn involves making an 
assumption; the gate-keepers of the neighbouring sphere do not need to 
examine each newcomer separately, when they can simply rely on a long-held 
rule of thumb (“If something has Meaning X, it must also have Meaning Y”).  
Quinn describes this very well:   
                                                 
86 M Bell, “Shifting Conceptions of Sexual Discrimination at the Court of Justice: from P v S to 
Grant v SWT” European Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 1999, 63, 65.  Bell’s emphasis, 
footnote omitted. 
87 Supra n 11, 290-1.  Even the judiciary is not immune to assumptions.  In the religious 
discrimination case of Şahin v. Turkey (Application No. 44774/98, 10 November 2005), the 
European Court of Human Rights justified the inequality caused when Ms Şahin was forced to 
obey a secular dress code, by reasoning that the wearing of the Islamic headscarf was 
“perceived as a compulsory religious duty”, imposed by men, sometimes against the wishes of 
the wearer, thus violating the “equality before the law of men and women” (paras. 115-116).  In 
his dissenting judgment, Judge Tulkens strongly admonished the majority for relying on mere 
perceptions about this particular religious practice and its application (see the Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Tulkens, para. 12), which Danchin went as far as to call “an essentialized and 




“[D]iscrimination may be motivated… by the use of proxies or 
stereotypes concerning the assumed characteristics of group members.  
[…] Disability is commonly – and mistakenly – taken as a proxy for 
inability to perform the routine tasks of life.  […] [I]t is… impermissible to 
use [the proxies] to cloud rational judgments about individual ability since 
it is always possible that individuals will not conform to the stereotype.  It 
is fundamentally unfair not to afford everyone an equal chance of proving 
themselves.  […] [T]he proxies are highly inaccurate and rest on 
encrusted layers of unexamined presuppositions that have piled up over 
the centuries.”88 
 
As might be predicted, assumptions make for very porous boundaries between 
spheres, and are thus prime targets for the complex egalitarian.   
 
In a case like Age Concern, what is really being distributed (from a Walzerian 
point of view) is continued employment, with youth, at least potentially, acting as 
a dominant good.89  When a worker under the age of 65 flashes their “badge of 
youth”, youth is apparently converted into “ability to do the job”90, and access to 
the sphere of employment is granted (or extended).  As Walzer himself puts it, 
 
“[t]he conversion process violates the common understandings of the 
goods at stake”.91 
 
A judge would hear evidence from both sides.  Counsel for the Government 
might well claim that the common understanding of work in the UK was that only 
younger people could do it, meaning that, in fact, there had been no boundary 
breach at all.  But this would obviously have to be convincingly proven.  If it was 
not (as seems likely), the judge could conclude without difficulty that the 
distribution of work in the UK was flawed, and could then speedily move on to 
the arguably more important business of putting this right (or of sending the 
                                                 
88 G Quinn, “Disability discrimination law in the European Union” in Meenan (ed), Equality Law 
in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 231, 244-5.  Miller regards income as one 
of the most important proxies.  If a person has a high income, it is often, if wrongly, assumed 
that they must have the skills to succeed in all of the other spheres: D Miller, “Complex 
Equality” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 
213. 
89 It would also, of course, be possible to view the case the other way around – the distribuend 
would then be compulsory retirement, and the (negative) dominant would be old age.  
90 For the purposes of this section, it is taken for granted that “ability to do the job” is the 
correct (and only) distributive criterion within the sphere of employment.  Of course a 
distributive community might settle on a different “shared meaning” of employment. 
91 Spheres of Justice, supra n 29, 12. 
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matter back to the UK for rectification there).92  No protracted, not to mention 
distracting, comparison between those under 65 and those over that age would 
be remotely necessary.  It can thus be seen how use of Walzer’s theory would 
enable a judge to pinpoint, with ease, the true core of the case, that is, the false 
assumption being made and perpetuated on the boundary between the two 
spheres at issue.93 
 
Exactly the same boundary breach, predicated on the same assumption, can be 
observed in Mangold and Palacios (although the exact distribuends vary).  In 
both cases, it is a natural or legal person who has allegedly discriminated on 
grounds of age, not a Member State.94  But for the purposes of this section it 
makes no difference to the outcome.  Counsel for Mr Helm would have to 
convince the judge that being young formed part of the common understanding 
of a restricted fixed term employment contract (and the employment certainty 
that went with it) in Germany.  And counsel for Cortefiel would have to convince 
the judge that being young formed part of the common understanding of 
continued employment (the same task as the UK’s in Age Concern) in Spain.   
 
Another case where Walzer’s theory would facilitate the pinpointing of the true 
core of the case would be Petersen.  Here, those able to show the “badge of 
youth” were accorded authorizations to provide panel dental care, while those 
over 68 came away empty-handed.  The Court reasoned that the fact that the 
age restriction did not apply vis-à-vis non-panel work fatally undermined the 
German Government’s claim that its purpose was to protect public health.  This 
reasoning is sound, but relies on comparison between the two sectors to show 
up a contradiction in the German Government’s approach; the danger is that if 
the age restriction had been applied across the board, the Court would have 
found it to be justified.  This kind of approach fails to answer the question which 
the case is really about: do dentists over 68 make more mistakes than any other 
dentists?  A complex egalitarian would ask whether the fact of being below 68 
formed part of the meaning of dental care, and the provision thereof.  While in 
                                                 
92 Of course, in the event, the Court of Justice’s contribution to this case was entirely technical, 
thus shunting the whole of the principle issue (age discrimination) back to the national court. 
93 The Sphere of Employment and the “Sphere of Age”.  It is wholeheartedly admitted that the 
latter “sphere” is difficult to picture, unless age is (continuously) distributed to man by Old 
Father Time.  However, a non-literal reading of Walzer’s theory is urged.  See section 3.3. for 
more on whether characteristics are (or even need to be) distribuends. 
94 Although Member State legislation is very much at stake. 
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this case both approaches might well have led to the same result (with the age 
restriction failing the justification test – at least on this ground), it is submitted 
that the Walzerian approach reaches the result via the more appropriate route. 
 
4.4. Sexual Orientation 
 
4.4.1. The ECJ’s case-law 
 
This section will begin with an appraisal of the European Court of Justice’s 
approach to the question of transsexuality in the landmark case of P v S95.  It is 
stressed that this is not to imply that a person’s transsexuality has anything to do 
with their sexual orientation.  It does not, and indeed the Court acknowledged 
this in P v S, where the Luxembourg judges rightly recognized that 
transsexuality, and gender reassignment, are a matter of gender96.  However, 
although the judges were prepared to stretch their traditional understanding of 
the concept of gender to aid a transsexual employee, in the later case of 
Grant97, they famously drew the line at aiding a homosexual one, at least until 
there was a stand-alone prohibition for discrimination on grounds of 
orientation98.  In order to understand Grant and its successors it is thus helpful to 
keep in mind the transsexuality cases, starting with P v S. 
 
Transsexuality usually involves a medical condition called gender disphoria, 
wherein the patient’s biological sex (sometimes called “chromosomal” sex) does 
not correspond to their sexual identity; in most cases, the condition can be 
                                                 
95 Case C- 13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143. 
96 As Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi explain, the concept of “sexual orientation” is sometimes given 
a wider meaning to include phenomena that are related to (what they call) “sex-as-gender”, 
such as transsexuality or transvestism.  And indeed in some Member States’ laws, “sex-as-
gender” phenomena have been included within the concept of sexual orientation, for example, 
transvestism in Denmark.  However, in the light of P v S, Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi are of the 
view that the appropriate course is to treat transsexuality as a matter of sex, not sexual 
orientation.  See further K Waaldijk and M Bonini-Baraldi, Sexual orientation discrimination in 
the European Union: national laws and the Employment Equality Directive (TMC Asser Press, The 
Hague 2006) 96-97.  Others regret the submerging or “covert inclusion” of “discrimination by 
reason of gender reassignment” within the general category of sex, and would prefer to see 
gender identity as an autonomous ground.  See M Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the 
European Union (Oxford Studies in European Law, OUP, Oxford 2002) 110, with reference at 
footnote 123 to a failed initiative by ILGA-Europe. 
97 Case C-249/96 Grant, supra n 2. 
98 Ibid., para. 48. 
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eased by medical treatment culminating (if desired) in surgery for gender 
reassignment.  P was a manager at an educational establishment, of which S 
was the principal and chief executive.  P was a transsexual whose biological sex 
was male, but whose sexual identity was female.  (In the UK at the material 
time, it was impossible to have the sex originally attributed to a person altered in 
the register of births, marriages and deaths).  P was dismissed after she99 
underwent gender reassignment surgery, and brought an action claiming sex 
discrimination.  The Industrial Tribunal at Truro made a reference. 
 
Advocate General Tesauro was not convinced by the argument (made by the 
UK) that the correct comparator for a male-to-female transsexual was a female-
to-male transsexual (who of course would have been treated equally badly, 
meaning that there could not have been any gender discrimination – the so-
called “equal misery” argument).  Rather, he imagined what things would have 
been like if P had remained a man.  Obviously, in that case, she would not have 
been dismissed.  He concluded: 
 
“where unfavourable treatment of a transsexual is related to […] a 
change of sex, there is discrimination […] on grounds of sex”100  
 
To argue that this was not discrimination “between the two sexes”101 would be, 
he said, “quibbling”102.  The Advocate General called for a “broader 
perspective”103, and warned the Court against making what he saw as a “moral 
condemnation”104 of transsexuals.  Because there was “no precise provision” on 
point, he explained in closing, what was needed was equality by inference.105 
 
The Court answered the call made by its Advocate General, and, in a very short 
decision, similarly rejected the “equal misery” argument.  According to the Court, 
                                                 
99 It is proposed to follow Advocate General Tesauro’s lead in referring to P as a female, that is, 
taking into account her sexual identity as opposed to her biological sex: Case C- 13/94 P v S, 
supra n 95, at 2146 (Para. 4 of the Opinion). 
100 Ibid., at 2154 (Para. 18 of the Opinion). 
101 Ibid., at 2155 (Para. 20 of the Opinion).  Indeed, as Flynn points out, since at all times P 
remained legally a man, technically the comparison offered by Tesauro, and later the Court, is 
between two men.  Flynn, “Case Note on P v S and Cornwall County Council” (1997) 34 CML Rev 
367, 377. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., at 2156 (Para. 23 of the Opinion). 




the Equal Treatment Directive106 included within its scope discrimination arising 
from gender reassignment.  It continued: 
 
“Such discrimination is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of 
the person concerned. Where a person is dismissed on the ground that 
he or she intends to undergo, or has undergone, gender reassignment, 
he or she is treated unfavourably by comparison with persons of the sex 
to which he or she was deemed to belong before undergoing gender 
reassignment.”107 
 
S’s behaviour in dismissing P was therefore precluded by the Directive. 
 
Almost two years after the judgment in P v S came the case of Grant108.  Ms 
Grant was engaged as a clerical officer by (the company which became) South-
West Trains in 1993.  Mr Potter, her predecessor, had obtained travel 
concessions for his “female cohabitee”, pursuant to the employment contract in 
conjunction with the Staff Travel Facilities Privilege Ticket Regulations (“the 
Regulations”).  However, when Ms Grant applied for travel concessions for her 
female cohabitee, pursuant to the same two documents, in 1995, she was 
refused.  The reason given was that, according to the Regulations, travel 
concessions were only granted to common law spouses (with whom a 
“meaningful relationship” had been shared for two years or more) of the opposite 
sex, not of the same sex.  Ms Grant brought an action for sex discrimination, 
and the Industrial Tribunal at Southampton made a reference. 
 
Advocate General Elmer, first holding that travel concessions were equivalent to 
pay, proceeded to consider the case under Article 119 EC109 alone.  Considering 
the same quotation as that given above110, he noted that the Court in P v S had 
found for P, not because she had been discriminated against on grounds of 
transsexuality (although she had been), but because she had been 
discriminated against on grounds of sex.  He further noted that the Court had 
rejected the “equal misery” argument (male transsexuals and female 
transsexuals treated alike), and had thus taken “a decisive step away from an 
interpretation of the principle of equal treatment based on the traditional 
                                                 
106 See supra n 10. 
107 Case C- 13/94 P v S, supra n 95, para. 21 (emphasis added). 
108 Supra n 2. 
109 Subsequently Article 141 EC, now Article 157 TFEU. 
110 Text accompanying n 107. 
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comparison between a female and a male employee”111.  Posing the question 
whether gender was the causative factor (of the unfavourable treatment) in this 
case, the Advocate General observed that the Regulations made the travel 
concessions conditional on the cohabitee’s being of the “opposite sex” to the 
employee.  Thus, gender was in fact “the only decisive criterion”112.  South-West 
Trains’ behavior was therefore, in Elmer’s view, gender discrimination within the 
meaning of Article 119.  Furthermore, as it was direct discrimination, it could not, 
in his view, be objectively justified. 
 
The Court, however, took a different view.  The first question it asked itself was 
whether the Regulations constituted discrimination based directly on the sex of 
the worker.  Ms Grant had been refused the travel concessions simply because 
she did not satisfy the conditions, conditions which applied regardless of the sex 
of the worker concerned.  Using the “equal misery” argument, the Court went on: 
 
“Thus travel concessions are refused to a male worker if he is living with 
a person of the same sex, just as they are to a female worker if she is 
living with a person of the same sex.”113 
 
South-West Trains’ behaviour could not therefore be regarded as discrimination 
on grounds of sex.  The second question which the Court asked itself concerned 
the following three categories of relationship: 
 
1 stable relationships between two persons of the same sex; 
2(a) stable relationships outside marriage between two persons of opposite 
sex; 
2(b) marriage between two persons of opposite sex. 
 
                                                 
111 Case C-249/96 Grant, supra n 2, at 627 (Para. 15 of the Opinion). 
112 Ibid., at 629 (Para. 23 of the Opinion), emphasis added.  However, as he goes on to discuss, 
that meant not just the gender of the employee, but also the gender of the cohabitee.  He 
concludes, though, that use of an “abstract criterion”, like “opposite sex”, could “make no 
difference” (Paragraph 25).  It is interesting to note how useful the doctrine of associative 
discrimination would have been to Ms Grant here.  But of course the Court did not recognize 
this doctrine until the case of Coleman v Attridge Law in 2008 (see below n 181, and 
accompanying text).  Alternatively, one could hold, as Barnard does, that the complainant 
remains the only object of scrutiny, but that she is scrutinized with regard to two attributes, not 
just one: “gender plus sexuality”.  As she continues: “Yet, for a valid sex discrimination analysis, 
the comparison must change only the sex of the complaining individual and must hold all other 
circumstances constant.”: C Barnard, “Some are more equal than others: the decision of the 
Court of Justice in Grant v South-West Trains” (1999) 1 C-YELS 147, 153.   
113 Case C-249/96 Grant, supra n 2, para. 27. 
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The Court needed to ascertain whether Community law required that Category 1 
should be regarded by all employers as equivalent to Category 2(a) or Category 
2(b).  The Court held that, although Member States were increasingly treating 
Category 1 as equivalent to Category 2(a) or Category 2(b), the Community had 
not yet adopted rules providing for such equivalence.  Thus, in the Court’s 
opinion, the correct way to proceed was to continue to regard Category 1 as not 
equivalent to Categories 2(a) or (b), an approach which had been endorsed by 
the European Court of Human Rights (or at least its Commission)114.  Thus, 
South-West Trains was not required to treat the situation of Ms Grant and her 
partner as equivalent to that of Mr Potter and his partner. 
 
The final question which the Court asked itself was whether discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation constituted discrimination on grounds of sex.  
Having held that P v S was to be confined to its facts (that is, was relevant only 
to cases involving gender reassignment), the Court answered this question in 
the negative; discrimination based on sexual orientation was not covered by 
Article 119115.   
 
Grant was of course decided before the Framework Employment Directive, so 
that Ms Grant’s main problem was to try to shoehorn a sexual orientation-
discrimination point into the sex-discrimination regime.  With sexual orientation’s 
now having its own, dedicated prohibition, it is highly unlikely that she would 
have lost had the case been brought today.  However, the age case of 
Mangold116 now poses an odd riddle.  If all of the Article 19 grounds are (and 
therefore always were) general principles of Community law (as age was 
declared to be in that case), then why could the (supposed) general principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation not be invoked by the Court 
in Grant? 
                                                 
114 Ibid., para. 33, and the case references therein. 
115 As Bell has written, “Grant was crucial in creating a separation in Community law between 
“sex” and “sexual orientation”.”: Bell, supra n 96, 110.  But not all writers agree with this 
“separation”.  WIntemute, for example, believes that discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation is sex discrimination: R Wintemute, “Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex 
Discrimination: Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes” 60 (1997) MLR 334, cited 
and discussed in Barnard, supra n 112, 153-4.  Barnard refers to Wintemute’s argument as 
“fancy footwork” – ibid., 154 – and then proceeds to offer her own version – ibid., 155-8.  The 
conflation of sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is also the favoured 
approach of the Human Rights Committee when interpreting the ICCPR: Toonen v Australia, 
Communication No. 488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994). 




Critics have made much of the inconsistencies between P v S and Grant, the 
most obvious difference being the Court’s rejection of the “equal misery” 
comparison in the former, and acceptance of the same in the latter.  Canor calls 
this “interpretative acrobatics”117.  She cites Flynn, who in 1997 (a year before 
Grant) wrote that the correct comparator for a female employee who is sexually 
attracted to or has sexual relations with women is a male employee who is 
sexually attracted to or has sexual relations with women118.  Had the Court in 
Grant taken this view, it would effectively have been comparing Ms Grant with 
Mr Potter, which was what she wanted all along.  The comparison proposed by 
Flynn is also regarded as the correct one for Grant by Koppelmann119 (who 
makes a scathing attack on the “equal misery” comparison actually chosen), 
and, it would seem, by Mancini and O’Leary120.  Others question the need for 
comparison at all, and wonder whether the establishment of detriment to Ms 
Grant could have been sufficient on its own, by analogy with Dekker121, a 
pregnancy case122.  These include Bell123, who furthermore regards P v S and 
Grant as “impossible to reconcile”124, and Carey, who also mentions the non-
comparative approach125.  Carey refers to the Court’s “illogical application of 
tests” and “incoherence”126.  He puts the apparent u-turn down to the relative 
sizes of the two communities at issue, with the Court perhaps being encouraged 
by the small number of transsexuals in the EC, only to then be discouraged by 
the large number of homosexuals (and the “potentially significant financial 
                                                 
117 Canor, “Equality for Lesbians and Gay Men in the European Community Legal Order – “they 
shall be male and female”?” 7 MJ 3 (2000) 273, 276. 
118 Flynn, supra n 101, 382, cited in ibid., 278. 
119 A Koppelman, “The Miscegenation Analogy in Europe, or, Lisa Grant meets Adolf Hitler” in 
Wintemute and Andenæs (eds), Legal recognition of same-sex partnerships: A study of national, 
European and international law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001). 
120 GF Mancini and S O’Leary, “The New Frontiers of Sex Equality Law in the European Union” 
European Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 4, August 1999, 331, 350. 
121 Case C-177/88 Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus [1990] ECR I-3941.  See supra, Chapter 3, text accompanying n 
37, et seq. 
122 For a nice discussion of the pros and cons of this approach, albeit written a year before 
Grant, see Flynn, supra n 101, 376 et seq. 
123 M Bell, “Shifting Conceptions of Sexual Discrimination at the Court of Justice: from P v S to 
Grant v SWT” European Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 1999, 63, 67 and 74. 
124 Ibid., 74. 
125 N Carey, “From obloquy to equality: in the shadow of abnormal situations” Yearbook of 
European Law 2001, n. 20, 79, 100. 
126 Ibid., 99. 
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consequences” of a positive ruling)127.  But as he rightly states, “equality should 
apply, by definition, to everyone and not just a group occupying a given 
minimum percentage of the population”128.  As well as this economic motive for 
the Court’s behaviour129, others have also detected a political, or even a moral, 
one130. 
 
The Court had another opportunity to consider the equivalence or otherwise of 
same-sex partnerships and marriage in the 2001 case of D and Kingdom of 
Sweden v Council131, this time with the added complication that the Member 
State concerned (Sweden) permitted the legal registration of same-sex 
partnerships, and that under Swedish law registered partners were treated as 
equivalent to married persons.  D was a Swedish official of the Council, who was 
in a registered partnership with another Swedish national.  D requested that the 
Council should treat his status as registered partner as equivalent to marriage in 
order for him to be entitled to the so-called “household allowance”.  However, 
the Council refused on the grounds that the Staff Regulations did not allow a 
registered partnership to be treated as equivalent to marriage.  On an 
application for annulment of this refusal, the Court of First Instance found for the 
Council. 
 
On appeal to the Court of Justice, D, supported by Sweden, claimed inter alia 
that the Council was bound by the provisions of Swedish law.  However, 
Advocate General Mischo, referring to the famous free movement case of 
Reed132, stated that any interpretation of a legal term on the basis of social 
developments must take into account the situation in the whole Community, not 
merely one Member State, and, at the material time, there existed in only three 
out of fifteen Member States the legal category of registered partnership, 
assimilated to marriage.  Moreover, even Swedish law acknowledged a 
distinction between the two categories.  The two categories did not have the 
same name, and there were a number of legal differences between them, for 
                                                 
127 Quotation from Bell/ ILGA-Europe, Equality for lesbians and gay men: a relevant issue in the 
civil and social dialogue (ILGA-Europe, Brussels 1998) 12. 
128 Carey, supra n 125, 104. 
129 Also mentioned by Barnard: C Barnard, “The Principle of Equality in the Community Context: 
P, Grant, Kalanke and Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows?” Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 57, No. 
2, 1998, 352, 357. 
130 Carey, supra n 125; Bell, supra n 123. 
131 Joined cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P D, supra n 2. 
132 Case 59/85 State of the Netherlands v Ann Florence Reed [1986] ECR 1283. 
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example pertaining to the adoption of children.  In the Advocate General’s 
phrase, Sweden “did not wish to give two persons of the same sex unqualified 
access to the legal category of marriage”133.  Finally, since the Court in Grant 
had found no equivalence between a stable relationship between two persons of 
the same sex and a stable relationship between two persons of opposite sex, it 
followed that there was no equivalence, in Community law, between a registered 
partnership and a marriage134. 
 
The Court agreed that the concept of a marriage and the concept of a registered 
partnership were distinct, and dismissed the appeal135.  
 
D of course pre-dates the Framework Employment Directive, and would 
undoubtedly be decided differently today.  But the same riddle, deriving from 
Mangold136, may be asked (mutatis mutandis) in relation to D, as was previously 
asked in relation to Grant137. 
 
A counterpoint to D is the transsexuality case of KB138.  Here, a female 
employee of the UK’s National Health Service, KB, was concerned that her long-
time partner, R, would not be provided for after her death.  This was because R 
was a female-to-male transsexual, and the NHS’ pension scheme only provided 
for a survivor’s pension to be payable to a member’s surviving spouse, where 
spouse meant solely a person to whom the member had been married.  Even 
after his gender reassignment surgery, R was prevented from marrying KB by 
UK law (as it stood at the material time).  During proceedings brought by KB, the 
Court was asked whether the exclusion of a transsexual partner from the 
scheme constituted sex discrimination. 
                                                 
133 Joined cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P D, supra n 2, at 4334 (Para. 77 of the Opinion). 
134 As Carey points out, though, the reference to Grant here is “not wholly obvious”: “Contrary 
to Grant who was legally single and without specific obligations towards her partner, D is, under 
Swedish law, obliged to fulfil duties towards his partner akin to those expected of one spouse 
towards the other.”.  See Carey, supra n 125, 105. 
135 Contrast the position in Canada, where the Supreme Court of Ontario held that Ontario must 
extend the definition of “spouse” to include same-sex partners: Case of M., as discussed in 
Mancini and O’Leary, supra n 120, 347.  And see now Maruko below (text accompanying 
footnote 147 et seq).  For a very interesting discussion of this issue, especially in the cross-
border context, see K Boele-Woelki, “The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships within 
the European Union” 82 Tul L Rev, 1949.  
136 Case C-144/04 Mangold, supra n 2. 
137 See supra, text accompanying n 116. 
138 Case C-117/01 K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for 




Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, reiterating that a survivor’s pension 
constituted pay, recalled that in the 2002 ECHR case of Goodwin v UK139, the 
European Court of Human Rights had held that the impossibility of a transsexual 
to marry (that is, to marry a person of the opposite sex to their post-operative, or 
“acquired”, sex) was a breach of the right to marry.  Returning to KB’s case, the 
UK argued that a male unmarried person and a female unmarried person would 
fare exactly the same under the pension scheme in question, regardless of 
transsexuality or sexual orientation.  However, the Advocate General took the 
view that the national rule which outlawed marriage between a transsexual 
individual, on the one hand, and a person of the opposite sex to their post-
operative sex, on the other hand (“transsexual marriage”) was contrary to 
Community law, given that thirteen out of fifteen Member States did recognize 
such marriages, and especially given the judgment in Goodwin.  Furthermore, 
this rule denied transsexuals access to a widow’s or widower’s pension.  He 
concluded: 
 
“The Court of Justice must ensure that the exercise of rights protected by 
the Treaty remains free of any prohibited discrimination and also that 
those rights are not made conditional on requirements which are contrary 
to European public policy.”140 
 
The impediment to marriage (and therefore the denial of access to the pension) 
was based on the gender reassignment of the person concerned.  This was 
covered by Article 141 EC141 following P v S.  Therefore, it followed that Article 
141 EC precluded the national rule which outlawed transsexual marriage. 
 
The Court agreed wholeheartedly with the Advocate General: 
 
“Legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, in 
breach of the ECHR, prevents a couple such as K.B. and R. from 
fulfilling the marriage requirement which must be met for one of them to 
be able to benefit from part of the pay of the other must be regarded as 
being, in principle, incompatible with the requirements of Article 141 
EC.”142 
 
                                                 
139 Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom, Application No 28957/95, 11 July 2002. 
140 Case C-117/01 KB, supra n 138, at 565 (Para. 75 of the Opinion). 
141 Now Article 157 TFEU. 
142 Case C-117/01 KB, supra n 138, para. 34. 
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Thus, it can be seen how Community law before Directive 2000/78 was 
prepared to remove the national rule impeding KB, a transsexual, but was not 
prepared to remove the national rule impeding D, a homosexual143. 
 
The case of Goodwin was also central to a later transsexuality decision: 
Richards144.  The UK, in response to the censure from the Strasbourg court, had 
adopted the Gender Recognition Act 2004, by which a post-operative 
transsexual could have their “acquired” gender officially recognized and taken 
into account in administrative and legal matters.  Unfortunately it did not come 
into force until 2005, which was too late for Ms Richards.  She was a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual.  Wishing to retire at the age of 60, she 
applied to the Department of Work and Pensions for a retirement pension.  
However, because her chromosomal sex was male, and because (pending the 
coming into force of the new act) there was no way for this to be changed, she 
was told that she could not have a retirement pension until the age of 65 (the 
pensionable age for men).  She appealed.  At second instance, a reference was 
made to the ECJ. 
 
Advocate General Jacobs noted that Ms Richards was denied her pension in 
circumstances where she would have been entitled to it had she been registered 
as a woman at birth, that is, had she been a person whose identity was not the 
result of gender reassignment surgery.  This posed a slight problem for the 
choice of comparator, however.  In P v S, which would seem to be the obvious 
precedent for a gender reassignment case, a post-operative male-to-female 
transsexual was compared to a man whose identity was not the result of gender 
reassignment surgery145.  If the same comparison was run in Ms Richards’ case, 
Ms Richards would not be found to have been discriminated against.  Unlike P, 
she did not want to be treated the same as a chromosomal man, because, if she 
were, she would indeed have to wait until the age of 65 for her pension!  
However, the Advocate General found greater inspiration from the case of KB.  
There, a post-operative female-to-male transsexual was compared to a man 
                                                 
143 That is, the rule or framework of rules by which Sweden only allowed persons of the same 
sex to have registered partners, but denied them access to the legal category of marriage itself.  
See supra Mischo AG’s comment in text accompanying n 133. 
144 Case C-423/04 Sarah Margaret Richards v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 
ECR I-3585. 
145 To borrow a phrase from Skidmore, P was “compared... with her former self”: P Skidmore, 
“Sex, Gender and Comparators in Employment Discrimination” Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 26, 
No. 1, March 1997, 51, 59. 
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whose identity was not the result of gender reassignment surgery.  Applying this 
comparison, mutatis mutandis, to Richards’ case, she (a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual) would also be compared to someone who possessed her 
acquired gender, but who possessed it not as the result of gender reassignment 
surgery (that is, in Richards’ case, a woman whose chromosomal sex was also 
female).  From such a comparison it would be plainly visible that, while Ms 
Richards received nothing at 60, the chromosomal woman received her full 
pension – clearly a case of like treated unlike, and therefore discrimination 
contrary to EC law. 
 
The Court used almost exactly the same reasoning to achieve exactly the same 
result.  As a consequence of Ms Richards’ inability to have her “new”146 gender 
recognized, she had been the victim of unequal treatment amounting to 
discrimination.  As in KB, a national rule which stood in the way of a Member 
State worker’s fulfilling the necessary requirements to attain a right protected by 
Community law, was incompatible with EC law and had to be removed. 
 
Returning to sexual orientation, the only case to have been decided by the ECJ 
since the coming into force of the Framework Employment Directive is 
Maruko147.  Mr Maruko, the surviving same-sex partner of a costume designer, 
was denied a widower’s pension by the body which administered the “Pay 
scheme for Germany’s theatres” (“the scheme”), to which Mr Maruko’s late 
partner had been affiliated.  During proceedings brought by Mr Maruko, a 
reference was made to Luxembourg. 
 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer first had to decide whether the scheme 
(and the pension which Mr Maruko was claiming under it) fell within the material 
scope of the Directive at all.  For example, was the pension a matter of social 
security (in which case it fell outside the Directive’s scope by virtue of Article 
3(3)), or did it instead constitute “pay” (in which case it fell within the Directive’s 
scope by virtue of Article 3(1)(c))?  The test for discerning whether a pension 
under a given scheme is social security or “pay” is basically whether it is 
determined more by considerations of social policy (social security), or more by 
the employment relationship (“pay”).  Having considered a number of factors, 
the Advocate General’s conclusion was that this pension was derived from the 
                                                 
146 The Court’s word.  Case C-423/04 Richards, supra n 144, para. 28. 
147 Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen (ECJ 1 April 2008). 
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employment relationship (of Mr Maruko’s partner), and therefore that it 
constituted “pay” within the meaning of Article 141 and Directive 2000/78.  
Turning to the question of marital status, Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer first considered 
Recital 22 of the Directive, which reads: 
 
“This Directive is without prejudice to national laws on marital status and 
the benefits dependent thereon.” 
 
However, he concluded that Recitals have no binding force, and that, although it 
is true that the Community has no powers with regard to marital status, Member 
States had to exercise their competence in a manner which did not infringe 
Community law.  Having reviewed Grant, D and KB, the Advocate General held 
that the refusal to grant Mr Maruko a pension was not based directly on sexual 
orientation, but rather on the fact that he was not married to his partner.  The 
refusal did however constitute indirect discrimination, because, under German 
law, only opposite-sex partners could get married, not same-sex partners.  In a 
break with D, the Advocate General went on to hold that the legal situation of 
persons in a registered legal partnership (as Mr Maruko and his partner had 
been), and the legal situation of spouses, were compatible.  Thus, like having 
been treated unlike, the refusal to grant the pension was (indirect) 
discrimination, on grounds of sexual orientation, contrary to Directive 2000/78, 
and furthermore was incapable of objective justification. 
 
The Court concurred that the pension was “pay” and therefore that it fell within 
the scope of the Directive.  It also entirely agreed with the Advocate General’s 
dismissal of Recital 22.  On the substance, the Court noted that Germany had 
created for persons of the same sex “a separate regime”, the conditions of which 
had been gradually made “equivalent” to marriage148.  Having provisionally 
established comparability149, the Court had no difficulty in deciding that surviving 
same-sex partners were being treated less favourably than surviving spouses.  
Thus, the German legislation concerned was discriminatory on grounds of 
sexual orientation150. 
                                                 
148 Quotations from ibid., para. 67. 
149 Although note how the ECJ leaves the final word on this to the national court: ibid., para. 72.  
See also the last sentence of para. 73. 
150 The Court makes a slight change to Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer AG’s Opinion here.  In its view, the 
discrimination was direct, not indirect.  Tobler and Waaldijk make some interesting suggestions 
as to why this might have been at C Tobler and K Waaldijk, “Annotation Maruko” [2009] 46 





4.4.2. A Walzerian analysis 
 
4.4.2.1. Sexual orientation, quintessential boundary conflict: Grant 
 
The ground of sexual orientation really comes down to the debate between 
those who think that marriage is about the gender of the parties, and those who 
think that it is more about free choice.  Ball sees these two interpretations as 
“mutually exclusive”, and calls the situation a “log jam”151.  The issue of same-
sex unions thus provides a classic example of a dispute, within a community, as 
to the meaning of a distributed good (a marriage certificate).  And it could be 
argued that, whatever meaning is decided upon, and whatever law is passed, 
any law on this subject would represent a boundary breach: the sphere of power 
invading the sphere of kinship, which Walzer calls “the deepest understanding of 
tyranny”152.  Attempting to present the shared understanding of sovereignty in 
the form of a list, he notes at point 2: 
 
 “[The state’s] officials cannot control the marriages of their subjects”153. 
 
Unsurprisingly, then, complex equality has been largely embraced by those 
seeking an end to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.  Indeed, Ball 
rightly notes another, crucial, boundary breach: 
 
“Even if one were to conclude that gay men and lesbians are not entitled 
to marry because their relationships do not fit within the definition of 
marriage as determined by our shared traditions, Walzer’s theory of 
justice would prohibit that view from spilling over into other spheres such 
as that of employment.”154 
 
Most of the cases discussed at section 4.4.1. directly concern the employment 
sphere (and one thinks particularly of Grant and D), and the others concern it 
indirectly in any event.  Why is society’s view of gay marriage being allowed to 
                                                                                                                                    
partnerships in Germany, this time in relation to supplementary pension payments, in Case C-
147/08 Jürgen Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2008]OJ C171/15. 
151 Ball, supra n 2552, 502 and 504. 
152 Spheres of Justice, supra n 29, 228.  Referring to the US of 1983, he notes that homosexual 
marriage is “legally unrecognized and politically controversial”: ibid. 
153 Ibid., 283. 
154 Ball, supra n 2552, 505. 
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invade this sphere?  For example, Grant seems to entail the ultimate violation of 
a shared meaning.  It is hard to conceive of any community wherein its 
understanding of train tickets would include the sexual orientation of the 
potential passenger, and that of the potential passenger’s partner. 
 
It seems appropriate, then, to turn to Grant first.  In section 3.3. above, it was 
explained how, if Walzer’s theory was not read literally, a free choice or even a 
characteristic could be considered as a distribuend in a fictional “first” sphere.  It 
is submitted that this is how Ms Grant’s homosexuality must be viewed.155  
However, for the purposes of this case, Ms Grant’s homosexuality is not just a 
good; it is a negatively dominant good.  When Ms Grant arrived in the sphere of 
office in possession of this negatively dominant good, she was excluded from 
the distribution and not allocated any travel concessions.156  The dominant good, 
being irrelevant to the shared meaning of the travel concessions (see above)157, 
was present in the sphere of office tyrannically, rendering the distribution flawed.  
Either the European Court or the national court would then likely order the 
rerunning of the distribution, with Ms Grant’s homosexuality taken out of the 
picture (left, as it were, “at the door” of the sphere).  It can thus be seen how a 
Walzerian analysis of the Grant case produces a much better result for Ms 
Grant, and avoids any need for tortuous comparisons between different types of 
couple, and different types of partner. 
 
4.4.2.2. Negative dominance, non-stop debate: P v S, KB, Richards 
 
As mentioned in section 2.3., the concept of negative dominance is especially 
important in the case of a suspect ground.  This is because, although a litigant 
could be complaining of a boundary breach by the holders of positively dominant 
goods (for example, “the young” in age discrimination cases), it is more common 
                                                 
155 It does not matter for the purposes of this dissertation whether Ms Grant’s homosexuality 
was chosen by her, or whether it was an innate characteristic.  The dissertation does not take a 
position on the question. 
156 Please note that, just as a positively dominant good can procure for its owner both good 
things and the absence of bad things (hard work, for example), so a negatively dominant good 
can procure for its owner both bad things and the absence of good things (travel concessions, 
for example). 
157 One is reluctant to assume a shared meaning, but, as mentioned earlier, it is difficult to 
imagine that any community would include sexual orientation in the definition of travel 
concessions.  It would be open to counsel for South West Trains to argue the contrary, but, for 
the purposes of this section, it is presumed that any such argument would fail. 
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that the complainant sees their own minority status (whatever it may be) as a 
negatively dominant good.  Good examples from section 4.4.1. include P v S 
and KB.  Assuming that the distribuend is “continued employment”, it seems 
foolish to refer to the dominant in P v S as “not being transsexual”158; it is surely 
more truthful and realistic to refer to the negative dominant (possessed by P) of 
“being transsexual”.  Likewise, in KB, where the distribuend is a widow(er)’s 
pension, it makes more sense to say that the negative dominant is, again, “being 
transsexual” (although in this case referring to the claimant’s partner, rather than 
the claimant themselves).  These two cases were resolved happily by the ECJ, 
and a Walzerian approach would produce the same result, the Court being 
highly unlikely to be convinced that transsexuality forms any part at all of the 
shared meanings of employment or pensions. 
 
The situation becomes slightly more rarified when one turns to Richards.  Here, 
it was not transsexuality alone which was costing Ms Richards her pension at 
60; it was the fact of being a woman whose identity was the result of gender 
reassignment surgery (as opposed to a woman whose identity was not the result 
of gender reassignment surgery).  But if this is made the (negative) dominant, 
then the distribution can easily be declared flawed, as long as it is held that (in 
the eyes of the community in question159) it makes no difference, for the receipt 
of a pension at 60, whether the pensioner is chromosomally female or female as 
a result of surgery. 
 
Richards raises another interesting point.  It is highly unlikely that the UK 
legislature intended to prejudice transsexuals when it declared that women 
should receive their pensions at 60.  It is just that gender reassignment surgery 
is a newer phenomenon.  But this merely underlines the fact that the debate (at 
which shared meanings are determined) must be ongoing160, and must be 
accessible by all, including those with “external”161 ideas or ideas “from outside 
the… mainstream”162.  As Rustin points out, it is only in fundamentalist societies 
“that arguments are only admissible in debate if they are already elements of 
                                                 
158 And see below, section 4.4.2.3. 
159 Or the Bench, if the alternative theory of mediated complexity is preferred; see below 
Chapter 8. 
160 See supra, section 2.4., and the quotations there. 




accepted doctrine”163.  If a contingency that was simply not thought of, or else 
deemed too remote, at the time of the setting of the original distributive criteria 
later materializes, or if a circumstance that was not anticipated later occurs, then 
there must be a facility for reopening the debate and modifying the criteria as 
appropriate.  This may indeed mean “carry[ing] out new surveys every time 




4.4.2.3. The Tyranny of “Normalcy” 
 
In P v S, KB and Richards, then, it is seen how in claims involving suspect 
grounds, it is often preferable to regard the case as one of negative dominance.  
The claimant has taken their characteristic or choice from the sphere to which it 
was germane to one in which it was, quite literally, not welcome.  It is this action 
which flaws the distribution, and causes it to have to be rerun.  The alternative is 
less palatable and could be called: The Tyranny of “Normalcy”.  There is little 
doubt that a teacher who was not transsexual would have been kept on by S 
and Cornwall County Council.  Likewise, KB would have had no difficulty in 
acquiring a widower’s pension for a partner who was not transsexual.  And it 
goes without saying that a British woman whose identity was not the result of 
gender reassignment surgery would receive her pension at 60.  Those without 
minority status, what one might call the “normal”, appear to be able to take their 
“normalcy” from sphere to sphere, gathering all the available goods as they go.  
“Normalcy” here is used somewhat ironically and within quotation marks.  It 
means being standard or being average, where “standard” and “average” are 
words used to describe someone all of whose characteristics and choices are 
the characteristics and choices generally possessed or made by the majority in 
the society concerned.  The Norm could be seen as setting itself, shifting in 
accordance with the shifts in the majority’s traits and preferences.  Alternatively, 
as Foucault suggested with his “bio-power” thesis, the State (borrowing tactics 
of regulation from what he called “the Disciplines”) may be exerting disciplinary, 
but also normalizing, power on the members of society, encouraging them to 
classify and sort themselves, so as to move ever closer to the Norm.  In such a 
                                                 
163 Ibid. 
164 J Elster, “The Empirical Study of Justice” in Miller and Walzer, supra n 88, 92.  
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programme of mass homogenization, (State-sanctioned) “normalcy” would take 
on a much more significant role; it would be very much the goal of the members 
of the community, with the law complicit as a mere legitimation of the other 
powers.165 
 
But whether self-created or imposed (or perhaps a bit of both), “normalcy” 
cannot be ruled out as a dominant good.  It could even be regarded as having its 
own sphere.  However, it is a sprawling sphere, very much “out of control” and in 
need of robust boundary revision.  “Normalcy” is constantly looking to colonize 
the spheres around it, cajoling and bullying, tempting other spheres to give up 
their autonomy and join it166, or else simply grabbing them outright.  The 
“normal” also very much favour the Aristotelian test for equality, since they are 
the Guardians of “Likeness”: they decide what (or who) is like, but also, more 
importantly, what (or who) is unlike.167   
 
However, “normalcy” moves about insidiously and has a chameleon-like nature; 
it can, by definition, fit in anywhere, so that its secret dominance goes practically 
unnoticed.  In any given distribution, it would be difficult to define exactly what it 
was at that precise moment, and therefore to know which, if any, distributee 
possessed it.  Likewise it would be difficult to know which characteristics he or 
she would have to leave “at the door” in order to make the distribution more just.  
Thus the use of negative dominance would still seem to be the best approach 
(from the Walzerian point of view) for cases involving minority statuses.  There is 
no knock-out blow, then, or perhaps that should be iron boundary, to defeat the 
                                                 
165 “The norm has a very different epistemological structure [to law]: it is supposed to be 
experimental; it keeps to the facts whose differences, divergencies and hierarchies it privileges.  
It multiplies inequalities and brings them out wherever it takes hold: inequalities in face of 
death, in face of sickness and knowledge etc.  It… “unequalizes”, because it is set up on the basis 
of its capacity to locate the most minimal disparities”: F Ewald, “Justice, Equality, Judgement: 
On “Social Justice”” in G Teubner (ed), Juridification of Social Spheres (de Gruyter, Berlin 1987) 
107. 
166 Foucault’s “bio-power” operates (reflexively) in the same way.  No one wants to be the one 
who does not fit in, and this much-feared consequence of resistance pushes everyone on to 
conform even more. 
167 “[A] society which perceives heterosexuality as the commonly prevailing normal sexual 
behaviour [...] which others should be compared to and should aspire to assimilate into, might 
sanction whoever fails to do so by approving of discrimination against that individual.”: Canor, 
supra n 117, 277.  “[D]oes the equal misery approach ensure that those outside the club of 
normality are to remain there but, while outside, are to be treated equally inter se?  Following 
this approach equality fast becomes a means of protecting normality.  Normality, in turn, 
becomes a vicious circle wherein only those who define its parameters are included [telling 
those who are excluded to...] fit in as we do or else do not bother complaining that it is cold 
outside”: Carey, supra n 125, 103 (Carey’s italics). 
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tyranny of a ubiquitous but ever-mutable “normalcy”.  Instead it must be fought 
indirectly, case by case. 
 
Nevertheless, the Tyranny of “Normalcy” remains an interesting topic.  It would 
be naïve to deny that county councils, national health services and secretaries 
of state (in other words, distributors) all have some kind of “Norm” in their minds 
when they distribute.168  And Foucault may well be right that normalizing powers 
(and therefore the Norm itself) are “institutionalized… by legal instruments”169 
(the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 in Richards, for example).  To take 
one of the other Article 19 grounds, disability, it is often the case that Health and 
Safety laws hamper the progress of the disabled, thus reinforcing the dominance 
of “Normalcy”.  The Tyranny of “Normalcy” will be returned to later. 
 
 
4.4.2.4. Distinctly identical: D and Maruko 
 
Finally, D and Maruko provide a neat example of the absurdity of the Aristotelian 
approach to equality cases, and the relative wisdom of Walzer’s.  In D, a 
registered (same-sex) partnership was treated as “unlike” a marriage, but seven 
years later in Maruko, a registered (same-sex) partnership was treated, at least 
pending the national court’s confirmation, as “like” a marriage.  If a traditional 
comparative approach is insisted upon, it is as a minimum to be hoped that the 
same comparison could be run in the same way twice, ceteris paribus, so that 
the Aristotelian rule could at least be seen to obey itself.  D and Maruko provide 
proof positive, if proof were needed, that the outcome of equality cases is as 
likely to be influenced by politics and opportunism as it is by logic or law.  The 
fact that the Framework Employment Directive was not implemented in 2001, 
and that D could thus only rely on the general principle of equal treatment, and 
that therefore it fell to the Court alone, without Member State backing, to declare 
the identity of same-sex partnerships and marriages, undoubtedly explains the 
Council’s victory in D: the political stakes were simply too high for the judges at 
the ECJ, and their nerve failed.  However, the fact that the Framework 
Employment Directive was implemented in 2008, and that Mr Maruko could rely 
                                                 
168 That is why it is essential that all members of the community, distributors and distributees, 
are present at the debate at which the distributive criteria are ascertained. 
169 A Barron, “Foucault and Law” in Penner, Schiff and Nobles (eds), Introduction to Legal Theory 
and Jurisprudence (Butterworths, London 2002) 994. 
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on it without recourse to the general principle, and that the Court could thus find 
for him while leaving the legislature to bear any responsibility, similarly explains 
the claimant’s victory in Maruko.  It is not the political u-turn in this story which is 
sad; political u-turns happen every day, and the second result is indisputably 
better than the first.  What is sad is the way the Aristotelian test can be so 
obviously moulded to produce the needed result.  Either two things are alike or 
they are not; the mere happenstance of which remedy may or may not be 
available on the day of the comparison cannot possibly affect this.170 
 
Looking at the two cases from the Walzerian point of view, the two distribuends 
at issue are obviously a household allowance (in D) and a survivor’s pension (in 
Maruko).  In both cases the dominant would appear to be the same: the status 
of being married, that is, that the tie between any claimant and their partner (or 
late partner) was one of marriage.  Thus there was a boundary breach in both 
cases, unless counsel for the Council, or for the German Theatre Pension 
Institution, could convince the Court that the status of being married (in the 
sense of a union between two heterosexuals) was part of the shared 
understandings of household allowances or survivor’s pensions in the 
communities concerned: Germany in Maruko, and the whole of the EU (or 
perhaps just the workforce of the Council) in D.  Debates held in these two 
communities would reveal the shared understandings; a summary of the 
relevant debate and its outcome could easily be presented by counsel, calling 
witnesses if necessary, always with the possibility for opposing counsel to cross-
examine.  Opposing counsel could also make their own presentation and call 
their own witnesses.  It would fall to the Bench to make the final decision, and 
then to declare whether the distribution under consideration was flawed or not.   
 
The results in the two cases cannot be predicted.  Nor can it be predicted 
whether the result in Maruko would be different from that in D, or the same.  If, 
as the Court hinted, there was indeed some kind of change of view in Europe, 
                                                 
170 Opponents of judicial activism might argue that the Court was right to wait for the 
Framework Employment Directive to be implemented before pronouncing on gay marriages, 
and that therefore there was a substantive difference between 2001 and 2008: agreement 
between the Member States as to the undesirability of discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation.  But this would be a nonsense.  The Framework Employment Directive still existed 
in 2001 (even if not on the date of D’s application).  Any “agreement” relied upon in 2008 could 
have been just as easily relied upon (if tacitly) in 2001.  And what exactly is the point of the 
general principle if not to allow the Court to correct any inequalities which it may encounter in 
the course of hearing a case? 
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with regard to gay marriage, between 2001 and 2008, this would be reflected in 
the result.  If not, this would similarly be reflected in the result.  D’s own 
community, and Mr Maruko’s own community, would thus bear the true 
responsibility for deciding whether, in their respective cases, a registered 
partnership was or was not the same as a (heterosexual) marriage.171  The 
Court would not have to fear making an unpopular decision, because the 




4.5.1. The ECJ’s case-law 
 
Disability is perhaps the most complex of the Article 19 grounds, not least 
because of the many definitional complications which the word “disability” 
presents.  On one view, disability discrimination is entirely “a function of the 
social reception” of the disabled person, and nothing whatsoever to do with “the 
functional state of [his or her] body or mind”172.  In other words, it is an ascribed 
difference (to use the first of Schiek’s three categories173), based only on the 
reactions and opinions of others.  The person to whom the ascription is applied 
may not consider themselves “disabled”, or different, at all.  In a recent study 
into happiness, published in The Lancet, children with cerebral palsy were found 
to be as happy as those not suffering from this condition.  Professor Allan 
Colver, who led the research, commented: 
 
“for the person with cerebral palsy – that’s who they are, and as they 
grow up and develop their sense of self, that disability is 
indistinguishable from their identity as human beings.”174 
 
Bell has summed up the problem which this poses in the legal context: 
                                                 
171 And of course it would be open to all counsel to make provision, in their pleadings, for the 
possibility of their side losing on the question of the shared meaning; they could request that, in 
that eventuality, the Bench apply the “override” (discussed above, for example, at section 2.6.) 
in order to mitigate any resultant injustice.  The Court would no doubt want this request, like 
any other request, to be fully reasoned.  And it would almost certainly demand that counsel 
produce very strong and compelling grounds, before it would consider overriding the duly 
ascertained wishes of the distributive community. 
172 Quotations from JE Bickenbach, “Disability and Equality” (2003) 2 J.L. & Equal. 7, 8.  
173 See supra n 16. 
174 D Lawson, “From Pentecost island to modern Britain, the futility of trying to measure 




“The meaning of “disability” is contested and gaps emerge between self-
perception and external categorizations.  The definition of disability for 
the purposes of discrimination law may not correspond to an individual’s 
assessment of whether they have a disability.”175 
 
The Framework Employment Directive has tried to skirt round this problem by 
eschewing a definition of “disability” altogether.  However, while the absence of 
a definition should have permitted judges to adopt the “greatest range” of 
possible meanings when construing the word176, in fact the ECJ opted for a very 
narrow understanding of “disability” in the first preliminary reference on the 
subject.  In Chacón Navas177, the issue was whether mere “sickness” was 
covered by the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability in Article 1 of 
the Directive.  The Court answered this in the negative.  Quinn has described 
the decision as “disappointing to say the least”178 and “an aberration”179.  
Meenan has commented that “[i]t would be a pity if Chacón Navas was to 
remain the final word… on the issue of definition”180. 
 
The second preliminary reference tackled by the Court on disability was the 
case of Coleman v Attridge Law181.  This again concerned the scope of the 
Directive, this time whether it covered what is sometimes called “associative 
discrimination”, also known as “transferred discrimination”182.  This is the 
phenomenon whereby the complainant has suffered discrimination not as a 
result of their own disability, but as a result of a third party’s.  Ms Coleman was 
working for a firm of solicitors when, in 2002, she gave birth to a son who was 
disabled.  She alleged that, inter alia, when she sought to take time off to care 
for her son she was called “lazy”, and she was also denied the same flexibility 
as regards her working arrangement as was granted to her colleagues with non-
disabled children.  She sued for constructive dismissal, and the South London 
Employment Tribunal made a reference. 
 
                                                 
175 Supra n 4, 197. 
176 The quotation is from Hosking, “Great Expectations: Protection from discrimination because 
of disability in Community law” EL Rev 2006, 31(5), 667, 681. 
177 Case C-13/05 Sonia Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR I-6467. 
178 Quinn, supra n 88, 274. 
179 Ibid., 277. 
180 Meenan, supra n 13, 348.  
181 Case C-303/06 S. Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law (ECJ 17 July 2008).   
182 See for example Pilgerstorfer and Forshaw, “Transferred discrimination in European law” 37 
Indus. L.J. 384. 
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Advocate General Poiares Maduro was clear that the Directive could indeed be 
applied to discrimination by association: 
 
“[T]he Directive does not allow the hostility an employer may have 
against people belonging to the enumerated suspect classifications to 
function as the basis for any kind of less favourable treatment in the 
context of employment and occupation… The Directive does not come 
into play only when the claimant is disabled herself but every time there 
is an instance of less favourable treatment because of disability.”183 
 
The Court followed this argument: 
 
“Although, in a situation such as that in the present case, the person who 
is subject to direct discrimination on grounds of disability is not herself 
disabled, the fact remains that it is the disability which […] is the ground 
for the less favourable treatment […].  […] Directive 2000/78, which 
seeks to combat all forms of discrimination on grounds of disability in the 
field of employment and occupation, applies not to a particular category 
of person but by reference to the grounds mentioned in Article 1.”184 
 
If the Directive applied only to those having the characteristic classified as 
suspect, and not to those associated with them, then, according to the Court, it 
would be “deprive[d]… of an important element of its effectiveness”185.  Unlike in 
Chacón Navas, then, the Court in Coleman opted for a wide interpretation of the 
scope of the Directive (albeit the scope rationae personae, not rationae 
materiae).186 
 
4.5.2. A Walzerian analysis 
 
Given the paucity of cases concerning disability, there is not much which a 
Walzerian analysis can add to the existing situation.  In Chacón Navas, the 
Court decided against allowing sickness either to form part of one of the original 
grounds in the Framework Employment Directive (specifically disability), or to be 
a ground in its own right.  Thus, the comparison (between a sick employee and 
a healthy one) was never run.187  Since complex equality is only being mooted in 
                                                 
183 Case C-303/06 Coleman, supra n 181, at Paras. 22-23 of the Opinion (emphasis added).  
184 Ibid., para. 50. 
185 Ibid., para. 51. 
186 For an interesting note on the case, see L Waddington, “Annotation Coleman” [2009] 46 
CMLRev 665. 
187 It is not exactly clear why the Court only mentioned the general principle (at Judgment, para. 
56), but did not actually make use of it; so far as can be seen the case falls within the scope of 
Community law.  One explanation is that this course of action was not alluded to by the national 
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this dissertation as a complement to traditional comparison within court cases at 
the ECJ188, there is no need to consider Ms Chacón Navas’ case from the 
Walzerian angle either. 
 
Coleman, meanwhile, offers a nice chance to review some of the features of the 
Walzerian approach already encountered in the earlier analyses.  While a 
number of things were being distributed by Mr Law to Ms Coleman, they could 
perhaps all be summed up in a single idea: flexibility.  Ms Coleman lost out in 
the distribution of flexibility owing to a characteristic (albeit of her child) which 
acted as a negative dominant, potentially rendering the distribution defective189.  
First, though, the Court would have to decide whether having a disabled child 
formed any part of the shared meaning of flexibility in Ms Coleman’s community.  
Assuming that it decided that it did not, the distribution would be declared 
defective, and a rerun ordered190.  This time Ms Coleman would receive her 
share of flexibility (of working arrangements, hours, and so on) on the same 
terms as workers with non-disabled children.  But a painstaking dissection of the 





                                                                                                                                    
court in its questions.  However, that should not have stopped the Court from raising the matter 
propio motu. 
188 Not as some kind of all-embracing programme for societal reform.  Of course a trickle-down 
effect, from the Court to the wider world, cannot be ruled out, and is even to be expected, 
where distribution is concerned.  
189 Note how, once again, it would be possible to view this case the other way around, so that 
workers with non-disabled children would be the ones responsible for the boundary conflict, via 
their (tyrannical) possession of a positively dominant good.  In this alternative scenario one can 
detect, again, the operation of the Tyranny of “Normalcy”. 
190 In the Forum, Ms Coleman would presumably argue that flexibility, as applied to an 
employee, meant the ability to vary one’s working arrangements to take account – within 
reasonable limits – of certain other circumstances, including personal circumstances.  Mr Law 
on the other hand might argue that it meant the same thing, but with the caveat, “such ability 
only being enjoyable by parents of non-disabled children”.  It is hard to see how he could make 
this argument at all, let alone in a convincing enough manner to attract a majority of votes (or 
whatever else the chosen system for electing the winning meaning required).  However, even if 
he had succeeded in this argument in the Forum, counsel for Ms Coleman could invoke the 
Override before the Court, asserting that this meaning infringed Article 14 and Protocol No 12 of 
the European Convention (at the very least).  Alternatively, the choice of meanings itself could 




On 2 July 2008, the Commission made its proposal for a so-called “horizontal” 
Directive for the four grounds covered by the Framework Employment Directive, 
which would expand the prohibition on discrimination on those grounds to cover 
social protection (including social security and healthcare), social advantages, 
education, and access to and supply of goods and services which are 
commercially available to the public (including housing)191.   
 
This means, for example, that if a female student in an EU Member State were 
to bring an action against her University for forbidding her to wear an Islamic 
headscarf, as Leyla Şahin did in the ECHR case of Şahin v Turkey192, she could 
rely on EU secondary legislation, in a way that she could not at the moment 
(although it is by no means clear that she would win, as there are, as the 
proposal stands, a number of exceptions concerning religion and belief). 
                                                 
191 See Commission (EC), “Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation” COM(2008)426 final, 2 July 2008.  On 2 April 2009, the European Parliament 
adopted by 363 votes to 226, with 12 abstentions, a legislative resolution making significant 
amendments to the proposal. 
192 Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, Application No. 44774/98, 10 November 2005. 
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5. Nationality Discrimination 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Nationality has been described as the legal bond between a person and a 
State1.  The operative word here is “legal”.  Unlike gender, race, or any of the 
other grounds of discrimination so far considered, a person’s nationality comes 
into existence by operation of law, and can sometimes even cease to exist by 
operation of law.2  This legal dimension greatly affects how society views 
inequality grounded on nationality.   
 
While discrimination in matters relating to nationality should certainly be, if at all 
possible, “avoid[ed]”3, and while discriminating against others on grounds of 
nationality (or supposed nationality) has certainly led to unfairness and even 
great hardship on occasion4, the fact remains that where a legal relationship is 
concerned, it makes no sense, from a purely legal point of view, and in the 
normal course of events, to treat those between whom the relationship pertains 
in exactly the same way as those between whom the relationship does not 
pertain, at least vis-à-vis the matters with which the relationship is concerned.  
To act in any other way would be to render the relationship redundant; it would 
no longer serve any purpose.  Entering into a relationship creates rights among 
the parties in which those outside the relationship simply cannot share; the 
creation of exclusive rights is the whole point of the exercise.  One could draw 
an analogy (although not a perfect one) with the doctrine (in English law) of 
privity of contract.  An individual who is not a party to a contract cannot derive 
rights thereunder.  He is a stranger to the contract.  The exclusion of the 
stranger is not only not unlawful, it is (in contract law) mandatory.  Similarly, the 
                                                 
1 European Convention on Nationality, Article 2(a).  There are of course other, non-legal senses 
of the term. 
2 In the European Union, possession or otherwise of nationality is a matter for national law, not 
EU law.  See the Declaration on Nationality of a Member State, appended to the Treaty of 
Maastricht: [1992] OJ C191/98. 
3 European Convention on Nationality, 5th recital to Preamble. 
4 For example, the expulsion of Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia after World War 
II; the detainment and internment of large numbers of Japanese Americans in the wake of 
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour. 
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foreigner5 should not be surprised to find himself excluded from a number of the 
bargains struck between the nationals of the State he is visiting, and the State 
itself.  He is simply not privy to them. 
 
However, the creation of the European Union puts a different complexion on 
things.  It is an entity sui generis, establishing, as the ECJ famously declared in 
the Van Gend & Loos case, a “new legal order”6, bringing with it new legal 
relationships not supplanting, but supplementing existing ones.  In Walzerian 
terms, this can in some cases mean the co-existence of two, mutually inclusive, 
distributive communities – a micro sphere within a macro sphere.  The stranger 
may now only be a stranger at the micro level; at the macro level he is a friend, 
a fellow distributee of certain rights and obligations, a co-contractor.  His claim to 
equal treatment is not just stronger now, it is insuperable.  But this dual (legal) 
personality is often stifled by Member States, and the EU’s split-level decision-
making, and double context, is misunderstood or ignored, as will be seen.7 
 
5.2. Nationality discrimination in EU law 
 
Discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited by Article 12 of the 
Treaty of Rome, now Article 18 TFEU, although the prohibition is reiterated 
(sometimes only implicitly) on several occasions thereafter, perhaps most 
noticeably in the provisions setting out the free movement of persons8, 
establishment9 and services10, and in a number of pieces of secondary 
legislation.11  This is because the outlawing of discrimination on grounds of 
                                                 
5 Étranger in French, extranjero in Spanish. 
6 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1, at Part IIB of the grounds. 
7 Walzer is perfectly comfortable with the idea of individuals living in spheres-within-spheres, 
and thus owing, as it were, a double allegiance.  See his description of what he calls 
multinational empires in M Walzer, On Toleration (Yale University Press, New Haven 1997) 14-
19.  The mere fact that the inner sphere’s inhabitants were – in some respects, anyway - 
governed from without rather than from within does not breach complex equality. 
8 See Article 39(2) EC – now, since the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 45(2) 
TFEU. 
9 See Article 43 EC, second paragraph – now, since the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
Article 49 TFEU, second paragraph. 
10 See Article 50 EC – now, since the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 57 TFEU. 
11 This means nationality of an EC Member State, though.  Third country nationals, subject to 
one or two exceptions, are excluded.  The ECJ has made it clear that the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality may not be invoked where non-member countries are 
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nationality lies at the heart of the internal market project.  As Van der Mei has 
put it, 
 
“Nationality requirements are by their very nature at odds with the 
objectives of the Community.  The common market could never have 
been realised, and could never operate effectively, if Member States 
were free to exclude nationals of other Member States from their territory 
and labour markets.”12 
 
In the field of free movement, the Court of Justice has heard countless cases 
involving nationality requirements, actual or constructive, most of which boil 
down to a dissonance between the treatment of a person or entity national to the 
so-called “host” State and the treatment of a person or entity entering the host 
State from another Member State (the “home” State), or indeed from a third 
country.  Where discrimination on the grounds of nationality is alleged, the Court 
uses Aristotelian reasoning in making its finding, with the same unsatisfactory 
results seen earlier in relation to the other grounds. 
 
In Angonese13, for example, the Court faced its perennial problem of identifying 
the right comparators.  In this well-known case, an Italian man was banned from 
applying for a job at a bank in the Bolzano region of Italy, on the grounds that he 
did not hold a certain certificate, awarded on the successful completion of an 
exam and known as the patentino, attesting his fluency in German; the fact that 
he was fully bilingual, having learnt German by other means, made no 
difference.  The patentino being a local qualification, many other Italians, in 
other parts of the country, would have been similarly turned down, making the 
case, according to some, one of residency discrimination and not nationality 
discrimination; the correct comparators would therefore have been a resident of 
Bolzano and a non-resident of Bolzano.  However, the Court held the bank’s 
condition to be discriminatory on grounds of nationality, preferring to compare 
residents of Bolzano with non-Italians.  Davies regards Angonese as further 
proof of the Court’s “shaky grasp of who should be compared with who”14, his 
                                                                                                                                    
at issue, for example, Case 52/81 Offene Handelsgesellschaft in Firma Werner Faust v 
Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 3745. 
12 A Pieter van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2003) 70. 
13 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA. [2000] ECR I-4139. 
14 G Davies, “”Any Place I Hang My Hat?” or: Residence is the New Nationality” 2005 European 
Law Journal 11:1 (Jan) 43, 46.  A Walzerian inquiry would reveal, almost definitely, that part of 
the meaning of a job at a bank in the German-speaking region of Italy – or at least the 
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principal example being a case about free entry for local children and OAP’s into 
the museums of Florence: Commission v Italian Republic15.  Again, in holding 
that there had been nationality discrimination, the Court ran a comparison 
between the resident and the foreigner, rather than between the resident and 
the non-resident; Davies calls this “logically regrettable”16. 
 
However, even after the comparators are selected, the Court still struggles with 
the question of whether two people or things are like or unlike, and whether their 
treatment was like or unlike.  In another case concerning a regional requirement, 
this time in the context of the free movement of goods, Walloon Waste17, it was 
necessary to compare waste produced in Wallonia with imported waste (as the 
Walloon Regional Executive wished to treat these two things in an unlike 
fashion).  As Wilsher has explained, the outcome of the comparison depends 
entirely on whether the observer used a market equivalence method, or a 
regulatory equivalence method.18  From the point of view of market equivalence, 
the two types of waste are of course alike.  But from the point of view of 
regulatory equivalence, waste produced at home and imported waste are 
different; the environmental policy pursued by the Executive – in keeping with 
the principle that waste should be disposed of as close as possible to its source 
– is satisfied by the first but not by the second, making them (in the eyes of a 
regulator) unlike.19 
                                                                                                                                    
opportunity thereof – was the need to be bilingual, not “possession of the patentino” (although 
of course the latter is one of the ways of satisfying the former).  As things stood, the patentino 
was an architypal dominant – those possessing it gained automatic and exclusive access to other 
goods, while those without it were turned away.  Although this Walzerian analysis reaches the 
same result as the Aristotelian one (a breach of the equality principle), it can be seen that the 
first is much easier than the second.  It avoids both the problem of choosing comparators (job-
applicants from two different regions of Italy, or job-applicants from two different Member 
States), and the problem of one of the comparators’ needing to be hypothetical. 
15 Case C-388/01 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-721. 
16 Supra n 14, 49. 
17 Case C-2/90 European Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431. 
18 Daniel Wilsher, “Does Keck discrimination make any sense? An assessment of the non-
discrimination principle within the European single market” ELRev 2008, 33(1), 3, 7. 
19 In the event, the Court mixed the two approaches by finding discrimination, only to justify it, 
controversially, on grounds of imperative requirements of environmental protection.  A 
Walzerian approach would have quickly distilled the case down to its essential question: in the 
business of waste-treatment, is the distance that waste has travelled a pertinent factor (in 
which case the breach of the border between the sphere of nationality and the sphere of waste-
management is legitimate), or an extraneous factor (in which case it is illigitimate)?  Guessing, 
for the sake of argument, that it is a pertinent factor (in accordance with the principle 
mentioned in the main text), then Belgium should have won the case outright.  Awkward – even 
absurd – questions about whether two lots of waste are like or unlike are avoided, as, for the 
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The tax case of Gilly20 also presented difficulties at the stage of the like-for-like 
analysis.  Here, a woman who lived on the Franco-German border, on the 
French side, who taught in a German state school, and who was of dual (French 
and German) nationality, found herself taxed in Germany, pursuant to a Franco-
German Double Taxation Convention.  Although married, her non-residence in 
Germany meant that she could not benefit from a so-called “splitting system”, in 
accordance with German federal income tax laws; this meant that she was 
treated as though she were single, with the result that she had to pay more tax 
in Germany than she would have had to had she been taxed in France, or than 
she would have had to had she been resident in Germany.  The Court examined 
the rationale for the German federal income tax laws.  This was that non-
residents usually have some other source of income, where they actually live, 
and the income received in the State where they are not resident is just a part of 
their total income, while, where the State is taxing a resident, they take the view 
that this is all of or the main, concentrated part of the taxpayer’s total income.21  
Accepting this rationale, the Court refused to find discrimination as between a 
person living in Germany and paying tax in Germany, and a person living in 
France and paying tax in Germany.22 
 
However, as Vanistendael23 has noted, Mrs Gilly’s being treated as a single 
person is highly discriminatory, and the rationale was flawed: clearly her 
teacher’s salary, in Germany, was the main part of (if not all of) her total income.  
As usual, Aristotle can be used to condone, perpetuate and, in some ways, 
further legitimize an existing (unfair) distinction.  The German federal income tax 
laws said (wrongly) that the non-resident and the resident were unlike, and the 
ECJ simply grafted Mrs Gilly’s case on top of this pre-existent, and unsound, 
analysis – treating the unlike in unlike fashion could not be discrimination.  
Rather, the resident and the non-resident (or the taxpayer with German 
                                                                                                                                    
record, are obscure and impenetrable legal riddles such as whether direct discrimination can or 
cannot be objectively justified.  
20 Case C-336/96 Mr and Mrs Robert Gilly v Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin [1998] ECR 
I-2793. 
21 Ibid., para. 49. 
22 Ibid., para. 50. 
23 F Vanistendael, “Annotation Gilly” (2000) CMLRev 167. 
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nationality and the taxpayer with dual Franco-German nationality) should have 
been treated as like, making their unlike treatment unjustified discrimination.24 
 
These examples hopefully illustrate that the ECJ’s reliance on the Aristotelian 
test for equality has been as problematic in the field of nationality discrimination 
as it has been in the other fields so far considered.  Using a sample of cases, 
this chapter attempts to ascertain if and to what extent a Walzerian analysis 
would improve matters.  
 
5.3. A specific example: the free movement of persons 
 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, Walzer holds equal citizenship to be an 
essential prerequisite for the establishment of complex equality25.  It is crucial 
that every member of the distributive community should have a fair and equal 
chance to participate in the forum, which means that even the most recent 
newcomer must be granted full political rights: “every immigrant and every 
resident is a citizen, too”26.  It is obvious that the existence of a second-class 
citizenry, such as the metics in ancient Greece, as described by Walzer in his 
chapter on “Membership”27, would pose a serious problem for the complex 
egalitarian.   
 
In the US, there exists such an underclass, whose members are known as 
“resident aliens”.  Linda Bosniak, for one, has applied Walzer’s theory to the 
                                                 
24 A Walzerian approach would have allowed the Court to face the real question, which was 
whether non-residency and/or non-nationality were pertinent factors for Germany to take into 
account when distributing the more lenient tax demands.  It soon becomes clear that the 
correct badge to be shown at the entrance to this particular distributive sphere was receipt of 
all or nearly all one’s income in Germany: that was the only legitimate dominant.  Any other 
badges (residency in Germany, German nationality) would have to be left at the door.  By 
focusing on the good and its meaning, Walzer cuts through the assumptions being made that 
(say) non-residence in a state somehow equates to a smaller contribution being made to that 
state’s exchequer.  For another example of the Court’s difficulties with the like-for-like stage, 
see the analysis and discussion of Vigier below, section 5.4.2.: Case 70/80 Tamara Vigier v 
Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte [1981] ECR 229. 
25 Supra section 2.5. 
26 M Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, New York 
1983) 52 (hereinafter referred to as Spheres of Justice).  See also Walzer’s later remark, 
“Participants in economy and law, [guests] ought to be able to regard themselves as potential or 
future participants in politics as well”: ibid., 60. 
27 See the discussion at ibid., 53-5. 
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problem of resident aliens, with some degree of success28.  She draws on cases 
where the US courts have attempted to ascertain which, if any, rights, enjoyed 
by nationals, may be lawfully withheld from aliens.  She then uses the concept of 
sphere-separability to explain why some denials of rights by States were held to 
be (or should have been held to be) impermissible.  For example, in the Graham 
case, the Supreme Court found that the denial of certain State benefits to 
resident aliens of foreign origin was akin to denying them a right to reside in the 
first place, in other words, it was an invasion, by the sphere of welfare benefits 
(a State concern), of the sphere of membership (a Federal concern)29.  Such 
decisions, and the tensions between State competence and Federal 
competence which they sometimes reveal, are very helpful when one comes to 
consider the ECJ’s case-law on the free movement of persons. 
 
Over the many years that it has been hearing cases on the subject, the ECJ has 
faced a plethora of distribuends: educational grants30, childbirth loans31, rail fare 
reduction cards32, places on training courses33, and so on.  The question was, 
could a Member State vary the way it distributed these things according to 
whether it was confronted with one of its own nationals, or with a national of 
another Member State exercising their right of free movement (or even a 
member of the latter’s family)?  Or did it have to treat both categories of person 
in the same way?  The Court declared in the majority of cases that equal 
treatment of national and migrant was required; what was good for the host 
State goose was good for the home State gander.   This idea can be plainly 
seen in a number of the early judgments, for example: 
 
“If the widow and infant children of a national of the Member State in 
question are entitled to such cards provided that the request had been 
made by the father before his death, the same must apply where the 
                                                 
28 See L Bosniak, The citizen and the alien: dilemmas of contemporary membership (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ 2006). 
29 John O Graham, Commissioner, Department of Public Welfare, State of Arizona, Appellant, v 
Carmen Richardson, Etc.; William P Sailer et al., Appellants, v Elsie Mary Jane Leger and Beryl 
Jervis: 403 US 365, 91 S Ct 1848. 
30 Case 76/72 Michel S. v Fonds national de reclassement social des handicapés [1973] ECR 457. 
31 Case 65/81 Francesco Reina and Letizia Reina v Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg [1982] 
ECR 33. 
32 Case 32/75 Anita Cristini v Société nationale des chemins de fer français [1975] ECR 1085. 
33 Case 152/82 Sandro Forcheri and his wife Marisa Forcheri, née Marino, v Belgian State and 
asbl Institut Supérieur de Sciences Humaines Appliquées - Ecole Ouvrière Supérieure [1983] ECR 
2323. 
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“[T]o require of a national of another Member State lawfully established 
in the first Member State an enrolment fee which is not required of its 
own nationals […] constitutes discrimination by reason of nationality”.35 
 
These sweeping, Aristotelian statements, insisting that Member States could not 
act towards nationals from other Member States differently to the way they acted 
towards their own nationals, in other words, that likes must be treated alike, 
conveyed in a way that did not draw too much attention to itself the fundamental 
axiom: that migrants and nationals were like.  The Aristotelian test’s knack for 
cloaking a hidden message, and the ease with which it could be used as a 
rubber stamp for a foregone conclusion36, were very much on display in these 
cases.  Even where the Court did wish to find for the Member State, in most 
cases37 it did this by declaring whatever the migrant or his family member were 
seeking to be outside the scope of Community (primary or secondary) law.38  
This reasoning also, at least partially, cloaked a difficult issue: the division of 
competences between the EEC (as it then was) and the Member States.  But 
the message was clear enough.  Migrants and nationals could be regarded as 
unlike when the matter under consideration was Member State competence, but 
as soon as the matter under consideration became Community competence, the 
two groups were to be regarded, almost without fail, as indistinguishable39. 
 
The Aristotelian test is a blunt instrument at the best of times, but using it in this 
fettered way renders the results even less convincing.  Above all, the sneaking 
suspicion that the Court’s decisions are entirely political, and that Aristotle is 
merely being used as so much whitewash, is raised throughout this case-law.  
                                                 
34 Case 32/75 Cristini, supra n 32, para. 15. 
35 Case 152/82 Forcheri, supra n 33, para. 18. 
36 See section 9.1. below. 
37 But not all.  See the discussion of Case 336/96 Gilly, supra text accompanying n 20. 
38 Or occasionally even national law eg Case 70/80 Vigier, supra n 24. 
39 If a Member State did want to plead some difference (as between its own citizens and 
newcomers), it could only do this, it seemed, at the stage of objective justification, and even 
then with little chance of success, eg Case 237/78 Caisse régionale d'assurance maladie de Lille 
(CRAM) v Diamante Palermo, née Toia [1979] ECR 2645; Case C-147/03 Commission v Republic 
of Austria [2005] ECR I-5969.  Somek has called this phenomenon “the proportionalisation of 
difference”: A Somek, “Solidarity Decomposed: Being and Time in European Citizenship” 2007 
ELRev 32(6), 787, 816.  
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5.4. Taking a Walzerian approach 
 
5.4.1. The early case-law 
 
As before, Walzer’s method allows for a much more subtle and contextual 
analysis of any given case.  That said, when one looks at the very earliest 
cases, the outcomes arrived at via a Walzerian analysis are not notably different 
from those which the Court itself arrived at via the Aristotelian test.  To take an 
example, in the Frilli case40, Belgium sought to deny Ms Frilli, an Italian national, 
its guaranteed income for old people.  The ECJ found this to be discrimination 
on grounds of nationality, and held that Ms Frilli must receive the benefit.  A 
complex egalitarian would wonder whether Ms Frilli’s “being Italian”, or 
“alienage” to use Bosniak’s word, constituted a negative dominant disqualifying 
her from the distribution of this particular benefit, or indeed whether (elderly) 
Belgian citizens’ “citizen status” acted as a positive dominant for them.  While, 
as usual, no definitive answer could be given until the distributive community 
concerned had stipulated what its shared understanding of a “guaranteed 
income for old people” was, it is possible to state, provisionally, that Ms Frilli 
should receive the benefit, unless “being Belgian” was in some way part of said 
understanding.  A guaranteed income for old people, at least on the face of 
things, is not about being Belgian, but about being old.41 
 
This seeming agreement between the judge who finds the differential treatment 
of national and migrant to be discriminatory, and the complex egalitarian who 
discerns the exertion of dominance42 in the non-distribution of the benefit 
concerned to the migrant, recurs often in the case-law.  The unlikelihood of 
“being French” forming part of the shared meaning of an allowance for 
handicapped adults43, a rail fare reduction card44, or an allowance for women 
                                                 
40 Case 1/72 Rita Frilli v Belgian State [1972] ECR 457. 
41 Of course, the distributive community could respond that only those old people who had 
contributed to this benefit by paying their Belgian taxes should receive it.  However, this would 
be not so much a nationality requirement as a residence requirement (for which, see the next 
paragraph).  This touches on the difficult issue of solidarity, discussed further below at 5.5. 
42 Or the imposition of negative dominance. 
43 Case 63/76 Vito Inzirillo v Caisse d'allocations familiales de l'arrondissement de Lyon [1976] 
ECR 2057. 
44 Case 32/75 Cristini, supra n 32. 
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with children45, or of “being Belgian” forming part of the shared meaning of an 
old age pension46 or a special unemployment benefit for young workers47, 
means that the host States’ inclusion of these attributes in their distributive 
criteria represents a boundary breach, causing the resultant distributions to be 
flawed.  The same applies to various forms of residence requirement.  In 
Scrivner48, Belgium’s insistence that UK nationals should have resided in the 
country for five years before being entitled to receive the minimum subsistence 
allowance (“minimex”) was found to be discriminatory by the Court.  Meanwhile, 
such a rule would also, almost certainly, be inimical to a regime of complex 
equality, as it is unlikely that long-term residence in Belgium would form part of 
the distributive community’s shared understanding of a benefit intended to 
alleviate the hardships of unemployment.  Likewise, in Frascogna49, France’s 
setting of a fifteen-year residence requirement as a condition precedent for the 
receipt of a special old-age allowance was held to be nationality discrimination 
by the ECJ.  A Walzerian view of the case would similarly result in the 
condemnation of the Member State, as long as the relevant distributive 
community did not consider long-term residence in France to be a part of its 
shared understanding of a benefit designed to alleviate the hardships of old 
age.50 
 
5.4.2. Cases deriving from the Second World War 
 
                                                 
45 Case 237/78 Palermo née Toia, supra n 39.  The allowance was granted when the woman 
concerned reached the age of 65.  The distributive community would therefore (probably) find 
that the “meaning” of the allowance was assistance for the elderly, in which case the presence 
of nationality within the distributive sphere (the nationality of the recipient’s children in this 
case) was tyrannical – an undue invasion by the sphere of membership.  However, another of 
the conditions for the granting of the allowance was that the woman concerned should have 
had at least five children.  If the distributive community found, then, that the meaning of the 
whole scheme was increasing France’s birth rate, it might well be justified in saying that the 
nationality of the children born did form part of this meaning; presumably children born with 
non-French nationality would be excluded from the calculation of France’s birth rate, thus 
precluding their mother from receiving the allowance. 
46 Case 261/83 Carmela Castelli v Office National des Pensions pour Travailleurs Salariés (ONPTS) 
[1984] ECR 3199. 
47 Case 94/84 Office national de l'emploi v Joszef Deak [1985] ECR 1873. 
48 Case 122/84 Kenneth Scrivner and Carol Cole v Centre public d'aide sociale de Chastre [1985] 
ECR 1027. 
49 Case 256/86 Maria Frascogna v Caisse des dépôts et consignations [1987] ECR 3431. 
50 But, again, would the communities not be within their rights to argue that pay-outs should be 
denied to those who had never paid anything in, such as new-arrivals?  See the section on 
solidarity below at 5.5. 
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In more complicated cases, however, the Aristotelian avenue and the Walzerian 
avenue lead, or at least might lead, in different directions.  In Fossi51, the 
German Government was of the opinion that an Italian national, habitually 
resident outside the Federal Republic of Germany, should be denied a total 
disablement pension claimed under a social security law dating back to the Third 
Reich (he had worked in a mine in Sudetenland during the War).  The ECJ, 
taking the view that this benefit fell outside the scope of the pertinent Community 
laws, agreed with this opinion.  Walzer, however, might wonder what the 
relevant distributive community would say was the meaning of the benefit.  The 
Federal Republic of Germany had assumed certain of the obligations incumbent 
upon the mineworkers’ social security institutions in existence before 1945, and 
had amended the “Imperial Law” concerned52.  The purpose of this amendment, 
as stated by the Government before the Court, was: 
 
“to alleviate certain situations which arose out of events connected with 
the National Socialist regime and the Second World War”53. 
 
Now if the distributive community was of the same view as regards the meaning 
of the law, and the benefits awarded thereunder, it might take the view that an 
Italian permanently resident in Italy was entitled to receive the pension.  The 
alleviation of hardships caused by the Nazis, if that was indeed the project, 
would not appear to come to an end on reaching the national border: the Nazis 
caused hardship in many different countries.  If Mr Fossi had a hardship caused 
by the Nazis which needed alleviating, it would surely need alleviating wherever 
he was.  The presence of elements, like nationality and residence, proper to the 
sphere of membership, in the sphere of distribution (of the type of pension 
sought by Mr Fossi) would therefore be tyrannical.  Once confined to their own 
sphere, however, the distribution could take place in the correct manner, and in 
perfect accordance with the meaning of the goods being distributed. 
 
Tinelli54 was a very similar case, only there the purpose of the law under 
consideration was given as: 
 
                                                 
51 Case 79/76 Carlo Fossi v Bundesknappschaft [1977] ECR 667. 
52 Ibid., para. 2. 
53 Ibid., para. 7. 
54 Case144/78 Renzo Tinelli v Berufsgenossenschaft der Chemischen Industrie [1979] ECR 757. 
 156 
“to facilitate the re-integration, following events connected with the 
National Socialist regime and the Second World War, of exiles and 
refugees who contribute by their work to reconstruction in the Federal 
Republic of Germany.”55 
 
Assuming that this “meaning” (of the law and the pensions available thereunder) 
was also the one endorsed by the distributive community, then Mr Tinelli’s being 
resident outside the Federal Republic of Germany might indeed have a bearing 
on whether or not he should receive the pension.  If the pension rewarded those 
who had contributed by their work to reconstruction in the Federal Republic, 
then those who had spent their working lives in Italy (as Mr Tinelli had done) 
would be unlikely to qualify.  In other words, residence in this case formed part 
of the shared meaning of the good at issue; its presence in the distributive 
sphere was thus appropriate, not tyrannical. 
 
In the same way, it is likely that nationality would form part of the shared 
meaning in the case of Even56, where the good in question was an early 
retirement pension, granted by Belgium, without any reduction, to Belgian 
veterans of the Second World War.  Mr Even was a French national in receipt of 
a war service pension under French legislation; when he moved to Belgium and 
applied for the Belgian veterans’ pension, his application was refused.  The ECJ 
provided no relief, declaring that the benefit fell outside the scope of the relevant 
Community Regulation.  And a Walzerian enquiry too, it seems, would 
exonerate Belgium.  The purpose of the veterans’ pension was: 
 
“to offer to Belgian workers who fought in the Allied forces between 10 
May 1940 and 8 May 1945 and suffer incapacity for work attributable to 
an act of war a testimony of national recognition for the hardships 
suffered during that period and to grant them, by increasing the rate of 
the early retirement pension, a benefit by reason of the services thus 
rendered to [Belgium].”57 
 
While not pre-empting the distributive community, it seems likely that “being 
Belgian” would form part of its shared understanding of the pension.  Nationality 
of Belgium and, perhaps more interestingly, loyalty to Belgium would seem to be 
absolutely central to this particular good.  Mr Even’s having fought for France 
                                                 
55 Ibid., para. 7. 
56 Case 207/78 Criminal proceedings against Gilbert Even and Office national des pensions pour 
travailleurs salariés (ONPTS) [1979] ECR 2019. 
57 Ibid., para. 12. 
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would take him outside the range of potential distributees, and, from a Walzerian 
point of view quite legitimately, outside the distributive sphere.58 
 
Among the other cases deriving from the Second World War, Vigier59 is also 
worth considering.  Ms Vigier, despite being born in Germany (in 1923), was of 
French nationality and resided in France.  As a “victim of persecution” within the 
meaning of Germany’s Federal Compensation Law, and indeed having already 
received some compensation from Germany for loss of educational 
opportunities, Ms Vigier applied in 1975 for authorization to make retroactive 
payment of contributions with regard to invalidity and old age insurance.  The 
Federal Insurance Office rejected this application; according to the relevant law, 
Ms Vigier had to have already paid at least one contribution to the competent 
(German) institution in order to be regarded as an “insured person”.  Ms Vigier 
argued that contributions which she had made in France ought to have been 
taken into account, as if they had been made in Germany.  The ECJ disagreed 
with this; such equivalence was not required within the circumstances of this 
particular case. 
 
For a complex egalitarian, the first line of enquiry would be the meaning of the 
distribuend, as shared by the members of the distributive community.  It is hard 
to anticipate what might happen here.  If the distributive community includes all 
of the victims of Nazi persecution, it seems odd in the extreme that they should 
decide that those victims who now live outside Germany (and who therefore find 
it hard to make the requisite payment) must be regarded as having foregone 
their compensatory rights within Germany.  Victims of persecution very often live 
outside the country where that persecution took place, the persecution itself 
having driven them away.  On this analysis, merely possessing the status of 
victim should be enough to guarantee someone in the position of Ms Vigier the 
right to participate in the distribution, even from France.  On the other hand, if 
this good is less an act of compensation for an earlier wrong, and more a simple 
return on an earlier investment, then it is the payment of the contribution, rather 
                                                 
58 But contrast Case 9/78 Directeur régional de la Sécurité sociale de Nancy v Paulin Gillard and 
Caisse régionale d'assurance maladie du Nord-Est, Nancy [1978] ECR 1661.  Here, a Belgian ex-
POW was refused a special old age pension by the French authorities.  Without usurping the 
role of the distributive community, it seems likely that a Walzerian analysis would produce a 
positive result for Mr Gillard, as the French law in question talked about a claimant’s wartime 
service “in the French or Allied Forces” (ibid., para. 5, emphasis added). 
59 Case 70/80 Vigier, supra n 24. 
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than the status of victim, which should be determinative; those outside the 
country and therefore less able to contribute can legitimately be excluded. 
 
It can be seen that the meaning of the distribuend in Vigier is very ambiguous.  
Walzer’s method, which allocates the “casting vote”, as it were, to the 
distributive community itself, provides a straight path to a resolution of the 
problem.60  Whatever the distributive community says goes.  An Aristotelian 
analysis of the case, meanwhile, simply exacerbates the earlier ambiguity.  It 
seems logical that someone who manages to pay the stipulated contribution 
(henceforth a “payer”) is more likely to be a German resident, and therefore 
more likely to be a German national, than a non-payer, who is more likely to be 
a resident of another Member State, and therefore more likely to be of a non-
German nationality.  It is submitted, then, that the rule set out in Germany’s law 
concerning victims of persecution is indirectly discriminatory against non-
Germans (with no obvious justification), breaching if nothing else Article 18 
TFEU (then Article 12 EC).  In other words, it is a case of unlikes being treated 
alike: Germans and non-Germans differ as to the ease with which they can find 
out about, get information on, and finally make the necessary contribution, but 
both are made subject to the same rule – a classic example of the second limb 
of the Aristotelian test in action, one might have thought.  However, the ECJ 
nicely illustrates how unforeseeable the test is by declaring there to have been 
no discrimination at all.  The Court relied on an earlier case as authority for the 
proposition that a condition of “prior affiliation” was acceptable, and that this did 
not mean that the Member State making the condition was compelled “to treat 
as equivalent insurance periods completed in another Member State”61.  The 
two groups of potential payers remain un-alike, and their treatment remains like, 
but neither the general principle of equality, nor any of its specific enunciations 
within EU legislation, would seem to have been breached.62 
 
                                                 
60 This  is the orthodox position, anyway.  For an alternative version of the theory, Mediated 
Complextiy, in which the casting vote is given to the Judge, see below Chapter 8. 
61 Case 70/80 Vigier, supra n 24, para. 19. 
62 Contrast Case 237/78 Palermo née Toia, supra n 39, where mothers of French nationality and 
mothers of non-French nationality faced the same rule, even though the mothers of French 
nationality were always going to have an easier time fulfilling it (that is, bearing French children) 
than their non-French counterparts.  Here, the Court had no difficulty in finding the rule to be 
indirectly discriminatory. 
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5.4.3. The more recent case-law 
 
In Chapter 2, it was explained how even Walzer himself understood the need for 
an Override in cases where complex equality inadvertently sanctioned, via its 
particularism, disagreeable attitudes or practices.  He called it the Minimal 
Morality.  Later in the same chapter it was suggested that, for EU purposes, the 
ECHR could fulfill this role, especially seeing as it represented a consensus 
among all the Member States with regard to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  In the ECJ’s more recent case-law on the subject of the free 
movement of persons, one can detect the emergence of a not dissimilar 
mechanism in EU law, even in its current, simple egalitarian form. 
 
A good example comes from Advocate General Jacobs in the case of 
Konstantinidis63.  Here, a Greek national who established himself as a masseur 
in Germany complained when he was forced to accept an “insulting [and] 
unpronounceable”64 transliteration of his name on official documents; the 
German court made a reference.  Jacobs was of the opinion not only that this 
state of affairs constituted discrimination on grounds of nationality65, but also 
that it could be impugned, if need be, as an indistinctly applicable restriction on 
the freedom of establishment66.  Reaching this last conclusion, he stated: 
 
“[A Community national invoking the free movement provisions] is […] 
entitled to assume that, wherever he goes to earn his living in the 
European Community, he will be treated in accordance with a common 
code of fundamental values, in particular those laid down in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In other words, he is entitled to 
say "civis europeus sum" and to invoke that status in order to oppose 
any violation of his fundamental rights.”67  
 
                                                 
63 Case C-168/91 Christos Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig [1993] ECR I-1191. 
64 Ibid., at 1202 (Para. 12 of the Opinion). 
65 See ibid., at 1205 (Para. 26 of the Opinion): “The entries made in official registers […]are of 
such obvious importance that the migrant worker should be entitled to demand that he, like any 
citizen of the host country, be properly identified in those documents and have his name 
written in a manner that is not insulting and offensive to him.”  See further 1206 (Para. 27 of the 
Opinion): “[A]s regards entries in official registers he is entitled to the same treatment as 
German nationals”. 
66 Following “Cassis de Dijon” [Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein [1979] ECR 649] in relation to goods and Case 76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer 
& Co. Ltd. [1991] ECR I-4221 in relation to services. 
67 Supra n 63, at 1211-1212 (Para. 46 of the Opinion). 
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A person exercising his right to freedom of establishment “should in general 
have to comply with the local legislation”68; this is reminiscent of Walzer’s 
insistence that all activity within a given sphere should be regulated by the rules 
intrinsic to that sphere.  It is nicely captured by the saying, “When in Rome, do 
as the Romans do”.  But the Advocate General questions, 
 
“whether… a disproportionate restriction or one entirely devoid of 
justification could be applied against a national of another Member 
State”.69 
 
In other words, regardless of whether or not it is the custom of the host State 
and regardless of whether or not all the nationals of the host State have to do it 
as well, if a practice beaches the “common code of fundamental values”, the 
migrant may lawfully object to it.  In the case in hand, of course, it was only Mr 
Konstantinidis who was being denied the right to be identified properly.  By 
declaring this to be a restriction on free movement, the Advocate General, and 
indeed the Court70, brought the treatment of Mr Konstantinidis into line with that 
of ordinary German nationals.  Community law thus granted him the equality 
which national law had withheld.  This case suggests that a move to the 
Walzerian system of equality would not be as big a shock for the Court as might 
have been thought.  The logic followed by Jacobs here (local meaning in the first 
instance, with Override in reserve) is almost identical to that which a complex 
egalitarian might have used.71 
 
Some years later, Advocate General Jacobs adopted a similar technique in the 
case of Bickel and Franz72.  Here, two defendants in criminal proceedings in 
Bolzano (Italy), both from German-speaking countries, requested that their trials 
be carried out in German.  Owing to the presence of the German-speaking 
minority in the Trentino-Alto Adige Region, there were laws in place allowing 
judicial proceedings to be conducted in German in courts in that region.  
                                                 
68 Ibid., at 1212 (Para. 48 of the Opinion). 
69 Ibid. 
70 In a short judgment, the Court held that Germany’s behaviour could be a violation of the right 
of establishment, provided that its effect (on Mr Konstantinidis) was felt when he was pursuing 
his occupation, for example, if potential clients were confusing him with other persons. 
71 In fact, a complex egalitarian might not have needed recourse to the Override, since it is fairly 
unlikely that the German population would hold that one’s nationality formed any part of the 
shared meaning of the right to be properly identified. 
72 Case C-274/96 Criminal proceedings against Horst Otto Bickel and Ulrich Franz [1998] ECR I-
7637. 
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Therefore, any locals who had made this request would have been 
accommodated.  The Bolzano court asked the ECJ whether it could refuse the 
two men’s requests, or whether such a refusal would constitute discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. 
 
While considering whether the subject-matters of the two men’s trials were 
within the scope of the Treaty, Advocate General Jacobs made use of the (at 
that time) new citizenship provision at Article 18 (ex 8a) EC, now Article 21 
TFEU.  Of this provision, he commented: 
 
“The notion of citizenship of the Union implies a commonality of rights 
and obligations uniting Union citizens by a common bond transcending 
Member State nationality. The introduction of that notion was largely 
inspired by the concern to bring the Union closer to its citizens and to 
give expression to its character as more than a purely economic union.”73 
 
This transcendent “commonality of rights”, like the earlier “common code of 
fundamental values”, is not dissimilar to the Override, and Jacobs seems to be 
using it in a similar way, that is, as a backstop, to be deployed if all else fails.  
But not everyone has been quite so optimistic about the advent of EU 
citizenship.  More, for example, has written: 
 
“it lacks connection to a set of common or shared values and, moreover, 
to a proper democratic process”74. 
 
Jacobs was probably on safer ground linking his “Minimal Morality” to the ECHR, 
as he did in Konstantinidis. 
 
In the event, the Advocate General found that there was nationality 
discrimination in Bickel and Franz, and did not accept any of Italy’s proposed 
justifications for treating the two foreigners differently to the local population.  
The Court agreed with this conclusion. 
 
A Walzerian examination produces the identical result.  Indeed, the boundary 
breach in this case is stark.  Mr Franz’s “being German” and Mr Bickel’s “being 
Austrian” are almost certainly negative dominants, subject to whatever the 
                                                 
73 Ibid., at 7645 (Para. 23 of the Opinion). 
74 G More, “The Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier to Fundamental Right?” in P 
Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford 1999) 539. 
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members of the distributive community decide is the shared meaning of the right 
to ask for German to be used in judicial proceedings in Bolzano.  To justify 
denying the right to foreigners, they would have to resolve that the meaning of 
the right was the protection of their minority (the German-speakers of Bolzano) 
and their minority only.  But this would be perverse and would surely require 
application of the Override.  A right to ask for German to be used in judicial 
proceedings is to help German-speaking defendants, to save money (on 
translation and interpretation), and generally to ensure the smooth-running of 
the trial and thus to aid justice.  Any other consideration, such as local loyalty, 
would without doubt be regarded by a complex egalitarian as extraneous75. 
 
The Court’s “new” technique for widening the scope rationae personae of 
Community law, namely via an expansive reading of Article 21 (then Article 18), 
was set to continue and indeed to become its pre-eminent method for dealing 
with free movement of persons cases.  A more recent example is Grzelczyk76.  
The case concerned a French national who went to study at a university in 
Belgium.  For the first three years he supported himself by working, but in the 
fourth year he applied for Belgium’s minimum subsistence allowance (the 
“minimex”).  This application was rejected on the grounds that he was a student, 
and therefore did not fall within the scope of the appropriate Regulation 
(Regulation 1612/6877); it was also established Community law that, while 
migrant students who fulfilled the requisite conditions could sometimes receive 
assistance from the host State with regard to their tutorial fees, they could not 
receive any kind of maintenance grant78. 
 
Following Bickel and Franz, the Court gave a wide interpretation to the 
citizenship provision (Article 21, then Article 18), so that it encompassed any 
Member State national who was 
 
                                                 
75 Note how Bickel and Franz is the reverse of a case like Case 207/78 Even supra n 56, where 
local loyalties were intrinsic to the distributive sphere. 
76 Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve 
[2001] ECR I-6193. 
77 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community [1968] OJ English special edition: Series I Chapter 1968(II)/475. 
78 See, for example, Case 293/83 Françoise Gravier v City of Liège [1985] ECR 593; Case 197/86 
Steven Malcolm Brown v The Secretary of State for Scotland [1988] ECR 3205. 
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“exercis[ing] [their] right to move and reside freely in another Member 
State”79 
 
This of course covered Mr Grzelczyk.  Article 18 (ex 12) could thus be utilized to 
guarantee him equality of treatment vis-à-vis students who were native to 
Belgium (and who received the minimex).  The Court acknowledged that this 
was a departure from the earlier student case-law, especially Brown80, but 
justified this on the grounds that, since that case was decided, a number of 
developments had occurred in EU law, including the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the creation of Union citizenship.  Nevertheless, the Court still 
insisted on fulfillment of the two conditions from the Students’ Directive 
(Directive 93/9681), namely, firstly, that the student must have sufficient 
resources to avoid becoming a burden on the public finances of the host 
Member State, and, secondly, that the student must be covered by sickness 
insurance82. 
 
From a Walzerian perspective, there is a clear boundary breach here, occurring 
at the level, not of the distributees this time, but of the distributors themselves.  
Since withholding the minimex from Mr Grzelczyk would to all intents and 
purposes force him to return to France, one could allege that the Distributor in 
the sphere of minimum subsistence allowances was attempting to usurp the role 
of the immigration services, by analogy with the US case of Graham83.  This 





5.5.1. What is transnational solidarity? 
 
                                                 
79 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, supra n 76, para. 33. 
80 Case 197/86 Brown, supra n 78. 
81 Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students [1993] 
OJ L317/59. 
82 And the host Member State was not allowed to automatically interpret the mere fact of 
asking for the allowance as proof of non-fulfilment of the first condition.  See Case C-184/99 
Grzelczyk, supra n 76, paras. 42 and 43. 
83 See supra, text accompanying n 29. 
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Solidarity has been described as the “cohesion and commonality of purpose of a 
given group”84, and solidarity rights have been defined as giving “legal form to 
social relations of reliance and trust”85.  The bond of solidarity which a national 
of a given Member State feels towards his fellow nationals may be based on a 
variety of things, including shared culture, history, tradition, language, or even 
sporting prowess.  As has been hinted earlier86, solidarity would play a major 
role when a distributive community came to determine its shared 
understandings, if the ECJ were to adopt a Walzerian approach to equality.  If it 
was proposed to distribute a certain benefit to a newly arrived migrant worker 
from another Member State, say, a lot would depend on whether the members 
of the distributive community considered that the solidarity which already existed 
between them extended to cover the newcomer.  As things stand, the extension 
or otherwise of solidarity is not a matter for community-members at all, but is 
decreed by the ECJ from Luxembourg in its ongoing attempt to integrate Europe 
by “redrawing [national] boundaries”87: 
 
“Especially in the field of social assistance (the sanctum sanctorum of 
national welfare […]), the orientation of the ECJ has been very clear: its 
jurisprudence has tended to restrict the scope of discretionality of the 
Member States, contrasting their “closure” tactics by appealing not only 
to the principle of non-discrimination, but often by referring also to the 
need to promote transnational solidarity”88. 
 
In a fascinating article, Somek has investigated the natures of national solidarity 
and transnational solidarity, inter alia, to see if there is any connection between 
them.89  His initial finding is not very encouraging: 
 
“Far from being an extension of national solidarity and serving as a 
transmitter, transnational solidarity is clearly in opposition to it.”90 
 
While the basis of national solidarity is fairly clear-cut91, Somek finds the root of 
transnational solidarity to be “mysterious”92.  Put another way, the link between 
                                                 
84 M Ferrera, “Towards an “Open” Social Citizenship?  The New Boundaries of Welfare in the 
European Union” in G de Búrca (ed), EU law and the welfare state: in search of solidarity (OUP, 
Oxford 2005) 19. 
85 RM Unger, False Necessity: Anti-necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical 
Democracy (CUP, Cambridge 1987) 537, cited in Somek, supra n 39, 801. 
86 Supra n 41 and n 50. 
87 Ferrera, supra n 84, 24. 
88 Ibid., 32. 
89 Somek, supra n 39. 
90 Ibid., 805. 
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the national and his nation (for example, Member State A) is reasonably 
obvious, but what is the link between the EU migrant and Member State A?  In 
D’Hoop, the Court accepted that there may have to be a “real link” between 
migrant and State in order for a tideover allowance to be granted.93  A “real link” 
condition was also accepted as legitimate in Collins94.  In Bidar95, the Court 
endorsed the making of university funding conditional upon the existence of a 
“genuine link” between the student and the host Member State.  The Court is 
implying here that there is a kind of continuum of linkage, with real or genuine 
links at one extreme and (presumably) false or bogus links at the other.  But 
what is the nature of the link?  What is it based on?  Somek rightly notes that the 
Court has been of very little help here, and that ultimately the link seems to be 
one of (what he calls) “being and time”96, that is, that if a person is in a certain 
place for a certain length of time, they will develop a link with that place.97  He 
comments: 
 
“This is not much.  It is, in a sense, even amazingly meagre.  One may 
wonder, indeed, whether being and time, taken by themselves, do suffice 
to establish a connection with any meaningful conception of solidarity.”98 
 
                                                                                                                                    
91 See the first paragraph of this section. 
92 Somek, supra n 39, 801. 
93 Case C-224/98 Marie-Nathalie D'Hoop v Office national de l'emploi [2002] ECR I-6191.  
Specifically, between the migrant and the State’s employment market.  However, in the Court’s 
view, the Royal Decree at issue in this case went too far.  Note Advocate General Geelhoed’s 
Walzerian language here; he focuses on the distribution of tideover allowances and notes that 
there is a conflict between the distributive criterion and the good being distributed: “[T]he 
refusal to allow nationals access to the programmes purely because they completed their 
education in another Member State appears problematic… [This refusal] does not to my mind 
square with the declared objective.”  See ibid., at 6206-6210 (Paras. 45-56 of the Opinion). 
94 Case C-138/02 Brian Francis Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] ECR I-
2703. 
95 Case C-209/03 The Queen, on the application of Dany Bidar v London Borough of Ealing and 
Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-2119. 
96 Somek, supra n 39, 807. 
97 Thus, the nexus between the migrant and the host Member State develops over time.  The 
most well-known instance of the Court’s saying that the link is formed by the passage of time is 
probably in Case C-209/03 Bidar, supra n 95, where it held that it was not illegitimate for a 
Member State to require of a student “a certain degree of integration” before it would grant 
him or her financial assistance (ibid., para. 57), and that this “may be regarded as established by 
a finding that the student in question has resided in the host Member State for a certain length 
of time” (ibid., para. 59).  In the Bidar case itself, the Court was prepared to accept three years’ 
prior residence as a suitable prerequisite.  Five years was also found to be acceptable in the 
later case of Förster: Case C-158/07 Jacqueline Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer 
Groep [2008] ECR I-8507. 
98 Somek, supra n 39, 807. 
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5.5.2. Consideration, responsibility and asymmetric solidarity 
 
Elsewhere, Somek explains how at least one form of solidarity, national or 
transnational, “is mediated by the self-interested motives of co-operation for a 
mutual gain”99.  Where this form of solidarity is prevalent, life will be centred on 
the concept of transaction.  When contemplating distributing a benefit to a 
migrant, members of a distributive community might employ a “consideration 
argument”100, reasoning that only those who have paid for a certain benefit 
should be able to enjoy it.101  This approach to benefit-distribution reduces all 
social activity to an unbroken series of financial bargains – an unceasing 
carousel which never lets new passengers on board.  And those who do not 
(cannot) concede the quid may not receive the quo.  Echoing Lord Atkin’s 
famous question, “Who, then, in law is my neighbour?”102, citizens may decide 
that they need not love a neighbour who claimed rights while repudiating what 
they saw as the concomitant duties. 
 
As well as the fact that they have not “paid for” the benefit in question, foreigners 
(especially indigent ones) may also face arguments based on the concept of 
responsibility.  In deciding whether there are any “solidaristic” bonds between 
them and an impecunious foreign migrant seeking a certain national benefit, the 
members of a distributive community may argue that this individual is the author 
of their own misfortune.103  The responsibility argument is thus a kind of worm in 
the bud of solidarity.  Person A can distance himself from Person B by 
examining in ever greater detail the personal choices made by B, and reasoning 
that B’s plight is a direct result of those choices, for which B and B alone must 
be responsible; A, convinced that he would never make such choices, can no 
longer see the mutuality which formerly characterized his relationship with B, 
and so the bond of solidarity is ruptured.  As Somek puts it, solidarity has 
“switch[ed] into a path-dependent mode”104.  Path-dependence is at least not 
                                                 
99 Ibid., 812. 
100 Davies, supra n 14, 47. 
101 In this section, the phrase “paid for” covers not just direct contribution, but also indirect 
contribution via the payment of national tax. And see also RCA White, “Citizenship of the Union, 
Governance, and Equality” [2006] 29 Fordham International Law Journal 790 at 793, where he 
comments that, “[c]itizenship in its classical sense involves duties as well as rights”; he goes on 
to note that EU citizenship entails the second but not (at the moment) the first. 
102 In the Scottish case of Donoghue v Stevenson: [1932] AC 562, 580. 
103 “Solidaristic” is Somek’s word: supra n 39, for example at 809. 
104 Ibid., 808.  Equally destructive of solidarity is a dependence on what might be called future 
paths, in other words, risk.  In this scenario, those who find themselves in a low-risk category 
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nationality-dependence; it is quite possible that a distributive community could 
take this approach towards a national whom it judged to be irresponsible.  
Similarly, a migrant who had made responsible choices may well find favour.  
But the fact remains that an applicant like Mrs Martínez Sala105, a Spaniard who, 
after a chequered employment history in Germany, had subsequently lapsed 
into (potentially) long-term unemployment, may not endear themselves to a 
German distributive community looking to dispense child-raising allowances.106 
 
A community which takes an overly transactional view of benefits, and which is 
unduly concerned with the “link” between benefit and recipient, is more likely to 
employ responsibility arguments, in parallel with consideration arguments, to 
query a given recipient’s entitlement.  The thrust of the argument would be that 
the would-be recipient has not come to the bargain with clean hands, that is, that 
they have vitiated the bargain via their behaviour.  While a consideration 
argument questions whether there was ever any entitlement at all, then, a 
responsibility argument works on the basis that what entitlement there was has 
been lost. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
with regard to a certain matter may try to break with those whose equivalent risk is deemed to 
be higher. 
105 Referring to Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. 
106 A number of theorists, including Trappenberg, Elster and Gutmann, discuss the introduction 
of a responsibility element into the theory of complex equality: Margo Trappenburg, “In 
Defence of Pure Pluralism: Two Readings of Walzer’s Spheres of Justice” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, Vol 8, No 3, 2000, 343, 346 and 352; J Elster, “The Empirical Study of Justice” in D 
Miller and M Walzer (eds), Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 98; A Gutmann, 
“Justice across the Spheres” in ibid., 99 and 112 et seq.  As Gutmann points out, though, varying 
distributions in accordance with people’s voluntary behaviour itself leads to a certain degree of 
inequality/ discrimination: ibid., 114.  Walzer himself is not opposed to the taking into account 
of responsibility, although he says it should constitute part of the shared understanding of the 
good in question, rather than acting as a distributive criterion in its own right: M Walzer, 
“Response” in Miller and Walzer, op. cit., 294.  This seems to be the correct approach.  In the 
free movement of persons case of Tas-Hagen, for example, it would be up to the distributive 
community to decide whether “not having chosen to live abroad” formed part of its shared 
understanding of benefits for civilian war victims.  Did Mr and Mrs Tas-Hagen’s choice to move 
abroad indicate some kind of desertion of the national cause, or lapse of loyalty, such that, in 
making it, they had abandoned their entitlement to compensation for wartime (and immediate 
post-war) hardships?  Was the choice – the conscious act of two responsible adults – a severing 
of their connection to the Netherlands of such severity that it vitiated any earlier 
demonstrations of loyalty?  The distributees’ responsibility (or lack thereof) for the move should 
not be the determinative criterion for the granting of the benefit (as it in fact had been), but 
should feature in the debate as to its meaning.  In other words, was blamelessness for any move 
away from the Netherlands an essential part of how the community understood this particular 
benefit?  See Case C-192/05 K. Tas-Hagen and R. A. Tas v Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen- 
en Uitkeringsraad [2006] ECR I-10451. 
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Davies accuses the Court of Justice of endorsing the consideration-based 
approach in its equality case-law and of “misunderstanding of the nature of 
community”107.  The Court’s “misguided philosophy”108 underestimates man’s 
capacity for benevolence towards his fellows, even where it is without 
reciprocation, or at least where the reciprocation is unseen (or hard to see).  A 
rule (that old age pensioners may swim in the local pool at a reduced rate, for 
example) may form part of a complicated web of causes and effects, with one 
thing subsidizing another thing, so that the national may be at fourth or fifth 
remove from the benefit.  But if the Court of Justice, seeing no link, forces the 
local authority to open the benefit out “to all Europe”109, then the benefit will 
probably collapse under the weight of oversubscription, and be lost. 
 
The point is that when the national pays his tax, he does not see clearly the 
return; he does not see clearly what, if anything, is “in it” for him.  And yet he 
pays anyway.  Ferrera calls this ““a-symmetric” solidarity”110.  This more 
optimistic vision of solidarity has been summed up by Davies as follows: 
 
“We do not ask how much tax has been paid by their parents before 
allowing a child free education, or how much has been paid by a person 
needing healthcare or other services.  Indeed, it is a premise of solidarity 
that there will be discrepancies: that many individuals will receive much 
from the authorities to which they have not financially contributed, and 
others will contribute more than they receive.  This is justified by an 
underlying concept of membership, or perhaps of humanity, but it can 
also be imagined in terms of transactions that are more than material or 
financial; the primary payment of the community member is perhaps 
loyalty”.111 
 
It is suggested that distributive communities are just as likely to adopt this more 
positive interpretation of solidarity as they are the “meagre” one proffered by 
Somek.  The glass can also be viewed as half full.112  As Ferrera states, 
 
“the entry of foreign workers into national sharing spaces will imply new 
contributions and not only new outlays”.113 
                                                 
107 Davies, supra n 14, 48. 
108 Ibid.  The particular case which Davies is criticizing is Case C-388/01 Commission v Italy, supra 
n 15. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ferrera, supra n 84, 31. 
111 Davies, supra n 14, 48 (emphasis added). 
112 Banting and Kymlicka have shown empirically that multiculturalism does not threaten a 
country’s welfare state, and can even make it stronger: K Banting and W Kymlicka, 
“Multiculturalism and Welfare” Dissent (Fall 2003) 59, throughout but see in particular 65. 
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What White calls “collective… solidarity”114, and what others have dubbed the 
“Social Union”115, need not be a mere pipe-dream.  Already the necessary rights 
have been put in place, with an entire section dedicated to solidarity in the EU’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights116.  The existence of “pan-European solidarity 
publics”117 and a “pan-European solidarity space”118 is starting to move from the 
realm of the impossible to the realm of the possible, thanks to many decades of 
“solidarity-making”119 on the part of the EU and its Court.  Solidarity trans-
nationalization is an appealing prospect for many social groups who wish to 
strengthen cooperation in the field of social policy.  Businesses such as pension-
providing institutions also stand to benefit from the economies of scale which 
solidarity trans-nationalization would lead to.  Providing that these savings were 
passed on to the consumer, this benefit could in turn be enjoyed by millions of 
workers across Europe. 
 
5.5.3. Solidarity and complex equality 
 
Davies has written: 
 
“[M]embership is not monolithic, but in accordance with modern ideas 
about identity and belonging, a multi-level, layered thing.”120 
 
This is of course in keeping with a Walzerian world, where multiple 
understandings happily co-exist.  Dougan and Spaventa have declared: 
 
“[T]he concept of social solidarity is not a constant or given, but dynamic 
and up for renegotiation”121. 
 
Again this recalls Walzer’s world, where social meanings are continually shifting 
and where variations are “inevitatble”122. 
                                                                                                                                    
113 Ferrera, supra n 84, 34. 
114 White, supra n 101, 806. 
115 C Tomuschat, “Annotation Martínez Sala” (2000) CMLRev 449, 454. 
116 Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/1, Chapter IV. 
117 Ferrera, supra n 84, 32. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Davies, supra n 14, 54. 
121 M Dougan and E Spaventa, ““Wish You Weren’t Here…”.  New Models of Social Solidarity in 
the European Union” in E Spaventa and M Dougan (eds), Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2005) 216.  And even Somek, following Unger, has commented that solidarity 
is “highly context-sensitive”: Somek, supra n 39, 801. 
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It is submitted that solidarity is itself a Walzerian concept.  Different communities 
are like spheres, separate one from another, but with a high degree of 
connectedness as between the members of each.  However, the separation is 
not set in stone and the boundaries are in constant flux.  A fellow member of 
one’s sphere may have been a member of the neighbouring sphere yesterday, 
or he may even become a member of the neighbouring sphere tomorrow.  
Moreover, connectedness of migrant and State is not proven by a single 
“representative element”, for example, the Member State in which the “migrant” 
completed his or her full-time secondary education.  Such a stringent approach 
risks turning the element in question into a requisite entry-token which will in 
time become dominant, yielding access to a particular distribuend “to the 
exclusion of all other representative elements”.123  There may in fact be multiple 
ways in which such connectedness can be shown, as the Court seemed to 
accept, for example, in D’Hoop. 
 
It also implicitly accepted this fact in the recent case of Metock124, where the 
Court was considering (not for the first time) the distribution of the right of 
residence to third country national spouses of EU citizens.  It held that a 
condition of prior lawful residence in another Member State, imposed by Ireland 
on such spouses, was precluded by EU law.  As Costello has nicely put it, the 
Court “support[ed] a vision of residence rights in which origins and belonging in 
the EU are decoupled”125.  A distributee whose origin is a certain place can 
always assert, usually unchallenged, that they belong there, while a distributee 
whose origin is elsewhere has a much harder time making the same assertion.  
Origin, then, can be used tyrannically and, in situations where this is happening, 
the Court is right to begin to “decouple” it from belonging, thus allowing 
claimants in the future a much broader range of means by which to demonstrate 
that a certain place is, or should be, their home. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
122 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, supra n 26, 226. 
123 The quotation is from Case C-224/98 D’Hoop, supra n 93, at para. 39.  The word “migrant” is 
in inverted commas because, in the D’Hoop case itself, the party claiming the Belgian benefit 
was in fact Belgian herself. 
124 Case C-127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform [2008] ECR I-6241. 
125 C Costello, “Metock: Free Movement and “Normal Family Life” in the Union” [2009] CMLRev 
46: 587, 622.   
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As Ferrera puts it, possession of “national roots”126 can be employed by potential 
distributees as a “marker of insiderhood”127, and by the gatekeepers of the 
distributive sphere in question as a “filter for… rights”128; those with the marker 
come in, while those without the marker stay out.  But thanks to the Court, 
 
“social rights (and the corresponding obligations) have been decoupled 
from national citizenship within the EU […].  [Consequently,] the 
underlying and ultimate filtering function performed by national 
citizenship qua overall and solid container of rights and basic instrument 
of closure is no longer there.”129 
 
In Walzerian terms, nationality is slowly being stripped of its (potential) 





The tentative conclusion must be that the ECJ’s applying Walzerian complex 
equality to its case-law on nationality discrimination would be a positive 
development for EU law.  In some cases it would produce fairer and more logical 
results – Gilly, for example, or some of the cases arising from World War Two.  
However, even where the result would be the same as that arrived at under an 
Aristotelian regime, the reasoning is noticeably clearer; Walloon Waste and 
Angonese are two examples.  This Walzerian reasoning avoids the tortuous 
intellectual gymnastics to which the Court must sometimes resort at present; 
such gymnastics lead to awkward, opaque judgments, unintelligible to the 
average EU citizen, who then feels further alienated from the Union and its law.  
In the later case-law one can even detect a slight Walzerian dimension creeping 
into the Court’s thinking, which should be encouraged. 
 
One point that must be stressed, though, is the need to strengthen solidarity 
within the EU.  Solidarity goes hand in hand with complex equality, and indeed 
the two concepts are related, as mentioned in section 5.5.3.  A complex 
egalitarian approach to free movement cases shines a light on local meanings, 
                                                 
126 Ferrera, supra n 84, 16. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid., 22.  The Court is not alone in pushing for a redefinition of the concept of nationality.  
See, for example, R Rubio-Marín, Immigration as a Democratic Challenge (CUP, Cambridge 
2000) 245. 
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and the less solidaristic a community, the more likely it is that nationality, or 
some other place-specific criterion, will still play a part in how it understands 
certain goods.  Of course this still leaves the Court with the Override, and, 
exceptionally, the ECJ may be able to overrule the Member State if it is in the 
name of preserving co-existential equilibrium, as described later in the 
dissertation.130  However, it is submitted that the best way of ensuring that 
antiquated meanings do not poison distributive criteria is to work for change – 
reinterpretation – at the local level.  Burying one’s head in the sand of simple 
equality, on the other hand, is not a viable option. 
                                                 
130 See below section 9.5., entitled “Macro and micro: the equilibrium of co-existence”.  A 
further option is use of the alternative theory – “Mediated Complexity” – described in Chapter 
8, which transplants the role of ascertaining meanings from the community to the Bench itself. 
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6. Semi-suspect and non-suspect grounds 
 
6.1. Introduction and explanation of terminology  
 
The doctrine of suspect classifications is American in origin, although it now has 
a large following outside the US as well.  If a law or executive action makes or 
relies on a classification which has been recognized as “suspect”, then such law 
or action will be presumptively unconstitutional, will be subject to heightened or 
“strict” scrutiny on the part of the courts, and is liable, unless a non-
discriminatory objective can be shown, to be struck down.  While it is difficult to 
pinpoint the exact moment of its birth, the 1944 case of Korematsu v US1 would 
seem to provide the earliest full statement of the doctrine: 
 
“It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail 
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.  That is 
not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that 
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public 
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial 
antagonism never can.”2 
 
Over the next twenty or so years, the doctrine grew in popularity until it became 
the Supreme Court’s principle method for dealing with discrimination cases, 
particularly in such decisions as McLaughlin v Florida3 and Loving v Virginia4. 
 
The ECJ itself has never explicitly said that it is employing a theory of suspect 
classifications.  However, a number of Advocates General have made mention 
of the doctrine (for example, Poiares Maduro AG in Coleman5, and more 
                                                 
1 Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214 (1944) (reliance on racial classification acceptable in 
the context of war). 
2 Ibid., 216.  Although the concept of strict scrutiny (minus the concept of suspect classifications) 
can perhaps be traced back further.  
3 McLaughlin v Florida, 379 US 184 (1964) (reliance on racial classification invidious). 
4 Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) (reliance on racial classification invidious).  See JM Balkin, 
“Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A play in three acts” 26 Cardozo L Rev 2004-2005, 1689 for a much 
fuller account of the development of the doctrine.  Balkin moots that a foreshadowing of the 
doctrine can even be detected as far back as 1819: McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316.  However, 
his basic thesis is that the system of suspect classifications arose out of the New Deal (1933-36), 
which brought with it an increased involvement of the State in private citizens’ lives. 
5 Case C-303/06 S. Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-5603, at 5607 (Para. 7 of 
the Opinion). 
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recently in Arcelor6, and Mazák AG in Age Concern7).  Furthermore, a number of 
commentators on EU law have referenced the doctrine.  These include 
McCrudden, whose recent reanalysis of the principle of equality8, at least as far 
as concerns the first three of his four categories or approaches, has, in his own 
words, “echoes in the United States Fourteenth Amendment context”9.  Martin 
believes that the Court is already using a type of strictness model, but calls for it 
to be tightened up, with both the suspect grounds and the levels of strictness 
properly classified.10  Koen Lenaerts, an ECJ judge but writing academically, 
has linked the ECJ’s indirect discrimination jurisprudence to the “suspect 
classification” approach of the Supreme Court11.  Howard has also called for a 
version of the doctrine to be applied at the ECJ12. 
 
It is true that the objective justification stage of the Aristotelian test used by the 
ECJ to some extent mirrors the “strict scrutiny” technique pioneered in the US13, 
                                                 
6 Case C-127/07 Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others v Premier ministre, Ministre de 
l’Écologie et du Développement durable and Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de 
l'Industrie (ECJ 16 December 2008), at Para. 31 et seq of the Opinion.  Poiares Maduro avers 
here that the ECJ does use a suspect classification/ strict scrutiny approach, even if not in name. 
7 Case C-388/07 Incorporated Trustees of the National Council on Ageing (Age Concern England) 
v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (ECJ 5 March 2009), at Para. 
71 of the Opinion. 
8 To be found in C McCrudden, “Theorising European Equality Law” in C Costello and E Barry 
(eds), Equality in Diversity (Irish Centre for European Law, 2003) and also in C McCrudden, “The 
new concept of equality” (Paper prepared for the Academy of European Law conference, “Fight 
Against Discrimination: The Race and Framework Employment Directives” 2/6/03-3/6/03) 
<http://www.era.int/web/en/resources/5_2341_679_file_en.796.pdf> accessed 14 April 2009.  
See also supra, Chapter 2, n 2. 
9 C McCrudden and H Kountouros, “Human rights and European equality law” in Meenan (ed), 
Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 74. 
10 D Martin, Égalité et non-discrimination dans la jurisprudence communautaire: étude critique à 
la lumière d’une approche comparatiste (Bruylant, Brussels 2006), 587 et seq. 
11 K Lenaerts, “L’égalité de traitement en droit communautaire: un principe unique aux 
apparences multiples” [1991] CDE 3, 14. 
12 E Howard, “The case for a considered hierarchy of discrimination grounds in EU law” 13 MJ 4 
(2006), 445, 457-8 et seq.  It is interesting to note her view that, of the Article 19 grounds, only 
sex, race, religion and sexual orientation should be classified as suspect; disability and age 
would be non-suspect.  
13 Although, according to Costello and Davies, in the gender discrimination context, the ECJ’s 
scrutiny is strictest where employers’ practices are concerned, and is weaker in the case of 
domestic legislation, and weaker still in the case of Community legislation!  See C Costello and G 
Davies, “The case law of the Court of Justice in the field of sex equality since 2000” Common 
Market Law Review 2006, v. 43, n. 6, December, 1567, 1588.  That “employer made” 
employment policies are scrutinized in a stricter manner than Member States’ employment 
policies is confirmed by Schiek: D Schiek, “A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in 
EC Law?” European Law Journal, v. 8, n. 2, June, 290, 297.  Meanwhile, Hilson detects 
differences in the severity of the Court’s review of laws and practices in the free movement 
field.  He postulates, for example, that the ECJ employs stricter scrutiny in services cases than it 
does in establishment cases, and that the Court scrutinizes Member States’ laws on, say, 
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allowing a discriminator (in theory, anyway) less and less scope to justify 
themselves, the more questionable the ground upon which they rely.  This in 
turn should lead to a hierarchy of grounds (most strict to less strict, as it were), 
and some commentators believe they can see the formation of such a hierarchy 
in the ECJ’s case-law: Martin and Warnier both insist, for example, that 
nationality discrimination is scrutinized in a stricter manner than gender 
discrimination (in other words, those discriminating on gender grounds will have 
their justifications more readily accepted by the Court than those discriminating 
on nationality grounds).14   Others regard the Court’s case-law as too haphazard 
for a hierarchy of grounds to be properly discerned, certainly when compared 
with that of the US Supreme Court.  Iliopoulou makes the interesting point that 
altering the degree of strictness also alters the very definition of equality itself.15   
 
Nevertheless, the allusion to the doctrine of suspect classifications in the title of 
this chapter is not to be taken as a definitive assertion that the ECJ has been 
using this doctrine in its equality case-law up till now, or as a call for it to do so in 
the future.16  Rather it is used simply as a convenient way to distinguish the 
grounds so far considered – gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual 
orientation and, in the particular context of the EU, nationality – with others 
which the legislature has not seen fit to single out and which the Court has 
therefore not regarded as requiring particularly heightened review.  While the 
                                                                                                                                    
insurance “more leniently” than it scrutinizes laws on, say, tourism.  See C Hilson, 
“Discrimination in Community free movement law” 1999 ELRev 24(5), 445, 461.  
14 Martin, supra n 10, 590; N Warnier, “Les discriminations directes and indirectes dans la 
domaine de l’égalité homme-femme et de l’égalité nationaux-non-nationaux” Revue de droit 
international et de droit comparé 2006, v 84, 2e trimester, 225, throughout, but see, for 
example, 285. 
15 A Iliopoulou, “Le principe d’égalité et de non-discrimination” in J-B Auby and J Dutheil de La 
Rochère (eds), Droit administrative européen (Bruylant, Brussels 2007) 448. 
16 Although it would perhaps be a step in the right direction.  The doctrine of suspect 
classifications, via strict scrutiny, enables the Supreme Court to look behind the ostensible 
purpose of a law in order to tease out the real motive.  In Korematsu, for example, the use of a 
racial criterion in the law in question triggered the need for strict scrutiny, which meant that the 
Court had to ascertain whether the law (which forbade US citizens of Japanese ancestry from 
being present in certain locations) was indeed aimed at meeting a “pressing public necessity”, or 
whether it was merely an exercise in “racial antagonism” – see the quotation from the case set 
out in the text accompanying note 2 above.  A Walzerian approach too would involve looking 
behind the distribution of rights of entry to certain locations, in order to see whether race was 
or was not part of the shared social meanings of such rights.  Both methods, then, entail 
consideration of a much wider context than is contemplated by the Aristotelian test, which 
requires only a surface review of the two comparators, without need of further 
contextualization at all. 
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elderly, or the gay, or nationals residing in another Member State may have 
been 
 
“subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or 
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness”17 
 
that the legislature and Court see the need to bestow on them “extraordinary 
protection”18, persons and entities in “non-suspect” cases find themselves 
distinguished from other persons or entities on a ground which connotes neither 
historical subjection, nor political relegation.  In fact, the cursory scrutiny given to 
such distinctions by the American courts is based on the assumption that the 
distinction in question will turn out to be merely 
 
“the democratically fair outcome of struggles within the political  
process”19. 
 
As Poiares Maduro AG has put it,   
 
“[A]ll legislative activity entails choices and involves the redistribution of 
interests: in principle, although such choices and redistribution inevitably 
favour certain social and economic categories over others, they do not 
constitute discrimination and it is for the political process to discuss, 
define and determine the configuration of such redistribution.”20 
 
However, just because a distribution proceeds from a ground which is viewed as 
non-suspect, does not mean that it is automatically legitimate, or, in Walzerian 
terms, just; it may still entail a boundary breach, and be in violation of complex 
equality.  Nevertheless, this concept of non-discriminatory redistributions is 
important from a Walzerian perspective. 
 
The waters are muddied slightly by the fact that the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union does provide for a handful of other prohibitions on 
inequality, tailored to certain very specific situations or comparisons.  The most 
important are Article 40(2) TFEU (ex Article 34(2) EC), prohibiting discrimination 
between producers and between consumers in the context of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, and Article 106 TFEU (ex Article 86(1) EC), requiring equal 
                                                 
17 San Antonio School District v Rodríguez, 411 US 1 (1973) at page 28. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Balkin, supra n 4, 1715. 
20 Case C-127/07 Arcelor, supra n 6, at Para. 33 of the Opinion.  
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treatment as between public and private undertakings.21  Given, on the one 
hand, that the legislative draughtsperson saw fit to give these situations special 
mention, but, on the other hand, that the situations are very discreet and that the 
provisions concerned have to date generated relatively little case-law, it is 
proposed to refer to the grounds of comparison outlawed by these two Articles 
as “semi-suspect”.  They will be dealt with first. 
 
6.2. Semi-suspect grounds 
 
6.2.1. Article 40(2) TFEU: Producers and consumers 
 
Within the context of the Common Agricultural Policy, perhaps the most 
contentious issue is the quota system – an attempt to cap supply of the various 
products, in the hope that this will drag the price downwards.  This capping 
takes the form of an additional levy demanded, as a sanction, from all producers 
who have exceeded their quota (or “reference quantity”).  Reference quantities 
for each Member State are fixed annually by the EU; it is then up to the 
individual Member State to divide the reference quantity between all of the 
national producers. 
 
The quota system has generated case-law as long as it has existed.  It is 
proposed to look at two cases – an older one from 1988, and a more recent one 
from 2000 – before briefly considering the two so-called German Banana 
Cases22.  It is notable that the issues have hardly changed in twenty years. 
 
                                                 
21 Article 55 TFEU (ex Article 294 EC), which requires Member States to accord equal rights to all 
participants in the capital of companies or firms, is arguably just a rarification of the prohibition 
on nationality discrimination in Article 18 TFEU (ex Article 12 EC), and will not be dealt with 
separately here.  Other prohibitions on inequality, or requirements of equality, are to be found 
in secondary legislation, for example, the rule that all shareholders of a company “who are in 
the same position” must be treated equally, which is at Article 42 of Council Directive 77/91: 
Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, 
for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of 
companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of 
the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their 
capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent [1977] OJ L26/1. 
22 Case C-280/93 Federal Republic of Germany v Council of the European Union [1994] ECR I-
4973 – “German Banana Case (I)”; Case C-122/95 Federal Republic of Germany v Council of the 
European Union [1998] ECR I-973 – “German Banana Case (II)”. 
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In Erpelding23, a milk producer was granted an extra reference quantity by his 
Member State (Luxembourg), but brought an action because it had been 
calculated by reference to the period 1981-1983, instead of the period 1975-
1979 as he had requested.  He argued that his production had decreased 
between 1980 and 1983 due to an outbreak of mastitis, and again at the end of 
1983 due to Canadian flu; it had since risen again.  But a low reference quantity 
meant that he could produce less milk before incurring the additional levy, which 
meant lower profits.  Was he being treated unfairly by comparison with a 
producer who had done well between 1981 and 1983?   
 
Advocate General Darmon did not think so, and the Court agreed.  Darmon 
foresaw grave consequences if producers were accorded a wide choice of 
reference year: 
 
“[T]here is a risk that producers would choose a reference year which 
was not merely unrepresentative but which would ultimately reveal a truly 
remarkable yield.  Given the number of Community producers such a 
consequence could not be regarded as negligible.”24 
 
The Court held that this was an instance of comparable situations being treated 
in a different manner, but that it was objectively justified by, firstly, the need for 
legal certainty, and secondly, the need to preserve the effectiveness of the 
system.  Thus, there was no breach of Article 40(3) EC25. 
 
A complex egalitarian, on the other hand, almost certainly would have found a 
breach.  This case is in some ways a classic boundary breach: one producer 
having his success in, say, 1983 converted into success in the distribution of 
quotas, and one producer having his failure in 1983 converted into failure in the 
quota-distribution.  It was surely open to Mr Erpelding to argue that the fact of 
having done well (or badly) in 1983 was not germane to the sphere of quota-
distribution – it was a sphere unto itself – and those whose performance had 
been poor in 1983 should not have to wear this like a mill-stone round their 
necks, the failure iterated and reiterated in all subsequent spheres from then 
onwards.  On the other hand, perhaps success or failure in 1983 was the correct 
                                                 
23 Case 84/87 Marcel Erpelding v Secrétaire d'État à l'Agriculture et à la Viticulture [1988] ECR 
2647. 
24 Ibid., at 2662 (Para. 13 of the Opinion). 
25 This was the old, pre-Amsterdam numbering for Article 34(2) EC, which, since the coming into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, is now Article 40(2) TFEU.  
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distributive principle, as agreed by all concerned parties.  It would depend on 
what said parties understood to be the meaning of a quota.  Was it a prize, to be 
awarded for good work in the past?26  Or was it part of an effort to safeguard the 
entire milk-production industry by reducing surplus?  It is logical that a 
producer’s (future) limit should be in some way related to his (past) capacity.  
But why should a producer be forced to have his limit calculated on the basis of 
a reference year which was not a true reflection, for him, and for genuine 
reasons, of his past capacity?  It is at least arguable that Luxembourg’s 
mechanical use of the period 1981-1983 here27 was a boundary breach, and led 
to the artificial (and quite unnecessary) creation of a dominant.  Besides, subject 
to the decision of the distributive community, the correct fundamentum 
distributionis would seem to be propensity for good (or bad) performance in the 
future; past performance is only one element which indicates that.28 
 
In the 2000 case of Kjell Karlsson and others29, a number of Swedish milk 
producers were also unhappy with their individual reference quantities.  Towards 
the end of 1995, Sweden had decided to pass a law making a number of 
changes to the arrangements for the distribution of quotas obtaining up until 
then.  For this purpose, it divided the distributees into four categories: milk 
producers whose production had not increased between 1991 and 1993, milk 
producers whose production had increased, so-called “ecological” milk 
producers (that is, those producing organic milk), and new producers.  In relation 
to the members of the second category, that is, those who had increased their 
production, Sweden decided to increase their so-called “own-risk deduction”.  
                                                 
26 Contrast a case like Gascogne Limousin Viandes, where the issue was whether it was a breach 
of the principle of equal treatment for one Member State to receive an early marketing 
premium, while another did not.  Here, it is quite obvious that the premium rewards effort (in 
reducing the slaughter-weight of calves), so that it is just for a Member State which has put in 
the requisite effort to reap the requisite reward, and vice versa.  The breeding of the calves and 
the distribution of the premium are still two separate spheres, but for the King of the one to 
rule in the other is not a boundary breach – it is a legitimate crossing; the calves are part of the 
meaning of the premium.  (The Court was also of the view that there was no discrimination.)  
See Case C-56/99 Gascogne Limousin viandes SA v Office national interprofessionnel des viandes 
de l'élevage et de l'aviculture (Ofival) [2000] ECR I-3079. 
27 Although effectively dictated by the Community institutions.  Note also that the governing 
Regulation did provide for some situations where alternative reference years could be used, but 
that none of these availed Mr Erpelding: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1371/84 of 16 May 
1984 laying down detailed rules for the application of the additional levy referred to in Article 5c 
of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 [1984] OJ L132/11, Article 3. 
28 Erpelding also touches on the important topic of luck.  This aspect of the case will be 
discussed below, at section 6.4. 
29 Case C-292/97 Kjell Karlsson and Others [2000] ECR I-2737. 
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This meant, for example in the case of Mr Karlsson himself, that a reference 
quantity of roughly 48,500 kg was to be reduced by 55%, instead of the earlier 
25%.  A similar increase was imposed on members of the fourth category (new 
producers), whose quotas were to be reduced by 30% instead of 15%.  
Meanwhile, the new law made no change at all to the arrangements for 
producers whose production had stayed the same, and ecological producers 
even received benefits.  Mr Karlsson and two others brought an action, claiming 
that several aspects of the new law breached the principle of equality in Article 
34(2) EC (now Article 40(2) TFEU), in particular the differential treatment as 
between the second and fourth categories and the first and third categories, and 
the differential treatment as between the second category and the fourth 
category themselves.   
 
Advocate General Colomer found nothing wrong with Sweden’s law, and any 
inequalities that there were were objectively justified.  The Court seemed to be 
of exactly the same opinion. 
 
Applying Walzer’s theory to the case, it would be entirely up to the distributive 
community whether the handling of each type of producer was or was not 
consistent with the meaning of the milk quota system.  Was it just to grant new 
producers such small quotas, for example?  Perhaps this served the purpose of 
trying to disincentivize newcomers, and perhaps, in an industry with chronic 
over-production, that would be a distributive criterion which would be met with 
approval by the wider community.  It must be remembered that, under Walzer’s 
theory of membership, members of a sphere have the exclusive power to decide 
who can or cannot join them30.  Meanwhile, was it just to reward the ecological 
producers?  It seems fairly uncontroversial that those who make efforts towards 
the protection of the environment, for example, by cutting back on the use of 
pesticides, should be rewarded, but, again, it would be up to the distributive 
community.  Neither of these categories, though, seems to have received 
treatment out of keeping with the industry under discussion, as understood by 
those who participate in it. 
 
                                                 
30 “[W]e who are already members do the choosing, in accordance with our own understanding 
of what membership means in our community and of what sort of a community we want to 
have”: M Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, New 
York 1983) 32. 
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Turning to the producers whose production had remained unchanged over the 
period 1991-1993, this category raises the same question as that already 
discussed in Erpelding, namely whether past performance was or was not part 
of the meaning of a quota.  Of course the final decision would be the 
community’s, but certainly there is some scope for the finding of a boundary 
breach here.31  Furthermore, turning from those whose performance was merely 
steady to those who actually managed to bring about an increase in production, 
it is striking to note that good performance in Karlsson is actually penalized, in 
contrast to Erpelding, where past success was the (potentially dominant) pass-
key to a higher quota going forward.  As usual, it would be the wider 
community’s job to decide if it endorsed this distributive principle, which certainly 
seems unfair on the face of it.  Perhaps it could be explained away as a kind of 
sanction for contributing, as the community saw it, to the glut in milk, which put 
everyone at risk.  However, if Mr Karlsson had invested money in order to make 
improvements on his farm32, it is particularly cruel to hamper his recouping of it.  
Past success in this case, then, would appear to be acting as a negative 
dominant.33 
 
Staying on the topic of quotas, it is instructive to look at the two so-called 
German Banana Cases34.  The second of these provides a rare example of the 
situation where the Court saw a distinction which the complex egalitarian might 
not see, or at least might not regard as a breach.  The first case is the less 
interesting of the two, from the Walzerian viewpoint.  Here, tariff quotas were 
subdivided in favour of importers of Community or ACP bananas35.  This meant 
that importers of this type received a larger quota, and could then import a larger 
quantity of bananas without incurring a penalty.  Germany, which tended to 
                                                 
31 In theory, anyway.  Perhaps in practice, though, the members of this category would not feel 
particularly hard-done-by, as their position vis-à-vis the distribution had not altered; they might 
not therefore feel a great need to complain of inequality in the first place. 
32 The Advocate General implies that he had bought five new cows: Case C-292/97 Karlsson, 
supra n 29, at 2741 (Para. 12 of the Opinion). 
33 This case also touches on the issue of luck.  That aspect of the case has not been mentioned 
here, but will be discussed at section 6.4. below.  Analysis of another Article 40(2) case, Frico, 
will similarly be postponed until section 6.4: Joined cases 424/85 and 425/85 Coöperatieve 
Melkproducentenbedrijven Noord-Nederland BA ("Frico") and others v Voedselvoorzienings In- 
en Verkoopbureau [1987] ECR 2755. 
34 Case C-280/93 German Banana Case (I) and Case C-122/95 German Banana Case (II), supra n 
22. 
35 “ACP” is the shorthand name for the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries with which the 
EU has a special agreement.   
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import “third country” bananas36, and was then subject to a much harsher 
regime with much lower quotas, brought an action against the Council alleging a 
breach of the principle of equal treatment.  The Court rejected the complaint, 
saying that the differential treatment was part and parcel of market-integration 
(another example of inequality being used to justify itself). 
 
A complex egalitarian would of course invoke the Standard Contingent Reply; it 
is up to the members of the distributive community how they allot tariff quotas 
(and, indirectly, market share) amongst themselves.  If Germany is unhappy, it 
must simply await the next meeting of the forum to express its view and lobby 
for change.  Prima facie, though, it does not seem to be contrary to the meaning 
of a tariff quota system to exclude or at least impede countries which are outside 
the protected bloc.   
 
In the second case, certain additional banana-producing countries were 
accorded preferred-nation privileges and duty-free access to the Community37, 
but only if the importing operator customarily marketed Community and/or 
“traditional” ACP bananas.  If the operator had previously marketed third country 
or “non-traditional” ACP bananas, or if they had started marketing third country 
or “non-traditional” ACP bananas since 1992, then they had to purchase costly 
export and import certificates, and pay duty on the incoming fruit.  Again, 
Germany complained.  In a judgment which was noteworthy for the way in which 
the Court was prepared to intervene in matters that were technically external to 
the Union, the ECJ this time upheld Germany’s complaint; there had been no 
need to penalize the latter two categories of operator and to do so was therefore 
discrimination. 
 
Utilizing a Walzerian form of reference, there would appear to be a connection 
between an operator’s choice of exporter on the one hand, and the distribution 
of (the obligation to buy) export certificates on the other.  This would mean that 
there was no boundary breach here.  The disparate treatment as between the 
first category of operator and the second two categories of operator was merely 
a “small inequality”.  In other words, a complex egalitarian would probably reach 
the same decision as was reached in the first case.  If Germany was unhappy 
                                                 
36 I.e. bananas that were neither from other Community countries, nor from ACP countries. 
37 These new countries were to be known as the non-traditional ACP countries, to contrast them 
with the traditional ACP countries. 
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with the current arrangement, it could campaign for a new “shared meaning” of 
an export certificate at the next forum.  As things stood, however, the distributive 
criterion being used did not appear to be out of keeping with the meaning of the 
distribuend at hand, and thus did not violate complex equality. 
 
6.2.2. Article 106(1) TFEU: Public and private undertakings 
 
Given that the entire goal of Article 106(1) TFEU (ex Article 86(1) EC) is to 
prevent Member States from distorting competition by using their greater 
resources to outdo private undertakings – what might be called legislative 
boundary defence – the simple egalitarian will usually find himself on the same 
side as the complex egalitarian where this article is concerned.  A 
straightforward example would be Asociación Profesional de Empresas de 
Reparto38, where the Court held Spain to be in breach of Article 86(1) EC for 
having entrusted to the wholly State-owned post office (Correos) not only 
permissible “reserved” services, but also the non-reserved services, and without 
having issued a call for tenders.  A complex egalitarian too would find against 
Spain here; the distribution of the non-reserved services was quite obviously 
flawed in favour of the public undertaking, with all of its State resources and 
backing, thus leaving any rival private undertakings with no hope of acquiring 
this work, and, it would seem, not even the chance to express their interest.  
 
However, more interesting cases, where a Walzerian analysis might produce a 
contrary result, may still be found. 
 
In Assurances de Crédit39, two Belgian insurance companies found their return 
considerably reduced thanks to a new obligation, imposed by the Community via 
Council Directive, to set up an “equalization reserve” (apparently to safeguard 
their solvency).  In bringing an action, the applicants alleged a breach of the 
principle of equal treatment – insurance undertakings in the public sector were 
excluded from the scope of the Directive.  The Advocate General thought that 
this was a case of like (economic operators) being treated unlike, and, having 
                                                 
38 Case C-220/06 Asociación Profesional de Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de 
Correspondencia v Administración General del Estado [2007] ECR I-12175. 
39 Case C-63/89 Les Assurances du Crédit SA and Compagnie Belge d'Assurance Crédit SA v 
Council of the European Communities and Commission of the European Communities [1991] ECR 
I-1799. 
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rejected both of the proffered justifications, he found there to have been a 
breach of Article 86(1) EC (now Article 106(1) TFEU).  The Court, so far as can 
be made out, took the situation to be one of unlikes being treated unlike; public 
undertakings were in an “objectively different situation”40, and therefore there 
was no discrimination. 
 
On the face of things, the private undertakings’ private status does seem to be 
something of a negative dominant here, a badge of dishonour causing them to 
be encumbered with burdens not imposed on holders of other badges.  On the 
other hand, perhaps the obligation to set up the reserve has been justly 
distributed in this case.  Whether a company is public or private might be the 
correct fundamentum distributionis; it could be argued that public companies do 
not need to put up the extra security because State ownership is already a 
sound enough guarantee.41  As usual, the Standard Contingent Reply would 
come into play, as the verdict of the distributive community itself is awaited.  
However, it is at least conceivable that whether or not a company is State-
backed might be part of the meaning of an obligation to establish financial 
guarantees for the protection of the insured, and third parties.  A second 
argument proffered by the defendant institutions, meanwhile, namely that they 
could not include public insurance companies in the Directive because they are 
too diverse, would almost certainly not stand up to Walzerian scrutiny.  It is not 
at all clear how belonging to a category of companies wherein the members are 
homogeneous, or belonging to a category of companies wherein the members 
are heterogeneous, has anything to do with protecting the insured (and third 
parties) from loss of solvency on the part of their insurer. 
 
In Acoset42, the Sicilian Regional Province of Ragusa, its Conference of Mayors, 
and twelve municipal councils of South-East Sicily, established a body which 
was to be responsible for Regusa’s integrated water supply.  This body then 
selected, as its form of management, a “semi-private company with share capital 
which is predominantly publicly owned”43.  At this point, a competition was held 
to select the private participant for this company, which Acoset won fairly; it was 
                                                 
40 Ibid., para. 22. 
41 Plus, as is pointed out a number of times in the Opinion and in the Judgment, the setting up, 
by the State, of a reserve for State-owned companies might well violate the rules on State Aid. 
42 Case C-196/08 Acoset SpA v Conferenza Sindaci e Presidenza Prov. Reg. ATO Idrico Ragusa and 
Others (ECJ 15 October 2009). 
43 Ibid., para. 17. 
 185 
clear from the contract notice that many of the works relating to the exclusive 
management of the water service would be the direct responsibility of the 
winning private participant, without need of further tendering procedures.  
However, a dispute then arose as to whether this process was compatible with 
EC law, and a reference was made. 
 
The Court and the Advocate General were unanimous that the process had 
indeed been correct.  There was no need for two tendering procedures, one to 
select the private participant and another to award the service concession itself.  
Such a “double competitive tendering procedure”44 would be a disincentive for 
private entities to come forward in the first place.  Rather, 
 
“the selection of the concessionaire can be regarded as an indirect result 
of the selection of [the] participant […], so that a second competitive 
tendering procedure for the selection of the concessionaire is 
unnecessary.”45 
 
Seen through complex egalitarian eyes, this case provides a neat example of 
the importance of defining the sphere or spheres at issue.  Technically, there are 
two distributions at play here: the distribution of the chance to participate in the 
public-private partnership, and the distribution of the management of the water 
service.  The Court opted to kaleidoscope the two into one: the distribution of the 
chance to participate in a public-private company which would then manage the 
water service.  If this approach is followed, and all the inhabitants of the 
resultant single sphere acquiesce, then it would appear that Acoset’s fair 
winning of the “first” (and now only) tender would be just.  However, if the 
inhabitants insisted that the two distributions be kept apart, then two boundary 
breaches are immediately apparent.  Firstly, the “winner” in the first distributive 
sphere can smuggle this win into the second distributive sphere, in order to 
claim automatic victory there as well.  Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, 
the public sector would be able to muscle in on the management of the water 
service, since, whichever private entity won in the first sphere, its (the public 
sector’s) own participation in the project was guaranteed.  The public sector 
does not do everything better than the private sector, as a matter of course, and 
so it is not at all cut-and-dried that the new partnership would deliver a better 
water service than one of the other private entities, working alone. 
                                                 
44 Ibid., para. 58. 
45 Ibid., para. 60.  Assuming of course that the first competitive tendering procedure had been 
conducted in accordance with the principles of EC law.  
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6.3. Non-suspect grounds 
 
6.3.1. General introduction: Omega 
 
The non-suspect ground cases are the last stop in this case study.  Certain sub-
categories can be identified, and three of these, public procurement, human 
resources and competition law, will be considered below.  However, aside from 
these, the list of non-suspect grounds is non-exhaustive, and the number of 
cases is potentially infinite, encompassing every possible difference between all 
possible entities.  That said, even the most minute and seemingly trivial 
difference may make a large difference to an applicant, even the difference 
between solvency and bankruptcy.  As an illustration of this, it is proposed to 
start by looking at the Omega case where a company’s aeroplanes were 
discriminated against by the Council by reason of their low by-pass ratios.46 
 
In 1999, legislation was passed at Community level to address the problem of 
the noise pollution caused by commercial aeroplanes; aeroplanes the engines of 
which had a by-pass ratio of lower than three were to be prohibited.  The new 
law did not affect new planes, which were all built to the new specifications 
anyway.  However, Omega was now prevented from using a number of older 
planes which it had refitted with newly manufactured engines, producing a by-
pass ratio of 1.74.  The company brought an action against the authorities in its 
home Member State (the UK), in an attempt to have the legislation annulled.  
Before the European Court, on a reference from London, it insisted that the by-
pass ratio was not the only indicator of engine noise, and that its refitted planes 
were in fact slightly quieter than those with engines the by-pass ratio of which 
was three or more.  A first comparison, then, was between Omega’s re-engined 
aeroplanes, and those complying letter-for-letter with the new law.  If Omega 
objected to being treated differently from companies in compliance with the 
Regulation, it also objected to being treated the same as companies which had 
                                                 
46 Joined cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd (C-27/00) and Omega Air Ltd , Aero Engines 
Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority (C-122/00) [2002] ECR I-
2569. 
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merely refitted their aeroplanes with so-called “hush-kits” (a far inferior response 
to the problem, according to Omega); this, then, was the second comparison. 
 
However, neither the Advocate General nor the Court found there to have been 
a breach of the principle of non-discrimination.  Alber AG was of the opinion, in 
relation to the first comparison, that Omega and companies producing new, 
Regulation-compliant planes could not be regarded as alike, especially 
considering that the latter had to be able to rely on their legitimate expectations 
that the new regime would be adhered to; in this way, unlikes were being treated 
unlike.  The Court, meanwhile, preferred to see the situation as one of likes 
treated unlike, but with legitimate expectations acting as an objective justification 
for the unlike treatment.  With regard to the second comparison, the Advocate 
General seemed to be saying that, despite the fact that they were different, the 
two comparators were the same – likes had therefore been treated alike.  The 
Court reached the same conclusion.  It can be seen, once again, how 
Aristotelian analysis tends to produce inconsistent or nonsensical results. 
 
A Walzerian analysis, on the other hand, would be relatively straight-forward.  
What is being distributed is restrictions on the use of aeroplanes at European 
airports, “in the interests of protection against noise”47.  The companies 
producing all three types of plane – planes reengined with engines having a low 
by-pass ratio, planes refitted with hush-kits, and new planes the engines of 
which had a by-pass ratio exceeding three – are the distributees.  On the face of 
it, the distribution would seem to be flawed in favour of companies producing 
aeroplanes of the first two types.  Companies producing aeroplanes of the third 
type seem to be immune from restriction, as though their aeroplanes’ very 
newness was a dominant48.  However, it would as usual depend on the 
distributive community’s understanding of these anti-noise restrictions.  If 
newness formed part of the understanding then bringing newness into the 
distributive sphere would be a legitimate crossing, not a boundary breach.  Yet 
there seems to be no reason why those living near airports should not be 
allowed into the forum as recipients of, if not the main distribuend, then an 
important by-product: peace and quiet.  They might not care about the method 
                                                 
47 Ibid., at 2572 (Para. 1 of the Opinion). 
48 In this case, a negative dominant.  If the distribution were viewed the other way around, for 
example, if the distribuend was read as being “permission to fly”, then newness would be a 
positive dominant. 
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by which a reduction in noise was achieved.  Their distributive criterion might 
simply be: those with the noisiest engines should receive the most restrictions.  
Did the Council draw up its thresholds in consultation with them?  If they agreed, 
for example, that “on take-off there would be no perceivable difference”49, and 
judged that to be the decisive factor, then Omega’s planes should also have 
been exonerated and restrictions needed only be issued for planes refitted with 
hush-kits. 
 
The danger is that the “by-pass ratio of three” is simply a line in the sand, 
mechanically applied by the Council and converted (also in the Walzerian 
sense) into a legislative death sentence for a company like Omega.  One might 
hope that the ECJ judges, whose job it is to curb the excesses of the legislature, 
might take a fresh approach.  But the yes-no simplicity of the Aristotelian test 
enables them (or forces them, depending on their viewpoint) to merely rubber-
stamp the Council’s choice.  This represents a jackpot for a company producing 
new planes, as the Council qua distributor bestows it with dominance, and the 
Court, unwilling or unable to make its own de novo assessment, is little more 
than a messenger-boy. 
 
6.3.2. Public Procurement 
 
One context in which the principle of equal treatment is regularly invoked is that 
of public tendering procedures; an example has already been seen earlier with 
Acoset50.  In Acoset, however, one bidder was contesting the procedure itself, 
whereas more usually the issue is whether two bidders have had an equal 
chance.  In Evropaiki Dynamiki51, for example, the Commission launched a 
tendering procedure in early 2002 for the provision of support services in relation 
to CORDIS (an informatics tool for European research framework programmes); 
here services had been provided up until then by the existing contractor, 
Intrasoft International SA.  Evropaiki Dynamiki (“ED”) submitted a tender but 
ultimately failed, the contract instead going to a company called Trasys which 
had made clear from the outset its intention, if successful, to subcontract at least 
35% of the work to the existing contractor.  ED challenged this result on a 
                                                 
49 Joined cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 Omega, supra n 46, at 2590 (Para. 75 of the Opinion). 
50 See supra, text accompanying n 42. 
51 Case T-345/03 Evropaïki Dynamiki - Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai 
Tilematikis AE v Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR II-341. 
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number of grounds, of which the most important two were, firstly, that the 
running-in phase was to be unpaid (which put a burden on everyone except the 
existing contractor), and secondly, that the Commission had initially failed to 
give out certain technical information (so that the only party who had this 
information from the beginning was the existing contractor). 
   
The Court of First Instance rejected the first of these pleas; the fact that an 
unpaid running-in period disadvantaged all but the incumbent was not the 
Commission’s fault – it was merely, for the existing contractor, an “inherent de 
facto advantage”52.  Turning to the second plea, this was itself divided into two 
parts: the Commission’s alleged failure to inform the bidders that it had recently 
acquired the so-called “Autonomy Software”, and the Commission’s alleged 
failure to provide information regarding certain technical specifications and 
source codes for CORDIS.  With regard to the first of these, the Court thought 
that there had been a procedural defect, but that it could not have made any 
difference to the tendering procedure; in other words, knowledge of the 
acquisition of the Autonomy Software was irrelevant anyway.  With respect to 
the second, a similar result seemed to have been reached – that there had been 
a defect but that ED failed on causation – except for the argument that, had it 
had the pertinent source codes and so on, ED’s actual bid would have been 
lower.  The Court accepted this argument; in its opinion, if it had had the source 
code information on time, ED would have tendered a lower price and thus would 
have fared much better in the competition.  The Commission’s decision was 
therefore annulled. 
 
An illegitimate boundary crossing would most probably be the verdict of a 
complex egalitarian reading this case.  In fact, it is a classic boundary breach for 
Intrasoft/ Trasys to bring “inside” knowledge, gained in a different sphere, into 
the distributive sphere at issue (the tendering procedure) and thereby swing the 
distribution in their favour.  Only if all candidates had been given the 
information53 would it lose its status as a monopolizable dominant and become 
simply part of the shared understanding of the procedure; in other words, only 
                                                 
52 Ibid., para. 70.  Note how the CFI entertains here the Walzerian idea of the small inequality. 
53 Or, more properly, “had been given an equal chance to learn the information”.  Those who 
ignored it, or misunderstood it, or applied it wrongly, would not be treated unjustly if not 
selected.  
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then would the crossing be legitimate.  The outcome for the complex egalitarian 
would thus have been the same as that arrived at by the Court. 
 
However, on occasion, a different result may be reached.  In Centro Studi54, the 
Council issued a tendering procedure for the full management of a crèche.  
Centro Studi Antonio Manieri Srl (“Centro Studi”), an Italian company, was 
accepted as a candidate for the procedure, and submitted its tender at the 
beginning of 2005.  However, on 16 January 2006 the General Secretary 
notified Centro Studi by letter that he was abandoning the tendering procedure, 
and announced his decision to accept the proposal of the so-called Office for 
Infrastructure and Logistics (OIB), which formed part of the General Secretariat.  
Centro Studi brought an action consisting of several pleas, one of which was 
that the Council had breached the principle of equal treatment by evaluating the 
OIB’s proposal independently of the tendering procedure.  In its judgment, the 
Court of First Instance reiterated that tendering procedures were only obligatory 
where a contracting authority was intending to hire a supplier of assets or 
provider of services from outside of its own organization, not where the would-be 
contractor was one of its own departments.  In the CFI’s view, because the OIB 
was a department of one of the Community institutions, it could not be compared 
to participants in a tendering procedure.  Therefore, the Council’s separate 
evaluating of its proposal was not an infringement of the principle of equal 
treatment.  The action was dismissed.55 
 
A supporter of complex equality would ask what the shared social meaning or 
understanding of the distribuend was.  The work on offer, namely managing the 
Council’s crèche, was surely above all else about the looking after of children.56  
From this meaning, the fundamentum distributionis would appear to be the 
ability to look after children, that is, whoever could best look after children should 
receive the contract.  The automatic allocation of the work to the OIB, then, 
whether or not a department of an institution, would now seem to be flawed.  
The OIB had been allowed to use its connection to the Council as a “master 
good”, which it could exploit to tyrannize neighbouring distributive spheres, in 
                                                 
54 Case T-125/06 Centro Studi Antonio Manieri Srl v Council of the European Union (CFI 28 
January 2009). 
55 Note that a plea made by Centro Studi on the basis of Article 106 TFEU (ex Article 86 EC) was 
also rejected because, while Centro Studi was a private undertaking, the OIB was not a public 
undertaking. 
56 Taking the Standard Contingent Reply as read. 
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violation of complex equality.  Thus a supporter of the theory would reach the 
opposite result to the one reached by the Court. 
 
6.3.3. Human Resources 
 
Another area in which it is commonplace to find allegations of unequal treatment 
is that of human resources, including the so-called “staff cases”.  However, in 
addition to the individual staff-members of the European institutions bringing 
actions against their employers, action is sometimes taken on an even larger 
scale, for example, when Italy sued the Commission for having decided to 
advertise vacancies in English, French and German only57.  The Court of First 
Instance held that, in a given competition, persons holding two of the excluded 
languages (knowledge of at least two languages being the minimum 
requirement for work at one of the European institutions), but who were 
nevertheless eligible for the post, would have no way to acquaint themselves 
with the vacancy notice, and would then be in a “less advantageous position”58 in 
relation to other candidates.  This was discrimination on grounds of language.  
The Commission’s decision was annulled. 
 
A Walzerian student of this case would almost definitely agree with the Court, 
concluding that a candidate’s choice to have learnt English, French or German, 
or characteristic of knowing English, French or German59, was exploitable here 
as a means of gaining privileged access to a separate sphere, where mastery of 
those three languages was not part of the meaning of (the possibility of) the post 
in question.60  Such spherical imperialism would represent a breach of complex 
equality. 
 
                                                 
57 Case T-185/05 Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities (CFI 20 November 
2008). 
58 Ibid., para. 136. 
59 The analysis works in either event.  See supra section 3.3. 
60 Taking the Standard Contingent Reply as read.  Of course, the situation would be different 
where the post itself was reserved for those knowing two or all of the three languages 
mentioned.  Then mastery of the languages would be part of the meaning of the distribuend, 
thus legitimizing the boundary crossing. 
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In many cases, officials of the European institutions complain of a perceived 
unfairness with regard to their pay, or other benefits.  In Beltrante v Council61, for 
example, the parents of various adult children, who for whatever reason were to 
be “treated as if they were dependent children”, complained when travel 
expenses in respect of such children were scrapped, unless the child lived in the 
same city as the official.  This created an inconsistency with the parents of 
dependent children strictu sensu, who could receive travel expenses for their 
children even where the child did not live in the same city as the official. 
 
In its judgment, the Court of First Instance demonstrated once again the illogical 
nature of the Aristotelian equality test.  First, it seemed to hold that the two 
categories of parent were alike, but that their unlike treatment was objectively 
justified62.  However, in the next paragraph, it states clearly that the situation is 
one of unlikes treated unlike.63  In either case, the objective justification (version 
one) or differing circumstances (version two) come to the same thing – the Court 
is of the belief that dependent children strictu sensu are “part of the family unit”64 
and give rise to a presumption of cohabitation, while children “treated as if they 
were dependent children” are “members of the family only in the broad sense”65.  
This presumably means that a parent of the former type of child needs to be 
recompensed, if the child lives in a different place, for the rupture to the family 
circle caused by his or her work; but for the job, they would have enjoyed a 
greater amount of familial warmth because all members of the family would have 
been in the same place.  The parent of the quasi-dependent child, apparently, is 
not expected to miss their absent offspring. 
 
Again, the test is seen to be too black-and-white.  It is true that in some 
circumstances the parents of children “treated as if they were dependent 
children” – adult children without gainful employment, for instance – might not 
feel any especial need to have said children come and visit.  But in other 
circumstances – where the adult child is disabled, say – the Court’s ruling 
seems unduly harsh and uncaring.  A further criticism would be that, from the 
linguistic point-of-view, it seems particularly absurd to define a certain type of 
                                                 
61 Case T-48/89 Fernando Beltrante and others v Council of the European Communities [1990] 
ECR II-493. 
62 Ibid., para. 33. 




children, in the Staff Regulations themselves, as “treated as dependent 
children”, and then, when asked, to declare that these same children, defined 
thus, are not to be treated as dependent children.   
 
A Walzerian dissection of the case avoids all of these pitfalls.  There is a single, 
autonomous distributive sphere.  Travel expenses are being distributed, by the 
Council, to various types of official.  Prima facie, whether an official’s children 
are dependent strictu sensu or “treated as if dependent” is not part of the 
meaning of travel expenses, and for the Council to use one or other of these 
attributes as a (positive or negative) dominant would appear to be a boundary 
breach.  On the other hand, it would be open to the distributive community to 
legitimate such a border-crossing by incorporating one or both of the attributes 
into its shared meaning of the benefit in question. 
 
6.3.4. Competition Law 
 
Another field in which equality pleas are popular is that of competition law, 
where, after a number of undertakings have been found guilty of a competition 
offence, there are sometimes allegations that differing levels of liability amongst 
the culprits have not been adequately reflected, by the Commission, in its 
imposition of sanctions. 
 
In the ECJ case of Weig v Commission66, for example, the applicant company 
was one of nineteen producers of cartonboard in the Community to be fined by 
the Commission for infringement of Article 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU), in 
other words, for participation in a cartel.  Having obtained only a slight reduction 
in its fine from the Court of First Instance, Weig proceeded to the ECJ, where it 
claimed unequal treatment as between it and three other cartel-members.  
These three undertakings, along with Weig, had been recognized as having 
taken a lesser role in the infringement.  However, while the other three had been 
so recognized earlier, and therefore had received a lower fine in accordance 
with the Commission’s formula, Weig was not so recognized until its appearance 
before the CFI, meaning that it had received a lower fine in accordance with the 
                                                 
66 Case T-317/94 Moritz J. Weig GmbH & Co. KG v Commission of the European Communities 
[1998] ECR II-1235; on appeal Case C-280/98 P Moritz J. Weig GmbH & Co. KG v Commission of 
the European Communities [2000] ECR I-9757. 
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CFI’s own method of calculation.  The ECJ upheld this argument – Weig had 
been treated in an unlike fashion. 
 
However, viewed through a Walzerian lens, the case in some ways resembles 
the second German banana case, discussed above67.  All four undertakings are 
legitimately within what might be called the “punishment sphere”.  They all bring 
their earlier behaviour or, more importantly, responsibility, with them, but that is 
not (on this occasion, anyway) a boundary breach; the two spheres are 
intimately related, the second designed to follow the first, with the result that any 
crossing from the one to the other is perfectly legitimate.  It is part of the shared 
meaning of a fine68 that it is allotted – indeed, only allotted – to those who have, 
in the past, behaved in a certain way.  But surely Weig is entitled to complain 
that, for the same offence, the distribution of punishments should also be the 
same?  Indeed it is, but such discussion is for the forum; it is up to the members 
of the distributive community as a whole to decide, amongst themselves, what 
the shared meaning of this particular sanction is, and therefore how it should be 
distributed.  The inequality being argued over is, at worst, a small inequality; no 
actual boundary has been breached.69 
 
6.4. Luck: Boundary breach or small inequality? 
 
There is a certain type of equality case wherein it is difficult (for the complex 
egalitarian) to tell if a boundary has been crossed.  Or put another way, there is 
a certain type of inequality which it is hard to categorize as either a small 
inequality or the result of a boundary breach.  This is inequality caused by luck.  
Luck is not often seen in the suspect grounds, where, usually, a great deal of 
deliberation has gone into the production of the inequality.  However, it appears 
quite regularly in the semi-suspect and non-suspect cases.  Just for the sake of 
                                                 
67 See supra, text accompanying n 34. 
68 Taking the Standard Contingent Reply as read. 
69 Space prohibits further examples, but other competition cases where equality was at issue 
include: Case T-21/99 Dansk Rørindustri A/S v Commission of the European Communities [2002] 
ECR II-1681; Case T-354/94 Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB v Commission of the European 
Communities [2002] ECR II-843; Case C-291/98 P Sarrió SA v Commission of the European 
Communities [2000] ECR I-9991; Case T-308/94 Cascades SA v Commission of the European 
Communities [2002] ECR II-813; Case T-86/95 Compagnie générale maritime and Others v 
Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR II-1011. 
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completeness, then, it is proposed to consider briefly the concept of luck as it 
applies or might apply to cases coming before the ECJ. 
 
In Frico70, an agricultural case under Article 40(3) EC71, butter-manufacturers 
from different Member States found themselves in different situations as a result 
of varying interest rates.  Specifically, the national intervention agencies afforded 
their domestic butter-manufacturers financing to enable them to store surplus 
butter, or at least to recoup the costs of past storage.  In the UK, payments were 
made with a 9.5% interest rate, while in Germany and the Netherlands, 
payments were made with a 7% interest rate.  Frico, a Dutch butter-
manufacturer, was concerned that rivals in a high-interest Member State might 
obtain loans in a low-interest Member State, so that when they were reimbursed 
they would actually make a profit; it therefore called for a uniform reimbursement 
rate of 7%.  The Court was unsympathetic, holding that any such move by rivals 
was “offset by the risk, to which that practice exposes them, that the exchange 
rates of those currencies might change to their detriment”72, and that the 
purpose of the scheme was to provide compensation for storage costs, not to 
improve competitiveness.   
 
From the point of view of complex equality, the arrangements with regard to the 
interest rate or rates used in the calculation of the repayments would certainly 
seem to be a matter for the distributive community.  All of the national 
intervention agencies, the Commission (which issued the pertinent regulation), 
and the butter-manufacturers, would have to decide between them how they 
wished the reimbursement payments to be worked out.  However, assuming that 
something like the extant arrangement was arrived at, it is still a matter of luck 
for Frico if the interest rate in its (low-interest) Member State falls to a point 
where it would become profitable (taking into account bank charges and so on) 
for a rival in a high-interest Member State to cross the border to obtain its 
financing.  The rate is set in a different sphere by the national bank of the 
Netherlands73.  But then the same could be said, mutatis mutandis, for the rival.  
A UK company, for example, would be dependent for its rate on the Bank of 
                                                 
70 Joined cases 424/85 and 425/85 Frico, supra n 33. 
71 This was the old numbering for Article 34(2) EC, which, since the coming into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, is now Article 40(2) TFEU. 
72 Ibid., para. 14. 
73 Obviously the case, referred to the Court in 1985, predates the introduction of the euro, 
although if the rival is in the UK, inter-currency speculation would still be possible today. 
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England.  The “national rate” cannot be a monopolizable dominant if everyone 
has one! 
 
The solution arrived at, for the purposes of this dissertation at least, is to 
distinguish between the luck occurring at the moment of distribution (which will 
be referred to, simply for linguistic ease, as “today’s luck”), and luck occurring in 
the past (“historical luck”); this seems the best resolution to the problem, and the 
most in keeping with Walzer’s theory in general.  The coin-toss at the beginning 
of the first football match of the season will determine which team plays in which 
direction, in the first and second halves, that day.  Noone would seriously 
suggest that it was unjust.  And so, technically, the same, perfectly fair coin-toss 
could be used to determine the same matter for every game of the season; why 
bother with another at the beginning of the subsequent games?  Fortuna has 
spoken, and that should be that.  However, the more time passes, the more the 
team that first plays, say, left to right, can come to rely on this as an entrenched 
right.  On a day when the sun would be shining particularly harshly on the team 
first playing right to left, the latter team may decide simply to default, without 
playing at all.  The other team has now brought the result of the original coin-
toss with it into the changing rooms, and used it to claim instant victory.  In other 
words, over time, it has become a dominant.  Clearly a coin-toss at the 
beginning of every game is fairer.  It is still only luck which decides, but 
something about today’s luck is special.  It is a new day and a new match; a new 
appeal to Fortuna is called for.  In Walzerian terms, the new day is like a new 
sphere. 
 
The meaning of this for those attempting to use the theory in practice is 
reasonably straight-forward.  In no situation, and therefore in no distribution, can 
every eventuality be planned for and regulated.  Something is always “left to 
chance”.  Everyone is equally affected by that “chance”, whether it manifests 
itself on that particular day positively or negatively, or differently for different 
people.  Everyone accepts it as an unavoidable risk inherent in human life.74  
                                                 
74 Although there are of course some philosophers, such as Dworkin, who do wish, if not to 
avoid luck altogether (of the type that he calls brute luck), then at least to mitigate its effects via 
compensation for the unlucky.  Rakowski has developed an entire theory of equality of fortune: 
“[O]nly by eliminating unsolicited good and bad fortune from the forces shaping people’s 
holdings can true equality of station be attained, and the distribution of resources be made 
acceptable to a community of persons who regard one another as moral equals.  […]  
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Therefore, for a given distribution, the “good” or “bad” luck75 (if it can even be 
characterized as such, a priori) brought into the distributive sphere by the 
various distributees, can in no way be regarded as a (positively or negatively) 
dominant good.  Whatever result it produces, as in Frico, is at most a small 
inequality, impliedly part of the distributive principle, and intrinsic to that 
distribution, that day, in that sphere. 
 
However, as soon as it has manifested itself, it becomes vulnerable to being 
converted, or to converting itself, into a dominant, and over a longer period of 
time the specific piece of luck (being born to wealthy parents, for example) can 
most definitely be used tyrannically.  Unless it is explicitly part of the shared 
meaning of a good, its presence in the sphere in which that good is being 
distributed would then represent a boundary breach.76 
 
Returning to the case of Erpelding77, the outbreaks of mastitis and Canadian flu 
which caused Mr Erpelding’s farm to do badly between 1981 and 1983, were 
matters of sheer luck; indeed, one of his arguments before the Court was force 
majeure.  He has a good point here, even though the Advocate General 
accused him of trying to rely on “an “invented” provision”78.  Could he not say to 
the Luxembourg authorities that their perfunctory use of the period 1981-1983, 
when distributing quotas, was unjust, as it forced him to bring into the distributive 
sphere a piece of historical bad luck, belonging to a separate time and a 
separate sphere?  This piece of historical bad luck, he could continue, was 
unrelated to, and not part of the meaning of, a quota79; its presence in the 
sphere governing the distribution of quotas was tyrannical.  Alternatively, he 
could separate the historical bad luck from the history itself, and claim that, 
whilst farmers’ performances between 1981 and 1983 were part of the shared 
meaning, any luck elements were not.  This would be the equivalent of having a 
defence of force majeure.  The final outcome cannot be known until the 
                                                                                                                                    
Undeserved, unwagered, unchosen inequalities warrant redress.”  Quotation from Eric 
Rakowski, Equal Justice (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991) 75-76. 
75 As in luckiness generally, not a specific piece of luck. 
76 Already in this dissertation it has been seen how a person’s attributes, which are another 
piece of historical luck, are to be regarded as having been separately distributed, in a separate 
sphere.  The bringing of them into a second sphere represents a border-crossing, legitimate or 
illegitimate, depending on the shared meaning of the good being distributed.  See supra section 
3.3. 
77 Case 84/87 Erpelding, supra n 23, and accompanying text. 
78 Ibid., at 2661 (Para. 5 of the Opinion). 
79 As explained above, that would be a matter for the entire community. 
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distributive community has spoken, but it can at least be seen here how 
historical bad luck inhabits its own sphere, and that its importation into a second 
sphere is not automatically just, but is contingent on the say-so of the 
community.80 
                                                 
80 The same analysis would apply to the milk producers whose production had not increased 







In order to reach a conclusion as to whether Michael Walzer’s theory of complex 
equality can be used by the European Court of Justice in its equality case-law as 
a complement to the Aristotelian test, it is necessary to look first at three 
counter-arguments, which arise from the case-study but which are not specific to 
any one type of ground.  These are the need for judicial interventionism, the 
possible need for expert evidence, or even specialized courts, and the need to 
rewrite legislation.  They will be dealt with in turn. 
 
7.2. Three counter-arguments 
 
7.2.1. The need for judicial interventionism  
  
The ECJ judge, at least when making a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 
TFEU (ex Article 234 EC), is conventionally required to pronounce upon the 
relevant law only and to distance himself or herself1 from the actual facts of the 
case.  They are a matter for the referring judge, that is, the judge in the national 
court which made the reference.  In the point comes up, the Court usually says 
something neutral, like: 
 
“It is established case-law that, in the procedure laid down by Article 177 
of the Treaty providing for cooperation between national courts and the 
Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an 
answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case 
before it.”2 
 
However, sometimes it hints that the boundary between law (ECJ) and fact 
(national court) may not be so clear-cut: 
                                                 
1 Henceforth the masculine only will be used, gender-neutrally. 




“It follows that in such a case it is for the national court, and if necessary, 
the Court of Justice to appraise the application of those provisions 
having regard to all the rules of Community law, including freedom of 
expression […] as a general principle of law the observance of which is 
ensured by the Court.”3 
 
For the Court, it is a “porous” boundary, as Davies has noted4.  Meanwhile, the 
legislative draughtsperson is more decisive, for example:  
 
“The appreciation of the facts from which it may be inferred that there 
has been direct or indirect discrimination is a matter for national judicial 
or other competent bodies, in accordance with rules or national law or 
practice.”5 
 
Under the Aristotelian regime, which, as has been seen many times, requires 
only a superficial analysis of the circumstances of the case, the allocation of 
competence as between the national and European courts has not usually been 
a problem, although the ECJ judge has from time to time strayed into the 
supposedly forbidden territory, often during the objective justification stage in a 
case of indirect discrimination.  Such straying is a form of judicial activism – a 
judge venturing into areas beyond his remit6.  Perhaps this particular form is 
better described as judicial “interventionism”7.  Under complex equality, 
meanwhile, the circumstances are all.  What is being distributed, and by and to 
whom?  What is the shared meaning of the distribuend to the distributive 
community?  What distributive principle is being used and is it in keeping with 
the meaning ascertained in the previous question?  All these matters need 
resolving, and they are unlikely to be resolved without a thorough airing of the 
facts of the dispute.  To take a concrete example, in the case of Gillard, which 
                                                 
3 Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon 
Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and 
others [1991] ECJ I-2925, para. 44 (emphasis added). 
4 G Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (Kluwer, The Hague 2003) 
36. 
5 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16 (“Directive 2000/78” or the 
“Framework Employment Directive”), recital 15.  The question of which court is competent to 
assess the facts is further discussed in A Arnull, “Annotation Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew 
Reed” (2003) CMLRev 753, and G Davies, “The Division of Powers between the European Court 
of Justice and the National Courts” 2004 conWEB – webpapers on Constitutionalism and 
Governance beyond the State No 3.  Both of these contain further interesting references. 
6 Although it is not the most notorious form, which of course is where the judge tries to usurp 
the role of the legislator. 
7 Davies, supra n 5, 28. 
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was briefly examined in Chapter 58, and where the good at issue was a special 
old age pension, Mayras AG put the matter very clearly: 
 
“Naturally it is not the Court’s function to classify the French provision in 
question with regard to Community law or indeed to inquire whether the 
law in question is intended to confer benefits strictly in the nature of 
compensation or whether it also has the objective of compensating ex-
servicemen and prisoners of war “for the hardships undergone by them 
and the services rendered by them to the country.””9 
 
It was not for the ECJ, according to the Advocate General, to ask what the good 
was for, in other words, to enquire as to its meaning.  But such an enquiry would 
be the first port of call for a Walzerian analysis.  There is no doubt that a 
Walzerian disposal of this case would look quite different from an Aristotelian 
one. 
 
However, to take a more complex example, in Dirk Rüffert v Land 
Niedersachsen10 (a kind of sequel to the Viking and Laval cases11), the “good” 
was a German obligation to pay posted workers in Germany the same wages as 
local workers12.  Even for a Court utilizing an Aristotelian approach, the meaning 
of the good here was absolutely vital.  Was it to protect the posted workers, to 
give them genuine additional help by ensuring that they received a wage that 
was significantly higher than their “home” wage?13  Such beneficence on the 
part of the German authorities might well qualify as an objective justification (for 
breaching the incoming company’s free movement rights)14, allowing Land 
Niedersachsen to win the case.  Or was it to protect German building 
undertakings from competition, by discouraging foreign undertakings from 
moving in the first place?  Such a goal could never qualify as an objective 
justification (measures restricting free movement cannot be justified by 
economic aims), and for the Court to take this line would spell defeat for Land 
                                                 
8 Case 9/78 Directeur régional de la Sécurité sociale de Nancy v Paulin Gillard and Caisse 
régionale d'assurance maladie du Nord-Est, Nancy [1978] ECR 1661.  See supra section 5.4.2. 
9 Ibid., at 1671 (Mayras’ emphasis). 
10 Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989. 
11 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri 
Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, 
Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
12 The distribuend could also be the equal wage itself. 
13 Once again, see how it is at the objective justification stage of a case that temptation to 
consider the facts is strongest.  
14 The Advocate General (Bot AG) thought it was. 
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Niedersachsen.  Thus the entire outcome of the case turned on the meaning of 
the good to the distributor and to the potential distributees – a factual issue.  In 
the course of his opinion, the Advocate General (Bot AG) often declared that this 
was a task for the domestic judge: 
 
“It is for the national court, which enquires as to the true objective  
pursued by the legislature, to determine whether, viewed objectively, the 
rules in question ensure the protection of posted workers or, more 
generally, the prevention of social dumping.”15 
 
But he went on to offer his own painstaking analysis of the meaning, anyway.  In 
its judgment, the ECJ did not even waste time with a bogus ascription of roles, 
but went through and pronounced upon all of the proposed justifications itself, 
ending with a proclamation (that the German measure was contrary to 
Community law) which would of course be binding on the referring court, leaving 
it with no say in the facts at all.16  The point is that judicial activism of this sort is 
already so prevalent17, that it is sometimes hard to see how a switch to a 
Walzerian equality-model would actually make anything worse.  Certainly, use of 
Aristotelian reasoning did not prevent judicial interventionism in equality cases 
like Walloon Waste18, or Kuratorium (where the Court indulged in a large amount 
of arguably inappropriate fact-finding)19, or Bickel and Franz20.  However, it 
cannot be argued that, by using complex equality, the ECJ would have to upset 
the jurisdictional balance as between it and the national court, any more than it 
is already upset. 
 
On the plus side, the issue is only relevant to the preliminary reference system.  
In challenges to Community legislation under Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230 
EC), for example, the ECJ itself would be the fact-finding tribunal, and it could 
                                                 
15 Case C-346/06 Rüffert, supra n 10, at 2018 (Para. 115 of the Opinion) – footnote omitted.  Bot 
AG even puts this allocation of duties into his final conclusion, at 2023 (Para. 136 of the 
Opinion). 
16 The Court several times refers to the “case-file submitted to the Court” (for example, at paras. 
40 and 42), as though to underline that it has looked at everything before drawing its 
conclusions.  But were all of the factual data sent to Luxembourg in the first place?  They were 
not in the Arsenal case, discussed by Arnull, supra n 5.  Under a Walzerian regime they would 
be, as it would be clearly understood that they were required. 
17 For another example, see Arnull’s commentary on the Arsenal case: Arnull, supra n 5. 
18 Case C-2/90 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium [1992] ECR I-
4431. 
19 Case C-457/93 Kuratorium für Dialyse und Nierentransplantation e.V. v Johanna Lewark 
[1996] ECR I-243. 
20 Case C-274/96 Criminal proceedings against Horst Otto Bickel and Ulrich Franz [1998] ECR I-
7637.  See discussion of this case at supra, section 5.4.3. 
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then investigate the facts of the case as thoroughly as it wanted without 
censure.  Furthermore, Rasmussen has pointed out that forays by the ECJ into 
factual matters can have beneficial consequences: 
 
“[Y]et another means of controlling the overall acceptability of judicial 
outcome might be the taking of steps, judicial or otherwise, aiming at 
enhancing the Court’s access to socio-economic fact.  […] [T]he absence 
of such fact[s] occasionally entails catastrophic consequences, and […] 
the usage of socio-economic fact in recent case law ha[s] triggered 
important salutory effects.  […] [O]nly by generalizing the availability of 
such fact might the Court, as a rule, make safe choices between various 
decisional alternatives because it will have been enabled to access fully 
the implications and ramifications of all of them.”21 
 
Thus, the Court’s using fact can have positive effects; in some cases, it could 
even be argued that, without access to fact, the Court’s contribution is 
deracinated and effectively worthless.22 
 
But, if still thought necessary, solutions to the problem of judicial interventionism 
are available.  A first possible solution can be extrapolated from Walzer’s 
general preference for particularism (not to mention the doctrine of subsidiarity).  
As it is the local community whose shared meaning is at issue (usually) in an 
Article 267 TFEU23 reference, it is the national court which is best placed to host 
the final adjudication, if such an adjudication is needed.24  However, rather than 
shying away from the facts of the case and simply batting it back down to the 
referring court with a bland and possibly even useless ruling attached25, it is 
submitted that the ECJ should have a sort of “first look” at the facts and deliver 
                                                 
21 H Rasmussen, On law and policy in the European Court of Justice: a comparative study in 
judicial policymaking (Kluwer, Dordrecht 1986) 512. 
22 Certainly Hosking is of that view in relation to disability discrimination: “The justifications 
which will almost certainly be offered for discriminating against disabled people relate to safety, 
business necessity, the costs of accommodation and the rights of others.  If the Court does not 
insist on a sufficiency of evidence to seriously look behind these justifications… the effectiveness 
of [Directive 2000/78] will be considerably reduced even within the narrow scope of its 
intended reach.”  See DL Hosking, “Great Expectations: Protection from discrimination because 
of disability in Community law” EL Rev 2006, 31(5), 667, 678. 
23 Ex Article 234 EC. 
24 For example, whether or not the German populace would be confused by a cosmetic 
product’s being called “Clinique” is surely a question which only the German populace itself can 
definitively answer: Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v Clinique Laboratoires SNC 
et Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH [1994] ECR I-317.  But the reference in this case was still 
necessary to establish that the measure at issue was a product rule and not a selling 
arrangement.  And of course the reverse is also true.  If Community legislation or behaviour was 
at issue, it would be the ECJ judge who would be best placed to adjudicate.  The ECJ would 
probably (although not necessarily) be the best choice in staff cases as well. 
25 Also a common occurrence under the Aristotelian test. 
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an interim opinion or view (to put it no stronger) as to the nature of the shared 
meaning, the distributive principle arising therefrom, whether or not such 
distributive principle is in fact being used, and thus whether or not complex 
equality has been violated.  While any legal rulings which it made would be 
supreme as usual (including with regard to the second of these four matters, 
where the issue of which distributive principle goes with which shared meaning 
might be regulated by law), the Court’s opinion or view on the first, third and 
fourth of these matters would be advisory only.  The national court could use it 
as a guide, but would retain competence to make the final decision.  The sort of 
mini-trial which the ECJ would have to stage here is not uncommon in the law – 
such hearings may be observed in many different courts, during the admissibility 
stage of an appeal, for example, or where a judge is called upon to rule on the 
need (or otherwise) for interim measures.  In both these examples, courts have 
to steer a careful middle course between the necessity for a just decision based 
on all of the relevant issues, and the desire, usually on all sides, not to perform 
such an accurate dress-rehearsal of the future (or possible future) trial that the 
need for such a trial is obviated altogether.  There would seem to be no reason 
at all why the ECJ should not be able to steer such a course. 
 
A second possible solution is that only the national court should involve itself in 
the ascertaining of the shared meaning, with the ECJ perhaps given a new 
cassation-style role (which would involve making it hierarchically superior to the 
national courts).  It could then review the domestic court’s decision.  If it felt that 
the  national court had worked out the shared meaning or the distributive 
criterion wrongly, or that its conclusion as to whether or not there had been a 
breach of complex equality was flawed, it could send the matter back down to 
the same court for a retrial.  Minus the Walzerian element, this is Gareth Davies’ 
preferred remedy for the law-fact problem.26 
 
A third and final solution would be that only the ECJ should involve itself in the 
ascertaining of the shared meaning.  This would only work if it was considered 
better for the adjudicator or referee himself to be from outside the distributive 
sphere concerned27.  As long as the forum was faithfully recreated in the 
European Court, with all views heard (and examined) in full, then the foreign 
                                                 
26 Davies, supra n 5, 26 et seq. 
27 The matter is debated at section 7.2.2. immediately below. 
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location should not alter anything.  In fact, the “fairy-tale Grand Duchy”28 might 
prove to be an ideal venue for a climactic showdown between two rival factions. 
 
Whichever solution is chosen, the new arrangement will have the added 
advantage of bringing to an end the current, intolerable situation.  By spelling out 
once and for all the allocation of duties as between the ECJ and the national 
court, things might become clearer and more predictable. 
 
7.2.2. The possible need for expert evidence, or even specialized courts 
 
Following on from the previous argument, it is reasonably easy to imagine a 
judge at the ECJ deciding on the first question mentioned there, having heard 
counsel on both sides, or even by simply reading the pleadings.  The second 
and third questions, though (the third by virtue of being contingent on the 
second), pose a problem.  How is the shared meaning to be discovered?  To be 
sure there is nothing to stop counsel reporting what they think it is, which would 
of course be the shared meaning most favourable to their client.  But with both 
advocates and the judge or judges unlikely to be members of the relevant 
distributive community themselves, it would be a violation of complex equality to 
allow any of them to definitively pronounce upon the meaning29: that is a job for 
the forum and the forum alone, assuming it can reach an agreement.  However, 
if (or more likely when) there is a conflict, and the fact that an action has been 
brought is almost definitely proof that there is indeed a conflict, it does not seem 
unreasonable for an arbiter (or “referee”) to be charged with resolving the 
argument one way or the other.   
 
Such an arbiter might come from inside the pertinent sphere, or he might come 
from outside it – there are advantages and disadvantages to both situations.  
The internal arbiter would have local knowledge (he would be a kind of relative 
of Walzer’s “connected critic”), but both parties to the conflict might suspect him 
of bias.  Meanwhile, the external arbiter is less knowledgeable, but more 
impartial.  Nevertheless, if an external arbiter were to be used, he would still 
                                                 
28 GF Mancini, “The Making of a Constitution for Europe” [1989] CMLRev Vol 26, No 4, 595, 597. 
29 It is true that the advocates’ contributions may simply be a repetition of the views of their 
clients, who almost certainly are members of the distributive community at issue.  But they 
might just as easily be part of a legal strategy dreamt up by the advocates on their own. 
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have to have the approval of the members of that sphere30.  Nor would any 
decision arrived at by the arbiter need to be the final word on the particular 
question at hand; debates on meanings (as has already been seen31) are 
ongoing, so the arbiter’s ruling would really only be a way of settling, in the short 
term, the argument in front of him, and might well only hold until the next conflict 
arose.32 
 
It follows that the ECJ judge or judges may legitimately hear submissions on the 
(disputed) meaning of the distribuend, prima facie without violating Walzer’s 
theory.  However, it is also plain that these submissions should not just contain 
the advocates’ view on the meaning, or even their clients’ view on the meaning, 
but must consist of nothing less than a presentation, to the Court, of the 
distributive community’s view on the meaning (or at least said view as discerned 
by the party in question).33  This means that convincing evidence would have to 
be adduced, not just of the proposed meaning itself, but also of the number of 
supporters which that meaning had locally34.  Only after hearing both sides’ 
presentations, in the course of a fully adversarial proceeding, could the judge 
properly adjudicate as to which meaning was, for the time being anyway, the 
true one.35 
                                                 
30 Quaere whether, in the case of the ECJ, this would lead to the politicization of judicial 
appointments. 
31 See supra section 2.4. 
32 But this is really not that dissimilar to the way in which the ECJ, and national courts within the 
EU, already operate today. 
33 In Grant, for example, the Court implied that there had been no advancement at Member 
State level of views on the equivalence of same-sex partnerships and opposite-sex partnerships: 
Case 249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-621 – see in particular 
paras. 32 and 35.  As Mancini and O’Leary point out, “it will be regretted that further and more 
detailed evidence of this lack of evolution was not adduced”.  See GF Mancini and S O’Leary, 
“The New Frontiers of Sex Equality Law in the European Union” European Law Review, Vol. 24, 
No. 4, August 1999, 331, 351 (emphasis added). 
34 It is not just a numbers game, however.  As mentioned at 4.4.2.4., n 171, advocates would 
also be able, if they wanted to, to use their written pleadings and oral submissions to request 
that the Bench apply the Override, possibly to the meaning which they themselves had 
adduced, but more likely to the meaning adduced by the other side, if and when the latter 
meaning was accepted.  As the European Court of Human Rights itself has put it, “Although 
individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not 
simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which 
ensures the fair and proper treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a 
dominant position”: Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, Application No. 44774/98, 10 November 2005, para. 
108. 
35 Common lawyers have for many years complained that the ECJ is not adversarial enough, and 
that it tends to adjudicate on points that were not argued before it: L Neville Brown and T 
Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) 
402.  One of the early Advocates General (Verloren van Themaat AG) also called for an 
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From all this, it is obvious that some expert evidence might need to be adduced.  
While representative members of the distributive community could be called to 
testify as to what Walzer might call the view from the cave36, or indeed they 
might opt to appear of their own volition37, more specialized witnesses might be 
required, such as those whose job it is to take polls or surveys in the community 
in question, or, depending on the nature of the distribuend, historians, 
anthropologists, and so on.  Some of the purported meanings themselves might 
be complex, for example, in the tax field, necessitating the appearance in court 
of economists, actuaries, and the like.  Ultimately, it may even be thought better 
to have separate panels of specialist judges, each dealing with a different sort of 
distribution38.  The consequences of these developments, both in terms of 
expense and duration of cases, would be not insubstantial.  It is thus an 
argument against the ECJ’s using complex equality that to do so would put 
financial pressure on both litigants and the EU taxpayer, and would exacerbate 
already lengthy backlogs. 
 
On the other hand, there are a number of arguments in favour of the admission 
of specialist evidence.  Specialist witnesses can assist the judges on technical 
questions which may arise, thus leading to a better quality of assessment.  
Furthermore, many other courts and tribunals around Europe already make use 
of experts; the WTO Panel, for example, is in a regular dialogue with experts, 
                                                                                                                                    
increased use of argument: Case 94/84 Office national de l'emploi v Joszef Deak [1985] ECR 
1873.  In the Advocate General’s opinion, the Court should not take a position on whether the 
granting of a tideover allowance to Mr Deak (a Hungarian national who happened to also be the 
son of a Community migrant worker) would or would not break up the national system, without 
hearing argument first.  The Court ignored the Advocate General, and clearly decided that it 
would not. Verloren van Themaat’s approach was arguably a proto-Walzerian one, asking 
effectively for an investigation into the local community’s understanding of the tideover 
allowance (what and who was it for?), before deciding whether or not Mr Deak should receive 
it.  He was correct that such an investigation involves the Court hearing arguments from all 
“interested parties” (at 1879) (and he included other Member States, whose nationals might of 
course be distributees, or, in Mr Deak’s case, parents of distributees).  Such a debate is vital.  
The Court – at least under orthodox complex egalitarian theory - cannot simply invent an 
understanding off its own bat. 
36 See the discussion at M Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic 
Books, New York 1983) xiv (hereinafter referred to as Spheres of Justice). 
37 Indeed, in the UK, such third party interventions are becoming quite common in judicial 
review proceedings: Roger Smith, “Benign intervention” Law Society Gazette (London 12 
November 2009) 10.  They are already common in the US. 
38 Such specialist judicial panels are already foreseen by Article 225a EC (introduced by the Nice 
Treaty), which, since the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, is now Article 257 TFEU.  An 
example is the European Union Civil Service Tribunal.  For more on this, see N Lavranos, “The 
new specialised courts within the European judicial system” 2005 EL Rev 30(2), 261. 
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and at the German Federal Patent Court in Munich, it is common to see 
chemists on the Bench.  Even as things stand (that is, without the adoption of a 
Walzerian approach to equality), it is not certain how long the ECJ can maintain 
its current iura novit curia stance.  The Court has already used its power to call 
for an expert opinion in staff and competition cases39; why not cases concerning 
equality?  As already mentioned, third parties from the distributive community 
who hear of the litigation might also apply to intervene in the case, to give the 
Court further guidance on the meaning of the distribuend.40  By widening the 
debate out, so that it (rightly) goes beyond the individual concerns of the two 
parties to the case, democracy too is arguably enhanced. 
 
7.2.3. The need to rewrite legislation 
 
Another consequence of the Court’s adopting a Walzerian approach to equality 
to sit alongside the current Aristotelian one would be that certain legislation 
might have to be rewritten, or even scrapped, especially where it sought to 
recreate or codify the Aristotelian test itself.  Examples of word-for-word 
codifications are admittedly rare.  One such was Article 60(1) of the now-defunct 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community: 
 
“Pricing Practices contrary to Articles 2, 3 and 4 shall be prohibited, in 
particular:- unfair competitive practices, especially temporary or purely 
local price reductions tending towards the acquisition of a monopoly 
position within the common market;- discriminatory practices involving, 
within the common market, the application by a seller of dissimilar 
conditions to comparable transactions, especially on grounds of the 
nationality of the buyer.”41 
 
                                                 
39 Case 12/68 X. v Audit Board of the European Communities [1969] ECR 109 (report ordered on 
official’s mental state); Case 48/69 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission of the 
European Communities [1972] ECR 619 (report ordered on the market in dyestuffs).  See A 
Alemanno, “Science & EU Risk Regulation: The Role of Experts in Decision-Making and Judicial 
Review” in European Risk Goveranance - Its Science, Its Inclusiveness and Its Effectiveness, 
Connex Report Series No. 6, E. Vos, ed., February 2008 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007401> 
accessed 21 March 2010, 23 for further examples.  Alemanno believes that, after many years of 
reticence, the Court is now showing “some readiness to become more involved in the 
examination of scientific evidence”: ibid., 20. 
40 The ECJ already has power to allow third parties to intervene in cases before it.  See, for 
example, Case T-37/04 Região autónoma dos Açores v Council [2008] ECR II-103, where a 
number of local fishermen’s associations intervened in a challenge, by the Azores, of a Council 
Regulation restricting the islands’ exclusive fishing rights. 
41 And now see Article 101(1)(d) TFEU (formerly Article 81(1)(d) EC). 
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Another example is to be found in the tenth recital in the Preamble to the new 
Equal Treatment Directive42: 
 
(10) […] According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, discrimination 
involves the application of different rules to a comparable situation or the 
application of the same rule to different situations.43 
 
However, other instruments, such as the Employment Framework Directive44 
and the Race Directive45, contain provisions which are Aristotelian in spirit if not 
actually in letter, for example, the definition of direct discrimination at common 
Article 2(2)(a). 
 
That is not to say that such instruments do not serve a useful purpose, for 
example, by setting out the scope of Community competence, but simply that 
they should not seek to petrify evolving shared meanings, for example, the 
shared meaning of jobs, the shared meaning of training, and so on.  In most 
cases, though, the provisions in question simply require rewording, leaving room 
for case-by-case decision-making.  At least some of the red lines should be 
converted into orange lines46; legislation such as this should point, but not 
emprison.47 
                                                 
42 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 
amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions [2002] OJ L269/ 15. 
43 Footnote omitted. 
44 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16 (“Directive 2000/78” or the 
“Framework Employment Directive”). 
45 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22 (“Directive 2000/43” 
or the “Race Equality Directive”). 
46 It is not the intention of this dissertation to advocate the abolition of red lines, though.  First 
of all, there should always be a minimum of red lines, which can then serve as the limit beyond 
which society will not allow people to fall (or be pushed).  This is a boundary the need for which 
Walzer himself acknowledges, and which he labels the “safety net”: M Walzer, “Exclusion, 
Injustice, and the Democratic State” Dissent, 40 (1993), 55, 57.  However, towards the end of 
this important 1993 essay, he entertains the idea of even greater encroachment by the nation 
(or perhaps in this case the supra-nation) into the spheres of justice, specifically when 
autonomy has failed: “[e]xclusion is a sign that the [citizens’] contests have gone badly – an 
invitation, therefore, to the state to set them right”; “[t]he state – or, at least, the modern 
democratic state – must defend the values of complexity and equality on behalf of all its 
citizens”: ibid., 63 and 64.  So it is not anti-Walzerian for a state or quasi-state to pass more 
thorough legislation (that is, to create a more extensive network of red lines) where it is 
intervening in a distributive community whose members are, for one reason or another, 
foundering.  As Gardner has put it, “The law of discrimination sits comfortably in [a] non-
individualistic theory of autonomy, according to which the state has its own project of providing 
the conditions of valuable flourishing for its citizens.  In this theory, prohibiting… discrimination 
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is merely a central and straightforward example of the state’s legitimate role”: J Gardner, 
“Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 9, No 1 (Spring 1989) 
1, 22.  Even McCrudden, who is on the whole critical of communitarianism, has written that it is 
a mistake to “assume that a system of rights leaves no room for benevolence or communal 
sentiment… A system of legal rights is not necessarily inconsistent […] with a belief in the pre-
eminence of “the good”, including a belief in constitutive community”: C McCrudden, 
“Community and Discrimination” in J Eekelaar and J Bell (eds), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 
(Third Series) (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987) 221, 227-8. 
47 Harris makes a similar plea in the gender equality context: “Even a jurisprudence based on 
multiple consciousness must categorize; without categorization each individual is as isolated as 
[Borges’ character] Funes, and there can be no moral responsibility or social change.  My 
suggestion is only that we make our categories explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable, and 
that to do so is all the more important in a discipline like law, where abstraction and “frozen” 
categories are the norm.”  See Angela Harris, “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory” 
(1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 581, 586.   
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8. Presenting a theory of mediated complexity 
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
The ascertainment of the shared meaning of a given distribuend, and in 
particular whose job this should be, remains the thorniest issue in the 
dissertation thus far.  There was some discussion in Chapter 2 of a “forum” 
consisting of all members of the relevant distributive community – distributors 
and distributees alike – and these terms, “forum” and “distributive community”, 
have been used in all subsequent argument.  Up until now, no further attempt 
has been made to describe the precise modalities involved in the establishment, 
running or regulation of these fora, other than some basic observations, for 
example, that these would vary from distribuend to distribuend and from 
community to community.  In this respect, it will be remembered, Walzer’s own 
lead is being followed, as he too preferred to leave his theory in the abstract, 
refusing to put any practical flesh onto the theoretical bones.  Perhaps he 
worried that the flesh might crush the bones, and that complex equality, once 
removed from the rarified and controlled atmosphere of the laboratory, would 
quickly disintegrate in the harsher conditions of the real world.  However, as this 
dissertation set out to assist a genuine court with a genuine problem, it is 
appreciated that it will have reneged on its promise if it delivers only in word and 
not in deed.  Some limited comments on the nature of the Forum will thus be 
made in the first section of this chapter: section 8.2.  Even then, there will be 
those who say that the theory remains too wooly to be of any practical use, at 
the ECJ or elsewhere.  There will be still others who fear that Complex Equality 
would lead to a kind of Mob Rule, with a vociferous majority bullying minorities 
into silence, or out of existence.  What if the distributive community votes 
against benefits for migrant workers, picking at the stitches of the very Union 
itself?  What if the distributive community votes against women on maternity 
leave receiving full pay?  What if the Override is not strong enough to temper the 
wilder excesses of the demos?  It is for these people that an alternative theory, 




8.2. Further consideration of the Forum, and some possible 
problems 
 
At section 2.4. above, some basic questions about the Forum are posed and 
then, hopefully, answered: Who should be present?  What characteristics do 
they need?  How are they to be treated, both during and after the debate?  How 
often should the debate take place?  However, the minutiae of the system are 
not given, and no indication is given of what a typical debate might look like, in 
concrete terms, or how consensus might be arrived at.  One of the reasons for 
this is that, as restated above, every debate is dependent on its context and so 
fora would have no fixed size, location or voting system.  It would be an endless 
task to try to describe all possible permutations.  But certainly the idea of a 
group, even a large group, of citizens coming together collectively to discuss 
and decide upon a given matter should not be dismissed out of hand.  One 
needs only think of the “gacaca” open-air community trials in Rwanda1, or 
President Obama’s Town-Hall meetings in the US.  In Australia there is a long 
tradition of public consultation on law reform, including public hearings.2  In a 
recent book, Fishkin describes a number of other real-life instances of what he 
calls “Deliberative Polling”, including public consultations on wind power in 
Texas, on a budget crisis in Rome, on sewage treatment in China and on ethnic 
differences in Bulgaria.3  
 
One objection to the idea of the Forum might be the physical impossibility of all 
the citizens of a country gathering together in one place, where the distribution 
under discussion was one which affected everyone (a tax matter, say).4  This 
would be compounded by the difficulties encountered in trying to manage the 
debate or take a vote; it would also make a mockery of the idea of 
representative democracy.  A counterargument, though, might be that 
                                                 
1 Although the system was revived specifically to deal with the issue of genocide, traditionally 
the Gacaca were village assemblies to settle all kinds of disputes. 
2 M Zander, The Law-Making Process (CUP, Cambridge 2004) 507-511.  The hearings are 
informal, without rules of evidence or legal representation, and sometimes even take place in 
the evenings.  Zander quotes Mr Justice Kirby as saying that “[t]he fears of irrelevant and long-
winded submissions or of hordes of unbalanced or nuisance witnesses has [sic] not been borne 
out” (at 509). 
3 JS Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (OUP, 
Oxford 2009). 
4 And what about all the citizens of twenty seven countries, if the distributive sphere were the 
whole of the EU?  Nevertheless, in an interesting section entitled, “Putting Europe in one room”, 
Fishkin describes how a real-life experiment was undertaken to try to do just that: Fishkin, supra 
n 3, 183 et seq. 
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representative democracy is outmoded in the age of the Internet, where many 
millions of citizens can vote simultaneously, on any matter and at any time, 
simply by pushing a button.  In the time it takes the representative to travel to 
the capital city to attend at the parliament, those whom he or she represents 
could already have made their views known, in a way that is both more accurate 
and more democratic, on any number of issues.5  In a future world where such 
“online democracy” was commonplace, the idea of multiple fora debating and 
voting on shared meanings, day in and day out, would not seem strange at all.6 
 
A second objection to the establishment of Walzerian Fora might be to point out 
how, going back to the idea of a physical debate, a gathering of large numbers 
of people, all wishing to make their divergent views known, can often descend 
into chaos and even violence.  One could perhaps plead as examples the 
demonstrations held at the WTO Summit in Seattle in 1999, the G8 Summit in 
Genoa in 2001, and the G20 Summit in London in 2009.  Against this it could be 
counterargued that such “powder-keg” situations arise precisely because 
citizens are given too few opportunities to air their opinions, not because they 
are given too many.  Once the novelty of permanent fora to determine shared 
meanings had worn off, it seems likely that things would settle down so that the 
only attendees would in fact be those with a genuine interest in discussing the 
matter at hand.  As has sometimes worked in the sphere of criminal law, making 
something widely available leads to responsible usage tempered by self-
regulation.7 
 
Following on from this last point, though, is a more urgent worry.  If the only 
attendees at the fora are those “with a genuine interest” in the topic at issue, 
might this not lead to a sort of tyranny-of-the-cognoscenti in the future, with the 
majority foolishly entrusting serious decisions to a minority who in time will come 
to wield disproportionate power over them?  One thinks here of the Soviet 
Union, or even Orwell’s Animal Farm, where “[t]he birds did not understand 
Snowball [the pig]’s long words, but they accepted his explanation”; by the end 
                                                 
5 A Hungarian party offering online democracy as a basic means of representation - the “Party of 
Internet Democracy” (IDE) - contested the 2009 European Parliament elections. 
6 See how, even today, the millions of “blogs” and other networking tools enable 24-hour 
discussion on almost any topic imaginable. 
7 Walzer is also of the opinion that, while “impassioned, bloodthirsty mobs” do exist, “organized 
parties and movements of many different sorts, good and bad, are far more common”: M 
Walzer, Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism (Yale University Press, New 
Haven 2004) 120 (hereinafter referred to as Politics and Passion). 
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of the story, of course, the birds have become the pigs’ slaves8.  The job of 
representation should come at the price that those represented retain the right to 
vote their representative out of office.  Unattended by such a democratic 
safeguard, representation becomes dangerous.  If someone absents themselves 
from one of Walzer’s Fora (and it is unlikely that anyone would be able to attend 
them all), they give away responsibility for the matter under discussion to others, 
a gift they may not be able to take back later. 
 
Another question that some struggle with is whether the Walzerian Forum is the 
same as (say) the Member State’s national parliament, or whether it is 
something else – a second entity.  Given that the entire citizenry of the Member 
State is only one possible distributive grouping, the answer must surely be: 
something else.  Walzer himself seems to be implying that it is something else: 
 
“Democracy puts a premium on speech, persuasion, rhetorical skill.  
Ideally, the citizen who makes the most persuasive argument… gets his 
way.  But… he must talk about the issues at hand.  And all the other 
citizens must talk, too, or at least have a chance to talk.”9 
 
This does not sound like a description of Parliamentary democracy in the 
classical sense. 
 
The question that then arises is whether this second entity would clash with the 
national parliament, and how any clashes that there were would be resolved.  
This is a big issue.  It is not the purpose of this dissertation to consider models 
of what is variously called participatory democracy, deliberative democracy or 
informal politics.  Many books have been written on the subject.10  Obviously 
one model would have to be settled upon, and its relation to the local parliament 
worked out.  The challenges posed would not be insurmountable.  One idea 
would be to give parliamentarians the “last word” after the Forum, umpired if 
                                                 
8 G Orwell, Animal Farm (Penguin Student Editions, Penguin, London 1999) 21. 
9 M Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, New York 
1983) 304 (hereinafter referred to as Spheres of Justice) – emphasis added. 
10 Fishkin, supra n 3, and the many books he refers to; A Gutmann and D Thompson, Democracy 
and Disagreement (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1996); HS Richardson, 
Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (OUP, New York 2002); JS 
Drysek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (OUP, Oxford 2001); 
T Christiansen, Informal Governance in the European Union (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 
Cheltenham 2004). 
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necessary by the judge, had delivered its view.  Court cases could then act as a 
catalyst for legislative change, but then this is no different from the situation 
today, both at Member State level11 and at EU level12. 
 
It can be seen, then, that there are several concerns raised by the idea of the 
Forum, some against which counterarguments may be put forward, others not.  
With the Forum being such a cause for worry, it seems sensible to at least 
countenance the idea of an alternative arrangement; one such arrangement is 
investigated in the next section. 
 
8.3. Mediated Complexity 
 
If a continuum were drawn between the European Court of Justice as it operates 
today, and the same Court as it might operate under a Walzerian regime of 
complex equality, as described above, a stark difference would be noted 
between the two positions in respect of shared meanings.  At the one extreme, 
the Court effectively ignores shared meanings altogether, judging the case 
without isolating the distribution at its heart, and thus not caring what the 
distribution is, what its shared meaning is, or whether the distributive criterion 
utilized is or is not in keeping with said meaning.  At the other extreme, though, 
the dependence on authentic shared meanings is such that the Court is to all 
intents and purposes a slave to the distributive community, unable to judge at all 
until such community has communicated its shared meaning for the distribuend 
in question, or until this has been thrashed out in the course of a no doubt 
lengthy game of interpretative tennis with the judge as referee.  Could there be a 
middle course?  In what follows there is proposed just such a middle course - a 
theory of mediated complexity.  
 
The central plank of the theory of mediated complexity would be that the judge 
would take charge of the ascertainment of shared meanings, not this time as a 
                                                 
11 In the UK, for example, where the Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords) can delcare 
an Act of Parliament to be incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998, effectively forcing 
Parliament to amend or even scrap the offending law. 
12 ECJ cases have often presaged changes to the Treaty, for example, Case 294/83 Parti 
écologiste "Les Verts" v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 and Case C-70/88 European 
Parliament v Council of the European Communities [1990] ECR I-2041.  O’Leary refers to the 
Court’s “policy-making leadership” and gives a large number of examples: S O’Leary, “The Free 
Movement of Persons and Services” in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law 
(OUP, Oxford 1999) 380. 
 216 
referee picking the side that made the best case, but literally discerning the 
meaning for him or her13 self.  This of course goes against much of what Walzer 
stands for, and certainly violates the second tenet of the theory of complex 
equality as described in Chapter 2 above, so much so that the word “shared” in 
“shared meanings” now seems redundant.  The alternative theory set out in this 
section is not, unlike the earlier sections, supposed to be a faithful translation of 
the theory of complex equality into the world of European law, though.  It 
borrows from or pays homage to Walzer’s theory, but only as one weapon in the 
judge’s armoury.   
 
It would fall to the judge, then, to work out and declare what the distribuend at 
issue meant to the community in which it was distributed, or, if he thinks it more 
appropriate, to everybody.  This last point is important.  Under mediated 
complexity, it is open to the judge to dispense with Walzer’s “relativism” 
altogether by deciding on a distribuend’s meaning erga omnes.  The fear that 
strange local proclivities would produce abhorrent meanings which in turn would 
produce abhorrent distributive criteria is significantly quelled if the meaning is 
drawn from a much larger interpretative pool, as it were, to begin with.  For 
example, in the field of gender discrimination, the fear that the members of a 
predominantly male selection committee at a bank in the City of London might 
include “ability to enjoy lap-dancing outings with clients” as part of the meaning 
of a job at such a bank (not forgetting that they would not be the only 
participants in the Forum at which the meaning was ascertained), would be 
allayed altogether if what mattered was not what a bank job meant to the 
members of that particular “culture”, but what it meant to all the world.14  
Complex Equality is thus distilled down to its bare essential: a theory of 
distributive justice, predicated on the interpretation of meanings.  What 
something means (in the world generally) and how it is distributed (in the world 
generally) must match.  Opening out the field of interpretation would also 
assuage fears of racist meanings being employed, as they might have been in 
apartheid South Africa.  On this view of mediated complexity, the role of the 
Override is also reduced (almost) to nil, as applying a universal code to 
                                                 
13 Henceforth the masculine form only will be used, gender-neutrally. 
14 Likewise the fear that a distributive community might conclude that being male (or of a 
certain age) formed part of the common understanding of what it is to be the Chief Executive of 
a multinational company. 
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particularist meanings, and universalizing those meanings in the first place, 
amount to practically the same thing. 
 
Handing sole jurisdiction to decide on meanings to the ECJ judge need not be a 
recipe for arbitrariness and a return to (or continuation of) the unpredictability of 
the Aristotelian regime.  It is submitted that there is also a substantive difference 
between a judge’s deciding on the “alikeness” or “un-alikeness” of two entities, 
and a judge’s deciding on the meaning of a distributed good.  The second task is 
more –for want of a better word – clear, while the first is obscure and intangible.  
And a task that is clearer to those doing justice is also clearer to those seeing 
that justice is done.  The Walzerian test is more accessible to those observing 
the Court’s activities, its commentators and critics, not to mention the public, 
which in turn enables the judges to be put under more effective scrutiny.  With 
Walzer, there is a chance not only to understand the answer, but also – for once 
– to understand the question. 
 
Furthermore, it is still possible to set rules for the judge to follow in carrying out 
his task.  One model could be the rules of statutory interpretation in English law 
(and other systems based thereon), which are used – in a loose and flexible way 
– by English judges when construing an Act of Parliament or Statutory 
Instrument.  Indeed, as a model, statutory interpretation provides a neat parallel 
for the ascertainment of “shared understandings” in the Walzerian sense; both 
activities involve the teasing out of meanings, and both give rise to the fear, 
sometimes unfounded, of judicial caprice making outcomes unforeseeable and 
advice to litigants difficult.  But just as the rules of statutory interpretation provide 
a check on judicial flights of fancy by limiting the judge to two or three easily-
anticipated options, so a set of rules for the ascertainment of meanings would 
act to curb the more outrageous indulgences of an overly creative Bench.   
 
The rules might be unwritten conventions, much like the English rules on 
statutory interpretation themselves.  Alternatively, they might be codified in some 
way.  Guidelines might be produced, along the lines of the Sentencing 
Guidelines in English law, or it is not uncommon for courts to produce Practice 
Directions to expand upon their basic rules of procedure.  An important example 
is a Practice Direction at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, which elaborated a basic provision in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence to create a viable system for adducing witness statements where the 
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witnesses themselves could not attend the hearing15.  Without such a system it 
is unlikely that any trials could have taken place.  Other examples of Practice 
Directions include Practice Directions relating to direct actions and appeals (in 
EU law)16, and to the power of the House of Lords to depart from its own 
previous decisions (in English law)17. 
 
But what should the rules say?  One possibility – and what follows are 
possibilities only, not concrete proposals – would be to ground the set of rules in 
the three tenets of the theory of complex equality as presented in Chapter 2.  
The judge would become, as it were, the guardian of the tenets, ensuring that 
the different spheres of justice are kept separate, that shared social meanings 
are respected, and that dominance is prohibited.  His principle task in an 
equality case would be to detect any distribution flawed by reason of boundary 
breach.  But of course to know whether an alien attribute was crossing a 
boundary legitimately or illegitimately, he would first have to work out the shared 
social meaning of the distribuend at hand.  He could approach this enterprise in 
a number of ways, some of them already mentioned in Chapter 7, such as the 
calling of expert witnesses, or other new ones such as appointing an amicus 
curiae to advise on the particular point or even (assuming that argument was 
going to be heard in open court) empanelling a jury to decide.  In England 
anyway, it is the usual solution, at least in cases where a jury is already in place, 
to leave questions of fact, as opposed to questions of law, to a separate “tribunal 
of fact”. 
 
These ideas, though, take the matter further and further out of the judge’s own 
hands, and represent a kind of liberal extreme.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, a judge could simply carry out his own research (just as English 
judges construing statutes are now allowed to consult Parliamentary records 
and so on).  An international judge taking time to ascertain local views is not 
such an unusual concept; the European Court of Human Rights often 
undertakes such an exercise, and indeed has a Research Division for precisely 
                                                 
15 Practice Direction on Procedure for the Implementation of Rule 92bis(b) of The Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, IT/192, 20 July 2001. 
16 [2004] OJ L361/15.  
17 Note [1966] 3 All ER 77.  For another example from English law, see Practice Note [1980] 1 All 
ER 555, on the possible sentencing penalties for unmeritorious criminal appeals. 
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that purpose.18  Alternatively, the judge could employ a “common sense 
approach”; relying on abstract concepts like “natural law” or some equivalent, he 
could fashion the meaning almost any way he wanted, but ensuring always that 
his view accorded with that which would be reached by one of English law’s 
favourite characters, the “reasonable man”.19  He might indeed refuse to hear 
evidence where a meaning “permit[ted] of ready comprehension”, “present[ed] 
no difficulty of application or understanding” or was “ordinary [and] 
uncomplicated”20, what Lord Diplock called “a matter of first impression”21.  In 
such a case, and following an equivalent of English law’s “literal rule”, he could 
simply give the distribuend its “ordinary natural meaning”.22  He could say, 
alternatively or in addition, that he was taking “judicial notice” of the meaning.  
Then again, he could back this up with a presumption, or series of 
presumptions, as the European Court of Human Rights does, for example, in 
cases of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.23  Thus, the “ordinary 
natural meaning” would be presumed unless one or other party adduced 
convincing evidence of a special meaning.  The onus would then be on counsel 
to bring to the Court’s attention, in particular via their pleadings, matters which 
they wanted it to consider, and which they knew it would not investigate propio 
motu. 
 
It should not be forgotten, of course, that one possible meaning may already be 
on the table, namely the meaning utilized in the original, contested distribution.  
Even if this was not explicit it can usually be worked out, a contrario, from the 
fundamentum distributionis actually used.  A very cautious judge could perhaps 
limit himself to upholding or striking down this original meaning, having set 
himself (or had set for him) a threshold of acceptability, along the lines of the 
famous Wednesbury test – in English law – that the courts should only interfere 
when an authority has come to a conclusion “so unreasonable that no 
                                                 
18 Discussed in E Howard, “The case for a considered hierarchy of discrimination grounds in EU 
law” 13 MJ 4 (2006), 445, 458. 
19 See, for example, how Lord Morris in the case of Brutus v Cozens states that the magistrates 
who had earlier heard the case should have applied “rational judgment and common sense” to 
reach a decision: Brutus v Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 1297, at 1300.  The issue here was the meaning 
of the word “insulting”. 
20 All phrases from ibid., at 1300, 1301 and 1303. 
21 Garland v British Rail Engineering [1983] 2 AC 751, 771. 
22 Brutus v Cozens, supra n 19, at 1302. 
23 Injury sustained while under State control means torture et cetera, unless an “alternative 
explanation… ha[s] been forwarded by the Government”.  This quotation from the case of 
Shishkovi v Bulgaria, Application No. 17322/04, 25 March 2010, but the principle has been 
stated on many other occasions. 
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reasonable authority could ever have come to it”24.  In other words, the judge 
would only strike down an existing meaning where the distributive community 
has arrived at a meaning so unreasonable that no reasonable distributive 
community could ever have arrived at it.25  As an alternative, the judge could 
interfere only when a meaning was perverse; this is a standard that has already 
been encountered in the dissertation.26  As with the ascertainment of the 
meaning itself, the judge will have to find (or have found for him) a workable 
approach for identifying a perverse meaning, but it seems likely that, to slightly 
paraphrase Lord Reid in Brutus v Cozens, an ordinary sensible person knows a 
perverse meaning when he sees or hears it.27  The sexual orientation of the 
passenger’s partner, for example, has nothing to do with the meaning of a train 
ticket.28  Likewise, the nationality of the victim has nothing to do with the 
meaning of criminal compensation.29 
 
In English judicial review cases, though, the Court does not try to stand in the 
place of the requisite authority, and make (or remake) the contested decision 
itself.  Having struck a decision down, it sends the matter back to this authority 
so that it (the authority) can make a second attempt in the light of the Court’s 
ruling.  Should the ECJ, hearing an equality case, and applying the theory of 
mediated complexity, follow suit, and, in the event that it invalidates an existing 
meaning, refuse to spell out the “correct” meaning by itself?  Again, if a strict 
Walzerian approach were being adopted, the answer to this question would 
probably be in the affirmative – the matter should be sent back down to the 
distributive community for redetermination of the shared meaning – unless one 
of the models sketched in Chapter 7 has been accepted, allowing the Court (for 
                                                 
24 Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, 230. 
25 Under a strict regime of complex equality, if it transpired that the “shared” meaning was not 
in fact that of the distributive community at all, for example, if it was the distributor’s own, then 
the meaning could already be invalidated, and the distribution could already be declared 
flawed, by dint of breach of the second tenet.  However, in the alternative version of the theory 
being presented here, in which much less importance is being placed on the element of 
“sharing”, perhaps the judge would allow any meaning to be the meaning, as long as the 
reasonableness test (or equivalent) was satisfied.  In such a case the test as stated in this 
sentence would have to be slightly rewritten, with a phrase like “decider as to meaning” or 
“meaning-interpreter” replacing “distributive community”.  Allowing non-shared meanings not 
just in Court but within the community as well represents, it is acknowledged, a further, massive 
break with orthodox Walzerian theory. 
26 An analogy could perhaps be drawn with the English “golden rule” here, that interpretations 
which result in absurdities must be avoided. 
27 Brutus v Cozens, supra n 19, at 1300. 
28 Case C-249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd. [1998] ECR I-621. 
29 Case 186/87 Ian William Cowan v Trésor public [1989] ECR 195. 
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example) to have a “first go” at declaring the meaning, in a strictly non-binding 
way.  However, in the theory of mediated complexity, the answer must be in the 
negative; unlike a public authority, a distributive community is too ephemeral a 
concept to be communicated with, albeit implicitly, in this way.  The judge, 
mediating the complexity on behalf of the community, must provide the recast 
meaning.30  Even then, though, the rejected meaning will no doubt provide some 
clues as to what the true meaning (for the moment, anyway) is or might be. 
 
It should be emphasized again that this section sets out a range of possibilities, 
not a concrete plan.  Mediated complexity is the half-way point on the continuum 
between the position today and the position as stated in the foregoing chapters, 
but even within mediated complexity itself there is a wide gamut of possible 
approaches for the ECJ to follow, depending which of the various options above 
it chooses.  A number of different Courts of Justice might emerge.  The Court 
might elect an accessible approach, throwing its doors open to a large number 
of helpers and advisers, or it might prefer to adopt a more remote position, 
standing aloof from the spheres themselves.31  Adopting a “common sense” or 
equivalent approach, the Court might feel that in most cases it “knows best”, and 
it might start to display the sort of paternalism of which the English Law Lords 
are sometimes accused.  In contrast to such an imperious stance, the Court 
might borrow from the Continental traditions and choose to operate in a more 
inquisitorial manner.  Like the English judges when they apply the mischief or 
purposive rules, or the more European teleological approach, the ECJ judge 
may decide to be more probing – looking into methods, motives and causes, 
rather than just taking things at face value.  And as the depth of the Court’s 
enquiry varies, so may the breadth.  Perhaps the judge will wish to consider only 
the specific parties in front of him, producing judgments “confined to their 
particular facts”, or perhaps he will opt to widen the focus, to produce judgments 
                                                 
30 Or the Court could plot a middle course, by sending the matter back on some occasions, and 
deciding itself on others.  For example, it might choose to send back where the distribution had 
taken place in the public sphere, and decide itself where the distribution had taken place in the 
private sphere. 
31 Another deviation from orthodox Walzerian theory.  Such aloofness is a particular problem for 
Walzer, who disdains those who “fashion for [themselves]… an objective and universal 
standpoint” (Spheres of Justice, xiv).  This has led him to a sustained critique of juridification, 
which perhaps reached its high-water mark with his review of Ronald Dworkin’s Taking Rights 
Seriously (Duckworth, London 1977): The New Republic 25 (June 25 1977) 28.  More recently, 
though, he seems to accept that “[m]uch… political debate takes place in the courts”: “not 
always the best place, in my view, but the place where the nuts and bolts of membership and 
equality are most often addressed”.  See Politics and Passion, xiii-xiv. 
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of more general application.  A lot will depend on how much work the Court 
wants to take onto its own shoulders.  At the moment, for example, the Court of 
Justice will not consider pleas other than those appearing in the parties’ 
previously-lodged pleadings, while the European Court of Human Rights, for 
example, is much readier to pursue extraneous matters propio motu. 
 
Put simply, adopting a regime of mediated complexity does not commit the ECJ 
to any one particular judicial style, but rather would offer the Court a choice of 
different styles.  When it comes to the trade-off between interpretative 
complexity and judicial efficiency, it will be up to the Court to decide how much 
of the one it can cope with, without causing irreparable harm to the other. 
 
What is being offered in this dissertation is a rule or set of rules to help the 
European Court to decide the equality cases before it, not to conjure up the 
result as if from Aladdin’s lamp.  Complex equality, and mediated complexity, 
are not touchstones, or yardsticks, or ready reckoners.  Rather, they are “a 
common language and a shared set of concepts for talking and thinking about 
questions of… equality”32, in other words, “a framework for debate”33.  The 
debate itself does not end, then, but its quality improves.  It can be seen how the 
judge’s reasoning is much more considered and much less rigid.  It is context-
sensitive; it sticks close to the subject-matter of the case, placing it at the very 
heart of the debate.  It resists deviations into less pertinent considerations and 
avoids reductionist, black-or-white rhetoric.  Of course, policy questions remain 
difficult for a judge to call – or indeed he may feel that he cannot call them at all 
and must leave them for the legislature.  This is a problem which judges 
perennially face, and no amount of theories will solve it.  A complex system of 
presumptions might bring some relief, but would inevitably just transfer the 
policy dilemma in question from the judge to whoever’s job it is to write the 
presumptions.34  Thus, some lines in the sand may remain, but there is a new 
                                                 
32 JM Balkin, “Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A play in three acts” 26 Cardozo L Rev 2004-2005, 
1689, 1699, referring to what he calls the “tripartite theory” in the US, which divided the rights 
of citizens into civil, political and social rights, but offered equality in respect of the first 
category only.  However, its replacement, the more familiar model of strict scrutiny and suspect 
classifications, is also described by Balkin as “a language for talking and thinking” (at 1690). 
33 RB Siegel, “Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing 
State Action” [1997] 49 Stan L Rev 1111, 1120, also referring to the “tripartite theory”. 
34 A concrete system of presumptions is not favoured as it would cost the theories their fluidity, 
which is one of their best qualities.  However, for the sake of completeness, the matter is briefly 
considered here.  As a preliminary point, the system would have to exclude all distributions of 
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concern for what Homi Bhabha has called the “border lives”35, those caught in 
the “in-between moment”36, frozen as they attempt to cross from one sphere to 
the next.  Focusing on this “intervening space”37 means more than just focusing 
on exceptional cases – cases that are exceptional to some rule.  It involves 
challenging the very rule itself: 
 
“The hither and thither of the stairwell, the temporal movement and 
passage that it allows, prevents identities at either end of it from settling 
into primordial polarities.  This interstitial passage between fixed 
identifications opens up the possibility of a cultural hybridity that 
entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy…”38 
 
Complex equality both “displays and displaces the binary logic through which 
identities of difference are often constructed”39. 
                                                                                                                                    
criminal sentences and other State-endorsed sanctions.  This should not prove too much of a 
problem at the ECJ, which does not hand down criminal penalties, although it does hand down 
some civil ones.  The easiest presumptions would be along the lines of “in dubito pro 
distributor” or “in dubito pro distributee”, but these would most likely be condemned as too 
simplistic, given the wide variety of distributions at issue.  A more useful set of presumptions 
would be: 
1. The Reasonable Distributor distributes according to a meaning which combines the 
interests of the Distributor and the interests of the Distributee in a ratio of fifty to fifty. 
2. Assuming that a distribution in line with Presumption 1 is impossible, the Reasonable 
Distributor gives additional weight (that is, from 51% of the total weight to 100% of the 
total weight) to the meaning of the party (“the first party”) whose predicted position, 
following a distribution carried out according to the meaning of the other party (“the 
second party”), would be worse than that of the second party following a distribution 
carried out according to the meaning of the first party. 
Elsewhere in this dissertation, Presumption 2 has been referred to as a kind of “hardship rule”.  
However, this would not settle everything and further presumptions would be needed to decide 
between, say, damage to life and limb and damage to material assets, in varying degrees and 
timeframes. 
35 HK Bhabha, The Location of Culture (Routledge, London 1993) 1. 
36 Ibid., 5. 
37 Ibid, 10. 
38 Ibid., 5. 




9.1. The two methods compared: Erpelding 
 
If one takes a case like Erpelding, step by step, one can see clearly where the 
Aristotelian test goes wrong.  The first conclusion which the Aristotelian analysis 
produces in this case is that milk producers who did well between 1981 and 
1983 and milk producers who did badly between 1981 and 1983 are “like”.  This 
seems uncontroversial, but already the Aristotelian analyst is guilty of 
superficiality.  The Walzerian analyst, meanwhile, would have spotted that they 
are not alike at all – one comes to the quota-distribution empty-handed, but the 
other, to make an analogy with a casino, brings with them a chip which they 
have already won at another table. 
 
The second Aristotelian conclusion here is that the two categories of milk 
producer, whilst like, were treated “unlike”; the producer who did well between 
1981 and 1983 received an additional individual milk reference quantity.  Again, 
this analysis does not go far enough.  The reason for this disparate treatment 
(having done well during the period 1981-1983, or having done badly during the 
same period) seems completely inappropriate.  In Walzerian terms, the reason 
for the distribution (or the distributive criterion) is wrong.1  But the Aristotelian 
analyst is powerless to do anything here.  Restricted to a “yes or no answer”, 
and faced, on the one hand, with the granting of a quota and, on the other hand, 
with a refusal to grant a quota, he can only state the obvious: that the two 
“treatments” are dissimilar.  He does not at any time, however, consider the 
reason for this, or answer the simple question: why?  It is worth remembering 
Lord Walker’s comment in the UK case of Carson2: 
 
“One of the most powerful criticisms of a rigid, step by step approach 
based on comparators is, if I may respectfully say so, in the speech of 
my noble and learned friend Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Shamoon v 
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary […].  That was a case 
under the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Ord 1976 (SI 1976/1042) 
and this House had to grapple with the statutory definition of 
                                                 
1 Keeping in mind the Standard Contingent Reply. 
2 R (on the application of Carson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and Conjoined 
cases [2005] UKHL 37. 
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discrimination.  Lord Nicholls demonstrated that a step by step approach 
was liable to obscure the real issue in the case, which was why the 
complainant had been treated as she had been treated.  Until that 
question was answered, it was impossible to focus properly on the 
question of comparators.  Lord Nicholls […] observed […] that: 
“employment tribunals may sometimes be able to avoid arid and 
confusing disputes about the identification of the appropriate comparator 
by concentrating primarily on why the Claimant was treated as she 
was…””3 
 
Walzer, on the other hand, brings the reason or reasons into the middle of the 
debate, rather than relegating it or them to an afterthought: 
 
“The phrase “for whatever reasons” conceals a problem […], which 
philosophers who are quick with hypothetical examples are prone to 
ignore.  […] Social meanings are constructed, accepted, and revised for 
reasons, and we have to engage those reasons.”4 
 
The third and final Aristotelian conclusion in Erpelding is that the unlike 
treatment of the two categories of milk producer is objectively justified on the 
grounds of certainty and effectiveness.  The Court thus rubs salt in Erpelding’s 
wounds by announcing that the need to have only one rule justifies the rule.  
The fact that it is or might be the wrong rule is not mentioned, even here, at the 
one point in the test where it might have been.  The wrongness of the rule is 
only revealed via Walzer’s root-and-branch scrutiny; the Aristotelian analyst 
satisfies him or herself with an inspection of the branch alone. 
 
In other words, applying Walzer’s doctrine to a case at the ECJ involving the 
principle of equality would facilitate a much more profound analysis of the 
original “distribution” giving rise to the case.  If a distribution is substantially 
flawed, more often than not an Aristotelian assessment will simply not reveal this 
(as in Erpelding).  Another significant defect in the “symmetric” approach to 
equality is its reliance on so-called objective justification as a means of rectifying 
any inequalities discovered.  As the consideration given to the two comparators 
is so superficial, the objective justification acts as little more than a “rubber 
stamp” or “white-washing exercise”, often condoning, and consolidating, the flaw 
in the original distribution. 
 
                                                 
3 Ibid., at para. 63 (Lord Walker’s emphasis).  The reference for the Shamoon case is [2003] 
UKHL 11, [2003] ICR 337.  Lord Nicholls’ observation is at 342, para. 11. 
4 M Walzer, “Objectivity and Social Meaning” in M Nussbaum and A Sen (eds) The Quality of Life 
(OUP, Oxford 1993) 173-176. 
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The problem is that the Aristotelian test is confined in the present.  Complex 
equality allows for a historical enquiry.  To use a simplistic analogy, it is like 
replacing a photograph with a piece of film; Aristotle provides the judge with a 
highly decontextualized “snapshot” of who he has in front of him, and what has 
(recently) happened to them.  Walzer encourages the judge to “look behind” this, 
revealing both the true identity of the comparators, and any secret advantages 
which they may enjoy, or disadvantages from which they may suffer, and the 
true nature of the grounds upon which the distribution was made. 
 
9.2. Formulating the argument 
 
In the previous section, several metaphors illustrating the differences between 
the Aristotelian approach to equality and the Walzerian one were encountered 
(snapshot and film, branch and root, and so on).  It is easy to come up with more 
such metaphors.  One could say that Aristotle was the analogue to Walzer’s 
digital5, or that while Aristotle insisted that there was only one straight line 
between two given points, Walzer would argue, in a post-Einsteinian way, that 
the number of possible straight lines was infinite; this last metaphor is not 
entirely fortuitous, there being a clear conceptual link between Walzer’s 
relativism and Einstein’s relativity – Walzer, like Einstein, cares deeply about the 
standpoint of the observer.  Turning to the world of medicine, one could say that 
the Walzerian test represented the scalpel to Aristotle’s sledge-hammer, or, in 
the field of car mechanics, that Aristotle was merely tinkering where Walzer 
provided an overhaul. 
 
Of course, these metaphors cannot go far enough by themselves to convince a 
reader that Walzer’s theory of complex equality should be used by the European 
Court of Justice as an complement to the Aristotelian test, or, if so, why.  It is 
hoped in this section to delve a little deeper into the issues in order to formulate 
a more persuasive argument. 
 
A lot of the metaphors imply an absence of subtlety on the part of the 
Aristotelian test, and a concomitant presence of subtlety in Walzer’s technique.  
It is true that, where Aristotelian eyes can usually only distinguish the two poles, 
                                                 
5 Although given the digital system’s dependence on a binary code, in which everything is either 
a zero or a one, one might wonder if it would not make a better cipher for Aristotle’s test. 
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or extremes, of a given situation, the more focused eyes of the complex 
egalitarian can make out the intermediate degrees – one could talk of the ECJ’s 
current test being too black-and-white, while a Walzerian approach might enable 
the judges to discern the various shades of grey.  The problem of intermediaries 
has been seen a few times in this dissertation, for example, in the case of 
Beltrante6, dealt with in the chapter on non-suspect grounds.  In this case, there 
are two “extremes” (parents of dependent children and parents of quasi-
dependent children, that is, those who are above the age of majority but 
unemployed), but an applicant like Mr Beltrante can find himself caught between 
them, for example, as the parent of a quasi-dependent child whose dependency 
– in adulthood – stems from disability7.  While there may be superficial 
similarities between him and the other members of the second category, the 
increased anxiety which he might feel for his child, if the child lived in another 
country, and his desire for filial visits whenever possible, would make him more 
a kin to a parent in the first category.  However, unable to deal with specificities 
or to take decisions on a case-by-case basis, an Aristotelian judge erects – 
almost arbitrarily – a barrier between the supposedly deserving and the 
supposedly undeserving.  A Walzerian judge, on the other hand, judges who is 
deserving by reference to the meaning of the thing deserved, and accepts that 
there is no hard-and-fast answer to this because the meaning is always 
changing.8  This method is less elegant9, but arguably much more just.10 
 
9.3. In search of flexibility 
 
The lurching between like and unlike which is symptomatic of the Aristotelian 
test is often caused by a sudden and dramatic shift in perspective.  Many of 
                                                 
6 Case T-48/89 Fernando Beltrante and others v Council of the European Communities [1990] 
ECR II-493. 
7 This is theoretical only; it is not known if this was the actual situation that Mr Beltrante was in. 
8 While a decision that two things are like – or unlike – may be much harder to reverse.  An 
example is Maruko on the subject of same-sex partnerships vis-à-vis (heterosexual) marriage: 
Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I-1757.  
But this would seem to be very exceptional. 
9 Walzer would be the first to admit that complex equality is not an elegant theory.  See M 
Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, New York 1983) 21 
(hereinafter referred to as Spheres of Justice): “The theory that results is unlikely to be elegant”. 
10 Another example of an “intermediate” case is Omega, also dealt with in the chapter on non-
suspect grounds: Joined cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd (C-27/00) and Omega Air Ltd , 
Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority (C-122/00) 
[2002] ECR I-2569. 
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those writing about equality these days are seeking a “happy medium” between, 
to use cinematic terminology, the “wide shot” which shows all people (or all 
objects) as the same, and the “close-up” which lays bare their individual 
differences.  In his famous essay about the politics of difference, Charles Taylor 
declares that “[t]here must be something midway” between the two 
approaches11.  However, what is sought may not be a single point at all, but 
rather acknowledgement of the continuum which exists between the two types of 
“shot”; the lens in a camera or telescope would in fact be of little use if it could 
only discern those things right in front of it, or those things many miles away.  
The call, then, is for variability, for flexibility.  Fittingly, what lies at the end of the 
rainbow is the ability to make out all the colours. 
 
Among those hunting for flexibility, from amongst those writers already 
encountered in this dissertation, are McCrudden, who supports a changeable 
approach to European anti-discrimination law: 
 
“What is necessary, then, is a recognition that different equalities are in 
play in different situations.”12 
 
O’Leary too, lambasting the Court’s “one solution fits all approach”13, calls for 
variability:  
 
“[N]ational authorities and, ultimately, the Court of Justice, may have to 
engage in a case-by-case assessment of whether denial of a benefit is 
reasonable given the individual circumstances of the claimant and the 
characteristics of the benefit.”14 
                                                 
11 “There must be something midway between the inauthentic and homogenizing demand for 
recognition of equal worth, on the one hand, and the self-immurement within ethnocentric 
standards, on the other”: C Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in C Taylor, Multiculturalism: 
Examining the politics of recognition (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994) 72. 
12 C McCrudden, “The new concept of equality” (Paper prepared for the Academy of European 
Law conference, “Fight Against Discrimination: The Race and Framework Employment 
Directives” 2/6/03-3/6/03) 
<http://www.era.int/web/en/resources/5_2341_679_file_en.796.pdf> accessed 14 April 2009, 
24. 
13 S O’Leary, “Developing an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe?  A reappraisal of 
the case law of the Court of Justice on the free movement of persons and EU citizenship” 2008 
YEL 27, 193. 
14 Ibid., at 192, emphasis added.  This approach is highly Walzerian, putting as it does the 




9.4. But does flexibility lead to uncertainty? 
 
On the other hand, if meanings are always changing, could it be argued that a 
Walzerian approach might lead to uncertainty?  As has already been seen 
countless times in the main case-study chapters, any final conclusion as to 
whether a given distribuend was distributed correctly or not is contingent upon 
the discovery of its shared meaning, which in turn is contingent upon the say-so 
of the distributive community itself.  Even if it is accepted that the judge is the 
final arbiter and therefore that his conclusion is not contingent, the many others 
involved in the dispute, particularly the client being advised by his or her lawyer, 
must make do with at best a provisional, qualified response to the question.  
Such uncertainty could be disadvantageous to a client whose decision whether 
or not to proceed with their case requires a robust prediction of the outcome, not 
an interim hypothesis.  However, under Walzer, the prognosis made in the 
lawyer’s office should not differ too much from the final decision reached in 
Luxembourg, since both lawyer and judge are basing their conclusion on the 
same thing, in contrast to the situation under Aristotle, where the result of the 
like-for-like test, like the famous “Chancellor’s foot” in English law15, varies from 
one beholder to the next.   
 
Such “precedents” as there are under Aristotle are bogus; what was like today 
may be unlike tomorrow.  Walzer at least acknowledges the ongoing nature of 
the debate and tries to incorporate it, but this in no way necessitates uncertainty.  
Although it may fluctuate, a doctor will still be able to take the temperature of 
his16 patient at any given moment and respond in the manner appropriate to that 
reading, and for that person, with that condition.  The “manner appropriate” is 
known due to years of experience (both his and others’), and the building up of 
genuine precedents.  Thus, the doctor can usually predict the sequence of 
events with a great deal of certainty.  If changeability were a bar to prediction, 
doctors could effectively be abolished.  Similarly, in contemporary physics, 
irregularity is no longer viewed as totally separate from regularity, but as 
generated by the same kind of mathematics.  Indeed, the idea of treating 
                                                 
15 For a nice account of this story, see SH Bailey et al, Smith, Bailey and Gunn on the modern 
English legal system (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002) 5. 
16 Gender-neutral. 
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perfection and imperfection – chaos and pattern – as two separate systems, as 
opposed to two parts of the same system, is distinctly old-fashioned.  The 
physicists’ breakthrough here, that is, to stop viewing the two phenomena as two 
distinct poles and to view them instead as two ends of the same spectrum, 
should set a precedent for lawyers grappling with sameness and difference.  
Indeed, the image of the continuum, or rainbow, has already been encountered 
above.  The results of Walzer’s test may be variable, but the underlying system 
remains constant, and identifiable. 
 
9.5. Macro and micro: the equilibrium of co-existence 
 
The main source of problems, from the EU legal point of view, is the European 
Union’s split-level structure, mentioned above17: the Member States on the one 
hand, and the Union itself on the other.18  This can mean that there are two co-
existent distributive communities, at least in areas where the EU does not yet 
have total competence, but even in some areas where it does – a micro sphere 
within a macro sphere.  And it is not just different goods which may be 
distributed at the two levels, but also different aspects of the same good.  To 
understand this, it is helpful to recall a slogan that was popular in the arena of 
EC monetary policy in the Seventies: the Snake in the Tunnel.  This refers to the 
experiment whereby the Member States attempted to prevent wild fluctuations 
between the European currencies by setting them a maximum of 1.125 percent 
above the dollar and a minimum of 1.125 percent below the dollar (the “Tunnel”), 
leaving individual currencies free to move about within these, but not beyond 
them (the “Snake”).  This imagery could be adapted to represent the situation 
when, for example, the Community institutions have decided to legislate on a 
certain matter, say, by means of a Directive.  The macro sphere (the Community 
itself, made up of all of the Member States) is responsible for drafting the 
Directive, that is, for setting out the basic coordinates of the new law, what it is 
hoped will be achieved, and, most importantly, the parameters within which the 
Member States will be expected to act.  This is the Tunnel.  The distributive 
community for the Tunnel is the whole of the EC: all citizens of all Member 
States have the right to participate in the debate, either via their MEP’s in the 
                                                 
17 See supra section 5.1, last paragraph. 
18 Although of course in many ECJ equality cases, only the micro level is implicated.  It is mainly 
in the field of nationality discrimination that the macro level comes into play. 
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Parliament and the Ministers of their Government (elected by them) in the 
Council, as at present, or else via some new means, yet to be invented.  Thus, 
the Tunnel will be distributed, to the Member States, in accordance with what it 
means, collectively, to all of them.  The micro level (the individual Member State) 
is responsible for implementing the Directive within the national borders, in other 
words, deciding on the best ways to achieve the goals set out in the Directive, 
and then putting those decisions into practice.  This is the Snake: the Member 
State must work within the parameters set by the Community, but must not go 
beyond them.  The distributive community for the Snake is the whole of the 
Member State concerned. 
 
The point is nicely illustrated by the FEDESA case19.  Here, the Council 
approved a Directive prohibiting the use in livestock farming of certain 
substances having a hormonal action.  FEDESA complained that the Directive 
had had unequal consequences.  The new obligations to be fulfilled were the 
same for all Member States.  That meant that the differentials between levels of 
protection20 in the different Member States remained identical, even after 
implementation of the Directive: Member States with a high level of existing 
protection still had a high level of protection, and Member States with a low level 
of existing protection still had a low level of protection.  However, the Court had 
no sympathy for FEDESA’s argument.  It was true that all Member States had to 
fulfil the same new obligations (Tunnel), but, as long as that was done, 
continuing divergences between them did not breach the principle of equal 
treatment (Snake).  In other words, the new obligations were a product of the 
macro distributive community – a single sphere with no internal boundaries.  But 
the Court was happy to re-erect the boundaries as between the Member States 
when it came to the Member States’ overall policies on this issue; whether they 
wanted a high or low level of overall protection was a decision for each of them 
to make separately. 
 
Litigants will sometimes champion the micro sphere, and other times the macro 
sphere, depending on their interest.  FEDESA was fighting for a macro sphere 
on that occasion; many product-manufacturers looking to conquer the whole of 
the EU market with a single design will (usually rightly) do the same.  In the 
                                                 
19 Case C-331/88 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State 
for Health, ex parte: Fedesa and others [1990] ECR I-4023. 
20 Against hormones finding their way into foodstuffs. 
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competition case of Distillers21, meanwhile, the litigant bemoaned the new EEC 
obligation to charge the same price for whisky in every Member State, because, 
according to it, the customs and traditions pertaining to the consumption of 
whisky were different from one State to the next.  It was arguing, unsuccessfully 
as it turned out, for the Community to be viewed as nine22 micro spheres, each 
distributing whisky after its own fashion.  What is sometimes hard for litigants 
(and others) to grasp is that the two models – one large sphere, many small 
spheres – co-exist.  Which one is to the fore depends on the circumstances, 
hence the absolute necessity for the Court to adopt a variable approach.23  
Walzer expresses this well, using the metaphor of the mirror which Hamlet holds 
up to his mother24.  The viewer looks in the mirror and sees what is wrong, 
where the definition of “wrongness” is the viewer’s own.  Each viewer or group of 
viewers has their or its own mirror.  But sometimes the definitions will coincide.  
As he puts it, 
 
“Nor is the meaning of critical exposure always a local and particular 
meaning.  If what is rotten in the state of Denmark includes murder and 
betrayal, then all of us can recognize the rottenness.  For some 
purposes, we all stand in front of the same mirror.  But only for some 
purposes…”25 
 
For some purposes, then, the citizens of the European Union “stand in front of 
the same mirror”.  For others, “local and particular” meanings return, and the 
one mirror becomes twenty seven separate ones. 
 
However, sometimes, a clash of the models is unavoidable.  An oft-quoted 
example is the Danish Bottles case26.  Here, a local law establishing a complex 
“return” system for bottles, the aim of which was the reduction of waste and the 
protection of the environment, was alleged to be a hindrance to the free 
movement of goods.  Although it accepted that protection of the environment 
was, in principle, a justification for the action (a so-called “mandatory 
                                                 
21 The Distillers Company Limited [1978] OJ L50/16, [1978] 1 CMLR 400; on appeal Case 30/78 
Distillers Company v Commission [1980] ECR 2229, [1980] 3 CMLR 121. 
22 The case was first brought in 1978. 
23 See supra. 
24 Hamlet, III.iv. 
25 M Walzer, The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Political Commitment in the Twentieth 
Century (Basic Books, New York 1988, 2nd edn 2002) 233. 
26 Case 302/86 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark [1988] ECR 
4607. 
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requirement”27), the Court went on to hold that Denmark’s behaviour was – at 
least partially – disproportionate to this aim.  While some have praised the 
decision, given that a system such as the Danish one was not in theory declared 
to be inimical to the free movement of goods28, Denmark’s defeat in practice 
here spells a victory for the macro sphere over the micro one.  Was permission 
to trade in bottles to be distributed at micro level, where, in this case, 
environmental concerns were the dominant consideration?  Or was it to be 
distributed at macro level, where economics took greater priority?  And if the 
latter, is the Court itself guilty of a boundary breach here – dethroning the local 
Distributor and rewriting the distributive criteria after its own fashion, ignoring 
those arrived at by the populace?  
 
Although a cursory study of Walzer’s work might suggest that micro should 
always triumph over macro, particular over universal, this is not in fact strictly the 
case.  As he made clear in a famous essay of 1990, and reiterated in a book of 
2004, the outer sphere must sometimes take precedence.  Writing in the context 
of the State’s relation to its citizens, he observes as many others have29 that 
classic liberalism produces a society of bloodless, abstract individuals, each free 
to choose their own conception of “the good”, but, in relation to one another, 
isolated, divided, fragmented, and undetermined: 
 
“The members of liberal society share no political or religious traditions; 
they can tell only one story about themselves and that is the story of ex 
nihilo creation, which begins in the state of nature or the original position.  
Each individual imagines himself absolutely free, unencumbered, and on 
his own”.30 
 
                                                 
27 Ibid., paras. 8 and 9. 
28 Sexton goes as far as to call Commission v Denmark “a landmark decision for environmentally 
minded States”: “This decision represents the first time the Court has allowed Member States to 
enact environmental protection measures contrary to economic integration”: TRF Sexton, 
“Enacting national environmental laws more stringent than other States’ laws in the European 
Community: Re Disposable Beer Cans: Commission v Denmark” 24 Cornell Int’l LJ 563, 593 and 
564. 
29 Charles Taylor’s essay “Atomism” is one of the most well-known versions of this observation: 
C Taylor, “Atomism” in C Taylor, Philosophical Papers Vol 2: Philosophy and the Human Sciences 
(CUP, Cambridge 1985).  But see also J Waldron, “The Cosmopolitan Alternative” in W Kymlicka 
(ed) The Rights of Minority Cultures (OUP, Oxford 1987) for a celebrated rebuttal of Taylor and 
others. 
30 M Walzer, “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism” Political Theory, Vol 18, No 1 (Feb 
1990) 6, 7-8, Walzer’s emphasis (hereinafter referred to as Communitarian Critique). 
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Walzer’s “communitarian critique”, however, requires States to remedy this by 
“sponsor[ing] certain sorts of communal identification”31 and “foster[ing] 
associative activities”32: 
 
“[T]he communitarian correction does require… a state that is, at least 
over some part of the terrain of sovereignty, deliberately nonneutral.”33 
 
The State, then, must sometimes step in to protect those groups within the 
community which are “at risk”34.  It follows that this nonneutral State must from 
time to time lend its support to a certain identity, in the process withdrawing its 
support from another: it must “discriminate among… assemblies”35, the macro 
sphere – on that particular occasion – overruling the micro one.  So although by 
nature hostile to what might be called “outside intervention”, outsiders deciding 
something which it is the insiders’ right to decide, Walzer does endorse it when it 
is needed precisely to uphold the system which bestows this right to begin with: 
being cruel to be kind.36 
 
In Politics and Passion, Walzer again examines the situation of a smaller group 
within a larger one, and reaches similar conclusions.  Where the larger one is 
the State, its need occasionally to overrule the smaller one, in the name of 
“assist[ing]” other smaller groups which find themselves under threat, is seen 
again.37  The same sense of having to be cruel to be kind is encountered: the 
cultural community at issue must engage with the larger entity, and vice versa, 
precisely to ensure the relevant culture’s perpetuation: 
 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 7. 
32 Ibid., 16. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 17. 
35 Ibid., 19. 
36 As he puts it, “the only theory that is necessary to the communitarian critique of liberalism is 
liberalism itself”: ibid., 8.  State intervention, although not unfettered state intervention, was 
also discussed by Walzer in a 1993 essay: M Walzer, “Exclusion, Injustice, and the Democratic 
State” Dissent, 40 (1993), 55.  This is considered in more detail supra, at section 7.2.3.  An 
example of a sphere-within-a-sphere utilized by Walzer in Spheres of Justice is that of a church 
within a State (at 35-42, for example).  Such a church could enact its own rules on membership, 
content of services, upkeep of buildings, and so on, but it would still be subject to the laws of 
the land vis-à-vis crime, tax, et cetera. 
37 M Walzer, Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism (Yale University Press, 
New Haven 2004) 40 (hereinafter referred to as Politics and Passion): “A form of state provision 
designed to assist the weaker groups will be a necessary – and permanent – feature of any 
egalitarian multiculturalism” (Walzer’s emphasis). 
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“So the internal hierarchies of group life are tolerated by this version of 
egalitarianism but also simultaneously subverted.”38 
 
And in the event of a clash, at least where the cultural community poses a threat 
to the larger entity, he is clear that the balance should be tilted against the 
community.39  However, he warns that this is advisory only: 
 
“This liberal tilt is simply a guideline for decisionmaking in a political 
crisis.  It doesn’t solve the problem of day-to-day coexistence.  For that 
there is no theoretical solution, no deduction from a set of principles, only 
a long and unstable series of compromises…universal happiness is not a 
plausible political project.”40 
 
This caveat should be taken as applying to this dissertation as well.  The 
Walzerian model – with the general rule of micro trumping macro, and the 
exceptional “rule” of macro trumping micro – should be seen as nothing more 
than a “guideline for decisionmaking”.41 
 
This model can be extrapolated outwards – mutatis mutandis – to create, in 
Walzer’s own phrase, a “republic of republics”42.  Whether this could ever work 
at the global level is questionable43, but the European Union is certainly very 
close to a working model of the republic of republics, which, as Walzer mentions 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 57. 
39 Ibid., 64.  This does seem to be a softening of his line in Spheres of Justice. 
40 Ibid., 65. 
41 It is not the intention of the foregoing to promote the EU as a whole to the role of “State”, 
and to relegate its current Member States to that of “secondary associations”, or to insinuate 
that the latter pose “threats” to the former, and so on.  These two pieces of Walzer’s are 
considered only for the insight they can give into the troublesome question – not dealt with in 
Spheres of Justice – of how an alleged boundary breach is to be dealt with where the spheres 
are not adjacent but concentric.  Are the borders of an inner sphere impenetrable, or porous?  
As usual, it will depend on whether the business of the outer sphere (for want of a better term) 
is part of the shared meaning of the distribuend at issue in the inner sphere – shared by the 
members of the inner sphere, that is.  But these pieces rightly draw attention to the atypical 
nature of the situation.  The same rules as would apply were the two spheres side by side 
cannot apply here; new rights and responsibilities flow from the fact of the one being inside the 
other.  Returning to the question of State versus individual(s), Walzer has in fact written of his 
“dilemma” in trying to find a midway point between the porous inner border and the 
impenetrable one – full intervention in the inner sphere and none: Politics and Passion, 171 
(footnote 8 to chapter 3).  If he were prepared to move one level of analysis up, he might find 
the EU to provide just such a creature, at least in embryonic form. 
42 Communitarian Critique, 20.  
43 See the section entitled “Conclusion: Global Equality” in Politics and Passion, 131 et seq, 
where Walzer looks at some of the difficulties which the global version might encounter. 
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in a footnote, goes hand in hand with complex equality.44  So while Danish 
shared meanings should be respected ordinarily45, a case can be made for the 
macro sphere – the EU as a whole – intervening via its Court to check 
Denmark’s environmentalism where the “bigger picture” may be at stake.46   
 
9.6. Complex equality and European Union 
 
The situation seen at the end of the previous section is, it is stressed, the 
exception.  Under normal circumstances, the theory of complex equality favours 
local norms and local meanings, and to apply a local meaning outside its sphere 
may constitute a boundary breach.  Each sphere has its own meanings and 
those visiting a sphere from outside should ordinarily respect these: “When in 
Rome, do as the Romans do”.  The question is, does such an approach suit the 
European Union and its law, and more particularly its Court and its Court’s 
approach to equality? 
 
Of course, one of the chief missions of the EU is to prevent European markets 
from being ring-fenced along national borders; this inevitably means that a fence 
erected by a Member State – usually in the form of a national law – will be struck 
down as a hindrance to free movement.  In this specific sense, it could be said 
that local meanings are being routinely jettisoned in favour of non-local 
meanings in which the Member State concerned had no say whatsoever, 
contrary to complex equality47.  The Belgian community may have felt that it was 
                                                 
44 Communitarian Critique, 23 (footnote 21). 
45 This is also in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity, where action at the higher level 
should only be contemplated if there is no solution to be found at the lower level.  See below 
for further discussion of this point. 
46 In this case – perhaps – the EU’s need for a functioning system of trade, and efficient 
collection of VAT monies which then feed Union projects, including environmental protection.  
Again there is a sense here of the macro sphere’s being “cruel to be kind”, denying pluralism to 
sustain it, suppressing environmentalism to promote it, but the environmentalism promoted is 
likely to offer greater protection than the environmentalism suppressed.  Of course being part 
of the EU requires Member States to accept that there is a “picture” bigger than their own, and 
if the acceptance comes hard this is almost certainly an occurrence or reoccurrence of the 
demos problem so masterfully identified by Weiler in his seminal paper: JHH Weiler, “Does 
Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision” (1995) 1(3) 
European Law Journal 219.  As he puts it, “majority rule is only legitimate within a demos… a 
parliament without a demos is conceptually impossible, practically despotic” (at 228-231).  Such 
questions, and their elusive answers, are regrettably beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
47 Although this is to ignore the second, “macro” sphere which encompasses all Europeans (see 
supra section 5.1.).  This distributive community, having agreed, via election of representatives 
and sometimes even via referendum, to create/ join the EU, has also agreed to the principle of 
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having Spanish rules on surnames foisted upon it in García Avello, for example, 
and that its view on the meaning of a surname was being ignored.48 
 
However, many aspects of European Union do follow the “When in Rome” 
precept, making complex equality a good match for the EU project generally.49  
In cases like Baumbast50 and Collins51, for example, the migrants actually 
sought the host State’s benefits, and, certainly in Baumbast, the Court took a 
very Walzerian line by insisting that the UK accede to their request; Mr 
Baumbast was in Rome, and was entitled to be treated as other Romans.  In 
cases like Konstantinidis52 and Laval53, the basic rule seemed to be that the 
migrant worker or service provider should take the host State rules as he found 
them, unless they were overridden by Community primary or secondary 
legislation.54  Similarly, in Vlassopolou55, the host State’s rules on professional 
qualifications took precedence, just as long as it did not ignore whatever skills or 
knowledge the migrant worker had brought with him or her, and, if they were 
                                                                                                                                    
non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality, at least as a grundnorm for its regional 
legislation.  So the members of the micro distributive community (qua members of the macro 
distributive community) have had a bigger “say” in things than they may think.  Of course, that 
still does not mean that they had a say in their neighbour’s law.  But, by agreeing to equality on 
grounds of nationality, they accepted a “tunnel” (see the discussion at supra section 9.5.), which 
foreclosed certain options to them in the drafting of their own law.  The point is that this 
foreclosure was something which they distributed themselves, to themselves, in accordance 
with a meaning which they shared, even if they later chose to forget it. 
48 Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State [2003] ECR I-11613.  Similarly, in the more 
recent case of Grunkin, the German community may have felt that it was having Danish rules on 
surnames foisted upon it, in disregard of its view on the meaning of a surname: Case C-353/06 
Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR I-7639. 
49 Tsakatika, although undertaking a very different project to the present one, has also found 
communitarianism useful in analysing the EU (communitarianism as a whole, that is, not any 
one particular theory): M Tsakatika, Political responsibility and the European Union (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester 2008).  
50 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-
7091. 
51 Case C-138/02 Brian Francis Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] ECR I-
2703. 
52 Case C-168/91 Christos Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig [1993] ECR I-1191. 
53 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] 
ECR I-11767. 
54 As Advocate General Bot said in the Dirk Rüffert case (a follow-up to Laval), “as a general rule, 
Community law does not preclude Member States from applying their legislation… to any 
person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which country 
the employer is established”: Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-
1989, at 2010 (Para. 69 of the Opinion).  As authority for this proposition he uses Cases 62/81, 
63/81 Société anonyme de droit français Seco and Société anonyme de droit français Desquenne 
& Giral v Etablissement d'assurance contre la vieillesse et l'invalidité [1982] ECR 223. 
55 Case C-340/89 Irène Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und 
Europaangelegenheiten Baden-Württemberg [1991] ECR I-2357. 
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deemed insufficient, was prepared to offer him or her an opportunity to prove 
that he or she in fact possessed the knowledge and qualifications which were 
lacking (as opposed to making him or her start from scratch). 
 
It is probably in the sphere of the free movement of goods that EU law could be 
said to be at its most anti-Walzerian, with the doctrine of “mutual recognition”56 
effectively forcing a host Member State to accept the decisions of an alien 
distributive community as valid for its own.  A foreign meaning is thus imposed 
on a Member State by one of its neighbours – “If it’s good enough for the home 
Member State, it’s good enough for the host Member State”.  However, even in 
this area the tide is beginning to turn, with the Keck case57 signaling a partial 
return to local regulatory autonomy (or the so-called “country of destination 
principle”).  As Weiler has commented, the situation now is that a foreign seller, 
in return for not being excluded from the host State’s market, must respect the 
host State’s selling arrangements, in exactly the same way as a foreign 
company would have to respect the host State’s tax arrangements, or a foreign 
visitor would have to respect the host State’s criminal law58.   
 
This taking back of sovereignty by Member States is also in keeping with the 
doctrine of subsidiarity, by which the Union should take action “only if and 
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States”59.  And since the ECJ already has to operate a kind of 
                                                 
56 Deriving from the case of “Cassis de Dijon”: Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
57 Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel 
Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. 
58 Joseph Weiler, “Towards a Principle of Economic Comity”.  Lecture given at Bentham House, 
UCL, 23 May 2001.  A selling arrangement may “reflect deeply-held policy choices about the 
character of national life”: Daniel Wilsher, “Does Keck discrimination make any sense? An 
assessment of the non-discrimination principle within the European single market” ELRev 2008, 
33(1), 3, 21.  Indeed, the Court has acknowledged this, describing the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages in the Gourmet Foods case as being “linked to traditional social practices and to local 
habits and customs”.  See Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet 
International Products AB (GIP) [2001] ECR I-1795, para. 21. 
59 Art. 5 EC (now Art. 5(3) TEU).  McCrudden has commented that, as long as there is a 
continued dialogue between the Member States and the Commission, “the strategy of devolving 
responsibility back to the Member States… has much to commend it”.  See C McCrudden, “The 
new concept of equality” (Paper prepared for the Academy of European Law conference, “Fight 
Against Discrimination: The Race and Framework Employment Directives” 2/6/03-3/6/03) 
<http://www.era.int/web/en/resources/5_2341_679_file_en.796.pdf> accessed 14 April 2009, 
23. 
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“jurisdictional subsidiarity”60, complex equality would not represent a particularly 
big leap forward.  Even theorists have spotted the link between complex equality 
and subsidiarity; Den Hartogh refers to it as “a principle to which Walzer often 
appeals”61: 
 
“Principles of justice should be applied by collective decisions of the 
smallest circle of people who can apply them efficiently.”62 
 
The Keck judgment and the doctrine of subsidiarity may have what Bernard has 
called “a decentralising effect”63, but as he rightly goes on to stress, 
centralization is not a sine qua non for integration, and “decentralisation is not 
synonymous with fragmentation”64.  That the Court and other Community actors 
have come to understand this is indeed “a sign of maturity”65.  It is submitted that 
the Court’s adoption of a complex egalitarian theory of equality would fit 
perfectly with this new, mature approach to EC law. 
 
Gareth Davies has called for a more sophisticated, less formalistic and above all 
adaptable approach to equality.  Again, Walzer’s theory would seem to fit the 
bill.  In particular, the way that the theory of complex equality permits “small 
inequalities” within a given sphere – perhaps Walzer’s most innovative proposal 
and the facet of the theory which marks its point of departure from simple 
equality66 - would seem to meet Davies’ requirement that the notion of equality 
be separated from that of uniformity (“the principle of one rule for all”67): 
                                                 
60 A Iliopoulou, “Le principe d’égalité et de non-discrimination” in J-B Auby and J Dutheil de La 
Rochère (eds), Droit administrative européen (Bruylant, Brussels 2007) 449.  
61 G den Hartogh, “The Architectonic of Michael Walzer’s Theory of Justice” Political Theory, Vol 
27, No 4, Aug 1999, 491, 508. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Nicolas Bernard, “Discrimination and Free Movement in EC Law” [1996] 45 ICLQ 82, 108.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Also the facet of the theory which has most confused Walzer’s critics, for example, Richard 
Arneson, who lambasts complex equality as “a very weak brew, in which any element of 
anything that could plausibly be identified with egalitarianism is so diluted as to be virtually 
undetectable”: RJ Arneson, “Against “Complex” Equality” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), 
Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 226. 
67 G Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (European Monographs, 
Kluwer, The Hague 2003) 201. 
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“The tendency to treat [equality] as synonymous with uniformity is 
logically false, and can often be a route to intolerance.”68 
The distribution of student maintenance grants, for example, takes place within 
its own, autonomous sphere and in accordance with the relevant distributive 
community’s shared understanding of such grants.  But that does not mean that 
every single student qualifies, at exactly the same moment, for exactly the same 
grant (as Davies puts it, “[t]he prohibition on nationality discrimination does not 
demand equal fees”69).  To go back to the education example in Chapter 270, 
that would be the equivalent of every student in the class receiving the same 
grade.  Under a Walzerian regime, variety is allowed; in Davies’ terms, Walzer 
can “cope with difference”71.  While Aristotle presents the Court with a black-
and-white choice – insiders versus outsiders, for example – Walzer’s more 
detailed analysis enables the Bench to place the choice in its wider context and 
to “recogni[ze]… what has occurred outside the jurisdiction”72.  This allows for a 
more nuanced decision – a dimmer switch rather than one that can only go on or 
off. 
                                                 
68 G Davies, “Higher education, equal access, and residence conditions: Does EU law allow 
Member States to charge higher fees to students not previously resident?” 12 MJ 3 (2005) 240. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See supra, section 2.2. 
71 Davies, supra n 67, 202. 




The Walzerian approach to equality exposes the Aristotelian test for all of its 
limitedness and shortsightedness, and admits a world of possibilities beyond the 
playing-board.  Likes within the same sphere may be treated unlike unjustly 
(boundary breach) or justly (“small inequality”).  Unlikes within the same sphere 
may be treated unlike justly (“small inequality”) or unjustly (boundary breach).1  
Likes within the same sphere may be treated like justly (correct placement of 
boundaries, correct distributive criterion) or unjustly (boundary breach, or 
wrongful placement of boundaries in the first place).  Unlikes within the same 
sphere may be treated like unjustly (boundary breach) or justly (“small 
inequality”).  A similar list could be drawn up for likes or unlikes who or which 
find themselves in separate spheres2, a boundary breach or wrongful (initial) 
placement of boundaries usually being at the root of any and all injustice.  Like 
treatment could now be merely a coincidence, or it could perhaps indicate a 
boundary breach by the distributor.  Even within this paragraph, it has been 
difficult to “shoe-horn” the myriad possibilities into the strictures, physical, 
temporal and perspectival, of the terms “like” and “unlike”, but it is only intended 
to provide a rough indication of the poverty of the Aristotelian test when faced 
with the richness of human experience. 
 
It is submitted, then, that the thesis is verified and that Michael Walzer’s theory 
of Complex Equality may be used by the European Court of Justice when 
dealing with cases concerning equality, as a complement (at the very least) to 
the Aristotelian “test” that likes should be treated in like fashion and unlikes in 
unlike fashion.  Like a cataracts operation for the ECJ judge, Walzer’s “radically 
particularist”3 theory finally restores his full sight and enables him for the first 
                                                 
1 A serf and a King, for example, receive unequal treatment justly under normal circumstances, 
but unjustly if the King has no business wearing his crown in that sphere.  Even then, that does 
not mean that he is to be stripped of his crown permanently, just that he must only wear it in 
the sphere in which he was coronated. 
2 While the latter – unlikes in separate spheres – might seem to be the more obvious scenario, 
an example of the former – likes in separate spheres – would be where two farmers were 
receiving quotas for different crops, or where two manufacturers were receiving finance for 
different products.  This situation came up, in one of the pleas, in Joined cases 424/85 and 
425/85 Coöperatieve Melkproducentenbedrijven Noord-Nederland BA ("Frico") and others v 
Voedselvoorzienings In- en Verkoopbureau [1987] ECR 2755, discussed at supra section 6.4. 
3 Spheres of Justice, xiv. 
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time to see the special cases, the exceptions, the substance of the dispute; the 
“dilemma of difference”, referred to in the Introduction4, is resolved.5   
 
Attempting to apply overly reductive and unitary rules and tests, from the top of 
the mountain (to use one of Walzer’s favourite images), to involved and complex 
situations on the ground (or “in the cave”), produced at best hit-and-miss results 
– the misses often being catastrophically bad, and the hits more the result of 
good luck than design.  It was like trying to wind an intricate watch while wearing 
an oven glove.  Particularism allows the judge to contextualize each 
comparison.  With its emphasis on proceedings in the Forum, complex equality 
effectively allows citizens to equalize themselves6. 
 
Critics of the theory, though, see danger lurking in the Forum.  Some have tried 
to fix the problem by combining Complex Equality and its context-dependency 
with something else, some universalist element that will (in their view) provide 
the missing safeguard; in this regard, Habermas’ ideal speech theory is 
especially popular7.  O’Neill describes this hybridity particularly well, referring to 
his own approach as “contextual impartialism”8.  In this dissertation, this kind of 
synthesizing of Complex Equality with distinct theories has not been thought 
necessary.  Walzer’s partiality – should it be considered dangerous – is 
sufficiently offset, it is submitted, firstly, by the Override, and secondly, by the 
doctrine of co-existential equilibrium, both of these traceable to or rooted in his 
own writing.   
 
                                                 
4 See supra section 1.2. 
5 As Armstrong puts it, Walzer offers “a highly positive intervention into the apparent impasse 
between equality and difference” and indeed a “synthesis” of the two ideas: C Armstrong, 
“Complex equality: Beyond equality and difference” 2002 Feminist Theory 3, 67, 68 and 80. 
6 Jürgen Habermas was perhaps thinking along the same lines when he wrote, “For in the final 
analysis, private legal persons cannot even attain the enjoyment of equal individual liberties 
unless they themselves, by jointly exercising their autonomy as citizens, arrive at a clear 
understanding about what interests and criteria are justified and in what respects equal things 
will be treated equally and unequal things unequally in any particular case.”  See J Habermas, 
“Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State” in C Taylor, Multiculturalism: 
Examining the politics of recognition (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994) 113. 
7 S O’Neill, Impartiality in Context: Grounding Justice in a Pluralist World (SUNY Press, Albany 
1997); L Atkinson, “Coming to Terms with Procedure: The Potential of the “Ideal Speech 
Situation” for Michael Walzer’s Communitarian Justice” 56 U Toronto Fac L Rev 1998, 223; ST 
Johansson, “Towards spherical justice: a critical theoretical defence of the idea of complex 
equality” (PhD thesis, University of Southampton 2003, unpublished). 
8 O’Neill, supra n 7, 201. 
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It is important, though, that Complex Equality is not made to stand or fall on the 
question of who should ascertain the meanings of distributed goods.  The 
doctrine still has much to offer whoever does the ascertaining.  If use of the 
Walzerian Forum is thought to pose a threat to the EU itself, then this aspect of 
the theory may be shed while still preserving the kernel of Complex Equality – 
analyzing the allegedly discriminatory act, not in terms of comparisons of the 
actors involved, but rather in terms of distributions and meanings of goods.  This 
is the true heart of the theory – its ability to separate the people from the 
problem – and it is not lost if the task of ascertaining the meanings is entrusted 
to the Bench.  The alternative theory of mediated complexity – admittedly 
representing a more significant departure from orthodox Walzerian doctrine – 
would be another way to rein in complex equality, if such reining in were 
needed. 
 
Aristotelian “like for like” equality constrains those who apply it, and ultimately 
those in relation to whom it is applied.  On the other hand, as Walzer has 
commented, “complexity is free”:  
 
“the more complex the [social] construction [of goods] the more room 
there is for cultural difference.”9 
 
As the European Union grows wider, as the activities of its citizens – both 
individual and collective – grow more complicated and their relations one with 
another more sophisticated, this is a freedom which they already deserve, and 
which they will increasingly demand.  The Court of Justice should be ready. 
                                                 
9 M Walzer, “Objectivity and Social Meaning” in M Nussbaum and A Sen (eds) The Quality of Life 




Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Comparator 1 and 
Comparator 2 
Treated Outcome 
Like Like Not discrimination 
Like  Unlike Discrimination 
Unlike Like Discrimination 







——, “Case Comment.  Nepal: Supreme Court – equality rights of “third sex” 
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and inter-sex)” PL 2008, Aut, 606-608 
——, “Summary of Workshops: Themes and Issues Raised” in J Cormack (ed), 
“Proving discrimination - the dynamic implementation of EU anti-discrimination 
law: the role of specialised bodies.  Report  of the first experts’ meeting, 14-15 
January 2003 hosted by the Belgian Centre for Equal Opportunities and 
Opposition to Racism” (European Commission, Brussels 2003) 
 
Adams, KD, “Can Promise Enforcement Save Affordable Housing in the United 
States?” 41 San Diego L Rev 2004 643. 
Alemanno, A, “Science & EU Risk Regulation: The Role of Experts in Decision-
Making and Judicial Review” in European Risk Goveranance - Its Science, Its 
Inclusiveness and Its Effectiveness, Connex Report Series No. 6, E. Vos, ed., 
February 2008 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007401> accessed 21 March 2010 
Allen, R, “Article 13 EC, evolution and current contexts” in Meenan (ed), Equality 
Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 
Anderson, JA, and Weijer, C, “The Research Subject as Wage Earner” 
Theoretical Medicine 23: 2002, 359. 
Andre, J, “Blocked Exchanges: A Taxonomy” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), 
Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 
Andrews, J, “National and International Sources of Women’s Right to Equal 
Employment Opportunities: Equality in Law Versus Equality in Fact” 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1994, 
413 
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (OUP, Oxford 1980), trans. WD Ross 
Armstrong, C, “Complex equality: Beyond equality and difference” 2002 Feminist 
Theory 3, 67 
Armstrong, C, “Philosophical Interpretation in the Work of Michael Walzer” 
Politics (2000) 20(2) 87 
Arneson, R, “Against “Complex” Equality” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), 
Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 
Arneson, RJ, “Equality and Equal Opportunity For Welfare” [1989] 56 
Philosophical Studies 77 
Arnull, A, “Annotation Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed” (2003) 
CMLRev 753 
Arnull, A, “Editorial: Out with the old...” (2006) 31 EL Rev Feb 1 
Arnull, A, “The European Court and judicial objectivity: a reply to Professor 
Hartley” 1996 LQR 112(Jul), 411 
Atkinson, L, “Coming to Terms with Procedure: The Potential of the “Ideal 
Speech Situation” for Michael Walzer’s Communitarian Justice” 56 U Toronto 
Fac L Rev 1998, 223 
 
Bailey, SH, et al, Smith, Bailey and Gunn on the modern English legal system 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002) 
Balkin, JM, “Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A play in three acts” 26 Cardozo L Rev 
2004-2005, 1689 
Ball, CA, “Communitarianism and Gay Rights” 85 Cornell L Rev 1999-2000 443 
Banting, K, and Kymlicka, W, “Multiculturalism and Welfare” Dissent (Fall 2003) 
59 
 246 
Barbera, M, “Not the same?  The Judicial Role in the New Community Anti-
Discrimination Law Context” (2002) 31 Industrial Law Journal 82 
Barnard, C, “Some are more equal than others: the decision of the Court of 
Justice in Grant v South-West Trains” (1999) 1 C-YELS 147 
Barnard, C, “The Economic Objectives of Article 119” in TK Hervey and D 
O’Keeffe (eds), Sex equality law in the European Union (Wiley, Chichester 
1996) 
Barnard, C, “The Principle of Equality in the Community Context: P, Grant, 
Kalanke and Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows?” Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 
57, No. 2, 1998, 352 
Barron, A, “Foucault and Law” in Penner, Schiff and Nobles (eds), Introduction 
to Legal Theory and Jurisprudence (Butterworths, London 2002) 
Barry, B, “Intimations of Justice” [1984] Columbia Law Review Vol. 84, 806 
Barry, B, “Spherical Justice and Global Injustice” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), 
Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 
Barry, B, Liberty and Justice – Essays in Political Theory 2 (Clarendon, Oxford 
1991) 
Barry, E, “Different Hierarchies – Enforcing Equality Law” in Costello and Barry 
(eds), Equality in Diversity – The New Equality Directives (Ashfield, 2003) 
Bell, M, “EU anti-racism policy: the leader of the pack?” in Meenan (ed), Equality 
Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 
Bell, M, “Shifting Conceptions of Sexual Discrimination at the Court of Justice: 
from P v S to Grant v SWT” European Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 1999, 
63 
Bell, M, and Waddington, L, “Reflecting on inequalities in European equality law” 
(2003) 28 ELRev 349 
Bell, M, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (Oxford Studies in 
European Law, OUP, Oxford 2002) 
Bell, M, “Publication review - Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the European 
Union: National Laws and the Employment Equality Directive” EHRLR 2007, 4, 
481-482 
Bell/ ILGA-Europe, Equality for lesbians and gay men: a relevant issue in the 
civil and social dialogue (ILGA-Europe, Brussels 1998) 
Bellamy, R, “Justice in the community: Walzer on pluralism, equality and 
democracy” in D Boucher and PJ Kelly (eds), Social Justice: From Hume to 
Walzer (Routledge, Oxford 1998) 
Berlin, I, “Equality as an Ideal” in FA Olafson, Justice and Social Policy: A 
collection of essays (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 1961) 
Bernard, N, “Discrimination and Free Movement in EC Law” [1996] 45 ICLQ 82 
Bernard, N, “What are the purposes of EC discrimination law?” in J Dine and B 
Watt (eds), Discrimination Law: Concepts, Limitations and Justifications 
(Longman, London and New York 1996) 
Bevan, GE (tr), Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America (Penguin Classics, 
2003) 
Bhabha, HK, The Location of Culture (Routledge, London 1993) 
Bickenbach, JE, “Disability and Equality” (2003) 2 J.L. & Equal. 7 
Boele-Woelki, K, “The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships within the 
European Union” 82 Tul L Rev, 1949.  
Bosniak, L, The citizen and the alien: dilemmas of contemporary membership 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 2006). 
Brown, C, “The race directive: towards equality for “all” the peoples of Europe?” 
Yearbook of European Law 2001-2002, n. 21, p. 195-227 
 
Cain, PA, “Feminism and the limits of equality” 24 Ga L Rev 1989-1990, 803 
 247 
Calderón, J, and Baez, A, “The Columbus Container Services ECJ Case and Its 
Consequences: A Lost Opportunity to Shed Light on the Scope of the Non-
discrimination Principle”, Intertax, Vol 37, Issue 4, 212 
Callinicos, AT, Equality (Polity Press, Cambridge 2000) 
Canor, “Equality for Lesbians and Gay Men in the European Community Legal 
Order – “they shall be male and female”?” 7 MJ 3 (2000) 273 
Carens, J, “Citizenship and Civil Society: What Rights for Residents?” in R 
Hansen and P Weil (eds), Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal 
Citizenship in the US and Europe: The Reinvention of Citizenship (Berghahn 
Books, New York 2002) 
Carens, J, “Complex Justice, Cultural Difference, and Political Community” in D 
Miller and M Walzer (eds), Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 
Carey, N, “From obloquy to equality: in the shadow of abnormal situations” 
Yearbook of European Law 2001, n. 20, 79 
Chong Ho Shon, P, ““Now You Got a Dead Baby on Your Hands”: Discursive 
Tyranny in “Cop Talk”” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law Vol XI no 
33 [1998] 275 
Christiansen, T, Informal Governance in the European Union (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham 2004) 
Clark, S, “Society against Societies: The possibility of transcultural criticism” Res 
Publica (2007) 13:107 
Clayton, J, “Running without legs?  That’s not fair on all the other athletes” The 
Times (London 15 January 2008) 30 
Cohen, J, Review of Spheres of Justice [August 1986] The Journal of 
Philosophy 83, 457    
Commission (EC), “Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation” COM(2008)426 final, 2 July 2008. 
Connolly, M, “The ECJ signals a light touch towards age discrimination and 
compulsory retirement” Emp LB 2007, 81(NOV), 1 
Connolly, M, “The Heyday case: much ado about very little” Emp LB 2009, 90 
(Apr), 2 
Costello, C, “Metock: Free Movement and “Normal Family Life” in the Union” 
[2009] CMLRev 46: 587 
Costello, C, and Davies, G, “The case law of the Court of Justice in the field of 
sex equality since 2000” Common Market Law Review 2006, v. 43, n. 6, 
December, 1567 
 
Danchin, PG, “Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious 
Freedom in International Law” 33:1 Yale J Int’l L 2008 1   
Davies, G, “”Any Place I Hang My Hat?” or: Residence is the New Nationality” 
2005 European Law Journal 11:1 (Jan) 43 
Davies, G, “Higher education, equal access, and residence conditions: Does EU 
law allow Member States to charge higher fees to students not previously 
resident?” 12 MJ 3 (2005) 227 
Davies, G, “The Division of Powers between the European Court of Justice and 
the National Courts” 2004 conWEB – webpapers on Constitutionalism and 
Governance beyond the State No 3 
Davies, G, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (Kluwer, 
The Hague 2003) 
de Búrca, G, “The Role of Equality in European Community Law” In Alan 
Dashwood and S O’Leary (eds), The Principle of Equal Treatment in E.C. Law 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 1997) 
de Schutter, O, “Methods of proof in the context of combating discrimination” in J 
Cormack (ed), “Proving discrimination - the dynamic implementation of EU anti-
 248 
discrimination law: the role of specialised bodies.  Report  of the first experts’ 
meeting, 14-15 January 2003 hosted by the Belgian Centre for Equal 
Opportunities and Opposition to Racism” (European Commission, Brussels 
2003) 
den Hartogh, G, “The Architectonic of Michael Walzer’s Theory of Justice” 
Political Theory, Vol 27, No 4, Aug 1999, 491 
Dine, J, and Watt, B, “Introduction” in Janet Dine and Bob Watt (eds), 
Discrimination Law: Concepts, Limitations and Justifications (Longman, London 
and New York 1996) 
Docksey, C, “The European Community and the promotion of equality” in C 
McCrudden (ed), Women, Employment and European Equality Law (Eclipse, 
London 1987) 
Dougan, M, and Spaventa, E, ““Wish You Weren’t Here…”.  New Models of 
Social Solidarity in the European Union” in E Spaventa and M Dougan (eds), 
Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) 
Drysek, JS, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, 
Contestations (OUP, Oxford 2001) 
Dworkin, R, A Matter of Principle (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986) 
Dworkin, R, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2001) 
Dworkin, R, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London 1977) 
Dyevre, A, “The constitutionalisation of the European Union: discourse, present, 
future and facts” 2005 ELRev 30(2), 165 
 
Eliot, TS, Murder in the Cathedral (Faber and Faber, 1935) 
Ellis, E, “Recent developments in European Community sex equality law” 
Common Market Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2, April 1998, 379 
Ellis, E, “The definition of discrimination in European Community sex equality 
law”, European Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 6, December 1994, 563 
Ellis, E, “The recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in the field of sex 
equality” 2000 Common Market Law Review 37, n. 6, 1403 
Ellis, E, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (Oxford EC Law Library, OUP Oxford, 2005) 
Elster, J, “The Empirical Study of Justice” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), 
Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 
Elster, J, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary 
Burdens (Russell Sage Foundation, New York 1992) 
European Parliament, “European Parliament resolution of 27 September 2007 
on the application of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin (2007/2094(INI))” P6_TA(2007)0422, 27 September 2007 
Evans, A, “Union Citizenship and the Constitutionalization of Equality in EU Law” 
in M La Torre (ed), European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge (Kluwer, 
The Hague 1998) 
Everson, M, “Women and Citizenship of the European Union” in TK Hervey and 
D O’Keeffe (eds), Sex equality law in the European Union (Wiley, Chichester 
1996) 
Ewald, F, “Justice, Equality, Judgement: On “Social Justice”” in G Teubner (ed), 
Juridification of Social Spheres (de Gruyter, Berlin 1987) 
 
Fenwick, H, and Hervey, T, “Sex equality in the single market: New directions for 
the European Court of Justice”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, 
April 1995, 443 
Ferrera, M, “Towards an “Open” Social Citizenship?  The New Boundaries of 
Welfare in the European Union” in G de Búrca (ed), EU law and the welfare 
state: in search of solidarity (OUP, Oxford 2005) 
 249 
Fishkin, JS, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public 
Consultation (OUP, Oxford 2009) 
Fitzpatrick, B, “The “mainstreaming” of sexual orientation into European equality 
law” in Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, 
Cambridge 2007) 
Flynn, “Case Note on P v S and Cornwall County Council” (1997) 34 CML Rev 
367 
Fox, JW, Jr, “Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship” 54 Case 
W Res L Rev 2003-2004 1 
Frankfurt, H, “Equality as a Moral Ideal” [1987] 98 Ethics 21 
Franzese, D, “The Gender Curve: An Analysis of Colleges’ Use of Affirmative 
Action Policies to Benefit Male Applicants” 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 719 
Fredman, S, “Changing The Norm: Positive Duties In Equal Treatment 
Legislation” 12 MJ 4 (2005) 369 
Fredman, S, “The Age of Equality” in S Fredman and S Spencer (eds), Age as 
an equality issue: legal and policy perspectives (Hart, Oxford 2003) 
 
Gardner, J, “Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination” Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol 9, No 1 (Spring 1989) 1 
Gilden, A, “Toward a more transformative approach: The limits of transgender 
formal equality” (2008) 23 Berkeley J Gender L & Just 83 
Gutmann, A, “Justice across the Spheres” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), 
Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 
Gutmann, A, and Thompson, D, Democracy and Disagreement (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1996) 
 
Habermas, J, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State” 
in C Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 1994) 
Harris, A, “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory” (1990) 42 Stanford 
Law Review 581 
Hartley, TC, “The European Court, judicial objectivity and the constitution of the 
European Union” 1996 LQR 112(Jan), 95 
Heide, I, “Sex equality and social security: selected rulings of the European 
Court of Justice” 2004 International Labour Review v.143, n. 4, 299 
Hervey, T, “Putting Europe’s House in Order: Racism, Race Discrimination and 
Xenophobia after the Treaty of Amsterdam” in O’Keeffe and Twomey (eds), 
Legal issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999) 
Hervey, T, “Thirty Years of EU Sex Equality Law: Looking Backwards, Looking 
Forwards” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2005, v. 12, n. 
4, 307 
Hervey, T, and Shaw, J, “Women, work and care: women’s dual role and double 
burden in EC sex equality law”, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1, 
February 1998, 43 
Hilson, C, “Discrimination in Community free movement law” 1999 ELRev 24(5), 
445 
Holmes, E, “Anti-Discrimination Rights Without Equality” (2005) 68(2) MLR 175 
Holtmaat, R, and Tobler, C, “CEDAW and the EU’s Policy in the Field of 
Combating Gender Discrimination”, Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, 2005, v. 12, n. 4, 399 
Hosking, “Great Expectations: Protection from discrimination because of 
disability in Community law” EL Rev 2006, 31(5), 667 
Howard, E, “The case for a considered hierarchy of discrimination grounds in EU 
law” 13 MJ 4 (2006), 445 
Huxley, A, Brave New World (Vintage, 2004) 
 250 
 
Iliopoulou, A, “Le principe d’égalité et de non-discrimination” in J-B Auby and J 
Dutheil de La Rochère (eds), Droit administrative européen (Bruylant, Brussels 
2007) 
 
Johansson, ST, “Towards spherical justice: a critical theoretical defence of the 
idea of complex equality” (PhD thesis, University of Southampton 2003, 
unpublished) 
 
Kautz, S, Liberalism and Community (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1995) 
Keat, R, “Colonisation by the Market: Walzer on Recognition” 1997 Journal of 
Political Philosophy Vol 5, No 1, 93 
Kommers, DP, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (2nd edn Duke University Press, Durham and London 1997) 
Koppelman, A, “The Miscegenation Analogy in Europe, or, Lisa Grant meets 
Adolf Hitler” in Wintemute and Andenæs (eds), Legal recognition of same-sex 
partnerships: A study of national, European and international law (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2001) 
Koppelman, A, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality (Yale University 
Press, New Haven 1996) 
 
Lacey, N, “From Individual to Group?” in B Hepple and EM Szyszcak (eds), 
Discrimination: The Limits of Law (Mansell 1992) 
Laski, HJ, A Grammar of Politics (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London 1925) 
Lavranos, N, “The new specialised courts within the European judicial system” 
2005 EL Rev 30(2), 261 
Lawson, D, “From Pentecost island to modern Britain, the futility of trying to 
measure happiness” The Independent (London 6 July 2007) 33 
Lenaerts, K, “L’égalité de traitement en droit communautaire: un principe unique 
aux apparences multiples” [1991] CDE 3 
Lenin, VI, The deception of the people by the slogans of equality and freedom 
(Lawrence and Wishart, London 1940) 
Lester, A, “The Uncertain Trumpet – References to the Court of Justice from the 
United Kingdom: Equal Pay and Equal Treatment without Sex Discrimination” in 
Schemers (ed), Article 177 EEC: Experiences and Problems (North Holland, 
1987) 
Lester, A, and Uccellari, P, “Extending the equality duty to religion, conscience 
and belief: proceed with caution” EHRLR 2008, 5, 567 
Lieber, DL, Etz Hayim: A Torah Commentary (Jewish Publication Society of 
America, 2001) 
Locke, J, The Second Treatise of Civil Government (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 
1946) 
Lucas, JR, “Against Equality” [1965] XL Philosophy 296 
 
Macdonald, RA, “Access to Justice and Law Reform” 10 Windsor YB Access 
Just 287 
MacKinnon, C, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence” (1983) 8 Signs 635 
MacKinnon, C, “Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law” (1990-91) 100 Yale 
Law Journal 1281 
Macklem, T, Beyond Comparison: Sex and Discrimination (CUP, Cambridge 
2003) 
Mancini, GF, “The Making of a Constitution for Europe” [1989] CMLRev Vol 26, 
No 4, 595 
 251 
Mancini, GF, and O’Leary, S, “The New Frontiers of Sex Equality Law in the 
European Union” European Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 4, August 1999, 331 
Martin, D, Égalité et non-discrimination dans la jurisprudence communautaire: 
étude critique à la lumière d’une approche comparatiste (Bruylant, Brussels 
2006) 
Martin, LH, Gutman, H, and Hutton, PH (eds), Technologies of the self: a 
seminar with Michel Foucault (University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst 
1988) 
Masselot, A, “The State of Gender Equality Law in the European Union” 
European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2, March 2007, 152 
Matson, W, “Justice: A Funeral Oration” [1983] I Social Philosophy and Policy 94 
Mayer, R, “Michael Walzer, Industrial Democracy, and Complex Equality” 
Political Theory, Vol. 29 No. 2, April 2001, 237 
McColgan, A, “Cracking the comparator problem: Discrimination, “Equal” 
Treatment and the Role of Comparisons”, EHRLR 2006, 6, 650 
McColgan, A, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd edn Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2005) 
McCrudden, C, “Community and Discrimination” in J Eekelaar and J Bell (eds), 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Third Series) (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987) 
McCrudden, C, “The new concept of equality” (Paper prepared for the Academy 
of European Law conference, “Fight Against Discrimination: The Race and 
Framework Employment Directives” 2/6/03-3/6/03) 
<http://www.era.int/web/en/resources/5_2341_679_file_en.796.pdf> accessed 
14 April 2009 
McCrudden, C, and Kountouros, H, “Human rights and European equality law” in 
H Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 
2007) 
McGlynn, C, “EC legislation prohibiting age discrimination: “Towards a Europe 
for All Ages”?” (2000) 3 C-YELS 279 
McGlynn, C, “Social Policy: Equality, Maternity and Questions of Pay”, European 
Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, August 1996, 327 
Meenan, H, “Age discrimination – Of Cinderella and The Golden Bough” in 
Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 
2007) 
Meenan, H, “Age equality after the employment directive” 10 MJ 1 (2003) 9 
Meenan, H, “Conclusion” in Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged European 
Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 
Meenan, H (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 
2007) 
Meenan, H, “Introduction” in Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged 
European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 
Merkel, W, “Social justice and the three worlds of welfare capitalism” European 
Journal of Sociology (2002) 43: 59 
Miller, D, “Complex Equality” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), Pluralism, Justice, 
and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 
Miller, D, “Introduction” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), Pluralism, Justice, and 
Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 
Millett, T, “European Community law: sex equality and retirement age” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1987, 36/03, 616     
Millett, T, “Sex equality: the influence of Community law in Great Britain” 
Yearbook of European Law 1986, 06, 219 
Moon, G, and Allen, R, “Dignity discourse in discrimination law: a better route to 
equality?” 2006 EHRLR 6, 610 
More, G, “”Equal Treatment” of the Sexes in European Community Law: What 
Does “Equal” Mean?” (1993) 1 Feminist Legal Studies 45-74 
 252 
More, G, “The Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier to 
Fundamental Right?” in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law 
(OUP, Oxford 1999) 
Muir, E, “Enhancing the effects of Community law on national employment 
policies: the Mangold case” EL Rev 2006, 31(6), 879 
Mullenix, LS, “The limits of “complex equality”” 97 Harv L Rev 1983, 1801 
 
Neruda, P, “Oda a la crítica” 
Neville Brown, L, and Kennedy, T, The Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) 
Nozick, R, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, New York 1974) 
Numhauser-Henning, A, “EU sex equality law post-Amsterdam” in Meenan (ed), 
Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 
 
O’Cinneide, C, “Age Discrimination and Mandatory Retirement” [2008] 6/7 
European Anti-discrimination Law Review 13 
O’Cinneide, C, “The Right to Equality: A Substantive Legal Norm or Vacuous 
Rhetoric?” 2008 UCL Human Rights Review 1, 80 
O’Leary, S, “Developing an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe?  
A reappraisal of the case law of the Court of Justice on the free movement of 
persons and EU citizenship” 2008 YEL 27, 193 
O’Leary, S, “The Free Movement of Persons and Services” in P Craig and G de 
Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford 1999) 
O’Neill, S, Impartiality in Context: Grounding Justice in a Pluralist World (SUNY 
Press, Albany 1997) 
Okin, SM, Justice, gender, and the family (Basic Books, New York 1989) 
Onions, CT (ed), The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd rev edn Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1973) 
Orwell, G, Animal Farm (Penguin Student Editions, Penguin, London 1999) 
Osbourne, T, “Will the European Union Directive on equal treatment fulfil its 
purpose of combating age discrimination in employment?” (2004) The 
International Lawyer v. 38, n. 3, Fall, 867 
 
Pigott, C, “ECJ passes the buck” NLJ 2009, 159 (7361), 407 
Pilgerstorfer and Forshaw, “Transferred discrimination in European law” 37 
Indus. L.J. 384 
Pitt, G, “Religion or belief: aiming at the right target?” in Meenan (ed), Equality 
Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 
Posner and Rosenfield, “Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An 
Economic Analysis” (1977) 6 JLS 83 
Prechal, S, “Equal Treatment, Non-Discrimination and Social Policy: 
Achievement in Three Themes” (2004) 41 CMLR 533 
 
Quinn, G, “Disability discrimination law in the European Union” in Meenan (ed), 
Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 
 
Rakowski, E, Equal Justice (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991) 
Rasmussen, H, On law and policy in the European Court of Justice: a 
comparative study in judicial policymaking (Kluwer, Dordrecht 1986) 
Read, K, “When Is a Kid a Kid?  Negotiating Children’s Rights in El Salvador’s 
Civil War” History of Religions, Vol 41, No 4, Essays on the Occasion of Frank 
Reynolds’s Retirement (May, 2002), 391 
Richardson, HS, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of 
Policy (OUP, New York 2002) 
 253 
Ricoeur, P, and Pellauer, D (tr), The Just (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
2003) 
Robertson, AH, and Merrills, JG, Human Rights in the World: An introduction to 
the study of the international protection of human rights (4th edn MUP, 
Manchester 1996) 
Robson, R, “Third parties and the third sex: Child custody and lesbian legal 
theory” (1994) 26 Conn L Rev 1377 
Rosenblum, NL, “Moral Membership in a Postliberal State” World Politics, Vol 
36, No 4 (Jul., 1984) 581 
Rubio-Marín, R, Immigration as a Democratic Challenge (CUP, Cambridge 
2000) 
Rustin, M, “Equality in Post-Modern Times” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), 
Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 
 
Scanlon, TM, The difficulty of tolerance: Essays in political philosophy (CUP, 
Cambridge 2003) 
Scanlon, TM, What we owe to each other (Bellknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Massachusetts 1998) 
Schiek, D, “A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law?” 
European Law Journal, v. 8, n. 2, June, 290 
Schiek, D, Waddington, L, and Bell, M (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on 
National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law (Ius 
Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2007) 
Schmitt, C, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität 
[Political Theology: Four Chapters towards a Theory of Sovereignty] (Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin 1990) 
Schwarze, J, European Administrative Law (Revised 1st Edition Sweet & 
Maxwell, London and Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 2006) 
Sen, P, and Al-Khalili, J, Atom (Television series, BBC, 2007) 
Sevón, L, “General Principles of Community Law – Concluding Remarks” in U 
Bernitz and J Nergelius (eds), General Principles of European Community Law 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000) 
Sexton, TRF, “Enacting national environmental laws more stringent than other 
States’ laws in the European Community: Re Disposable Beer Cans: 
Commission v Denmark” 24 Cornell Int’l LJ 563 
Shakespeare, W, Twelfth Night (The New Cambridge Shakespeare, CUP, 
Cambridge 1985)  
Siegel, RB, “Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action” [1997] 49 Stan L Rev 1111 
Skidmore, P, “EC Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment: 
Towards a Comprehensive Community Anti-Discrimination Policy?” (2001) 30 
ILJ 126 
Skidmore, P, “Sex, Gender and Comparators in Employment Discrimination” 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1, March 1997, 51 
Smith, R, “Benign intervention” Law Society Gazette (London 12 November 
2009) 10 
Somek, A, “Solidarity Decomposed: Being and Time in European Citizenship” 
2007 ELRev 32(6), 787 
Stokke, H, “Reasonable Discrimination? Affirming Access to Higher Education in 
Malaysia” 1999/ 2000 Hum Rts Dev YB 189 
 
Taylor, C, “Atomism”, in C Taylor, Philosophical Papers Vol 2: Philosophy and 
the Human Sciences (CUP, Cambridge 1985)  
 254 
Taylor, C, “The Politics of Recognition” in C Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining 
the politics of recognition (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994) 
Thigpen, RB, and Downing, LA, “Liberal and Communitarian Approaches to 
Justification” Review of Politics, 51:4 (1989: Fall) 533 
Tobler, C, and Waaldijk, K, “Annotation Maruko” [2009] 46 CMLRev 723 
Tobler, C, Indirect discrimination: a case study into the development of the legal 
concept of indirect discrimination under EC law (Intersentia, Antwerp 2005) 
Tomei, M, “Discrimination and equality at work: A review of the concepts” 
International Labour Review, 2003, v. 142, n. 4, 401 
Tomuschat, C, “Annotation Martínez Sala” (2000) CMLRev 449 
Trappenburg, M, “In Defence of Pure Pluralism: Two Readings of Walzer’s 
Spheres of Justice” The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol 8, No 3, 2000, 343 
Tridimas, T, “The Application of the Principle of Equality to Community 
Measures” in Alan Dashwood and S O’Leary (eds), The Principle of Equal 
Treatment in E.C. Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1997) 
Tridimas, T, “The Court of Justice and judicial activism” 1996 ELRev 21(3) 199 
Tsakatika, M, Political responsibility and the European Union (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester 2008) 
 
Unger, RM, False Necessity: Anti-necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of 
Radical Democracy (CUP, Cambridge 1987) 
 
van den Hoven, J, and Vermaas, PE, “Nano-Technology and Privacy: On 
Continuous Surveillance Outside the Panopticon” Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 32:2007, 283 
van der Mei, AP, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003) 
van der Veen, RJ, “The Adjudicating Citizen: On Equal Membership in Walzer's 
Theory of Justice”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol 29, No 2 (Apr., 1999), 
225 
Vanistendael, F, “Annotation Gilly” (2000) CMLRev 167 
Villiers, C, “Employees as creditors: a challenge for justice in insolvency law” 
Comp Law 1999, 20(7), 222 
Vlastos, G, “Justice and Equality” in Richard Brandt (ed), Social Justice 
(Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1962) 
 
Waaldijk, K, and Bonini-Baraldi, M, Sexual orientation discrimination in the 
European Union: national laws and the Employment Equality Directive (TMC 
Asser Press, The Hague 2006) 
Waddington, L, “Annotation Coleman” [2009] 46 CMLRev 665 
Waddington, L, “The development of a new generation of sex equality directives” 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2004, v. 11, n. 1, 3 
Waddington, L, and Bell, M, “More equal than others: distinguishing European 
Union equality directives” Common Market Law Review 2001, v. 38, n. 3, June, 
587 
Waldron, J, “The Cosmopolitan Alternative” in W Kymlicka (ed) The Rights of 
Minority Cultures (OUP, Oxford 1987) 
Walzer, M, “Exclusion, Injustice, and the Democratic State” Dissent, 40 (1993), 
55 
Walzer, M, “Interpretation and Social Criticism” in SM McMurrin (ed), The 
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, viii (CUP, Cambridge 1988) 
Walzer, M, “Liberalism and the Art of Separation” Political Theory Vol. 12 No. 3 
(Aug 1984) 315 
Walzer, M, “Objectivity and Social Meaning” in M Nussbaum and A Sen (eds) 
The Quality of Life (OUP, Oxford 1993) 
 255 
Walzer, M, “Philosophy and Democracy”, Political Theory, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug., 
1981), 379 
Walzer, M, “Response” in D Miller and M Walzer (eds), Pluralism, Justice, and 
Equality (OUP, Oxford 1995) 
Walzer, M, “Review of Taking Rights Seriously by Ronald Dworkin” The New 
Republic 25 (June 25 1977) 28 
Walzer, M, On Toleration (Yale University Press, New Haven 1997) 
Walzer, M, Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism (Yale 
University Press, New Haven 2004) 
Walzer, M, Spheres of Justice – A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic 
Books, New York 1983) 
Walzer, M, The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Political Commitment in 
the Twentieth Century (Basic Books, New York 1988, 2nd edn 2002) 
Walzer, M, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (University of 
Notre Dame Press, Indiana 1994) 
Walzer, M, and Dworkin, R, “Spheres of Justice: An Exchange” New York 
Review of Books 30/12 (July 1983), 43 
Warnier, N, “Les discriminations directes and indirectes dans la domaine de 
l’égalité homme-femme et de l’égalité nationaux-non-nationaux” Revue de droit 
international et de droit comparé 2006, v 84, 2e trimester, 225 
Warren, ME, “What Can Democratic Participation Mean Today?” Political 
Theory, Vol 30, No 5 (Oct 2002) 677 
Weiler, JHH, “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German 
Maastricht Decision” (1995) 1(3) European Law Journal 219 
Weiler, JHH, “Towards a Principle of Economic Comity”.  Lecture given at 
Bentham House, UCL, 23 May 2001   
Wentholt, K, “Formal and Substantive Equal Treatment: the Limitations and the 
Potential of the Legal Concept of Equality” in T Loenen and PR Rodrigues (eds), 
Non-discrimination law: comparative perspectives (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague 1999) 
Westen, P, “The Empty Idea of Equality” (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537 
White, RCA, “Citizenship of the Union, Governance, and Equality” [2006] 29 
Fordham International Law Journal 790 
White, SK, Political Theory and Postmodernism (CUP, Cambridge 1991) 
Williams, BAO, “The Idea of Equality” in Peter Laslett and WG Runciman (eds), 
Philosophy, Politics and Society, Series II (Basil Blackwell, 1972) 
Wilsher, D, “Does Keck discrimination make any sense? An assessment of the 
non-discrimination principle within the European single market” ELRev 2008, 
33(1), 3 
Wintemute, R, “Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination: 
Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes” 60 (1997) MLR 334 
Wintemute, R, “When is Pregnancy Discrimination Indirect Sex Discrimination?” 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol 27, No 1, March 1998, 23 
 
Zander, M, The Law-Making Process (CUP, Cambridge 2004) 
 
 
 
 
